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Dieser Krieg ist in Wirklichkeit eine Revolution. Die alte soziale Ordnung, 
das alte politische Regime sind am Zusammenstürzen. Hitler stellt eine 
Art elementarer oder dämonischer Kraft dar, die eine vermutlich not-
wendig gewordene Zerstörungsarbeit verrichtet… Ob Hitler die politische 
Einheit Europas zustande bringen wird, läßt sich nicht voraussagen; 
wahrscheinlich ist er vor allem ein Zerstörer, der Hindernisse aus dem 
Wege schafft.
Hendrik de Man, De Panne, 20 May 1940
All we need is one world, one vision
One flesh, one bone
One true religion
One race, one hope
One real decision
Wowowowowo woh yeah oh yeah oh yeah
Queen, ‘One Vision’ (1985)
Weil du Probleme hast, die keinen interessieren
Weil du Schiss vor schmusen has, bist du ein Faschist
Du musst deinen Selbsthass nicht auf andere projizieren
Damit keiner merkt, was für ein lieber Kerl du bist.
Die Ärzte, ‘Schrei nach Liebe’ (1993)
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 Preface
More than 70 years after the end of its era, fascism continues to haunt our 
political and cultural imagination. It is the classic Hollywood villain, the 
standard ingredient of dystopian science f iction and a multi-use political 
swear word. Its more attractive elements have permeated modern pop cul-
ture, and its symbolism survives in brands, emblems and music. Recently, it 
has also made its comeback in headlines of the international press. Although 
not primarily motivated by present-day concerns, this study was inspired 
by the lasting relevance of fascism. It sets out to explore this relevance, 
especially in relation to two other prominent modern political phenomena: 
Europeanism and neoliberalism.
This book is a reworked, updated and partially extended version of the 
doctoral thesis I defended at the European University Institute in November 
2015. As it is the result of years of research in different countries, I owe 
gratitude to more people than I can possibly mention on these pages. First, 
I want to thank my supervisor Dirk Moses and my second reader Laura 
Lee Downs, who have both been crucial for the success of my thesis. I also 
express my gratitude to Professors Peter Romijn and Kevin Passmore, and to 
Heinz-Gerhardt Haupt, Kiran Klaus Patel, Anthony La Vopa and everybody 
working at the EUI history department, in whose midst it has been a true 
pleasure to pursue my research. During my MA years at the University of 
Amsterdam (UvA), Professor Frits Boterman gave me the guidance, inspira-
tion, enthusiasm and historical Bildung that made it possible for me to 
imagine becoming a historical researcher in the f irst place.
My Florence years would never have been so pleasurable without the 
company of my Florentine friends, with whom I have shared so many 
unforgettable moments. Besides being a ‘community of scholars’, the EUI is 
also a great place because it is an endlessly inspiring and energising melting 
pot at all kinds of less scholarly levels. With Jonas, Gabriele and Karena, I 
have thrown myself down snowy mountain slopes, discovered unknown 
islands and cycled through the impressive landscapes of the Mugello and 
the Chianti. With Robrecht, I shared so many drinks, hikes, crappy football 
games, serious thoughts and laughs that I can’t wait for the next Benelux 
meeting with him, Griet and of course little Kasper and Suzanne. I have 
also experienced countless memorable moments with Matti, Vera, Alan, 
Sani, Kaarlo, Pol, Bart, Roel, Tommaso, Andrea, Brian, Carolina and so 
many others, and I hope that off icial and unoff icial occasions will keep 
bringing us together.
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Archival research brought me to Paris for several short and less short stays. 
I wish to thank Anne de Jouvenel and the descendants of the Fabre-Luce 
family for generously giving me access to their relative’s private archives, 
kept at the Archives Nationales and the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. 
At this latter institution, I am grateful to conservator Michèle Le Pavec for 
preparing the manuscripts I wished to consult, and for her friendly and 
important guidance through the vast Jouvenel archive. I would also like to 
thank Anne de Simonin and Pascal Raimbault, who have been very helpful 
in directing me towards Fabre-Luce’s Épuration dossier. I am grateful to the 
Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach for hosting me, for several snowy 
February days, in a studio right next to their beautiful archive, where I 
consulted the Ernst Jünger papers.
During the past years, my good old UvA has provided me with an aca-
demic refuge of the best kind. I am very grateful to James Kennedy and 
Jouke Turpijn for giving me the occasion to further develop myself as a 
visiting scholar and subsequently as a lecturer. My off ice mates, colleagues 
and friends, Tim, Frans, Josephine, Thomas, Alberto, Valentina, Guido, 
Eleá, Jan, Lisa, Karlijn, Robin, Lotte, Nathan, Merel and Marjet, made my 
working environment a fantastic place where I liked to spend time, albeit 
occasionally slightly too much time. The editors of Historisch Café deserve 
a special mention here, as do all the students of the Grand Tour historical 
study trip, with whom I have shared unforgettable experiences.
Although it would be impossible to mention them all, I want to thank 
all my Amsterdam friends – Tim, Micha, Tim, Matthijs, Ambi, Harmen, 
Ellen, Tim, Onno, Willemijn, Thomas, Bo, Ambi, Lea, Maria, Sterre and so 
many others – for supporting me, distracting me and most importantly for 
just being there. For general inspiration, I wish to thank Wamberto. The 
German, Italian, Austrian and Swiss national railways have carried me, the 
seldom-flying Dutchman, across Europe on so many occasions that they 
also deserve my gratitude. They gave me breathtaking views of the Alps 
and ample time to think, read and listen to music, while feeling weirdly 
happy. I senk ju för träweling.
Lastly, I want to thank my parents, Jette and Robert, for everything that 
I have done in life. And I thank my brother Bram and his family, Anne-Rose 
and Jonas, for being such great people. And f inally, of course, my love Julia, 
with whom I share my life and who has given me our children Simon and 
Elsa. This book is dedicated to them.
Daniel Knegt
Amsterdam, 18 February 2017
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 Introduction
Fascism in France and Beyond
This study analyses the political ideas of two twentieth-century French intel-
lectuals, Alfred Fabre-Luce (1899-1983) and Bertrand de Jouvenel (1903-1987), 
between 1930 and the early 1950s. During this period, both intellectuals 
moved from the republican centre-left to fascism and the post-war extreme 
right. Despite these lasting extreme-right connections, they also reinvented 
themselves as right-wing liberals and cold warriors. My leading argument 
is that Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s political trajectory needs to be seen as 
the result of an interplay of Europeanism, fascism and (neo)liberalism. Not 
only were Europeanist and pacif ist convictions an important element in 
both intellectuals’ ‘fascist drift’; the same ideas permitted them to make an 
important contribution to the post-war intellectual renewal of the French 
extreme right. Paradoxically, their continuing involvement with the extreme 
right did not collide with their post-war adherence to neoliberalism. Rather, 
Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel seem to have been inspired by anti-communist, 
Europeanist and elitist ideas that were common to both the extreme right 
and the early neoliberal movement. This interpretative framework is mainly 
based on scholarship on fascism and the French extreme right, but it also 
takes inspiration from other directions such as the study of internationalism, 
technocracy, early neoliberalism and collaboration during the Second World 
War. With this approach, I aim to contribute to a better understanding of 
the links between French fascism, Europeanism and intellectual renewal 
between the interwar and the post-war period.
Intellectual Fascism?
In 1982, the Italian legal philosopher Norberto Bobbio said in an interview: 
‘Where there was culture, there was no fascism; where there was fascism, 
there was no culture. There never was a fascist culture.’ Half a decade later, 
the French historian Lionel Richard described Nazi cultural policy as ‘the 
inverse of King Midas’.1 The message of these claims is clear: fascism is to be 
seen as negative and barbaric, the natural enemy of all things respectable in 
human society. Fascism and culture can never truly combine, and as soon 
1 Griff in, Modernism and Fascism, 22; Richard, Le Nazisme et la Culture, 7.
14 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
as fascism does ‘touch’ culture, it does not, like the mythical king, change it 
into gold but into barbarity. Even though Richard supported his statement 
with some convincing examples of Nazi cultural barbarity, it can be taken 
with a grain of salt in the light of modern scholarship n fascism. In the 
f irst place, it is not always possible to clearly distinguish between culture 
and barbarism or to f ind objective criteria to separate respectable from 
unrespectable manifestations of human culture. Secondly, fascism seems 
to have been both cultural and barbaric at the same time, placing extreme 
forms of ‘redemptive violence’ as its core method but also attracting the 
service of path-breaking artists, architects and musicians.
Of course, Bobbio and Richard were not the first to advocate a fundamen-
tal opposition between fascism and culture. There is a longer intellectual 
tradition of denying fascism any positive characteristics and describing it 
as a purely negative, incoherent political phenomenon – as having no real 
ideology at all but being just an instrument of the base and inhumane.2 
Consequently, supporters of fascism can only be brutal sadists, opportunists 
or misguided petty bourgeois. In the Marxist variant of this tradition – one 
of the f irst to develop in the late 1920s – fascism was reduced to being the 
ultimate defence reaction of late capitalism in crisis. This was the only way 
to make fascism ‘f it’ into the historical-materialistic theory of the course 
of human history. Marxists had been puzzled by the rise of fascism, since 
it seemed to contradict their convictions of a direct transition from liberal 
capitalist society to socialism. They embraced a conception of fascism as 
‘the power of f inance capital itself’, a form of ‘political gangsterism’ based 
on deceit and brutality, typical of the transition phase before the coming 
of revolution and ‘real’ social progress.3
On a more general level, the view of fascism as the antithesis of culture 
seems to be almost as old as fascism itself. It can be traced back at least to 
Benedetto Croce’s ‘Manifesto of the Anti-Fascist Intellectuals’ from 1925. 
Croce, an Italian liberal, had endorsed the Mussolini regime during its f irst 
years, even raising his hand in support of the Duce during key moments 
such as the parliamentary vote of conf idence after the assassination of 
Giacomo Mateotti. One year later, however, shortly after the publication 
of a ‘Manifesto of Fascist Intellectuals’ – written by the philosopher Gio-
vanni Gentile and signed amongst others by Curzio Malaparte and Luigi 
Pirandello – Croce wrote a counter-manifesto, signed by many intellectuals 
2 See Rauschning, Die Revolution des Nihilismus.
3 Iordachi, ‘Comparative Fascist Studies: An Introduction’, in Comparative Fascist Studies, 
ed. Iordachi, 6, 7.
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including Gaetano Mosca and Luigi Albertini, in which he expressed his 
scepticism about fascist claims as to having founded a ‘new religion’ and a 
‘new culture’. He accused the fascist intellectuals of betraying not only the 
liberal nationalist tradition of the Risorgimento but also – foreshadowing 
Julien Benda’s famous thesis of the Betrayal of the Intellectuals – their task as 
intellectuals owing allegiance to humanity as a whole instead of a political 
party. He pointed to the inconsistencies of the fascist manifesto and called 
the fascist attempts at culture ‘sterile nods in the direction of a culture 
devoid of the necessary premises, mystical swoons, and cynical utterances’.4
After the Second World War, historical scholarship on fascism echoed 
this conviction. Hannah Arendt famously wrote in 1945 that Nazism ‘owed 
nothing to any part of the Western tradition, be it German or not, Catholic 
or Protestant, Christian, Greek or Roman’.5 Scholars generally neglected 
cultural aspects of fascism, preferring to analyse it from an economic, 
political or social point of view. This situation might have also been influ-
enced by a contemporary political agenda – the Cold War context favouring 
a quick integration of Germany and Italy into the liberal West – while 
theories on ‘totalitarianism’ permitted fascism to be lumped together 
with Soviet communism as antithetical to Western liberalism. If fascism 
could be considered a shallow political phenomenon, born out of the First 
World War and dead because of the next, it could be presented as nothing 
more than a regressive interlude in an otherwise progressive narrative 
of triumphant liberal modernisation. This meant that no fundamental 
investigations were necessary as to its origins, heritage and relationship 
with mainstream culture and mentality.
This situation changed during the 1970s because of a new generation of 
scholars like George L. Mosse who explicitly approached fascism from a 
cultural perspective, demonstrating that culture was at the centre of fascist 
politics and that fascism often shared many aspects of its culture with 
other political currents of the interwar period. According to Mosse and 
later also Emilio Gentile, fascism ought to be seen as a ‘political religion’ 
that mobilised key elements of the culture, traditions and mentalities of 
a society with which it was profoundly connected.6 Since the 1990s, the 
relationship between fascism and modernism, modern mass culture and 
4 Sternhell, ‘How to Think about Fascism and its Ideology’, 280. An English translation of 
both manifestoes is included in Schnapp, ed., A Primer of Italian Fascism, 297-307.
5 Arendt, ‘Approaches to the German Problem’, in idem, Essays in Understanding, ed. Kohn, 
109.
6 Gentile, ‘Fascism as Political Religion’, 229, 232.
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postmodernism has become a key focus of study, even to the point where 
scholars have spoken of a ‘new fascination with fascism’.7
What can be said about the cultural aspects of fascism also applies to 
its intellectual dimensions. For a long time, many scholars were largely 
unable and unwilling to explain why fascism was so attractive to some 
of the twentieth century’s brightest intellectuals. How could great minds 
like Martin Heidegger, Louis-Ferdinand Céline and Giovanni Gentile have 
‘betrayed’ their role as intellectuals and involved themselves with an anti-
intellectual ideology of violence and hatred? Several strategies have been 
used to avoid asking this question, all starting from the assumption that 
fascism is incompatible with intellectual thought. The f irst is to ignore 
an intellectual’s political aff iliations and focus solely on his or her contri-
bution to the arcane realm of the mind, pretending that it is completely 
independent of the ‘profane’ world of politics. This strategy has often been 
used in studies on Heidegger. The second strategy is either to deny that the 
intellectual in question ‘really’ was a fascist or, where this is impossible, to 
stress mental instability or to question his or her qualities as an intellectual. 
This has often been the case with treatises on Céline or his fellow novelist 
Pierre Drieu la Rochelle.8
This study takes a fundamentally different approach. In line with Zeev 
Sternhell, A. James Gregor and Roger Griff in, I argue that fascism can only 
be understood properly if it is taken seriously both as an ideology and 
as an intellectual phenomenon. This approach, of course, does not imply 
any kind of sympathy or admiration for fascism, nor is it an attempt to 
trivialise the crimes against humanity that were committed as a direct 
consequence of fascist ideology. On the contrary: this study stresses that 
the effort to take the intellectual dimensions of fascism at face value is a 
better guarantee against related phenomena occurring today than a lazy 
denial that it could in any way be attractive to a developed mind. If there 
is any truth to Sternhell’s claim that fascism ‘impregnated the political 
life of Europe in the period between the two World Wars to such a degree 
that it became its distinctive feature, its Zeitgeist ’, fascism simply cannot 
be dismissed easily and a fundamental investigation must be undertaken 
as to its ideology, meaning and attractiveness.9
7 Schnapp, ‘Fascinating Fascism’, 237; Betts, ‘The New Fascination with Fascism’, 541.
8 Griff in, Modernism and Fascism, 358; Brown, ‘Language, Modernity and Fascism: Heidegger’s 
Doubling of Myth’, 138; Soucy, Fascist Intellectual, 11.
9 Sternhell, ‘How to think about Fascism’, 284; Gregor, Mussolini’s Intellectuals, 8; Griff in, 
‘Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age’, 6.
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For reasons that will be discussed below, this is especially true for the 
way fascism manifested itself in the French context. Although France is 
traditionally not counted among the countries that were central to the 
development of fascism, several scholars have stressed fascism’s influence 
on French interwar society, its specif ically intellectual character and 
its strong ties to related phenomena abroad. In comparison with other 
national manifestations of the fascist phenomenon, French fascism was 
organisationally weak, with a plethora of competing, generally short-lived 
political formations, none of which was at any time able to monopolise 
the extreme right. But French intellectuals played a very important role in 
developing and spreading fascist ideas. They often looked abroad for inspira-
tion, establishing connections in Italy and Germany as well as with related 
movements and intellectuals in other countries, giving French fascism a 
pronounced international outlook. In the complex international context of 
the late 1930s, French fascism could even present itself as a form of pacif ism 
and internationalism, entering conflict with traditional nationalism. This 
paradoxical situation endured during the German occupation and the 
Vichy regime and survived even in the post-war era, when many former 
fascists clung to Europeanist ideas and advocated the construction of an 
international human rights regime. To explain these specific characteristics 
of French fascism, a deeper excursion is necessary into the development of 
the scholarly debate on the topic.
Between Immunity and Pan-Fascism
In his classic work La Droite en France (1954), the French political historian 
René Rémond established an interpretation that would hold a dominant 
position in French academia. According to Rémond, the French political 
right consisted of three currents that were born in the nineteenth cen-
tury: an ‘Orleanist’ (bourgeois-liberal), a ‘Bonapartist’ (authoritarian) and 
a ‘legitimist’ (reactionary monarchist) current. Since in Rémond’s view 
all French right-wing movements and parties necessarily belonged to 
one or more of these currents, there was no room for any kind of French 
fascism. The few authentic fascist movements, he claimed, existed in the 
very margins of political life because they did not f it within the political 
tradition of the French right. Parties and movements that called themselves 
fascist were not only small, they also largely depended on f inancial support 
from Italy and/or Germany. It was only after the country’s traumatic defeat 
in 1940 and in the special circumstances of the Vichy regime that some 
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political space was to open for fascists in France. Even this collaborating 
regime was, according to Rémond, essentially conservative, not fascist. 
Anti-parliamentary right-wing groups from the 1930s that did attract a big 
following, such as the Croix-de-Feu movement of Colonel François de la 
Rocque, could not be labelled as fascist. Rémond stated that these parties 
had a clear Bonapartist aff iliation.10
In the decades since its publication, Rémond’s book was regularly re-
printed in updated editions. It laid the foundations of the French school of 
political history, and it became mandatory reading at the grandes écoles 
in Paris, where the French political and intellectual elite is trained. Con-
sequently, generations of French historians and political scientists were 
taught Rémond’s paradigm. His political institutional approach included 
a preference for the use of French historical comparisons at the expense 
of contemporary international parallels.11 Another reason for Rémond’s 
success lies in the political and social context of post-war France, that is, 
implicit assumptions about the fundamentally democratic character of 
the French people f it his approach well. Henri Rousso has described how, 
during and after the Algeria War, a ‘relative consensus’ around a Gaullist 
‘resistance myth’ dominated French memory and provided French society 
with democratic and anti-fascist credentials.12 After Charles de Gaulle’s 
return to power in 1958 and the foundation of the Fifth Republic, Rémond 
could state that the right had been definitively reconciled with the Republic. 
With Gaullism, which Rémond saw as a mixture of Bonapartism (De Gaulle’s 
authoritarian style of leadership and his establishment of a presidential 
system with a very strong executive) and Orleanism (De Gaulle’s democratic 
convictions and support for civil liberties), the conflict between the right 
and a republic – initially considered an adventure of the left – seemed to 
be solved.13
It took foreign intervention to f inally break this silent consensus about 
the marginality of French fascism. Already in 1963, Ernst Nolte had attacked 
Rémond’s thesis in his Der Faschismus in Seiner Epoche. By emphatically 
associating the Action Française with Italian Fascism and German National 
Socialism as three manifestations of the ‘fascist era’, Nolte identif ied France 
as one of the heartlands of European fascism. Although a French translation 
10 Rémond, La Droite en France.
11 Sternhell, ‘Morphology of Fascism in France’, in France in the Era of Fascism, ed. Jenkins, 
22-64, 31.
12 Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 117.
13 Rémond, Les Droites en France; Jenkins, ‘The Right Wing Leagues and Electoral Politics’, 
1360.
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appeared in 1970, Nolte’s book seems to have had surprisingly little influence 
on French scholarship on the topic.14 Vichy France (1972), Robert O. Paxton’s 
work of reference on the Vichy regime, had a more signif icant impact. 
Paxton’s analysis collided with some of Rémond’s key assumptions about the 
period of the Second World War. In Paxton’s view, ‘Vichy’ was not Rémond’s 
conservative government mainly trying to protect its own population from 
the worst aspects of Nazi occupation but an anti-democratic regime that 
enthusiastically collaborated with the Nazis while wilfully taking part in 
the Holocaust.15
French historians were quick to adopt Paxton’s analysis of the Vichy re-
gime, but this at f irst did not lead to a reconsideration of French fascism and 
its presumed marginality. Regarding this point, it was the Israeli historian 
Zeev Sternhell who opened the debate sometime around the turn of the 
1970s. Sternhell had first published a study on the nationalist writer Maurice 
Barrès that had largely gone unnoticed, but his next two, more ambitious 
books caused a big stir. In La Droite Révolutionnaire (1978), Sternhell traced 
the birth of fascism to ultra-leftist circles in fin-de-siècle France. Long before 
the start of the First World War, these marginal groups had developed a 
synthesis of revolutionary syndicalism, anarchism and nationalism. Under 
the influence of the sociology of Georges Sorel, the philosophy of Henri 
Bergson and a fundamental rejection of liberal politics and the bourgeoisie, 
a completely new ideology was born that combined anti-rationalism, anti-
Marxism, elitism and a cult of violence and heroism. The implication was 
that fascism had a pedigree preceding the First World War. All the war had 
done was to spread this thought among larger circles in Europe, preparing 
the ground for a political mass movement that was f inally given the name 
of fascism by Mussolini a few years before its coming to power in Italy.16
By far the greatest controversy arose after the publication of Sternhell’s 
third book, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, in 1983. In this book, Sternhell radicalised 
his thesis from La Droite Révolutionnaire and extended it to the period 
after 1919. He claimed not only that French interwar society had been ‘im-
pregnated’ with fascist thinking, which had taken hold of a large number 
of intellectuals, writers and politicians who mostly did not see themselves 
as fascists. Sternhell also described – using a history of ideas approach far 
14 Nolte, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche; idem, Le Fascisme dans son Époque.
15 Paxton, Vichy France, 233, 371. Surprisingly, in 1963 Nolte had already suggested something 
comparable on the Vichy regime, of which he stressed the popularity. Nolte, Der Faschismus, 
120.
16 Sternhell, Maurice Barrès; idem, La Droite Révolutionnaire. For an interpretation of Stern-
hell’s work, see: Costa Pinto, ‘Fascist Ideology Revisited’, 471.
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removed from Rémond’s classical political history – how fascism came to 
symbolise an ethical, anti-materialist and anti-Marxist revision of social-
ism. Once ‘freed’ from the materialism of Marx, this socialism presented 
itself as a ‘third way’ between liberalism and communism. Its goal was no 
longer a revolution for the proletariat but a ‘revolution for the entire nation’.17 
In the climate of political and economic insecurity of the interwar period, 
reinforced by widespread cultural notions of decadence and decline, this 
fascism was highly attractive to large parts of French society.18
Sternhell pays much attention in his book to ‘non-conformist’ politicians 
and intellectuals. Dissident socialists and communists like the Belgian 
Hendrik de Man and the Frenchmen Marcel Déat and Jacques Doriot, who 
opted out of their left-wing parties and ended up advocating fascist ideas, 
f igure prominently. Sternhell also addressed a specif ic group of young 
French intellectuals whom the French historian Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle 
labelled ‘the non-conformists of the 1930s’ in his 1969 classic. These non-
conformists consisted of several small circles centred around intellectual 
periodicals and thinkers such as Emmanuel Mounier, Denis de Rougemont 
and Thierry Maulnier who distanced themselves from all political parties 
during the early 1930s and engaged in a quest for radical political renewal. 
Sternhell’s analysis of these groups was fundamentally different from 
Loubet’s. While Loubet considered their thought as an experimental but 
altogether valuable contribution to the post-war renewal of democracy, 
Sternhell saw them as democracy’s fascist or semi-fascist gravediggers.19
The response to Sternhell’s book was massive, both inside and outside 
academia. Bertrand de Jouvenel, one of the main characters in Ni Droite, Ni 
Gauche and still alive during the 1980s, took the Israeli historian to court 
in a libel suit that became a media event involving prominent French and 
foreign intellectuals. Among others, Nolte, Rémond, Mosse and Stanley 
Payne testif ied in defence of Sternhell, often stressing that they disagreed 
with his analysis but wanted to defend its academic legitimacy. Jouvenel was 
supported by friends he knew from the post-war period: prominent names 
like Henry Kissinger, Milton Friedman and Raymond Aron, who – adding 
to the drama – died of a heart attack just a few hours after leaving the court. 
Caught in the difficult situation of having to pronounce a verdict on a history 
book, the judge refused to persecute Sternhell on his claims that Jouvenel had 
17 Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, 295.
18 Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, 235; Robert Wohl, ‘French Fascism: Both Right and Left’, 92.
19 Loubet del Bayle, Les Non-Conformistes des Années 30, 464. For a longer treatment of this 
subject, see chapter 2.
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been a leading fascist intellectual during the 1930s and that he had after 1945 
actively tried to hide these compromising elements of his past. Instead, he 
reached a different verdict on Sternhell’s other statements about Jouvenel’s 
proximity to collaborationism during the war. Judging this claim unfounded 
in empirical evidence and therefore libellous, he condemned Sternhell to a 
fine of 1500 French francs without ordering that the book’s text be changed.20
Outside the courtroom and within French academia, the reactions were 
no less intense. French political historians like Michel Winock, Serge Ber-
stein and Jacques Julliard repeated the arguments of their tutor Rémond, 
presenting what Michel Dobry has described as the ‘immunity thesis’.21 
Berstein argued that French society of the 1920s and 1930s was to a large 
extent immune or ‘allergic’ to the ‘fascist impregnation’ that Sternhell 
claimed to signal. Established in 1871, democracy had more time to settle in 
France than in the unstable young democracies of Germany and Italy. With 
the Parti Radical, France also had a strong party of the republican centre 
that could dominate politics and function as a bridge between the left and 
the right. As a result, an overwhelming majority of the French population 
considered democracy a positive achievement, not a façade for a political 
oligarchy (Italy) or a Fremdkörper installed by foreign victors (Germany). 
Finally, the relative mildness and slow development of the Great Depression 
shielded French politics from the degree of destabilisation experienced by 
other European countries at the start of the 1930s.22 Winock added that 
the absence of any kind of irredentism after 1919 effectively robbed French 
fascism of much potential support. As a victor of the First World War, France 
had reintegrated the lost territories of Alsace and Lorraine and added several 
protectorates to its colonial empire. Therefore, from a territorial point of 
view, the country could not have been more satisf ied.23 Because of these ele-
ments, so the argument went, France never experienced a fascist takeover, its 
extreme-rightist movements only able to achieve at most short-time success.
Sternhell’s French and foreign opponents mainly protested his analysis of 
the leftist origins and the revolutionary character of fascism. By using a very 
20 For an analysis of the historical and legal context of the lawsuit, see Assouline, ‘Enquête 
sur un Historien Condamné pour Diffamation’, 98-101; Bredin, ‘Le Droit, le Juge et l’Historien’, 
93-111.
21 Dobry, ‘Février 1934’, 512.
22 Berstein, ‘La France des Années Trente Allergique au Fascisme’, 93.
23 Winock, ‘Fascisme à la Française ou Fascisme Introuvable?’, 42; idem, ‘Retour sur le Fascisme 
Français’, 5; Julliard, ‘Sur un Fascisme Imaginaire’, 859; Milza, Fascisme Français. For a reaction 
by Sternhell, see Sternhell, ‘Le Fascisme: Ce Mal du Siècle’, in Le Mythe de l’Allergie, ed. Dobry 
390.
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selective definition of fascism as the anti-materialistic revision of Marxism 
and by focusing almost exclusively on young, non-conformist intellectuals, 
Sternhell was said to have closed his eyes to evidence that contradicted his 
theory. He was also accused of neglecting political reality because of his 
history of ideas approach and of underestimating the importance of the 
First World War in the genesis of fascism. Sternhell also seemed to pay little 
attention to the Third Reich, a clear example of right-wing fascism that did 
not seem to f it his theory well.24
Although Sternhell clearly overplayed his hand and used an excessively 
polemical style, he changed the f ield of scholarship on French fascism, 
despite the fact that most of the French and foreign reactions to his books 
were critical. Because of the heated debates following the publication of his 
book, French fascism became more closely linked to wider developments 
in the international discipline of fascist studies. As the dust settled, two 
questions remained:
1 Is fascism essentially an anti-bourgeois, modernist and revolutionary 
phenomenon that is clearly related to radicalism of the left? Or should 
it be considered an extreme variation of the conservative right, happy 
to use revolutionary rhetoric but always willing to collaborate with 
the forces of business and capital?
2 How receptive was French interwar society to fascist thought, and 
which political movements can be labelled fascist? And what does this 
say about key political events of the 1930s such as the anti-government 
riots of 6 February 1934 and the rise and fall of the Popular Front 
government in 1936-37?
The American historians Robert Paxton and Robert Soucy agreed that 
there were many fascists in interwar France, but they claimed that Stern-
hell was looking in the wrong places. Instead of Sternhell’s intellectual 
approach, Paxton proposed to study fascism ‘in motion’ and ‘contextu-
ally’, mainly focusing on the paramilitary ligues and parties of the French 
extreme right and their relationship with non-fascist groups.25 On the 
basis of extensive research on this wide palette of movements – from 
Charles Maurras’ anti-Semitic and monarchist Action Française via Henri 
24 For example: Berstein, ‘La France des Années Trente’, 85; Julliard, ‘Sur un Fascisme Imagi-
naire’, 851; Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, 25; Wohl, ‘French Fascism’, 93-94.
25 Paxton, ‘The Five Stages of Fascism’, 10.
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Dorgères’ pitchfork-wielding peasant militias to the authoritarianism of La 
Rocque’s Croix-de-Feu – Soucy and Paxton concluded that French fascism 
was not associated with the left, as Sternhell claimed, but belonged to 
the political right, its agenda corresponding to the political programme 
of conservative parties.26 Soucy showed that right-extremist movements 
were at their strongest around electoral victories of the left – the Cartel 
des Gauches in 1924 and 1932 and the Popular Front in 1936. At these times, 
they could present themselves as the necessary allies of the conventional 
parties of the right. By manifesting their willingness to f ight the danger of 
a ‘Bolshevik’ takeover using every possible means, they attracted political 
and f inancial support from alarmed rightists. After political change led to 
a government coalition of the centre-right – as happened in both 1926 and 
1934 – conventional rightists were much less interested in working together 
with the extreme right, which was weakened as a result. This means that 
where Sternhell implicitly drew a line between moderates and extremists, 
Soucy and Paxton re-established the traditional political spectrum, where 
the main division is between left and right.27
If there was much agreement between English-speaking historians like 
Soucy and Robert Wohl and their French colleagues Winock, Berstein and 
Pierre Milza on the point of criticising Sternhell, on other issues they still 
split along language lines. The biggest source of division was the question 
of the size and importance of French fascism. Strikingly, many French 
scholars implicitly shared Sternhell’s view of fascism as an essentially 
revolutionary phenomenon related to the radical left, def ining it in such 
a way that the ligues of the extreme right hardly meet the criteria. While 
Sternhell, as a historian of ideas, stressed that this revolutionary fascism 
‘impregnated’ French society and its intellectuals, they conclude based 
on their political history approach that there were hardly any political 
organisations that could be called fascist, which made French fascism a very 
marginal phenomenon. English-speaking historians tended to apply less 
sharply delineated definitions of fascism, including large parts of the French 
radical right in their definition. In their approach, interwar France suddenly 
seemed to be sprawling with fascist and semi-fascist parties, movements 
and ligues.28 Later exchanges between Winock, Soucy and Berstein on the 
pages of the periodical Vingtième Siècle suggest that the gap remains wide 
26 Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 68.
27 Soucy, The First Wave, 234; and especially the historiographical introduction of the second 
part: idem, The Second Wave, 5.
28 Soucy, The Second Wave, 6-8; Jenkins, ‘The Right-Wing Leagues’, 1360.
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between French and English language historians, which does not improve 
the tone of the debate.29
Within this ongoing debate, the Croix-de-Feu (CdF) and the Parti Social 
Français (PSF) play an important role. Under the charismatic leadership 
of Colonel de la Rocque, the Croix-de-Feu grew from a war veterans’ social 
club into a very large anti-parliamentary league marked by a paramilitary 
style, strictly organised storm troopers, an absolute authority of the leader 
and code speech about an ‘H hour’ on which ‘action’ was to be taken. After 
the victory of the Popular Front in 1936 and with the political union of the 
left against the presumed ‘fascism’ of La Rocque and others, all paramilitary 
ligues were dissolved by government decree. La Rocque, who had always 
maintained that he was a republican, responded by founding the Parti Social 
Français, a party that appeared to be more moderate and that publicly 
respected the rules of parliamentary democracy. The allusions to a coup 
and to founding a new, authoritarian regime never completely disappeared, 
though, and after 1940 La Rocque radicalised his opinions again. Because of 
its sheer size, the question of whether the CdF/PSF could be called fascist is 
of major importance. When it was dissolved, the CdF had peaked at 500,000 
members, and two years later the PSF achieved a high point of probably 
around one million members. That is more than the French socialist and 
communist parties combined and almost as much as Hitler’s NSDAP in 1932. 
If the PSF was indeed fascist, the immunity thesis cannot be maintained.30
The Paris riots of 6 February 1934, known in French public memory 
simply as Le Six Février, is the second key issue in this debate. After the 
victory of the centre-left in the 1932 elections and in response to the govern-
ment’s incapacity to deal with the consequences of the Great Depression, 
right-wing opposition against the government kept growing, reaching its 
climax at the end of 1933 in the Stavisky scandal. This corruption scandal 
involving several prominent members of the governing Parti Radical was 
seized upon by radical right-wing groups to illustrate the ‘perf idy’ of the 
parliamentary system and to call for a general ‘cleansing’ of French politics. 
After a reshuffling of ministers, Prime Minister Édouard Daladier wanted 
to assure his government of the support of the Socialist Party by f iring the 
police prefect of Paris, Jean Chiappe, a known reactionary lenient in his 
29 Winock, ‘Retour sur le Fascisme Français’; Soucy, ‘La Rocque et le Fascisme Français’, 219-36; 
Winock, ‘En Lisant Robert Soucy’, 237-42; Berstein, ‘Pour en Finir avec un Dialogue de Sourds’, 
243-46.
30 Brian Jenkins, ‘Introduction: Contextualizing the Immunity Thesis’, in France in the Era 
of Fascism, ed. Jenkins, 1-21, 15; For an extensive description of the CdF/PSF: Soucy, The Second 
Wave, 104-203.
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dealings with violence by right-wing groups. The radical right responded 
immediately, organising a day of demonstrations and violence in Paris. On 
6 February 1934, a demonstration of some tens of thousands of members 
of right-wing parties, ligues and veterans organisations on the Place de 
la Concorde escalated into shootings with the police and an attempt to 
storm parliament which left 17 dead and thousands injured.31 Three days 
later, in a civil war atmosphere, the French communists staged a counter-
demonstration against what they saw as a ‘fascist coup attempt’. The police 
intervened, killing six and injuring hundreds.
During the afternoon of 6 February and with the violence still raging 
outside, Daladier resigned as prime minister, making room for a govern-
ment of national union led by former president Gaston Doumergue. His 
grandfatherly aura and the broad base of support for his government soon 
brought a relative return to tranquillity, but the events of Le Six Février cast 
a shadow over French politics throughout much of the 1930s. The perceived 
threat of fascism played an important role in bringing together the parties 
of the left in the Popular Front coalition, and in the large electoral victory 
it achieved at the 1936 elections. At the same time, the events marked the 
breakthrough of La Rocque’s CdF, at that moment a minor group in the 
wider landscape of veterans’ ligues. His troops had caught the country’s 
attention through their military discipline and organised behaviour. Instead 
of taking part in the improvised attack on parliament, they had manoeuvred 
tactically, approaching the building from behind but in the end refraining 
from attacking it. La Rocque himself had not been among his men but in a 
secret headquarters, where he was in constant touch with his troops. This 
display of force and discipline brought the CdF a tremendous reputation 
on the far right while at the same time making it the organisation the left 
feared most.32
These two subjects are treated very differently by English-speaking 
historians and by French-speaking representatives of the immunity thesis. 
Many French historians stress the spontaneous character of the violence 
of 1934. Most demonstrators had been unarmed, and not all belonged to 
the extreme right, with even a small number of communist war veterans 
taking part. They also argue that for many participants, cuts in the veterans’ 
benefits had been the principle reason to protest. These historians consider 
the CdF/PSF as an authoritarian but essentially conservative formation, its 
31 Soucy, The Second Wave, 32.
32 Didier Leschi, ‘L’Étrange Cas De la Rocque’, in Le Mythe de l’Allergie, ed. Dobry, 155-194, 169; 
Soucy, The Second Wave, 107.
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paramilitary style being nothing more than uniformed folklore or ‘political 
boy scouting for adults’, according to a famous quotation from Rémond.33 La 
Rocque’s ideology clearly became more moderate and republican after 1936, 
showing more commonality with post-war Gaullism than with contempo-
rary fascism. Finally, French historians stress the difference between the 
PSF and Jacques Doriot’s smaller and more radical Parti Populaire Français 
(PPF). If there was an authentically fascist movement in France during the 
late 1930s, this had to be the PPF, not the more moderate PSF.34
English-language historians such as the American Soucy, the Canadian 
William Irvine and the British Brian Jenkins – and to a lesser extent also 
Kevin Passmore – have refuted the conclusions that French historians drew 
from Le Six Février. They conceded that the violence had indeed been largely 
spontaneous and that most demonstrators had been mainly interested in 
bringing down a government of the left rather than staging a fascist coup. 
But in their eyes, this did not necessarily mean the movements involved were 
not fascist. La Rocque’s attitude during the riots seems to have been at the 
very least ambiguous. Moreover, a certain degree of political legalism can 
be easily combined with fascist convictions.35 Recently, the French scholar 
Laurent Kestel has joined these critics by attacking the false dichotomy 
between republicanism and fascism. He argued that, on the extreme right, 
‘republicanism’ was mostly used to distinguish oneself from Maurrassian 
monarchism, while it did not imply any attachment to a republic with a 
democratic, let alone a parliamentary character. During the 1930s, France 
produced some models for a future ‘republic’ that in reality looked more 
like authoritarian or corporatist regimes led by an almost almighty dictator. 
La Rocque’s self-asserted republicanism should, according to Kestel, not be 
taken as an aff irmation of anti-fascism.36
Furthermore, Mussolini and Hitler also allowed their parties to partici-
pate in parliamentary politics and sometimes suggested f idelity to repub-
lican rules before f inally coming to power not through a violent takeover 
but in a semi-legal political way. The French circumstances of the late 
1930s offered no opportunity for La Rocque to proceed with a comparable 
Machtübernahme – the apogee of his movement coincided with a Popular 
Front government that kept a close watch on the PSF, and after 1938 interior 
33 Cited in Dobry, ‘Février 1934’, 527. See also Passmore, ‘Boy Scouting for Grown-Ups?’, 528.
34 Winock, Nationalisme, Antisémitisme et Fascisme, 255; idem, ‘Retour sur le Fascisme 
Français’, 27; Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, 192.
35 Passmore, The Right in France, 297, 307.
36 Kestel, La Conversion Politique, 122. See, for example, Gustave Hervé’s ‘République Au-
toritaire’ as described in: Hervé, C’est Pétain qu’il Nous Faut!, 26.
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political struggle was mainly suspended under the threat of war and foreign 
invasion. This lack of opportunity does not necessarily mean that La Rocque 
did not cherish plans to seize power. These historians not only considered 
the differences between the CdF/PSF and Doriot’s PPF to be smaller than 
French historians claimed, they saw both parties as ideologically linked 
with fascism.37 Sternhell has made known that despite his own focus on 
non-conformist intellectuals, he has been convinced by the arguments of 
Irvine and Soucy that the CdF/PSF was a fascist movement.38
New Perspectives
Although the ‘deaf men’s dialogue’39 between French-speaking repre-
sentatives of the immunity thesis and English-speaking members of the 
‘pan-fascist school’40 seems to be far from over, research is also turning 
into new directions. Firstly, the French political scientist Michel Dobry, 
who already criticised the immunity thesis in 1989, has gathered a group 
of young French academics around him who do consider French fascism a 
signif icant phenomenon. Inspired by a sociological perspective borrowed 
from Pierre Bourdieu, they reject the immunity thesis and the general 
‘classif icatory logic’ of historians involved in the controversy about French 
fascism. Instead, and in contrast with their older French colleagues, they 
prefer to focus on aspects of intellectual and social history. Since they 
also do not seem to be willing to fully accept the conclusion of English-
language scholars, they have generally considered the debate undecidable 
and relatively irrelevant to their approach.41
Secondly, after research on French fascism having been entirely domi-
nated by the question of who was fascist and who was not, in the last f ifteen 
years researchers are f inally also turning to other topics. Developments in 
37 Irvine, ‘Fascism in France and the Strange Case of the Croix-de-Feu’, 274; Soucy, ‘Fascism 
in France: Problematizing the Immunity Thesis’, in France in the Era of Fascism, ed. Jenkins, 
65-104, 92; Jenkins, ‘The Right-Wing Leagues’, 1372; Millington, ‘February 6’, 547.
38 Sternhell, ‘Morphology of Fascism in France’, 49.
39 Term coined by Berstein, ‘Pour en Finir avec un Dialogue de Sourds’, 243.
40 Term coined by Winock, ‘Retour sur le Fascisme Français’, 5. Generally, immunity thesis 
historians declare the discussion closed since they claim they have convincingly established 
the marginality of fascism in France. English-speaking scholars stress that many questions are 
still unanswered and insist on continuing the debate.
41 Dobry, ‘Février 1934’. See also the contributions of Dobry, Annie Collovald, Didier Leschi, 
Gisèle Sapiro and Bruno Goyet in Le Mythe de l’Allergie and the recent book by Kestel, La Conver-
sion Politique, 232.
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the wider international f ield have also started to have a larger impact on the 
research into fascism in France. In the wake of Dobry, some scholars have 
dropped the idea that there is a f ixed definition of fascism or an essential 
‘fascist minimum’. As a consequence, researchers have been free to pick 
any working def inition, which is worthwhile only in as far as it leads to 
new insights within one’s own research. This development has led to the 
popularity of the use of the plural ‘fascisms’ instead of the singular form, 
intended to illustrate the impossibility of including all variations of fascism 
within a single definition. There has also been a rise of micro-studies, often 
concentrating on a single organisation or on the developments in one region 
or town. Provincial France, Algeria and Indochina have started to receive 
attention instead of the formerly exclusive focus on Paris.42 Themes from 
social history such as the relationship between gender and fascism are also 
starting to receive more attention.43
Thirdly, the cultural turn in fascist studies seems to have increas-
ingly inf luenced the French debate. Scholars have not given up asking 
questions about fascism as a general phenomenon, and the search for a 
definition or a theory of ‘generic fascism’ continues. The primacy of culture 
in thinking about fascism could open doors to more agreement between 
French and English-speaking historians, since it avoids key issues from the 
Sternhell controversy. Roger Griff in has repeatedly called upon his French 
colleagues to give up their resistance to a general def inition and join his 
‘new consensus’ def inition, stressing the importance of populism within 
fascism as well as the ‘palingenetic’ myth of national rebirth after a period 
of decadence. It is very questionable whether Winock, Milza and others 
will accept this invitation.44 Also outside of France, disagreement on the 
nature of generic fascism is still the rule rather than the exception. Griff in 
has himself been accused of academic ‘imperialism’ – trying to impose a 
non-existent consensus definition within a still very heterogeneous f ield of 
research.45 While Stanley Payne seems receptive to Griffin’s ‘new consensus’, 
42 For example: Passmore, From Liberalism to Fascism; Paxton, French Peasant Fascism; 
Goodfellow, Between the Swastika and the Cross of Lorraine; Jennings, ‘Conservative Confluences’; 
Kéchichian, Les Croix-de-Feu à l’Âge des Fascismes; Kalman, ‘“Le Combat Par Tous les Moyens”’.
43 Passmore, ‘The Gendered Genealogy of Political Religions Theory’, 663. See also Kennedy, 
‘The End of Immunity?’, 39, 41; Meyers, ‘Feminizing Fascist Men’, 109-42; Downs, ‘“And so we 
Transform a People”’, 2-39.
44 Griff in, ‘“Consensus? Quel Consensus?”’, 59, 68. Griff in has repeated this request at a more 
general level in 2012: see Griff in, ‘Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age’, 12.
45 For a rich collection of reactions to Griff in – and for another example of the problematic 
confrontation between different national traditions in fascist studies – see the exchanges in 
the special theme edition of Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik: Streitforum für Erwägungskultur 3 (2004).
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Paxton, Soucy and Passmore have declared their unwillingness to join his 
approach, stressing that it overestimates fascism’s revolutionary character 
and places too much emphasis on intellectual currents in the early ‘stages’ 
of fascism – at the expense of the ‘real’ politics of fascist regimes once power 
has been achieved.46
French fascism appears to be more in touch with international develop-
ments in studies that stress its participation in an international phenom-
enon. Within this approach, fascism is considered a transnational ideology 
that manifested itself within different national contexts. The influence of 
the two fascist regimes on comparable movements in France is an obvious 
subject for such studies, but this approach opens a much wider f ield of 
transnational and comparative analysis within fascist studies. Studies 
on international relations at the level of intellectuals, organisations and 
governments could shed new light on the way fascism functioned during 
the interwar era, exploring the ‘entanglement’ of different manifestations 
of fascism in Europe and beyond. Recent publications – such as Dietrich 
Orlow’s book on the relationship of Dutch and French fascists with Nazi 
Germany and Robert Grunert’s work on Europeanist ideas among Dutch, 
Belgian and French fascists – are inspiring examples of this new direction 
of research.47 Similarly, Arnd Bauerkämper has refused to dismiss fascist 
Europeanism as mere propaganda, stressing the role of European discourses, 
entanglement and transfer within different fascist movements.48 Samuel 
Goodfellow has applied the same method on a regional level, tracing a 
transnational fascism in interwar Alsace.49
Another recent and controversial development concerns the question of the 
existence of fascism outside its ‘classical’ geographical and temporal bounda-
ries of Europe during the first half of the twentieth century. It would take us 
far beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss the possible existence of 
fascism in Brazil, Argentina, the United States, South Africa, Egypt, amongst 
anti-colonial groups in India and China or even among the present-day Israeli 
46 Payne, ‘Fascism and Racism’, in The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political 
Thought, eds. Ball & Bellamy, 124; Passmore, Fascism, 21; Soucy, ‘What is Meant by “Revolution-
ary” Fascism?’, 351; Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 205.
47 Orlow, The Lure of Fascism in Western Europe; idem, ‘Der Nationalsozialismus als Export- und 
Marketing-Artikel’, in Das Unrechtsregime, ed. Büttner, 427-68; Grunert, Der Europagedanke; 
idem, ‘Autoritärer Staatenbund oder Nationalsozialistischer Großraum?’, 442-448.
48 Bauerkämper, ‘Ambiguities of Transnationalism’, 45; idem, ‘Transnational Fascism’, 238; 
idem, ‘Interwar Fascism in Europe and Beyond: Toward a Transnational Radical Right’, in New 
Perspectives on the Transnational Right, eds. Durham & Power, 41.
49 Goodfellow, ‘Fascism as a Transnational Movement’, 87-106.
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extreme right (or, according to one’s preferences, in the ‘Islamo-fascism’ of 
Muslim extremists).50 The question of fascism after 1945, however, certainly 
deserves some attention here, especially since it is very relevant for the French 
case. French post-war history suggests the continued existence of a right-wing 
extremist tradition from the Vichy years until the present day: from the neo-
fascist and Pétainist circles of the 1950s, the terrorists of the Organisation de 
l’Armée Sécrète (OAS) during and after the Algerian War, the later intellectual 
prominence of the French New Right (Nouvelle Droite) as well as the enduring 
success of the ‘national-populist’ Front National (FN).51 Seen in this light, 
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s succession at the head of the FN by his allegedly more 
‘modern’ daughter Marine – who saw the FN become the country’s biggest 
party at the 2014 European elections and captured close to 34 % of the votes 
in the second round of the 2017 French presidential elections – is just another 
chapter in the history of the French extreme right.52
Many historians of fascism are inclined to treat their subject of study 
as something that perished in May 1945 and was buried under the ruins of 
Berlin. For all his later controversial statements, Ernst Nolte was following a 
generally accepted idea when he published his study of Italian, German and 
French fascism ‘in its epoch’, that is, the period between 1919 (or, for some, 
the end of the nineteenth century) and 1945.53 Many felt that transcending 
these temporal boundaries by examining a period with fundamentally dif-
ferent dynamics and political culture risked inflating the concept of fascism 
to the point of blurring it. Although the existence of post-war neo-fascist 
groups could not be denied altogether, they were generally considered too 
marginal to merit serious consideration. After all, skinhead and neo-Nazi 
groups posed (and continue to pose) more of a problem of public order than 
a menace to democracy, their symbols and slogans giving rise to almost 
universal revulsion in modern society. The same cannot be said of the 
political parties of the more ‘modern’ post-war extreme right, who have 
achieved considerable electoral support in France and many other European 
50 See Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 191; Griff in, ‘What Fascism Is Not and Is’, 260.
51 Mammone, ‘The Eternal Return?’, 175; Annie Collovald, ‘Le “National-Populisme” ou le 
Fascisme Disparu: Les Historiens du Temps Présent et la Question du Déloyalisme Politique 
Contemporain’, in Le Mythe de l’Allergie, ed. Dobry, 280. Mammone’s recent monograph is an 
excellent treatment of this continuity. See Mammone, Transnational Neofascism, 98, 230.
52 ‘With Eye on Far Right Leadership, Marine Le Pen Stirs the Pot’, www.france24.com (retrieved 
4 November 2013); Kim Willsher, ‘Marine Le Pen Scores Stunning Result in French Presidential 
Election’, The Guardian (22 April 2012); idem, ‘Marine Le Pen’s Conf idence Vindicated by Front 
National Election Triumph’, The Guardian (25 May 2014).
53 Nolte, Der Faschismus in Seiner Epoche. See also Payne, ‘Fascism and Racism’, 148.
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countries and have sometimes even participated in coalition governments. 
Not only do these parties themselves energetically reject any affiliation with 
fascism, they also generally lack such prominent characteristics of ‘classical’ 
fascism as a paramilitary style, uniforms, a leader cult and an official agenda 
to abolish parliamentary democracy. The question is whether these are 
merely ‘superf icial’ aspects of fascism that could easily be shaken off to 
adapt to the political culture of a new era or whether their absence simply 
means that the fascist element is gone.54
Despite these understandable hesitations, several younger academics 
such as Andrea Mammone and Tamir Bar-On have pointed to some strik-
ing resemblances between the interwar, wartime and post-war European 
extreme right, while at the same time showing how it could adapt to radi-
cally new circumstances. They signalled the rise, especially in the ranks of 
1950s French and Italian neo-fascism, of a European and internationalist 
discourse that had been overshadowed by ultra-nationalism during earlier 
stages. Neo-fascist movements were also eager to establish relations with 
like-minded groups in other countries. Support for the extreme right waned 
during most of the 1960s, but the student movement of 1967-69 provoked 
a right-wing backlash, providing a new stimulus for extreme-rightist and 
neo-fascist groups and laying the basis for the new successful ‘populist’ 
parties of the late twentieth century. Underlying these new directions, 
Mammone and Bar-On have traced a high degree of personal and ideological 
continuity of the European extreme right from the 1930s well into the late 
twentieth century.55 In articles covering a wide range of post-war extreme 
rightist groups, parties and individuals, Roger Griff in has concurred with 
Mammone and Bar-On, declaring that large parts of the post-1945 extreme-
right conform to his ‘consensus’ def inition of fascism.56
Despite these new tendencies, Sternhell’s original perspective has not 
entirely left the stage. Even if most historians are critical of Sternhell’s 
conclusions, it is hard to completely dismiss his analysis. Some French 
scholars have started to follow Sternhell’s (and Loubet del Bayle’s) focus 
on young intellectuals in the 1930s without necessarily abandoning the 
immunity thesis. In ‘L’Europe Nouvelle de Hitler’ (2003), Bernard Bruneteau 
looks back from the perspective of intellectuals who supported the Vichy 
54 Griff in, ‘Fascism’s New Faces’, 293; Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 185.
55 Bar-On, Where Have All the Fascists Gone?, 142; idem, ‘Transnationalism and the French 
Nouvelle Droite’, 208; Mammone, ‘Revitalizing and De-Territorializing Fascism in the 1950s’, 
296; idem, Transnational Neofascism, 27.
56 Griff in, ‘Fascism’s New Faces’, 295; idem, ‘Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age’, 16; Bar-On, 
‘The French New Right’s Quest for Alternative Modernity’, 28.
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regime in 1940. How could these intellectuals, many of whom belonged 
to the progressive left, end up supporting a collaborating regime of the 
reactionary right? His striking conclusion is that Europeanist idealism 
and a longing to break with ‘old-fashioned’ nationalism often played an 
important role in their choice.57 Other scholars are less willing to make 
this link, preferring to adopt a more technical approach to their study of 
circles of young intellectuals in 1930s France and Belgium. Olivier Dard is 
hostile to Sternhell’s thesis, even concluding at the end of a 300-page general 
study that France’s young intellectuals failed to develop original ideas or 
to achieve any considerable influence.58
It is also possible to both apply and refute Sternhell’s method at the 
same time, as the Swiss historian Philippe Burrin has done. On the one 
hand, Burrin distanced himself clearly from Sternhell with arguments 
that show a strong similarity with those used by representatives of the 
immunity thesis: Sternhell was using too narrow an approach and his focus 
on non-conformists and dissident ex-socialists made him inflate a marginal 
phenomenon to excessive proportions.59 On the other hand, Burrin’s own 
book, La Dérive Fasciste (1986), shows clear aff inity with Sternhell’s ap-
proach. He conducted extensive research on three leftist militants who 
‘drifted’ towards fascism during the 1930s: the communist Jacques Doriot, 
the socialist Marcel Déat and the liberal Gaston Bergery. Burrin described 
how, in the case of all three militants, a combination of idealist ambitions, 
personal frustrations and psychological identif ication with a former op-
ponent (fascism) contributed to this drift.60
Burrin noticed that within the international and national tension f ield 
of the late 1930s, fascism was highly attractive to a host of mostly young 
intellectuals. Widespread notions of decadence, political ‘putrefaction’ and 
the inertia of the Third Republic made them long for a more powerful and 
‘masculine’ regime that would put an end to eternal division and install a 
new, harmonious society. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany seemed to reflect 
this longing, but at the same time these countries were a manifest threat 
to European peace. Through their aggressive attitude, Italy and Germany 
increasingly challenged the order of Versailles, and the incapacity of the 
French government to act against them reinforced the image of the weak 
57 Bruneteau, ‘L’Europe Nouvelle de Hitler’, 336, 338.
58 Dard, Le Rendez-Vous Manqué, 286.
59 Burrin, ‘La France dans le Champ Magnétique des Fascismes’, 54.
60 Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, 14, 448. Burrin’s ambivalent attitude is noticed by Michel Dobry 
(amongst others), ‘La Thèse Immunitaire Face aux Fascismes: Pour une Critique de la Logique 
Classif icatoire’, in Le Mythe de l’Allergie, ed. Dobry, 51.
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and divided democracies versus the dictators marching from one success to 
another.61 The establishment of the Popular Front government and the wave 
of strikes and factory occupations that came in its wake increased fears of 
chaos and class war. At the same time, across France’s southern border, the 
election of a related Spanish Popular Front government escalated into civil 
war. And in France itself, the 1936 elections resulted in the country’s first ever 
socialist becoming prime minister, Léon Blum, whose Jewish origins made 
him susceptible to verbal and physical violence from right-wing anti-Semites.
After the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, the threat 
of European war loomed ever larger over French politics. In their desire 
to maintain the peace at all costs, France’s non-conformist intellectuals 
typically combined progressive and nationalist elements. From their period 
on the left, they had preserved a pacifism rooted in the experience of the 
First World War. This was joined by the conviction that France would have 
more to lose than to win from a future war. They were hoping that peaceful 
concessions to the fascist regimes could keep France out of this war, but this 
hope was frustrated considerably with the signing of a Franco-Russian pact in 
1935.62 Doriot, Déat and Bergery were sufficiently informed about the agenda 
of National Socialism to consider a conflict with the Soviet Union to be 
inevitable. Their f ierce anti-communism and their increasing identification 
with the fascist regimes meant that they rejected the pact as a step towards 
war. Some French intellectuals were convinced that ‘world Jewry’ was in some 
way working towards war because it ‘self ishly’ wanted to punish Germany 
for its anti-Semitic policies. If only France could rid itself of its ‘Jewish yoke’, 
entente with the ‘new’ Germany and Italy could surely be achieved.63
The radicalisation of a large part of the French intelligentsia, combined 
with the complex international constellation, led to unexpected alliances: 
the declaration of war in 1939 was denounced by an unlikely coalition 
of fascists and radical pacif ists, both unwilling to ‘die for Danzig’ in the 
name of democracy or the French guarantees of the Polish border. They 
faced a broad majority of conservatives, liberals and socialists who, despite 
their fundamental differences, all agreed that Hitler had gone too far and 
that the mistake of ‘Munich’ should not be repeated. Communists were 
divided between loyalty to the Komintern (which meant loyalty to the 
61 Sternhell, ‘Le Fascisme’, in Le Mythe de l’Allergie, ed. Dobry, 394; Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, 215.
62 An important element was the effective use of double language by Hitler, who accompanied 
every act of aggression (remilitarisation of the Rineland, ‘Anschluss’ of Austria, annexation of 
Sudetenland) with declarations that Germany had no territorial claims on French territory and 
that he wanted to achieve Franco-German reconciliation. Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, 212.
63 Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, 197, 231, 241, 295; idem, ‘La France dans le Champ Magnétique’, 54.
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Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact) and a rejection of fascism combined with a 
patriotic affection for France. The same disarray in the political spectrum 
caused some convinced fascists to end up f ighting in the Resistance, while 
others completely identif ied with the Nazi European order.
Laurent Kestel, a former student of Dobry, has recently published a book 
dedicated to Doriot and the PPF in which he criticises Burrin’s approach 
as based too much on intellectuals, ideas and international developments. 
Instead, Kestel proposes a ‘socio-political’ analysis of Doriot and his peers’ 
process of political ‘conversion’, strongly inspired by Bourdieuan sociology. 
Within this perspective, Doriot is reduced to being a political entrepreneur 
who manoeuvres across a political f ield, his actions influenced by the op-
portunities and barriers of a given moment. In Kestel’s analysis, Doriot’s 
exclusion from the French Communist Party (PCF) and from the Popular 
Front coalition brought him to the frontiers of a new political f ield, directing 
Doriot towards the foundation of the PPF. Kestel’s book does an excellent 
job in refuting the use of the Doriot case to either lazily lump together com-
munism and fascism or to analyse the psychological disposition of a supposed 
‘fascist mind’. He fails, however, in his attempt to refute the importance of 
ideas. Halfway through his book, in order to explain the attractiveness of the 
nascent PPF to young non-conformist intellectuals, Kestel grudgingly f inds 
himself obliged to dedicate an entire chapter to their thought. He shallowly 
concludes that all these intellectuals were essentially ‘reactionaries’.64 It is also 
questionable what the added value of some of Kestel’s comparisons is, such as 
the one between Doriot and Martin Luther as rejected prophets vengefully 
turning to repressive and ‘reactionary’ ideas.65 As this study is more about 
the ideas and activities of intellectuals than about politicians ‘converting’ 
to fascism, Kestel’s approach is of less use to us than Burrin’s. But for this to 
become clear, I must explain in more detail what this book aims to do.
Europeanism, Fascism and Neoliberalism
No definitive conclusions can be drawn on the leftist or rightist character of 
fascist ideology and practice. The debate on this topic is beginning to repeat 
itself, although the tone is not showing signs of calming down.66 Meanwhile, 
64 Kestel, La Conversion Politique, 9, 109.
65 Ibid., 231.
66 For example, see Roussel, ‘Le Fascisme Français ne Passera Pas’, Le Figaro (27 November 
2014).
INTRODUC TION 35
recent research is spreading in a range of directions, which will surely enrich 
our understanding of the fascist phenomenon but at the expense of a general 
overview of the f ield. Even so, it is possible to arrive at a few preliminary 
conclusions. Fascism draws its attractiveness from the fact that it combines 
revolutionary as well as conservative elements within its ideology, which 
makes it not ‘ni droite, ni gauche’ but both right and left at the same time, in 
the words of Robert Wohl.67 Revolutionary and anti-capitalist rhetoric and 
a considerable social agenda almost always joined hands with a political 
praxis that robbed workers of their rights as well as a readiness to ally 
the movement with conservative elites. It should also be stressed that, 
upon achieving power, fascist regimes have generally proved themselves 
to be much f iercer enemies of left-wing parties and organisations than of 
conservative groups. This is not to say that social arguments played no role 
in the ‘fascist drift’ of certain intellectuals. On the contrary: its capacity 
to present itself as a revolutionary, anti-capitalist ideology without the 
frightening downside of class war was one of the elements that made fascism 
especially attractive to non-conformist intellectuals.
With the calls for a ‘new consensus’ and the arrival of a new, sceptical 
generation of French scholars, it seems that the immunity thesis has had 
its time. No state can be considered historically ‘immune’ to fascism, and 
in the case of interwar France, the steadily growing influence of fascist 
thought cannot be denied. Marshall Pétain’s ‘National Revolution’ reached 
back to a strong indigenous anti-democratic tradition, and his regime was 
anything but an incident uniquely born out of military defeat. Long before 
1940, the French republic had been undermined by an anti-rationalist and 
anti-republican counter-culture that showed many commonalities with 
the fascist tradition, being just as strongly rooted in the French past as it 
was influenced by contemporary phenomena in other countries.68 This 
counter-culture persisted in post-war France, manifesting itself in different 
movements and parties of the extreme right, some of which remained 
conf ined to intellectual or extremist circles while others received mass 
electoral support.
French fascism must be taken seriously both at the level of organisations 
(parties, groups and ligues) and as an ideology that attracted a large fol-
lowing among the country’s intellectuals. An approach focused purely on 
intellectual history does not do justice to fascism’s very concrete political 
67 Wohl, ‘Both Right and Left’, 95.
68 Zeev Sternhell, ‘La Modernité et ses Ennemis: De la Révolte Contre les Lumières au Rejet 
de la Démocratie’, in L’Éternel Retour, ed. Sternhell, 37.
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context in interwar Europe. The same is true for traditional political history, 
since it fails to explain the reasons why fascism was so attractive to intel-
lectuals and why it exercised such a wide influence on culture and society 
during the interwar period. This study combines these two approaches 
instead of focusing solely on one of the two manifestations of fascism. In 
this sense, it is not so far removed from the one proposed by Tony Judt in his 
classic book Past Imperfect, dedicated to the intellectual irresponsibilities of 
the French post-war Marxist intelligentsia. In his introduction, Judt stated 
that he was not conducting a full-f ledged history of ideas but rather ‘a 
history of conversation: the one conducted among themselves by a genera-
tion of French intellectuals and addressed to questions of “engagement”, 
“responsibility”, “choice”, and so forth’.69 Though this study will neither treat 
an entire generation nor follow Judt’s focus on moral failure, it is similar 
to Judt’s approach in its focus on the political engagement, choice and 
responsibility of intellectuals.
Fascism should also be studied as an international phenomenon that 
manifests itself within different national contexts. There is an obvious inter-
relatedness of European fascist movements, but scholarship has too often 
stuck to the boundaries of a single nation-state, as if an ultra-nationalist 
phenomenon like fascism did not ‘look’ at what was happening across 
the border. In the same way, more attention should be paid to the links 
between fascism and internationalist and Europeanist intellectual currents 
in interwar Europe. Contrary to what one would intuitively expect, elements 
of the French liberal and internationalist intellectual avant-garde turned 
out to be very receptive to fascist ideas during the 1930s –and sometimes 
even kept thinking along these lines well into the 1950s. Fascist sympathies 
could evidently coexist with European engagement and the longing for a 
peaceful international order. After the Second World War, Europeanism 
became an even more important part of the extreme right’s discourse. Not 
only did it provide a way to escape political isolation and association with 
aggressive war within the national context; it also allowed for extensive 
contacts and collaboration with neo-fascist and extreme-rightist groups 
in other countries.70
This study explores the development of the political thought of two 
French intellectuals who belonged to this Europeanist avant-garde while 
placing special emphasis on the way their ‘fascist drift’ related to their 
Europeanist and internationalist ideas. Alfred Fabre-Luce and Bertrand 
69 Judt, Past Imperfect, 10.
70 Mammone, ‘Revitalizing and De-Territorializing Fascism in the 1950s’, 301.
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de Jouvenel were precocious and productive journalists, novelists and 
political writers. During the 1920s, they were among the ‘Young Turks’ of the 
Parti Radical, the governmental f lagship of French progressive liberalism. 
Enthusiastic about the League of Nations and detesting the traditional 
nationalism they held responsible for the outbreak of the First World War, 
they advocated a programme of elaborate reforms, Franco-German recon-
ciliation and the construction of a ‘United States of Europe’. Jouvenel came 
from a prominent family of politicians and notables, while Fabre-Luce was 
the grandson of Henri Germain, the founder of the Crédit Lyonnais bank. 
Because of their wealth, their foreign acquaintances and their journalist 
work, they could travel frequently. Both regularly visited Britain and all of 
France’s neighbouring countries, while Fabre-Luce spent several months 
in the Soviet Union and Jouvenel in the United States.
From the end of the 1920s, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel rapidly lost faith both 
in the capacity of the Third Republic’s political system to renew itself and 
in the capacity of free-market capitalism to survive the Great Depression. 
The years between 1932 and 1936 marked a turning point in their political 
thought and engagement: they left the Parti Radical, developed a hatred 
of the Marxist left and the Popular Front, and called for a revolution that 
would sweep away both the parliamentary and the capitalist system. This 
revolution, they claimed, would have to be both national and socialist. 
Shortly after its foundation by Doriot, they joined the PPF and became 
members of its political bureau. Their visits to foreign countries seem to 
have played an important role in their rising anti-capitalism: both were 
shocked by the misery of the unemployed in Liverpool, Chicago and the 
American South, and admired the leadership of Hitler, who seemed to have 
pulled his working class out of inertia and imbued it with energy and hope. 
In the same way, they saw Doriot’s party as a way to bridge the class divide 
and to construct a ‘healthy’ national community. Although both distanced 
themselves from Doriot in the wake of the Munich Agreement in 1938, their 
fascist conceptions of society did not change. After France’s defeat against 
Germany and the establishment of the Vichy regime, both were fascinated 
by the German victory and the unseen chances it offered for building a 
fascist Europe and a continental economic bloc. While Fabre-Luce fully 
embraced collaboration out of a conviction that a nationally regenerated 
France would have a rightful place within the new German-dominated 
Europe, Jouvenel was more hesitant, preferring to support the collabora-
tion politics of the Vichy regime rather than the more radical Paris-based 
Germanophiles. Both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were in close contact with 
French collaborators and high-ranking off icials of the German embassy.
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This attitude gradually changed in 1942 and 1943. The increasingly harsh 
occupation regime, the German occupation of the ‘free’ southern zone and 
the prospect of German defeat led Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel to begin to 
question their prior engagements. Jouvenel managed to flee to Switzerland, 
while Fabre-Luce, who remained in Paris, was f irst imprisoned by the 
Germans and later by the Free French. Despite their very critical attitude 
towards De Gaulle and the Resistance and a fundamental rejection of the 
Fourth Republic, after 1945 Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were able to gradually 
reintegrate into the political mainstream while embracing the post-war 
European project. At the same time, Jouvenel and especially Fabre-Luce 
remained prominent members of right-extremist and neo-fascist circles. 
By relating both intellectuals’ ‘fascist drift’ to their Europeanism and their 
economic and political ideas for French politics from the beginning of the 
1930s until the early 1950s, this study explores the implications of fascist 
engagement for two of France’s leading intellectuals. In doing so, it also 
raises the larger and thornier question of the relationship between fascism 
and Europeanism between the 1930s and the early 1950s.
Both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel lived long lives and enjoyed an extraor-
dinarily long period of intellectual production spanning seven decades. 
In 1922, at the age of twenty-three, Fabre-Luce published his f irst political 
book, a study of Franco-British relations since the end of the First World 
War.71 Jouvenel was made editor-in-chief of the progressive journal La Voix 
when he was twenty-five, and his f irst book appeared that same year.72 Both 
continued to publish until shortly before their deaths in the 1980s.73 From 
the dozens of books and thousands of articles they wrote, it is possible to 
analyse many different intellectual and political currents of the twentieth 
century. Especially in the case of Jouvenel, the better-known and probably 
the more Janus-faced of the two, this longevity and productivity have led 
to different and often mutually hostile readings of his work. Considered by 
some authors to be essentially a liberal political scientist and the spiritual 
father of ecology and future studies, others have called him an ‘aristocratic’ 
or a ‘melancholic’ liberal and a neoconservative avant la lèttre, while still 
others have labelled him one of France’s leading fascist intellectuals and a 
wartime collaborator.74 Although one claim does not necessarily exclude 
71 Fabre-Luce, La Crise des Alliances.
72 Jouvenel, L’Économie Dirigée.
73 Casanova, ‘Hommage à Alfred Fabre-Luce’, 608; Ullmann, ‘Hommage à Jouvenel’, 366.
74 Essentially, see Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, 132; Soucy, The Second Wave, 256; De Dijn, 
‘Bertrand de Jouvenel and the Revolt Against the State in Post-War America’, 376; Jouvenel & 
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the other – and all three seem to be at least partially true – these different 
readings have sparked controversy and conflict all the way up to the French 
courtroom, as we have seen. Fabre-Luce has almost exclusively been the 
object of shallow commentaries in which the conclusion is fully determined 
by the political positions of the writer. While Marxists and former members 
of the Resistance attacked him as a ‘reactionary’ and a collaborator, his 
only existing biography is in fact a hagiography, whose author attempts 
to justify and praise about every political position taken by Fabre-Luce 
during his life.75
To avoid the conflicts of def inition and categorisation that have already 
dominated the study of fascism in France for too long, and being all too 
aware of the absence of a real ‘consensus’ in fascist studies about its own ex-
act subject of analysis, I prefer not to start from a f ixed definition of fascism. 
Working with a def inition based on present-day scholarly insights carries 
the additional risk of according a meaning to a historical phenomenon that 
is very different from how contemporaries interpreted it – an inconvenient 
situation for anyone writing the history of intellectuals. Instead, I choose to 
focus on what meaning the relevant concepts of fascism, Europe and (neo)
liberalism had for the intellectuals themselves during the period with which 
I am concerned. This means that I also consider fascism a relevant concept 
for the years following 1945, since during this period it was extensively 
interpreted and discussed by Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce.
I base myself on published material by Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel but 
also on archival sources (letter correspondences, reading notes, unpub-
lished material and personal documents). The main part of the relevant 
archival material consists of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s personal archives, 
respectively kept at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris and the Archives 
Nationales in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine. While Fabre-Luce’s archive is an invalu-
able source of information about his entire life, the (very extensive) Jouvenel 
papers mainly consist of documents relevant to the years after 1942, almost 
all prior material having been lost during the war. Although this lacuna 
in Jouvenel’s papers cannot be f illed entirely, a partial solution consists 
of using the surviving archival fragments, other sources and memoirs 
written by Jouvenel and his associates. The judicial f ile of Fabre-Luce’s 
Roussel, Itinéraire 1928-1976, 12; Lapaque, ‘Jouvenel: Le Libéral Mélancolique’, Le Figaro (4 April 
2002).
75 See, for example, citations in Blandin, ‘Les Interventions des Intellectuels de Droite dans 
Le Figaro Littéraire’, 188; Garbe, Alfred Fabre-Luce; Sternhell, ‘Entre le Tragique et l’Imposture’, 
80-120.
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collaboration trial during the late 1940s, also kept at the Archives Nationales, 
is an important source on both his activities during the occupation and his 
post-war experience with the transitional justice of the French Épuration. It 
also offers valuable insight into his sophisticated attempts at whitewashing 
compromising elements from his own history.
In this study, I focus on both intellectuals’ political thought from the 
beginning of the 1930s to the early 1950s. As this period corresponds to the 
time of their ‘fascist drift’ during the 1930s, their involvement with intel-
lectual collaboration during the war and their ambiguous post-war position 
as extreme-rightists turning to neoliberal ideas, the main aim of this book is 
to analyse Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s political trajectory as the interplay of 
Europeanism, fascism and (neo-)liberalism, a topic that historiography has 
failed to treat in a proper way. Biographers Olivier Dard and Laurent Kestel 
mostly stress Jouvenel’s anger and frustration with established politics as 
the prime motivation behind his process of radicalisation.76 The author of an 
unpublished PhD dissertation on Bertrand de Jouvenel as a ‘disenchanted 
liberal’, written under the supervision of immunity theorist Serge Berstein, 
largely denies that Jouvenel was anything more than a ‘Platonic’ fascist very 
momentarily infected by the ‘brown Germanic contagion’.77 Fabre-Luce’s 
biographer even tries to justify his fascism as an understandable defensive 
reaction against the communist menace, much along the arguments ad-
vanced by Ernst Nolte during the German Historikerstreit.78 The American 
political scientist Daniel J. Mahoney has written a very sympathetic biogra-
phy of Jouvenel’s post-war ‘conservative liberal’ thought that is of little use 
for the period we are concerned with here. Mahoney, whose main aim is to 
prove the value and relevance of Jouvenel’s ideas for current-day use, tries 
to minimise Jouvenel’s fascist period. Altogether, he seems more shocked 
by the fact that Jouvenel supported the socialist François Mitterand during 
the 1981 French presidential elections than by his admiration for Hitler 
during the 1930s.79
Klaus-Peter Sick, a scholar of French liberalism, states that an elitist 
criticism of democracy led Jouvenel to fascist positions, while Fabre-Luce 
76 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 89; Kestel, ‘L’Engagement de Bertrand de Jouvenel au PPF’, 112.
77 Delbecque, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel ou le Libéral Désenchanté’, 435.
78 Garbe, Alfred Fabre-Luce, 147; Nolte, ‘Vergangenheit, die Nicht Vergehen Will’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (6 June 1986).
79 Mahoney, ‘A Symposium on Bertrand de Jouvenel: Introduction’, 37; idem, Bertrand de 
Jouvenel, 4. Jouvenel’s support of a fellow Vichyite and former sympathiser of the CdF who 
walked an equally winding political path is probably less surprising than it at f irst sight seems.
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was seduced by the concept of a strong authoritarian leader.80 In a contribu-
tion published in the French right-wing liberal review Commentaire – to 
which Fabre-Luce himself frequently contributed during the last f ive years 
of his life – Sick describes Fabre-Luce as essentially a liberal who was only 
seduced by certain superf icial aspects of fascism. He wrongly claims that, 
during the war, Fabre-Luce supported Vichy but retained a certain distance 
vis-à-vis the German new order. Sick’s suggestion that Fabre-Luce always 
stayed attached to ‘the essential elements of liberal centrism’ seems rather 
inspired by wishful thinking and a readiness to please his readers than by 
a thorough analysis of Fabre-Luce’s work from the early 1940s.81 Bruneteau, 
in his excellent study of the intellectual seduction of ‘Hitler’s new Europe’, 
does stress Europeanism and the concept of a new, ‘totalitarian democracy’. 
His analysis remains largely confined to the early 1940s, and he does not 
explore what happened to this Europeanism once the Nazis were gone.82
In their post-war memoirs, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce stress the social 
dimension of their move to the extreme right. Fabre-Luce wrote in 1962 
that, during the 1920s, he had too long believed in ‘fashionable liberalism’ 
but that the Great Depression opened his eyes. He came to believe that 
large-scale state intervention as promoted by ‘Keynes, Hitler and Roosevelt’ 
was necessary to restore the economy to a situation of full employment.83 
In his 1980 memoirs, Jouvenel focuses on the day his political hero Daladier 
became prime minister on 31 January 1933, one day after Hitler was named 
Reich Chancellor. Daladier’s subsequent failure to launch a New Deal 
programme along the lines of Roosevelt and Hitler left him with feelings 
of disappointment and anger, ‘with major consequences for my judgment 
and my conduct’.84 These explanations might have easily been influenced 
by the need to retroactively justify fascist political positions for a post-war 
audience. Regarding the general self-justifying tone of these publications 
as well as their possible deformation through hindsight, it is appropriate to 
concentrate on contemporary sources rather than on these later explana-
tions by the authors themselves.
The second element in this book is the development of the two intel-
lectuals’ political ideas after 1942, especially their relation to neoliberalism 
and the post-war extreme right. Although Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce both 
80 Sick, ‘Vom Neoliberalismus zum Faschismus?’, 65.
81 Sick, ‘Alfred Fabre-Luce et la Crise du Libéralisme’, 561.
82 Bruneteau, ‘Antiliberalismus und Totalitäre Verschwörung’, in Rechtsextreme Ideologien, 
ed. Backes, 134; idem, ‘L’Europe Nouvelle de Hitler’, 233.
83 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 165.
84 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 114.
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claimed that their wartime experience laid the basis for a return to the 
liberal democratic principles of their youth, many ambiguities remained. 
As public opinion associated them with fascism and collaboration, the years 
following the Liberation saw them in the position of outcasts resentful 
of Gaullism, the Resistance and the republican regime. Branded as col-
laborators and excluded from large sections of the post-war press, they were 
confined to publishing in extreme rightist newspapers and publishing their 
books outside France. Thanks to his Swiss exile, Jouvenel was the quickest 
of the two to adapt to the new circumstances. In his influential magnum 
opus Du Pouvoir, translated into English as On Power, he adopted a sceptical 
form of right-wing liberalism, convinced that both state power and the 
essentially irrational character of the masses could easily lead to tyranny.85 
Outside of France, this analysis caught the attention of neoliberal academics 
such as Friedrich Hayek and Wilhelm Röpke, who were equally sceptical of 
democratic society’s potential to survive. Jouvenel was quickly integrated 
into these international circles and became a founding member of the 
neoliberal Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. At the same time, he continued 
to associate himself with extreme-rightist and even royalist newspapers 
and journals.
Released from prison but condemned for ‘national indignity’ and partially 
stripped of his civil rights, Fabre-Luce initially maintained a principled re-
jection of the post-war order. In a series of brochures and books, he defended 
the position of Pétain and his supporters and strongly attacked De Gaulle, 
the Resistance and Marxist intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre. During the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, Fabre-Luce became a prominent and indefatigable 
spokesperson of former collaborators, Vichyites and other ‘victims’ of the 
French Épuration. He frequently published in the extreme-rightist monthly 
Les Écrits de Paris (as did Jouvenel) and even acted as editor-in-chief of the 
neo-fascist review Rivarol as late as 1955. But, paradoxically, in the mean-
time Fabre-Luce also began to reintegrate into the right-wing mainstream. 
His support for European integration and especially the project to create 
a European Defence Community in 1954 seems to have played a certain 
role in this development. Despite initially f ierce clashes, he became a close 
friend of Raymond Aron and eventually a regular contributor to Aron’s 
right-wing liberal journal Commentaire. Apart from the question mentioned 
above of fascism’s relationship to Europeanism, the treatment of Fabre-
Luce and Jouvenel’s post-war ideas and aff iliations also carries a broader 
relevance, since it could shed new light on three other larger questions: the 
85 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 26.
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intellectual relationship between fascism and neoliberalism, the character 
of the post-war ideological transformation of the French extreme right, and 
its relationship to fascism.
The f irst two chapters are dedicated to Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s ac-
tivities and ideas between the late 1920s and the outbreak of the Second 
World War. The f irst focuses on Europeanism and international contacts, 
while the second analyses the two intellectuals’ political and economic 
ideas for France as well as the national framework of their ‘fascist drift’. 
Chapter three provides an analysis of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s ideas and 
activities during the German occupation, including their attitude towards 
the prospect of a continental Europe under German occupation, issues of 
collaboration and attentisme (wait-and-see), Vichy and the Resistance. 
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the period from 1944 to the early 1950s, 
focusing on liberation, persecution and the relationship of both intellectuals 
to the post-war extreme right and the lasting importance of their European-
ist ideas. The f ifth and f inal chapter discusses the extent of rupture and 
continuity in the two intellectuals’ thoughts about neoliberalism during 
the same period.

1 ‘En Faisant l’Europe’
Internationalism and the Fascist Drift
‘La Nouvelle Génération Européenne’: Generational Politics in 
1920s France
Through their family background, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce encountered 
foreign ideas, languages and culture from a very young age. Both grew up as 
members of the French intellectual upper bourgeoisie in a privileged envi-
ronment of absent parents, foreign holidays and an important educational 
role played by British and German governesses. As the son of a diplomat, 
Fabre-Luce initially cherished a short-lived dream of a career in diplomacy, 
and in 1919 his father’s connections provided him with a six-month intern-
ship at the French embassy in London.1 Jouvenel’s father Henry de Jouvenel 
was a political writer and prominent member of the liberal Parti Radical, 
while his mother Claire Boas hosted a well-known political salon in Paris. 
It was through this salon that the young Bertrand met a great number of 
foreign politicians, especially around the time of the negotiations of the 
Paris peace treaties. He was impressed by the Czech politician Edvard Beneš, 
who together with his Slovakian colleague Milan Stefanik almost designed 
the new state of Czechoslovakia during an evening at the Jouvenels. In 
1924, Bertrand spent a few months in Prague as the personal secretary of 
president Beneš, and he also considered a career in international politics.2
Both these f irst diplomatic steps ended in failure – Jouvenel did not 
understand Czech and Fabre-Luce accidentally insulted King George by 
turning his back on him during a reception. They soon abandoned this 
career prospect to concentrate on journalism and political writing, which, 
along with the occasional novel or play, would be their main métier for the 
rest of their lives.3 In 1924, Fabre-Luce published La Victoire, a thoroughly 
researched study of international diplomacy before and after the First World 
War. In the f irst part of this sarcastically titled book, Fabre-Luce refuted the 
war guilt thesis according to which Germany had been solely responsibility 
for the outbreak of the conflict. Although this thesis held off icial status 
1 Garbe, Alfred Fabre-Luce, 70, 74.
2 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 17, 45; Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Tchéco… Slovaquie…’, Gringoire 
(25 March 1938).
3 Fabre-Luce, J’ai Vécu Plusieurs Siècles, 20; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 74.
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as a clause in the Versailles treaty that Germany had been forced to sign, 
he claimed that no serious historian defended it anymore. The Russians 
also had their share of responsibility, and so did even the wartime French 
president Raymond Poincaré, whom Fabre-Luce found to have encouraged 
the Tsar to take an aggressive stance during the July Crisis. The second part 
centred on post-war politics and described a fragile international order still 
under the spell of wartime antagonisms. Especially France, again under the 
leadership of Poincaré who had become prime minister in 1922, had been 
unable to ‘master its victory’ and work on a just international order. By 
sending French troops to occupy the Ruhr area after Germany defaulted on 
its payment of reparations, Poincaré had alienated France from the United 
Kingdom and resorted to the same kind of politics that had led to the war 
less than a decade before.4 In early 1920s France, Fabre-Luce’s conclusions 
were explosive. Although largely ignored in the nationalist press, the book 
sold well, was quickly translated into several foreign languages and became 
a reference work for historians of the First World War. It also earned him 
the lasting admiration of Thomas Mann, who wrote to thank him for his 
‘oeuvre pleine de liberté, de sagesse et d’humanité’ and who was impressed 
when introduced to Fabre-Luce during a visit to Paris in 1926.5
In his memoirs, Jouvenel pays respect to La Victoire as the book that 
defined his generation’s thought about international relations and war.6 For 
Fabre-Luce, Jouvenel and a larger group of young progressive-liberal French 
intellectuals, the Poincaré-led right-wing governments that had come to 
power after the 1919 elections represented a France that was stubbornly 
clinging to outdated nationalist politics. Instead of the logic of force and 
inequality behind the Versailles Treaty and the Ruhr occupation, they came 
to promote an international order built on justice and cooperation. Inspired 
by Woodrow Wilsons’s Fourteen Points and the foundation of the League of 
Nations but unsatisf ied with its realisations, they adhered to what Klaus-
Peter Sick has called a theory of interdependence in international relations.7 
The horrors of the war inspired them to refute traditional diplomacy’s 
doctrines of national sovereignty and balance of power. Although he f irst 
considered the League of Nations a vehicle for the victorious Entente powers 
4 Fabre-Luce, La Victoire, 417, 424.
5 Thomas Mann to Fabre-Luce (22 August 1924), Thomas Mann to Fabre-Luce (15 March 1931), 
Fonds Alfred Fabre-Luce, Archives Nationales de France, 472 AP 2. See also extract from Thomas 
Mann, Pariser Rechenschaft included in Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
6 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 77.
7 Klaus-Peter Sick, ‘De l’Unité et de la Multiplicité de l’Europe: “Réalisme” et “Pluralisme” 
1930-1950’, in Les Relèves en Europe, eds. Dard & Deschamps, 374.
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to consolidate their positions, Jouvenel quickly came to appreciate the 
Geneva-based organisation as a necessary step towards European union. 
This enthusiasm received a considerable boost during the middle of the 
1920s. The left won the 1924 elections and the Poincaré governments were 
replaced by an unstable series of minority governments led by the Parti 
Radical. Under the leadership of Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, France 
ended its occupation of the Ruhr and started to pursue a politics centred 
on improving international relations through the League of Nations. The 
Locarno treaties and the resulting German membership of the League 
further enhanced the reputation of this organisation in the eyes of Fabre-
Luce and Jouvenel.8
Around the same time, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel associated themselves 
with Jean Luchaire (1901-1946), a precocious journalist and essayist like 
them but politically more engaged since his earliest years. It is hard to 
overestimate Luchaire’s importance for the political development of Fabre-
Luce and Jouvenel.9 Luchaire was born in Siena, Italy to an intellectual and 
cosmopolitan French family and spent most of his youth between Paris and 
Florence, where his father Julien Luchaire founded the French Institute that 
is still extant today. During the First World War, the young Jean volunteered 
to work in military hospitals close to Grenoble and in Florence, after Italy 
entered the war in 1915, receiving a f irst impression of the horrendous 
consequences of modern industrial warfare. He met Jouvenel in 1920 and 
the two soon became inseparable friends, participating together in several 
internationalist youth organisations.10 In 1927, Luchaire founded the review 
Notre Temps, together with Émile Roche. Subtitled ‘Revue de la Nouvelle 
Génération Européenne’, Notre Temps and its associated publications as-
sumed a leading role in mobilising a group of young internationalist French 
intellectuals – amongst whom were Jouvenel, Fabre-Luce, but also Pierre 
Mendès-France, Henri Jeanson, Hubert Beuve-Méry, Pierre Brossolette and 
Jacques Kayser – while providing them with a political agenda and a strong 
generational identity.11
8 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Talleyrand aurait-il Siégé à la Société des Nations?’, L’Europe Nouvelle 
(13 March 1926), 884.
9 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 81. It is striking that even in his memoirs, just after mentioning 
Luchaire’s wartime career as the head of the collaborationist press off ice in Paris and his 
execution as a traitor in 1946, Jouvenel still paid hommage to him as ‘le plus brillant sujet de 
notre génération’.
10 Alden, ‘The Road to Collaboration’, 9, 24; Meletta, Jean Luchaire, 80.
11 Sick, ‘A Europe of Pluralist Internationalism’, 45.
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Like several other European countries, 1920s France witnessed a spread 
of generational discourses centred on the experience of the First World War. 
During the same decade, through the work of social scientists such as Karl 
Mannheim, the generational concept also acquired validity as an academic 
tool of analysis.12 Although generational discourses differed markedly from 
country to country – and competing versions could exist within a single 
country – a few interesting transnational commonalities can be identif ied. 
The war experience was often considered an essential divide between the 
old and the young, the latter having been fundamentally transformed by 
the experience of the conflict. The discourses often displayed a certain 
wariness with the rituals of parliamentary politics and with established 
ideologies such as (reformist) socialism, liberalism and conservatism. 
Instead of these ‘outdated’ political reflexes, they championed a ‘pragmatic’ 
and ‘unemotional’ approach to politics as a matter better left to technical 
‘experts’ rather than petty, squabbling party politicians. There was also a 
widespread feeling of urgency – the need to achieve radical reforms within 
a short time – possibly reinforced by the notion of a ‘missed opportunity’ 
(‘verpasste Chance’) by having been too young to f ight in the war. In several 
European countries, the 1920s saw a new political generation claim a central 
place in the reshaping of politics.13
In Luchaire and Jouvenel’s minds, their generation consisted of those who 
had been born around 1900. Through their specif ic experience of having 
been ‘raised by the war’ and coming of age during the conflict without 
having fought in it, Luchaire found his generation essentially different 
from both the older generation and the war veterans, their ‘older brothers’ 
who had proven themselves unwilling to build a new France once victory 
had been achieved. Instead, the veterans had retreated into private life, 
quietly accepting conservative government and failing to seize the political 
role that seemed reserved for them. This left only Luchaire’s generation 
to achieve radical reforms in both national and international politics.14 
Luchaire def ined his generation as ‘realistic’, unimpressed by ideological 
dogmas and instead favouring a concrete approach to political problems. 
His generational concept also bore technocratic and potentially elitist 
connotations: rather than trusting politicians and the machinations of 
12 Heinz Bude, ‘“Generation” im Kontext: Von den Kriegs- zu den Wohlfahrtsstaatsgenera-
tionen’, in Generationen, eds. Jureit & Wildt, 31.
13 See Herbert, ‘“Generation der Sachlichkeit”’, in Zivilisation und Barbarei, eds. Bajohr et 
al., 117; Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten; Wanrooij, ‘The Rise and Fall of Italian Fascism as a 
Generational Revolt’, 405.
14 Sirinelli, Génération Intellectuelle, 642, 643; Luchaire, Une Génération Réaliste, 20.
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parliament to deal with these problems, he felt these matters were better 
left to technically and economically trained ‘experts’.15
Its ‘European spirit’ was, according to Luchaire, what fundamentally 
separated the young generation from those rooted in the world before 
1914.16 But this is not to say that this ‘generation’ lacked older tutors or that 
these tutors were homogeneous. Campaigning in favour of the League of 
Nations brought Luchaire into close contact with Briand, who had been 
able to remain foreign minister after Poincaré’s return to power in 1926. 
His ministry came to provide considerable annual subsidies to Notre Temps, 
allowing it to become a weekly, and its contributors often accompanied 
Briand to Geneva to attend his speeches in front of the Assembly of the 
League.17 Through Bertrand’s uncle Robert de Jouvenel and through Roche, 
who were both important f igures in the Parti Radical and who acted like 
tutors of the young intellectuals, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were drawn closer 
to this party. They joined the group of ‘Young Turks’ around Daladier, who 
was triumphantly elected party leader in 1927.18
Fabre-Luce was a long-time admirer of Joseph Caillaux, the liberal 
reformist politician who had been arrested and imprisoned as a traitor in 
1918 for his wartime initiatives to end the war through a ‘paix blanche’, a 
peace without annexations. From the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Caillaux defended a progressive income tax, pacif ism and Franco-German 
rapprochement based on free trade and industrial relations, which exposed 
him to violent attacks by the nationalist right. Apart from these political 
reasons, the right also hated Caillaux because in early 1914 his wife had shot 
Gaston Calmette, the chief editor of Le Figaro, who had led a press campaign 
against her husband. The 1924 victory of the left permitted parliament to 
adopt an amnesty law, after which Caillaux resumed his political career 
and f igured as f inance minister in several governments. During this period, 
Fabre-Luce regularly met Caillaux. They became friends and in 1925 Caillaux 
even viewed the young writer as his political successor. Failing to achieve 
15 Luchaire, Une Génération Réaliste, 22; Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La Politique à Vingt Ans: 
Naissance d’une Génération’, Notre Temps (February 1929), 23; Jean Luchaire & Émile Roche, 
‘La Discipline Européenne’, Notre Temps (September 1927), 122; Fabre-Luce, Journal Intime 1937, 
6. See also Clarke, France in the Age of Organization, 8; Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 12.
16 Jean Luchaire & Émile Roche, ‘Frontières Spirituelles’, Notre Temps (October 1927), 2.
17 Jouvenel, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 273.
18 Claude Lévy, ‘Autour de Jean Luchaire. Le Cercle Éclaté de Notre Temps’, in Entre Locarno et 
Vichy, eds. Bock et al., 123; Binion, Defeated Leaders, 121; Georges Bonnet, ‘Les Idées des Jeunes 
d’Aujourd’hui’, L’Europe Nouvelle (7 January 1928), 6.
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this, Fabre-Luce instead became his biographer, and the two remained in 
touch until shortly before Caillaux’s death in 1944.19
During the 1920s, Luchaire was a stated enemy of Italian Fascism and a 
close friend of anti-fascist intellectuals like the brothers Carlo and Nello Ros-
selli and Gaetano Salvemini, who had become his stepfather after Luchaire’s 
mother remarried in 1916. But these credentials did not keep Luchaire’s writ-
ings from drawing the attention of Georges Valois.20 Before the First World 
War, Valois (a pseudonym of Alfred-Georges Gressent) had been a member 
of what Pierre Milza called ‘the Maurrassian left’. He started his political 
career on the extreme left as an anarchist and revolutionary syndicalist 
inspired by the ideas of Georges Sorel, the theoretician of mass psychology, 
myths and violence. After turning to the Action Française in 1906, Valois 
took the lead of the Cercle Proudhon, an intellectual initiative to create a 
synthesis of nationalism and revolutionary syndicalism that was to pave 
the way for an anti-republican alliance of the extreme left and right. Some 
historians, most notably Zeev Sternhell, consider the Cercle Proudhon as the 
intellectual birthplace of fascism due to its role in creating this synthesis.21
After the war and inspired by Mussolini’s March on Rome, Valois left 
Maurras’ monarchist phalanx to found Le Faisceau, France’s f irst attempt 
at a genuine fascist movement. Valois called upon all war veterans and 
‘producers’ to support the creation of a national state that would sweep 
away republican bourgeois mediocrity, restore ‘natural hierarchy’ under 
the rule of an authoritarian leader and create a ‘new elite’ by appointing 
war veterans at the head of private enterprises and various institutions of 
society. At the same time, Valois was careful not to entirely alienate the intel-
lectual bourgeoisie from his project, as he frequently stressed that especially 
young non-conformists and technical experts were more than welcome to 
contribute to the renewal of France as members of its new elite. Despite initial 
signs of success and lavish subsidies from the perfume tycoon François Coty, 
which permitted Valois to start the mass daily Le Nouveau Siècle, Le Faisceau 
never achieved large support and quickly went down under the pressure of 
f ierce competition from the Action Française and other right-wing ligues.22
19 ‘Réflexions 1924-1928’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 1; Caillaux to Fabre-Luce (7 March 1933), 
Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2; Fabre-Luce, Caillaux. Caillaux wrote Fabre-Luce to thank him for his 
‘beautiful’ biography.
20 Alden, ‘The Road to Collaboration’, 14, 21, 60.
21 Sternhell, La Droite Révolutionnaire, 405; Mazgaj, The Action Française and Revolutionary 
Syndicalism, 214-15.
22 Douglas, From Fascism to Libertarian Communism, 92, 104; Amzalak, Fascists and Honorable 
Men, 72.
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His failure to rally the war veterans behind his project left Valois 
disappointed with the conservatism and political inertia of these former 
soldiers – a dismay he shared with Luchaire, Jouvenel and their ‘genera-
tion’. Instead, Valois now turned to them and other representatives of the 
‘Young Turks’ inside the Radical Party as well as future neosocialists and 
dissident members of the French Socialist Party, hoping they would be 
the vanguard of a revolutionary remaking of France along technocratic 
corporatist lines. Abandoning his aspirations to be a fascist leader and 
retreating to publishing and editing, Valois became the publisher of 
both Luchaire and Jouvenel’s f irst books through his book series of the 
Bibliothèque Syndicaliste.23 In a further attempt to realise a synthesis of 
technical experts and progressive non-conformist intellectuals, Valois also 
founded the periodical Les Cahiers Bleus, which published contributions 
from Jouvenel, Luchaire, Pierre Dominique, Marcel Déat, André Philippe 
and Paul Marion. Despite some striking commonalities between the ideas 
of Le Faisceau and members of the ‘young generation’, these connections 
could hardly be seen at the time as a sign of outright fascist aff iliation on 
the part of Jouvenel and Luchaire. After the failure of Le Faisceau, Valois 
started moving to the left again, and he would end his life in 1945 as an 
imprisoned Resistance f ighter at the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. 
Valois later expressed his disappointment at seeing so many of the young 
intellectuals he had tutored end up associating themselves with fascism 
and collaboration.24
The turn of the 1930s saw a radicalisation of the Europeanism espoused 
by Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce. While they had f irst only supported the Eu-
ropean project as the best guarantee against future war, it soon became 
the very core of their political agenda. Back in 1927, in Locarno sans Rêves, 
Fabre-Luce positively compared the League of Nations to the balance-of-
power system of the late nineteenth century and called on support for the 
League of Nations out of pragmatic reasons including enlightened national 
self-interest.25 A few years later, this stance was not enough for him. As 
the beginning of the economic recession and the decline of the Locarno 
collective security system began to make themselves felt, the sense of crisis 
did not milden their Europeanist convictions – instead, it encouraged 
23 Milza, Fascisme Français, 93-109; Jouvenel, L’Économie Dirigée. In his memoirs, Jouvenel 
praised Valois and defended his editorship of his f irst book: ‘En ce temps-là on ne demandait 
pas compte aux gens de leurs attitudes passées’. See Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 82.
24 Amzalak, Fascists and Honorable Men, 76.
25 Fabre-Luce, Locarno sans Rêves, 222.
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them to continue at increased speed. In 1930, Jouvenel published Vers les 
États-Unis d’Europe in which he rejected the ‘powerless’ League of Nations 
system and called for the quick realisation of a European state. He took the 
American founding father Alexander Hamilton as an example and wanted, 
much like Pierre Drieu la Rochelle at the time, a European nationalism to 
replace the old narrow-minded nationalisms. From a global perspective, 
the differences between European nations and cultures were minimal, 
and they had to be overcome if Europe wanted to keep its dominant posi-
tion vis-à-vis the rising superpowers in the East and the West. Europe 
already had an own identity, which was mainly constructed in opposition 
to the ‘despotism’ of Asia and the ‘plutocracy’ of the United States. In his 
last chapter, Jouvenel showed the degree to which Europe had in his eyes 
become a panacea to all the problems of his time: ‘On ne peut réaliser le 
Désarmement qu’en faisant l’Europe. On ne peut organiser la répression de 
la guerre qu’en faisant l’Europe. On ne peut restaurer l’État qu’en faisant 
l’Europe.’26
26 Jouvenel, Vers les États-Unis d’Europe, 205. See also Drieu la Rochelle, L’Europe contre les 
Patries, 139; Luchaire, Vers les États Fédérés d’Europe.
Figure 1  Alfred Fabre-Luce (l.) and Bertrand de Jouvenel (r.), around 1930
source: Roger Viollet / Hollandse Hoogte source: Roger Viollet / Hollandse Hoogte
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Reconciliation with Germany at All Costs?
In international politics, European peace and cooperation meant above 
all Franco-German reconciliation. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce called for 
revisions to the Versailles Treaty and participated in several initiatives 
to establish contacts with German representatives of their generation. 
As Jouvenel described six years later, the f irst post-war meeting with a 
German delegation during a Prague youth congress in 1923 left him feeling 
more French than ever, but later contacts were less tense.27 Relations were 
established between the Notre Temps group and non-conformist elements 
of the German progressive youth movement. Wolfgang Stresemann, the son 
of the German foreign minister, published an article in Notre Temps on ‘the 
young German generation’, and Luchaire was given the chance to develop 
his generational points of view in the German press.28
The most lasting contacts were established through Otto Abetz (1903-
1958). During a visit to Paris, Abetz, at the time the head of the Circle of 
Karlsruhe Youth Organisations, invited the Notre Temps group, along with 
representatives of other receptive French youth associations, to a meeting 
with various representatives of German youth movements on the Sohlberg, 
a low mountain in the Black Forest not far from the French border. Through 
the pines, the Sohlberg offered a view of the cathedral of Strasbourg. Held 
in the summer of 1930 in a deliberately unacademic, all-male atmosphere of 
camping, hiking, singing and campfire chats, the Sohlberg meeting was a 
great success, and it marked the beginning of a permanent Sohlberg Circle 
that organised youth meetings in France and Germany. Common points in 
the generational discourse of the participating French and German youth 
organisations played an important role in bringing them together in an 
atmosphere in which their very real political differences were cloaked by 
a meta-political form of spiritual aff inity.29
Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce did not attend the 1930 meeting, but they were 
present in subsequent years. When Luchaire could not attend a reunion in 
Berlin in January 1934, Jouvenel – who had become president of the associ-
ated Comité d’Entente de la Jeunesse Française pour le Rapprochement 
27 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La Politique à Vingt Ans’, Notre Temps (February 1929), 84.
28 Wolfgang Stresemann, ‘La Jeune Génération Allemande et les Problèmes de l’Heure’, Notre 
Temps (July 1929), 145; Luchaire, ‘Eine Realistische Generation’, 429.
29 Rita Thalmann, ‘Du Cercle de Sohlberg au Comité France-Allemagne: Une Évolution 
Ambiguë de la Coopération Franco-Allemande’, in Entre Locarno et Vichy, eds. Bock et al., 67; 
Ray, Annäherung an Frankreich im Dienste Hitlers?, 81.
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Franco-Allemand – instead headed the French delegation.30 In a report 
written by Jouvenel in preparation of the Berlin trip, he mentioned the 
diff icult situation of the Comité d’Entente, which had come under attack 
from both the ‘anti-German’ right and the ‘anti-Hitlerian’ left. Nonetheless, 
the Committee and its member organisations were convinced that the quest 
for reaching ‘a common vocabulary’ between French and German youth 
was too important to be abandoned merely ‘for political reasons’.31 This 
position was supported by a plethora of associated youth organisations, from 
Marc Sangnier’s pacif ist Catholic Le Sillon via the ‘Jeunesses Démocrates 
Populaires’ to the ‘University Group in Support of the League of Nations’ 
[‘Groupement Universitaire pour la SDN’]. A representative of Gustave 
Hervé’s fascist Milice Socialiste Nationale was more outspoken: his organisa-
tion had always been in favour of reconciliation, ‘whether with Stresemann’s, 
Brüning’s or Hitler’s Germany’, and it considered reconciliation with Hitler 
‘not more diff icult, but more effective’, since Hitler’s government better 
reflected ‘the German temperament’. Even Rudolf Sobernheim, representing 
the exiled Germans in opposition to National Socialism – those who, he 
stressed, ‘used to be the ones f ighting for Franco-German rapprochement’ 
– indicated that the meeting should continue, since they did not want to 
‘play the role of the Coblenz émigrés’.32
Jouvenel’s private papers reveal an elaborate correspondence with Abetz, 
who organised the practicalities of the trip. Abetz was happy to announce 
that beds had been found at youth hostels in the city centre and that, in line 
with the committee’s wishes, it would be strictly a youth meeting ‘without 
off icial ceremonies’. Those who wished so were welcome to attend ‘une 
grande soirée hitlérienne’ as well as a lunch at the Hotel Adlon organised 
by the Reichsjugendführung. ‘For you personally’, Abetz continued, ‘we 
have planned several meetings with German captains of industry and I 
think you will be interested’.33 Although in his memoirs Jouvenel tries to 
minimise the importance of the Berlin meeting, he was still impressed 
by his experience of the German capital under National-Socialist rule, 
especially when contrasted with the ‘chaos’ he had found when he visited 
the city two years earlier. Drieu accompanied Jouvenel to Berlin, and his 
experience of the fanaticism and discipline of the Hitler Youth marked 
30 Unteutsch, Vom Sohlbergkreis zur Gruppe Collaboration, 87.
31 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La Jeunesse Française et le Rapprochement Franco-Allemand’, folder 
‘1933’, Fonds Bertrand de Jouvenel, Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF), Don 90 39 (52).
32 Jouvenel, ‘La Jeunesse Française et le Rapprochement Franco-Allemand’.
33 Letters from Abetz to Jouvenel included in folder ‘1933’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (52).
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an important step in his conversion to fascism.34 During 1934, Jouvenel 
brought Abetz into contact with several key personalities within the French 
veterans’ organisations. Henri Pichot, leader of the left-wing Union Fédérale 
des Anciens Combattants, showed considerable enthusiasm for a reconcili-
ation ceremony with German veterans, and even Jean Goy of the right-wing 
Union Nationale des Combattants was won over. After meeting Hitler in 
Berlin in November 1934 (through an invitation organised by Abetz), Goy 
told Jouvenel he used to have little faith in reconciliation with a republican 
government that was ‘not really in charge’ in Germany. But with Hitler, 
Germany f inally had ‘a stable government’ that allowed for ‘long-term 
agreements’.35
By this time, the ‘youthful’ element of the meetings had lost most of 
its importance. The Sohlberg Circle had evolved from a youth platform 
into the Comité France-Allemagne (CFA), a club of cultural and political 
writers centred on the bilingual review Cahiers Franco-Allemands / Deutsch-
Französische Monatshefte. Although Abetz may have adhered to social 
democracy in the 1920s and kept presenting himself in France as a man of 
the left, by 1933 he proved more than willing to accommodate himself to 
Hitler’s rule, moving tactically between rivalling Nazi institutions to play 
as big a role as possible. The German foreign off ice funded the bilingual 
review and several of Abetz’s initiatives, rightly supposing that they were 
an excellent tool to seduce a considerable part of the French intelligentsia 
into accepting the Third Reich.36 Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel proved to be 
an easy catch. Their conceptions of Europe and peace were so intimately 
linked to Franco-German rapprochement that there seemed to be no 
alternative to this politics. Already in 1926 in private writings, Fabre-Luce 
considered Germany the only way of salvation for France. He lamented 
the predominance of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture and the ‘Americanisation’ of 
Paris, which he held responsible for the spread of ‘European decadence’. 
Like the Paneuropean Movement of the count Coudenhove-Kalergy, with 
whom he had several meetings at the time, Fabre-Luce imagined Europe as 
34 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 202; Drieu la Rochelle, Socialisme Fasciste, 202. Jouvenel seems to 
have played a certain role in bringing Drieu into contact with Abetz, who was eager to present 
him with the marvels of National Socialism. Abetz obtained an invitation for Drieu to attend 
the 1935 Nuremberg Party Rally and to visit a Nazi elite school at the Pomeranian castle of 
Krössinsee in 1936. See Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Français, 107.
35 Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Français, 72, 79; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 203. These reconciliation 
attemps led to little more than two joint Franco-German veterans meetings, in Besançon in 
1935 and at Douaumont in 1936. Duroselle, ed., La Décadence, 207.
36 Bruneteau, ‘L’Europe Nouvelle de Hitler’, 234; Unteutsch, Vom Sohlbergkreis, 95.
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a continental civilisation, both a political and a cultural centre of gravity 
between Asia and the United States.37 Coudenhove even asked Fabre-Luce 
to head his movement’s French section, which the latter politely declined 
while assuring Coudenhove of his complete agreement on the necessity of 
propaganda for the European idea.38
In Fabre-Luce’s view, with such an important objective in mind, how 
could the rise of Hitler bring any change to this agenda of reconciliation? 
Indeed, during the f irst years after Hitler’s coming to power, Jouvenel and 
Fabre-Luce took pains to stress that nothing had changed and that the 
League of Nations system would continue to function. In private, Fabre-Luce 
thought that Nazi rule was a passing phenomenon in a Germany on its way 
to ‘communism or the republic’.39 In public, he stated that the biggest danger 
to European peace was not the fascist regimes but the panicked reaction 
against them in the French press. An understandable antipathy toward the 
fascist regimes should not inspire French foreign policy: ‘Un vrai libéral ne 
doit pas vouloir imposer le libéralisme.’ Hitler might be an ‘anti-European, 
prisoner of a bellicose demagogy’, but he would continue on the path to 
Franco-German reconciliation, as this was manifestly in the interest of 
his country. If Hitler did not seize the chances for peace and international 
cooperation, he would be confronted with a strong liberal opposition. If 
France fought off its ‘absurd collective psychosis’ and if it were willing to 
revise the Versailles Treaty, it was still possible to realise a large project of 
European union in which ‘borders would become irrelevant’.40
Jouvenel showed the same degree of underestimation and misinterpreta-
tion of National Socialism, which was later joined by an increasing admira-
tion. In 1930, when visiting Munich to report on the German parliamentary 
elections, Jouvenel attended two Hitler speeches which failed to make 
much of an impression on him. On the f irst occasion, he found himself in 
a largely empty circus tent in which a handful of ‘fat-bellied Austrians and 
boy scouts’ had apparently been the only ones willing to pay the 10-pfennig 
entrance fee for listening to an incoherent political monologue. A few days 
later, Jouvenel did f ind the tent packed with people, but he quickly noticed 
that a large part of the audience consisted of Hitler’s own men, uniformed 
SA storm troopers who had been herded into the tent to give their leader 
37 Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 1.
38 Lubor Jilek, ‘Paneurope Entre 1923 et 1940’, 421.
39 Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 1.
40 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Contre la Manifestation Gide’, Pamphlet (31 March 1933), 9; idem, ‘La 
Paix en Quelques Mots’, Pamphlet (14 April 1933), 2; idem, ‘Comment Vaincre Hitler?’, Pamphlet 
(14 April 1933), 4.
‘EN FAIsANT L’EUROPE’ 57
the appearance of mass support. Otherwise, Jouvenel was struck by the 
overrepresentation of women and youth. Ironically titling the article ‘What 
is Menacing World Peace’, Jouvenel criticised French nationalists who 
were taking Hitler’s rise as a pretext for pushing French politics towards 
rearmament and away from international reconciliation.41 In a speech at 
the October 1930 congress of the Parti Radical, Jouvenel evoked his Munich 
experiences and tried to explain the Hitler phenomenon through a typical 
series of comparisons with the French past: ‘We have seen this: f irst Thiers 
(or Stresemann). Then the election of MacMahon (or Hindenburg). Then 
f inally the Hitlerian (or Boulangist) movement.’ But he also linked ‘Hitler’s 
whiteshirts’ [sic] to related phenomena in Italy, Austria and Hungary and 
to the French Jeunesses Patriotes and Action Française.42
During the following years, Jouvenel did become aware of the significance 
of Hitler and his party. By 1934, he had to concede that Hitler’s popularity 
had not been as short-lived as General Boulanger’s mass appeal. In a long 
article, he advised the French not to expect a quick end to Nazism in Ger-
many but to instead hope for an ‘authoritarian regime’ for France, as this 
would make it easier to solve international conflicts by taking ‘drastic steps’. 
Jouvenel explained National Socialism as essentially an attempt to organise 
and rationalise the economy at the national level after the failure of inter-
national socialism to coordinate the economy by international agreements. 
According to Jouvenel, this project need not be a menace to international 
relations and the chances of peace: ‘It is the task of the new generations to 
see to it that these different national socialisms do not turn into nationalist 
socialisms.’43 He blamed the failure of the 1934 disarmament negotiations 
on France, whose weapons industry had exploited the unpopularity of the 
Hitler regime to sabotage a unique chance of ‘pacifying Europe’.44
Through these statements, the two intellectuals were engaging them-
selves along the lines of an anti-leftist neo-pacif ism, which was gaining 
ground in 1930s France.45 Blaming the danger of war on the ‘bellicosity’ of 
the French left, they held French communism, socialism and anti-fascist 
intellectuals such as André Gide and André Malraux responsible for missed 
chances for coming to a fundamental agreement that Germany was sup-
posedly offering. Jouvenel’s most well-known manifestation of this attitude 
41 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Ce Qui Menace la Paix du Monde’, L’Oeuvre (13 September 1930); idem, 
[untitled], L’Oeuvre (16 September 1930).
42 A transcript of Jouvenel’s speech is included in Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (11).
43 Jouvenel, ‘Réflexions sur les Rapports Franco-Allemands’.
44 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Ils Nous Donneront des Fusils…’, La Lutte des Jeunes (10 June 1934).
45 Vaïsse, ‘Der Pazif ismus und die Sicherheit Frankreichs’, 605.
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is his notorious Hitler interview of February 1936, a few days before the 
German remilitarisation of the Rhineland, during which he showed himself 
impressed by the ‘giant task’ the Führer had assigned himself of ‘putting 
an end to the old French-German hatred’.46
In Fabre-Luce’s writings, this pacif ism sometimes took on anti-Semitic 
dimensions. In an article discussing European problems ‘from a racial point 
of view’, Fabre-Luce called Arthur de Gobineau ‘possibly the most important 
writer for today’s Europe’. He refuted Nazi ideas of racial purity as an illusion, 
but he also tried to explain anti-Semitism as the understandable hatred of 
the poor Austrian peasantry against rich and hedonistic Vienna, which was 
‘dominated by the Jews’. The French media had been justif ied in criticising 
the ‘excesses’ of German anti-Semitism, but too much indignation was 
misplaced, as France’s allies Poland and Romania had known persecutions 
that were ‘much worse’ than what was happening in Germany. Most impor-
tantly, France should put strict limits on Jewish immigration, since it was 
already receiving the ‘worst elements’ of German Jewry. Jewish immigration 
even meant a danger to international peace, since ‘Hitler’s anti-Semitic 
persecutions have been followed by a Jewish counter-offensive’ inciting 
France to go to war with its eastern neighbour. ‘Against this provocation’, 
Fabre-Luce concluded, ‘French anti-Semitism or anti-Marxism can turn out 
to be legitimate defence movements, or a kind of tolerance’.47
This attitude was reinforced by admiration for the fascist dictators, whom 
Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce had the honour of meeting in person. In his Hitler 
interview, organised by Abetz and held at the Führer’s mountain retreat in 
Berchtesgaden,48 Jouvenel described Hitler as ‘completely different from the 
way I expected him to be’. Instead of the frightful dictator doing everything 
to impress his visitor, as he had found Mussolini during an earlier trip to 
Rome, Jouvenel was confronted with a ‘modest’ man dressed in a khaki 
suit who sat down next to him at a small table and repeatedly patted him 
on the shoulder. Hitler was ‘un homme de sport’ with ‘beautiful hands’ 
and a sincere will of peace. When Jouvenel confronted him with radically 
anti-French citations from Mein Kampf, Hitler responded by stressing that 
it was a book he wrote in prison as a young man at a time when the Ruhr 
was occupied by French troops. The text did not need to be rectif ied in 
46 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘“Soyons amis”: Interview avec Adolf Hitler’, Paris-Midi (29 February 
1936). See also Fabre-Luce, Le Secret de la République, 200.
47 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Les Querelles de Races’, Pamphlet (15 December 1933); idem, ‘Faux 
Départ’, Pamphlet (23 February 1934).
48 See also Abetz, Das Offene Problem, 78.
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later editions, according to Hitler: ‘My rectif ication? I’m giving it every 
day with my foreign policy that is fully oriented towards friendship with 
France!’49 In 1938, having obtained an off icial invitation through Abetz, 
Jouvenel attended the Nazi party rally in Nuremberg – a privilege very 
seldom accorded to foreign guests.50 In the same way, Fabre-Luce showed 
himself deeply impressed after a private meeting with Mussolini in early 
1934. Describing the Duce as an authentic, great man, ‘animated by the soil, 
the people and history’, Fabre-Luce concluded that France had a lot to learn 
from his fascist regime.51
In November 1934, the famous feminist journalist Louise Weiss, no longer 
believing in the League of Nations she had championed for many years, 
abandoned her position at the head of L’Europe Nouvelle, the prestigious 
Europeanist weekly she had founded in 1920 and headed ever since. The 
board of editors was split over the question of whether the European project 
could continue after the coming to power of Hitler. A considerable group 
agreed with Weiss that nothing could be done and left the periodical in her 
wake, while those who believed in rapprochement stayed. Within a week’s 
time, Fabre-Luce took Weiss’ place as the editor in chief. Closely involving 
Jouvenel, Drieu and Pierre Dominique with the weekly, he steered it towards 
the neo-pacif ist line of continued rapprochement with Germany.
This is not to say that Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel welcomed all of Hitler’s 
political moves. While they initially continued believing in the vitality 
of the League of Nations system, developments in international politics 
gradually led both intellectuals to change their minds. They supported 
the April 1934 Stresa agreements between France, Great Britain and Italy 
as an eff icient way to contain German expansion (and to convince Hitler 
to return to the negotiating table), and they severely criticised Britain and 
France when this alliance fell apart as a result of Italy’s invasion of Abys-
sinia.52 Although writing in a more pessimistic tone about the menace of 
49 Jouvenel, ‘“Soyons amis”’.
50 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 322. Private notes suggest that Jouvenel had another private meeting 
with Mussolini on 3 June 1936, but he was not allowed to comment on it in the French press. See 
‘Documents diplomatiques français’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (12).
51 Capitals by Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Interprétation de Mussolini’, Pamphlet (19 January 1934); 
idem, ‘Le Fascisme est-il Exportable?’, Pamphlet (19 January 1934).
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‘Scandale International’, L’Europe Nouvelle (21 December 1935). The signatories to the Stresa 
agreement reaff irmed the Locarno Treaties, guaranteed the independence of Austria and 
pledged to resist any further German attempt to change the Treaty of Versailles.
60 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
war, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel continued to consider Hitler’s foreign policy 
as led by essentially rational considerations. They were convinced that 
through clever diplomatic moves, France could make Germany see ‘no 
other solution than peace’.53
In his 1974 memoirs, Fabre-Luce prided himself on his last editorial in 
L’Europe Nouvelle. From the same post-World-War-II perspective, Raymond 
Aron and Daniel Garbe, his very sympathetic biographer, joined him in this 
praise.54 In the article, which appeared in late January 1936 – less than two 
months before the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland – Fabre-Luce 
envisaged the event and correctly estimated its political consequences. With 
the Rhineland effectively closed to French troops, France would have no 
means to enforce its Eastern European treaties, Fabre-Luce stated. Consider-
ing the evident fact that Germany was engaged in a politics of aggressive 
expansion into new ‘virgin territories’ in Eastern Europe, France was left with 
two political options: either to pre-emptively occupy the Rhineland together 
with the British or to try to satisfy Germany through territorial, political and 
economic concessions at the expense of France’s eastern allies. The risk of the 
f irst option was an escalation into a European war, while the second option 
carried the risk of being interpreted as an encouragement by a Germany 
whose ‘hunger grows while eating’. Doing nothing was worse still, since 
it would inevitably lead to a later war, ‘under less favourable conditions’.55
While the article gave a correct estimation of the implications of re-
militarisation, it did not mark a fundamental shift in Fabre-Luce’s attitude. 
On the contrary, after the victory of the Popular Front in May 1936 and 
their association with the PPF, both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s sympathy 
for Germany grew again. They even partially returned to the idea of Eu-
ropeanism, albeit in a different form than before. Instead of the League 
of Nations model, they now came to advocate the concept of a European 
federation based on treaties between a smaller number of large, authoritar-
ian states with their spheres of influence and colonial dependencies. This 
new conception went along with some technical large-scale projects from 
their Notre Temps days, such as the joint exploitation of colonial empires, 
which Jouvenel enthusiastically proposed in a German-language article 
53 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Nouvelles Considérations sur la Prochaine Guerre’, L’Europe Nouvelle 
(16 March 1935).
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in the Cahiers Franco-Allemands.56 Even the countries of Eastern Europe 
could become parts of a Franco-German colonial empire, Jouvenel sug-
gested in early 1938. A trip through Romania and the Balkan countries left 
him with little hope about the capacities of these ‘invertebrate nations’ to 
exist independently. He proposed that France and Germany jointly found 
a ‘Europe Company’, modelled after the colonial chartered companies of 
the eighteenth century, to assure the rational exploitation of the Balkan 
territories.57 Jouvenel continued to blame the international tension almost 
exclusively on France. He accused Prime Minister Léon Blum of refusing 
offers of friendship by Mussolini and Hitler because he was only serving 
the interests of the Socialist International rather than France. Instead of 
reconciling itself with Germany and Italy, France had signed a treaty with 
the Soviet Union, abandoning its foreign policy to ‘Potemkin’ and raising 
‘all of Europe against us’.58
Metaphysical Europeanism
In 1937, Fabre-Luce imagined a peaceful international order dominated 
by ‘f ive of six’ great powers (he failed to name them, but probably meant 
France, Germany, Britain, Italy, the Soviet Union and a future Francoïst 
Spain), bringing all smaller countries under their respective spheres of influ-
ence. These smaller powers would lose their independence, but they would 
profit from being part of a ‘larger organisation’. German racism was one of 
the best guarantees against further expansion, since ‘out of hygiene, it shuns 
annexing other peoples’.59 One year later, he even directly contradicted his 
own Rhineland article by stating that only ‘bellicose’ demagogues of the 
extreme left wanted France to pre-emptively go to war, pretending that it 
was in any case inevitable in the long run, ‘under less favourable condi-
tions’.60 France could save the peace only by allowing Germany ‘free hands’ 
in Eastern Europe, by ending ‘decadence’ and giving itself a strong regime, a 
French version of what had already been achieved in Italy and Germany. If 
56 Jouvenel, ‘Das Französische Weltreich’, 104.
57 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Notes sur une Tournée en Europe Centrale du 15 Février au 2 Mars 
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France continued to fail at this job, it would inevitable become ‘Germany’s 
vassal, progressively through peace or brutally through war’.61 Looking back 
at his engagements during the past f ifteen years, Fabre-Luce resumed his 
political convictions in the battle cry ‘Contre la guerre d’Occident! Contre 
le bolchevisme!’ Of course, he admitted, complex political problems could 
not be solved so easily, but it was at least a beginning and there was no time 
for doubt. ‘We will doubt no more, as long as we have not saved Europe.’62
Around the same time, possibly in reaction to the bleak political perspec-
tives for peace and European integration during the late 1930s, the Europe-
anism of both intellectuals gained spiritual and metaphysical dimensions. 
Fabre-Luce – seemingly foreshadowing Mircea Eliade – reflected on the 
metaphysical identity of his European generation engaged in a search for an 
‘Eternal Return’, deepening ‘the experience of the Moment’ and ‘reshaping 
the Sacred’. Jouvenel longed for a situation where the spiritual and the 
temporal would overlap, as in the Arabian Peninsula under Muhammad 
during the f irst years of Islam. Regrettably, Western society was hopelessly 
divided, not only between spiritual and secular powers but also within the 
spiritual sphere between rival beliefs and ideologies, with communism 
playing an especially disruptive role. Because of these divisions, modern 
man was lost in the world, a prey to cynicism and scepticism. While the new 
regimes attempted to solve this crisis by acting as a necessary ‘organising 
authority’ restoring a coherent social sphere, they were confronted with 
opposition from the side of the Church and ‘so-called humanists’ claiming to 
defend general principles but in fact only prolonging Europe’s state of crisis.63
For inspiration, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel mainly looked abroad. Aware 
of the disaster that a public association with Hitler would mean for his 
party, Doriot repeatedly stressed that the PPF was thoroughly French and 
that neither its doctrine nor its ideas were imported from abroad. This did 
not keep the two intellectuals from travelling to France’s neighbouring 
countries in search of political examples that reflected their aspirations. 
Apart from the two fascist regimes, they were also interested in related 
movements in Belgium, Britain and Spain. When the Spanish Civil War 
broke out in July 1936, Jouvenel crossed the frontier at Irun and became 
one of the f irst French journalists to report from the insurgents’ side.64 He 
met the generals Emilio Mola and Francisco Franco as well as José Antonio 
61 Ibid., 224, 237.
62 Fabre-Luce, Journal Intime, 238.
63 Ibid., 236; Jouvenel, Le Réveil de l’Europe, 279, 283.
64 Davis, A Fearful Innocence, 135, 140.
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Primo de Rivera, the leader of the fascist Falange movement, and was im-
pressed by their dedication. When Primo de Rivera was killed by Alicante 
republicans in November 1936, Jouvenel praised him as a martyr who had 
inspired young Spaniards to sacrif ice themselves for their fatherland. His 
death was a great loss to Spain, Jouvenel argued, because Primo de Rivera 
had dedicated his life to ‘the social ideal of class fusion within a fraternal 
community’.65 Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s articles on Spain betray a definite 
sympathy for the insurgents’ side, blaming the outbreak of the war on the 
republican Frente Popular government and using the Spanish example as 
a warning for the kind of damage the French Popular Front could inflict.66 
Largely along the lines of other fascist French writers like Drieu and Robert 
Brasillach, they depicted Spain as ‘a different world’, a country of strong 
believers rooted in the traditions of Medieval chivalry and the ‘example of 
the conquistadors’ and willing to give their lives in defence of their faith.67
In Belgium, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel were fascinated by the quick rise of 
the young Walloon fascist Léon Degrelle and his Rexist movement, which 
won more than 11 % of the votes at the 1936 parliamentary elections. Degrelle 
concluded from this victory that he was close to seizing power through legal 
means, much like Hitler in 1933, but he was weakened by repeated disavow-
als of his party by the Belgian Catholic Church and in subsequent years lost 
support. Fabre-Luce met Degrelle and admired his dynamism and youthful 
charm.68 Jouvenel also met the Flemish fascist Joris van Severen, who had 
founded the Verdinaso movement which campaigned for a corporatist 
Greater-Dutch state including all three Benelux countries plus the French 
part of Flanders. Despite being a radical anti-Semite, Van Severen despised 
Germany almost as much, telling Jouvenel he hated the ‘Hitlerians’.69
Despite these encounters, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s sympathies were 
divided between Degrelle and the very government he was f ighting, a big 
coalition of socialists, Catholics and liberals that had adopted large parts of 
65 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘On a Tué un Chef: José Antonio’, L’Assaut (24 November 1936); Jouvenel, 
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the ‘planist’ programmes of Hendrik de Man and Paul-Henri Spaak.70 When 
the government took energetic measures against Degrelle and Spaak spoke 
of founding an ‘authoritarian democracy’, Jouvenel praised the initiative: 
‘The speech should be read with care. It’s about infusing enough fascism 
into democracy as to immunise it against fascism.’71 Fabre-Luce, who had 
already met the English fascist Oswald Mosley in 1933, thought likewise 
about the chances of fascism in Belgium and Britain. He was unsure whether 
fascism could be effective and relevant in countries with streamlined and 
‘authoritarian’ democratic systems, the very elements he had little hope 
of seeing established in France.72 He explained that, contrary to the Third 
Republic, the British system worked because it artif icially created stable 
majorities and kept public opinion at a certain distance from government. 
Most importantly, the British political parties created a natural elite that 
was up to its tasks. The parties functioned as ‘schools of Führers’ who were 
‘chosen from adolescence, trained in athletes’ schools, imposed upon the 
people and assured, even while in power, of long periods of rest that keep 
them worthy and serene’.73
The Sudeten Crisis in August-September 1938 may have contributed to 
both intellectuals leaving Doriot’s PPF,74 but it could not fundamentally 
detach them from their pacif ist and Europeanist convictions. Jouvenel, 
making good use of his long-standing relations with Beneš, visited 
Czechoslovakia twice in 1938, writing long articles for the French mass 
press. During a conversation with Beneš in March, at the time of the An-
schluss, Jouvenel noted that the Czechoslovakian president manifested 
his conf idence in French guarantees of his country’s independence. In 
late September, during the Munich negotiations, Jouvenel visited the 
Sudeten area and several Czechoslovak cities, witnessing the populations’ 
anger and despair when it became clear that France was abandoning its 
ally by refusing to assist the country militarily in the case of a German 
attack.75
70 Fabre-Luce, ‘La Défaite de Degrelle’; Bertand de Jouvenel, ‘Une Expérience Belge Commence’, 
Vu (27 March 1935). For a longer treatment of De Man and planism, see the next chapter.
71 Bertrand de Jouvenel, [no title], Vu (21 October 1936).
72 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Conversation avec Sir Oswald Mosley’, Pamphlet (19 May 1933); idem, 
‘Rex et l’Assaut ’, L’Assaut (13 April 1937).
73 Fabre-Luce, Journal Intime, 98.
74 For a larger treatment of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s activities as members of the PPF, see 
the next chapter.
75 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Tchéco… Slovaquie…’, Gringoire (25 March 1938); idem, Un Voyageur, 
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‘EN FAIsANT L’EUROPE’ 65
In French society, the resulting Munich Agreement initially met with 
wide acclaim. Prime Minister Daladier, himself aware that France had 
suffered a severe diplomatic defeat, was given a hero’s welcome upon 
his return by cheering crowds. The mass daily Le Petit Journal opened a 
‘livre d’or’ in which more than a million people expressed their gratitude 
to Daladier and Chamberlain for having saved the peace. The French 
parliament gave the prime minister a standing ovation and approved the 
agreement by 515 votes against 75. As soon as the initial wave of relief 
had passed, however, this attitude changed and French politics became 
strongly divided between ‘munichois’ (supporters of the agreement) and 
‘antimunichois’ (its opponents). Except for the unanimously disapproving 
communists, lines cut right through all parties, but the ‘antimunichois’ 
camp gradually grew during the following year, receiving considerable 
boosts from subsequent German acts of aggression such as the annexation 
of the entire Czech territory in March 1939. By the time of the German 
invasion of Poland in September 1939, only a small number of fascists, 
radical pacif ists and communists opposed the French declaration of 
war.76
Division also raged in the PPF, with many high-ranking members disap-
proving the ‘munichois’ stance that Doriot had adopted. In a speech at the 
national party congress of 15-16 October, Jouvenel reported his experiences 
in Prague and openly criticised Doriot’s position. The same day, he wrote 
a letter to the editor, published in The Times, in which he stated that ‘the 
British and French governments have, in fact, not granted the right of self-
disposal to the Sudeten Germans, but simply turned Czechoslovakia over 
to Germany, lock, stock and barrel’. If a European war were to break out in 
the future, Jouvenel asserted, ‘the Führer will not be the only one to blame 
for that disaster’, since Paris and London had ‘led him to think that England 
and France were dogs that bark but bite not.’ He called upon France and the 
UK to ‘cure themselves of their present laxity and slovenliness. What has 
been achieved by Germany has been achieved only because the ceaseless 
effort of every German, man, woman, and child, has built up that platform 
of strength from which Herr Hitler speaks.’77 Jouvenel left the PPF a few 
days later, appalled with its compliance with the dismembering of Beneš’ 
76 Duroselle, La Décadence, 356. The negative votes consisted of all 73 communist deputees 
plus two individuals, the socialist Jean Bouhey and the rightist Henri de Kerrilis. One year later, 
the PCF off icially kept to the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact and opposed going to war, but many 
French communists refused to follow this line.
77 Jouvenel, ‘To the Editor of The Times’ (signed Paris, 16 October).
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state. Fabre-Luce also left, calling the Munich Agreement a ‘catastrophic 
humiliation’ for France.78
It is uncertain whether Doriot’s support of the Munich agreement really 
was their main reason for turning their backs on the PPF. Just one month 
earlier, Jouvenel had energetically defended the party’s position, calling 
upon France to pressure the Czechoslovakian government into making ter-
ritorial concessions to Germany. Fabre-Luce had accused ‘liars’ of wanting 
to plunge France into an avoidable war. During the summer of 1938, in an 
exchange of letters with the pacif ist baron and Action Française f inancer 
Régis de Vibraye, Fabre-Luce agreed that France should do everything to 
stay out of a future European war, especially since ‘conditions no longer 
exist for a French intervention in Czechoslovakia or Poland’.79 Kestel and 
Dard believe that the departure of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce was instead due 
to the PPF’s weakened f inancial and political position, which diminished 
their prospects of launching a political career via the party. Jouvenel and 
Fabre-Luce were unhappy with their status of ‘party intellectuals’ having to 
follow the line of the PPF without being able to really influence it. Doubts 
were also rising about the leadership qualities of Doriot, who failed to meet 
Jouvenel, Drieu and Fabre-Luce’s criteria of a dynamic fascist ‘chef’.80
As dramatic as Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s separation from Doriot – the 
‘chef’ they thought they had f inally found just two years earlier – may 
seem, it did not lead to a fundamental rethinking of their international 
principles. Their separation was also not complete from the beginning. 
Fabre-Luce continued to publish in L’Émancipation Nationale until as late as 
28 October 1938, while Jouvenel was still in touch with the party leadership 
in December of the same year.81 During the same month, Fabre-Luce called 
upon French politics to abandon Central and Eastern Europe and focus 
instead on France’s overseas Empire, where its essential interests lay. France 
was ‘neither willing nor able’ to prevent German eastward expansion, and it 
would have little to fear from it. Rather than German aggression, Fabre-Luce 
78 Fabre-Luce, Histoire Sécrète de la Conciliation de Munich, 110; idem, ‘Mensonges’, 
L’Émancipation Nationale (30 September 1938); Bertrand de Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 338.
79 Correspondence with Régis de Vibraye, July-August 1938, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
80 Kestel, ‘L’Engagement de Bertrand de Jouvenel au PPF’, 123; Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 140. 
Drieu, who left the PPF in early 1939, was deeply disappointed in Doriot, especially because 
the latter often doubted his decisions, had gained a lot of weight and had acquired the habit of 
frequenting brothels. For Drieu, himself not averse to the Paris maisons closes, this meant that 
Doriot had succumbed to decadence, becoming ‘effeminate’ and weak, and could no longer 
embody the ascetic ideal of a ‘pure’, strong, popular leader. See Soucy, The Second Wave, 243.
81 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Histoire Sécrète de la Conciliation de Munich’, L’Émancipation Nationale 
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argued that low birth rates and a lack of political ‘authority’ were France’s 
real enemies.82 This is strikingly similar to a statement made by Jouvenel 
one year earlier, before their separation from the PPF. He announced that 
he was still hoping for a ‘def initive reconciliation’ with Germany, which 
should be possible because France’s interests lay in the Mediterranean area, 
not in Eastern Europe towards which German expansion was directed.83
From early 1939, the growing threat of war left little room for grand 
international projects. During the f irst half of the year, possibly because 
they foresaw its imminent impossibility, both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel took 
long-distance trips. Via Genoa and Naples, where he stopped for a few days 
after an inflammatory Mussolini speech made him fear that war might 
break out at any moment, Fabre-Luce travelled to India, Burma, China and 
Hawaii. His journey resulted in Un Fils du Ciel (1941), a novel inspired by a 
combination of Nietzschean longing for a heroic Übermensch and oriental 
spirituality, garnished with observations from war-torn China.84 In late 
spring, Jouvenel went to Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, writing long 
articles for the right-wing weeklies Candide and Gringoire that revealed his 
talent as an écrivain-reporter, a travelling reporter with writer’s credentials 
that was a prominent feature of French interwar journalism.85
In Turkey, Jouvenel contrasted his observations of hedonistic and deca-
dent Constantinople – ‘une sorte de foire malade où s’assemblent toutes les 
graisses de la nation’ – with Ankara, the new capital where a harsh climate 
kept people working hard. The militaristic Ankara atmosphere reminded 
him of Prussia under the ‘soldier-king’ Frederick William I (1688-1740). 
Jouvenel was surprised that Turkey had aligned itself diplomatically with 
the ‘satisf ied nations’ of France and Britain, while he found its political 
structure to be more similar to fascism: ‘One man commands, a single party 
educates the nation and spreads the instructions of the leader everywhere. 
The role of Parliament is to register the dictator’s wishes, while the press 
must explain them. Isn’t this fascism?’ But the Turks assured him that it 
was not, since Kemalist ideology was ‘progressive, not reactionary’. Jouvenel 
concluded by citing Hippolyte Taine and associating the Kemalist, Mus-
solinian and Hitlerian variants of authoritarian government all with Taine’s 
description of ‘Jacobinism’.86
82 Fabre-Luce, ‘Veux-Tu Vivre ou Mourir?’.
83 Jouvenel, ‘Le Parti Populaire Français’, 370.
84 Fabre-Luce, Un Fils du Ciel; idem, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 278.
85 Boucharenc, L’Écrivain-Reporter au Coeur des Années Trente, 29, 151. In 1947, Jouvenel 
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86 Article included in folder ‘Allemagne’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (23).

2 Planning, Fascism and the State: 
1930-1939
From Liberalism to ‘l’Économie Dirigée’
The European project and the will to preserve the peace at all costs were 
important factors in the ‘fascist drift’ of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce. We shall 
see in this chapter that elements linked to developments in French politics 
and the socio-economic ideas of the two intellectuals played at least as 
big a role. During the 1920s, Fabre-Luce adhered to free-market liberalism. 
Both intellectuals considered economic capitalism as intrinsically linked to 
democracy and political freedom, although Fabre-Luce was more insistent on 
this point than Jouvenel. Fabre-Luce criticised collectivist socialism, Italian 
Fascist corporatism and American Taylorism as incompatible with liberty.1
In the summer of 1927, Fabre-Luce was invited for a one-and-a-half-month 
tour of the Soviet Union, a favour the regime only accorded to writers 
deemed to write sympathetically about the communist experiment. Fol-
lowing the directions of a typical Russian Grand Tour, Fabre-Luce travelled 
to Moscow and Leningrad by train, after which he descended the Volga 
on a boat almost to the shores of the Caspian Sea. Trains and cars took 
him from Stalingrad over the Caucasus to Tiflis, then to Batum where he 
crossed the Black Sea to Crimea and Odessa. The Soviet authorities probably 
selected Fabre-Luce because of his harsh criticism of French nationalism 
in La Victoire, but their faith could not have been more misplaced. In the 
introduction of his resulting book, Fabre-Luce criticised the failure of other 
overly positive travel accounts to stress ‘the profound, irreducible moral op-
position separating liberal intelligence from communism’.2 Fabre-Luce was 
even more outspoken in an article in L’Europe Nouvelle. He lumped Soviet 
Communism and American Taylorism together as materialistic enemies 
of human civilisation marked by ‘the same contempt of the person, the 
same suppression of liberty’. Both countries had abandoned all metaphysi-
cal and cultural attachments, believing in nothing but the ‘quantitative 
ideal’. The only inspiration that France could gain from communism was 
fear of this materialistic onslaught by a country as large as a continent, 
which had incorporated the technological discoveries of the West but not 
1 Fabre-Luce, Le 22 Avril, 69, 80.
2 Fabre-Luce, Russie 1927, 7; idem, ‘Au Tombeau de Lénine’, Notre Temps (November 1927), 55.
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its civilisation. Calling communism ‘the great sickness of the century’, 
Fabre-Luce concluded: ‘like the Japanese, like the Moroccans, the Russians 
will turn our inventions against us’.3
Jouvenel disagreed with Fabre-Luce’s view of the United States, which 
he considered essentially liberal and capitalist. In a comparison of the 
economic situation in the United States and the Soviet Union, he celebrated 
capitalism as clearly the most eff icient economic system, since even ‘the 
proletariat agrees that the capitalist system’ provided ‘the strongest produc-
tivity and the biggest general prosperity’.4 By contrast, even if American 
capitalism were to momentarily grant a higher level of prosperity than 
Soviet communism, the young Jouvenel was unconvinced of the long-term 
viability of the capitalist system in post-1919 society. Already in 1927 in a 
contribution to Notre Temps, he associated laissez-faire liberalism with an 
old generation hypocritically clinging to an outdated model that no longer 
reflected economic reality: ‘Free competition? The liberty to conspire to put 
an end to competition. Free trade? An open door to all kinds of dumping. 
Private initiative? The right to lack initiative! The liberal system? A myth 
that is defended in theory because it has long been suffocated in reality!’5
From the mid-1920s, both intellectuals developed a critique of the ex-
cesses of the free market and envisaged the need for an organising authority 
able to rationalise it. Already while working on La Victoire, Fabre-Luce 
became interested in the ideas of John Maynard Keynes about the economic 
consequences of the 1919 peace treaties, but he later also read and discussed 
the Englishman’s publications on f iscal policy and monetary devaluation as 
an effective way to temper an economic crisis. In 1933, Fabre-Luce utilised 
a trip to London to meet Keynes in person.6 Jouvenel played a pioneering 
role through his f irst book, L’Économie Dirigée, thereby coining a French 
term that would have a prolif ic life. Ambitiously subtitled Le Programme 
de la Nouvelle Génération, the book f irst described a situation in which 
the state, instead of leading the economy, remains a passive element in 
the struggle between competing oligarchies in business and industry. To 
combat this situation, the state should directly intervene in the economy. 
3 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Méditation devant le Kremlin’, L’Europe Nouvelle (12 November 1927), 
1514, 1515.
4 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘L’Avenir du Syndicalisme’, Notre Temps (October 1927), 15.
5 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La Politique à Vingt Ans III’, Notre Temps (August 1927), 93. See also 
Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 13.
6 Klaus-Peter Sick, ‘Alfred Fabre-Luce et la Crise du Libéralisme dans l’Entre-Deux-Guerres’, 
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Jouvenel’s solution, however, did not go as far as a communist-style state-led 
economy. In his view, the state had to orient the economy by making use 
of its traditional tools, taxes and tariffs, in a rational way, based on an 
analysis of statistical material and making use of a trained elite of economic 
experts.7 In an article in The New York Times, Jouvenel argued that a capital-
ism enriched by state planning based on the systematic study of consumer 
needs was much more eff icient than a communist system.8
This insistence on the role played by economic and technical ‘experts’ 
rather than supposedly unqualif ied politicians was an important topic in 
the discourses of Jouvenel and other members of the Notre Temps group. It 
brings them close to a current that Jackie Clarke has analysed in her book 
France in the Age of Organization. In interwar France, an increasing number 
of young social scientists, industrialists and economists were proposing a 
similar programme of reforms in which techniciens had to play a leading role 
outside and partially against parliamentary politics.9 Rational economic 
organisation also became part of Jouvenel, Luchaire and Fabre-Luce’s idea 
of a future European Union, where large-scale planning would ensure a 
rise in prosperity for everyone. The prospect of a joint exploitation of the 
European colonial empire offered even more opportunities. At the second 
meeting of the Solhberg Circle in 1931 in the French town of Rethel, Jouvenel 
gave a lecture entitled ‘De l’Unité Économique Européenne à l’Économie 
Dirigée Mondiale’, in which he suggested studying ‘immense regions, like 
the entire African continent, that offer the occasion for immense projects 
to undertake collectively’.10 In 1934, Fabre-Luce enthusiastically discussed 
the possibility of large-scale settlement of white Europeans in French North 
and West Africa in preparation for ‘a political Federation of the European-
African block’. Its triple benefits would be a new ‘impetus’ [‘élan’] for the 
European youth and a tool against overpopulation and unemployment, an 
economic impulse for Europe and Africa and a substantial reduction of the 
risk of European war.11
7 Jouvenel, L’Économie Dirigée, 85; idem, ‘L’Avenir du Capitalisme’, Notre Temps (December 
1927), 117. See also Alain Chatriot, ‘L’Économie Dirigée de Bertrand de Jouvenel. Un Essai sur la 
Réforme de l’État’, in Henry, Robert et Bertrand de Jouvenel, eds. Le Béguec & Manigand, 107.
8 Jouvenel, ‘Communism Contrasted with Modern Capitalism’.
9 Clarke, France in the Age of Organization, 8.
10 ‘Discours de Bertrand de Jouvenel sur l’Unité Économique Européenne et l’Économie Dirigée 
Mondiale’, Notre Temps (16 August 1931). See also Jouvenel, De l’Unité Économique Européenne 
à l’Économie Dirigée Mondiale; Luchaire, De l’Unité Fédérale Européenne à la Réforme de l’État 
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11 Plan du 9 Juillet, 50.
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At a more general level, interest in alternative economic models was strong 
during the early 1930s. Facing a malfunctioning laissez-faire capitalism and 
the frightful prospect of communist revolution, many young intellectuals 
were looking for a ‘third way’ between the two systems. The corporatist 
model of Fascist Italy represented a potentially attractive alternative, as it 
allowed – at least theoretically – for the continued existence of a degree 
of personal freedom while bringing employers and workers together at the 
negotiating table. The New Deal in the United States and the large-scale 
employment projects of Nazi Germany seemed to be almost as promising 
examples of state intervention to combat the unproductive chaos of fluctua-
tions in the economy.12 In interwar France, the most popular alternative 
model was the ‘planism’ proposed by the Belgian socialist leader Hendrik 
de Man. Like his French counterpart Marcel Déat, De Man had delivered a 
fundamental critique of Marxism, stating that its principles failed to meet 
the economic development of its times. Instead of the mechanical doctrine 
of Marxism, De Man proposed an explicitly ‘moral’ socialism aimed at 
integrating the middle classes and ready to boost the national economy 
through state-led planning.13 De Man did not consider the proletariat a 
worthwhile agent of social change, as he found it to have essentially the 
same aspirations as the bourgeoisie, which meant that a proletarian revolu-
tion would necessarily be a shallow, hedonistic one. Instead of a class with a 
supposedly historical role, De Man considered the state as the only institu-
tion capable of revolutionary change. To achieve this transformation, the 
state depended on qualif ied experts, civil servants and techniciens. Based 
on their merit and their dedication to the common good, but independent 
from the fluctuations of parliamentary politics, they would be the natural 
elite of a planist economy.14
Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s enthusiasm for planism seems to have been 
motivated by the linking of two main elements. At the national level, De 
Man’s ideas of social peace offered an alternative to both laisser-faire capi-
talism and Marxist class struggle, which could then be linked internation-
ally to a project to reinforce European peace and reconciliation through 
large-scale projects of economic planning on a continental scale. In the 
minds of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel, planning could permit the energy of 
the European youth to be directed away from warfare and towards more 
12 Alain Chatriot, ‘Les Nouvelles Relèves et le Corporatisme: Visions Françaises des Expériences 
Européennes’, in Les Relèves en Europe, eds. Dard & Deschamps, 174.
13 Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, 136, 159.
14 Amzalak, Fascists and Honorable Men, 105.
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constructive activities like public service, colonisation and engineering. 
Jouvenel played an active role in spreading De Man’s ideas in France. When 
Louise Weiss wanted to invite De Man to give a lecture at the Sorbonne 
in December 1934 as part of the lecture series of her Europeanist École 
de la Paix, Jouvenel brought her into contact with the Belgian politician.15 
Fabre-Luce was quick to apply for tickets via the Groupe du 9 Juillet, even 
stressing that in the case of scarcity of tickets he ought to have priority over 
other candidates.16 A few months later, De Man became ‘minister of public 
works and absorption of unemployment’ in a Belgian government coalition 
that had embarked on a policy inspired by planism. Jouvenel travelled to 
Brussels to obtain an interview with him and had long conversations about 
his ideas for restarting the economy and about the Off ice of Economic 
Recovery that he wanted to create.17
While Fabre-Luce’s visit to the Soviet Union increased his appreciation 
of liberal capitalism, a long trip by Jouvenel to the United States pointed 
him in the opposite direction. Leaving in October 1932 from a France in 
which the crisis was only just beginning to make itself felt, Jouvenel arrived 
in a United States at the depths of the Great Depression. During the eight 
months he spent travelling through the country, he was appalled by the 
misery of the masses of unemployed in Chicago and New York and also in 
the South, where the cotton industry had collapsed. Jouvenel had originally 
planned to use the trip to study American capitalism, much in the same 
way his compatriot Alexis de Tocqueville had studied American democracy 
one century before. But instead of studying its functioning, he felt he was 
witnessing its death throes. In the last chapter of the resulting book, La 
Crise du Capitalisme Américain, Jouvenel concluded that American ‘big 
capitalism’ had died. The Wall Street crash, the closing of the banks and 
the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt had delivered the f inal blow. The 
new president was taking energetic measures, replacing capitalism with ‘a 
vast experience of économie dirigée’. Jouvenel showed enthusiasm for the 
psychological aspects of the New Deal: Roosevelt had given the nation hope 
and contributed to the rise of a new civic patriotism, from which a new 
elite of young technicians would rise. If Roosevelt continued the chosen 
track, Jouvenel believed that his rule would mark ‘the greatest revolution 
of our times’.18
15 Correspondance of Louise Weiss and Hendrik de Man, BNF, FR Nouv. Acq. 17814.
16 Letters of the ‘Groupe du 9 juillet’ to Louise Weiss, BNF, FR Nouv. Acq. 17814.
17 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 222.
18 Jouvenel, La Crise du Capitalisme Américain, 13, 333, 343.
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Fabre-Luce also became interested in ‘l’économie dirigée’, probably by 
reading Jouvenel’s book, and he paid shorter visits to all three countries 
that he considered to have taken this direction: The United States, Italy 
and Germany. At f irst, his conclusions were more mixed than Jouvenel’s. 
Compared to France, where state control of the economy was very weak, 
he estimated that Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany had a great advantage 
in their capacity to mobilise national wealth and reserves in the interest 
of the state and the regime, if necessary by ignoring personal freedoms 
and property rights. He praised the successes of all three governments in 
f ighting unemployment through public works and in reducing salaries and 
working hours. He disagreed with Jouvenel on the revolutionary nature of 
Roosevelt’s achievements. Instead, he stated that Roosevelt had not gone far 
enough, which would have implied ‘to orient the American political system 
much more clearly towards fascism’.19 But he also signalled the ineff icient 
interior chaos of the Nazi system, in which different overlapping institutions 
often defended contradictory policies. In March 1934, Fabre-Luce put his 
cards on the table when he announced that his economic point of view was 
very close to the corporatist fascist model: rather than Roosevelt’s New Deal 
or De Man’s ‘planism’, his ‘économie dirigée means Revolution’. Contrary 
to the communist model, fascist corporatism would still preserve elements 
of private initiative but in a disciplined way, within a corporation ‘under 
discreet government supervision’.20
A National and Social Revolution
During the f irst half of the 1930s, political developments in France led to the 
two intellectuals drifting further away from conventional politics. The 1932 
elections marked a return to power of the centre-left, but as in 1924 this led 
to a series of unstable minority governments dependent on the uncertain 
support of the Socialist Party. With a few years’ delay, the Great Depression 
started to hit France hard, and its governments found no effective way to 
respond to it, clinging to budget cuts and the gold standard. In 1933, the com-
ing to power of Hitler and the growing exasperation with the inertia of the 
19 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Nouvelles Réflexions sur l’Expérience Roosevelt’, Pamphlet (8 December 
1933).
20 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘L’Économie de Demain’, Pamphlet (18 March 1934); idem, ‘L’Économie 
Hitlérienne’, Pamphlet (2 March 1934); idem, ‘Le Système des Corporations’, Pamphlet (19 January 
1934).
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French government led to increased activity among the anti-parliamentary 
right, which culminated in the Stavisky Affair and the Paris riots of 6 Febru-
ary 1934.21 In the direct aftermath of the riots, Daladier resigned as a prime 
minister. The establishment of a government of national union under Gaston 
Doumergue could bring back a certain degree of political tranquillity, but 
by that time events had already convinced many young intellectuals that, 
like in Germany and Italy, a revolution of the right was possible in France.22
Le Six Février, as the events came to be known in France, shocked Jouvenel 
and Fabre-Luce. Although at the time, both opposed the ‘reactionary’ right-
wing leagues, their conf idence in the parliamentary system, which was 
already far from solid to say the least, received a fatal blow. In 1933, Fabre-
Luce anticipated the rising anti-parliamentary sentiment in the country 
and called for a ‘stronger’ regime. Dictatorships had already triumphed in 
most European and ‘in all American’ countries, while France was also on 
its way to a form of authoritarian rule. Most markedly, Fabre-Luce became 
convinced that the spirit of the times did not favour liberal democracy, 
which led him to argue that it was necessary to pull back from this political 
system. Whether one liked it or not, to be able to preserve certain freedoms 
in a profoundly non-liberal age, France would have to ‘discipline its liberty’ 
and make concessions to fascism. When discussing the menace of the fascist 
regimes to the position of France, he stated:
One upon a time, the whole of Europe has made concessions to democracy 
to fight against the French Revolution. Today, we must make concessions to 
fascism in order to fight against the foreign fascisms. In a certain sense, the 
defence of liberty and the limitation of liberty have become synonyms.23
As agitation among the right grew in the wake of the Stavisky scandal, 
Fabre-Luce decided to keep a ‘Bulletin de la Révolution’ in the hopes that a 
revolution would soon break out. However, after three of these bulletins, he 
condemned the riots as a ‘reactionary revolt without leader, programme or 
social aspirations’.24 Similarly, Jouvenel was electrif ied by the ‘fermenting’ 
anger that f illed the Paris air as the scandal ran its course. A visit to a 
meeting of the executive committee of the Radical Party left him disgusted 
21 See the introduction for more background information.
22 Soucy, The Second Wave, 32.
23 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Quel Remède?’, Pamphlet (28 April 1933), 12; idem, ‘Adaptations à la 
Démocratie’, Pamphlet (11 August 1933); idem, ‘Du Nouveau en France’, Pamphlet (11 August 1933).
24 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Bulletin de la Révolution’, Pamphlet (12 January 1934); idem, ‘Après 
l’Émeute’, Pamphlet (9 February 1934).
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with the party, where he suspected Stavisky’s protégés everywhere around 
him. The smell of clientelism and corruption had not only infested the 
Radicals but was also ‘poisoning our republic’. On the same day, during 
a demonstration in front of his house on the Boulevard Saint-Germain, 
Jouvenel tried to help a man who was being beaten up by the police, only 
to be mistreated himself and arrested by ‘half a dozen of cops’, who dragged 
him to the police station under the threat of further violence. Released 
thanks to the intervention of an influential friend, Jouvenel concluded that 
police brutality would never suff ice to uphold a system that was rotten to 
the core.25 This did not lead Jouvenel to approve of the events of 6 February, 
however. In a letter, he dismissed the riots as a spontaneous but useless 
‘agitation d’aveugles contre la nocivité du néant’.26
For Jouvenel, the events had nothing but negative consequences: Daladier 
had proven himself incompetent as a leader, the demonstrators had achieved 
25 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La République des Camarades’, Vu (17 January 1934).
26 Jouvenel to Pierre Andreu (undated but probably from 1953-1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 
(294).
Figure 2  Damage caused by the 6 February riots: wrecked policemen’s bikes hung 
to a bus stop at the Place de la Madeleine, Paris
source: Rue des Archives / Hollandse Hoogte
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nothing they wanted, and the Doumergue government was set on a conserva-
tive course, doing nothing to address France’s f inancial, psychological and 
political problems. Fabre-Luce concluded that the only positive revolution 
could come not from the right or the left but from the ‘centre’, combining 
social and national elements. If during the following months a ‘chef’, a strong 
leader, could be found to unite the forces of Marcel Déat’s neosocialism and 
the Croix-de-Feu movement of Colonel François de la Rocque, this revolution 
would be possible: ‘Revolution of the Centre, Left-wing Fascism, or just simply 
the extra-parliamentary resurrection of the old ideal of a Controlled Economy’. 
The board of Fabre-Luce’s journal Pamphlet was split on the issue, with Fabre-
Luce and Jean Prévost opposing the riots and Pierre Dominique considering 
them a worthwhile contribution to the fall of the republican system.27
Jouvenel’s conclusions were not very different, but they had more radical 
consequences. Furious with established politics, parliamentarianism and 
Daladier, who had not dared to compose a strong reformist government 
in response to the riots, he left the Parti Radical and founded La Lutte des 
Jeunes. This weekly, which Jouvenel edited and published together with a 
small group of non-conformist intellectuals – Drieu f igured prominently, 
along with Pierre Andreu, Jacques Arthuys, Philippe Boegner and Georges 
Roditi – rejected all established political parties. Very much against par-
liamentary politics, it wanted to unite French youth to establish ‘a regime 
in which all particular interests are mercilessly subjected to the general 
interest’.28 In Jouvenel’s eyes, the riots had marked the beginning of a na-
tional revolution that would result in a ‘new state, cleansed of parliamen-
tarianism and capitalism’.29 He grouped these two enemies systematically 
together to stress the social dimension that his anti-parliamentarianism 
had taken. In a long article in which he gave a generally positive analysis 
of the Italian economic system, Jouvenel announced that he refused to 
take a principled stance on the character of France’s future regime: ‘I will 
accept any [regime], under the sole and explicit condition that it has as 
an objective to profoundly transform the living conditions of the working 
classes’.30 Jouvenel announced that the Depression would lead to the end of 
27 Alfred Fabre-Luce, Pierre Dominique and Jean Prévost, ‘L’Avis de Pamphlet’, Pamphlet 
(23 February 1934); Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Si Daladier n’avait Pas Été Daladier’, Pamphlet (23 Febru-
ary 1934).
28 ‘Que Voulons-nous?’, La Lutte des Jeunes (25 February 1934).
29 ‘Un Plan National pour la Jeunesse’, La Lutte des Jeunes (4 March 1934); Bertrand de Jouvenel, 
‘Aveugles’, La Lutte des Jeunes (4 March 1934). 
30 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Examen de l’Économie Fasciste: Comment Fonctionne-t-elle?’, La 
Lutte des Jeunes (24 March 1934).
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democracy but expressed the hope that new, authoritarian leaders would 
use their strength to ‘break capitalism’ and install ‘a rational economic 
regime assuring the legitimate satisfaction of human needs’.31
Placing trust entirely in the young generation, La Lutte des Jeunes was 
another manifestation of the generational discourse from Jouvenel’s Notre 
Temps days. In his memoirs, Pierre Andreu recalled Jouvenel walking the 
boulevards of Paris, distributing leaflets that called upon ‘all youth, to con-
stitute battle groups against misery and against the regime’. Below this text 
figured photographs of two political demonstrations, one of the left, the other 
of a right-wing demonstration. ‘Voyez-vous la différence? Non. Il n’y a qu’une 
jeunesse.’32 In a contribution written for Le Cahier Bleu, a left-wing periodi-
cal directed by his half-brother Renaud de Jouvenel, Bertrand denounced 
the ‘bourgeois’ mentality that had for too long pressed French youth to be 
patient, save money and wait for rewards that would come with old age. He 
described ‘young intellectuals, arched over vile old papers, hoping to once 
be at the Institut de France so that glory will bring them the women they 
desire today’. Now a new youth was on the rise that was no longer willing to 
wait, burning to pursue its desires right here, right now. This generation was 
exasperated with the ‘extraordinary obstruction’ of the country: ‘from the 
Gambetta monument to the busts of Marianne, so many things to destroy!’ 
A ‘thorough clean-up’ was necessary to build a ‘new civilisation’:
Il faut rétablir un certain sens de l’espace. Nettoyer par le vide, édif ier 
l’indispensable, travailler pour vivre et non pour accumuler, jouir des 
loisirs et non pas les rejeter à la f in de la vie, organiser une civilisation 
d’hommes libres et non pas d’ilotes ivres de travail, – le programme de la 
jeunesse est simple. Sa réalisation, croyons-nous, sera un coup de gomme 
dans la grisaille contemporaine.33
At the same time and partially with contributions from the same people, 
Fabre-Luce engaged in a different attempt to bring his intellectual gen-
eration together and establish a common political programme through 
the Groupe du 9 Juillet. Containing young representatives of diverse po-
litical currents in France – syndicalists, socialists, agrarians, republicans, 
31 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La Crise du Capitalisme et la Fin des Démocraties’, La Lutte des Jeunes 
(1 April 1934). See also idem, ‘Pour que le France puisse Vivre, le Capitalisme doit Mourir’, La 
Lutte des Jeunes (17 June 1934).
32 Andreu, Le Rouge et le Blanc, 87.
33 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Le Paradis Bourgeois’, Le Cahier Bleu (22 January 1934).
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Croix-de-Feu, Jeunesse Patriote – the Groupe du 9 Juillet was inspired by 
the same generational ideas as Jouvenel’s weekly. Though present at the 
f irst meetings, Jouvenel dropped out of the group before it had agreed 
on a common programme. The pacif ist writer Jules Romains, who was 
also a prominent member of Abetz’s Comité France-Allemagne, informally 
led the Groupe du 9 Juillet. The meetings of the group resulted in a Plan 
du 9 Juillet, probably written by Fabre-Luce,34 signed amongst others by 
Philippe Boegner, Jean Coutrot, Paul Marion, Georges Roditi and Romains 
(who also wrote the introduction) and edited as a book, which was widely 
discussed in the French press.35
Though the political diversity of the group inevitably led to a certain 
vagueness, the general line of the plan was manifestly authoritarian and 
corporatist. First, the plan established the end of ‘decadent’ liberalism and 
called for stronger executive power. While warning against the danger of 
‘totalitarianism’, the Groupe stated that liberty could only be safeguarded 
‘through order’:
An unemployed man unable to f ind work, a worker erring from factory 
to factory according to the caprices of overproduction, a citizen informed 
by a corrupt press are not free men. To emancipate an individual means 
f irst to give him the means to live from his work, within a framework 
[‘dans un cadre’] that he knows and accepts, within a society to which 
he can contribute.36
Apart from constraining parliament by reinforcing the power of govern-
ment, which would alone hold the right to legislate, the plan called for 
the creation of a new ‘Conseil des Corporations’ that would represent the 
interests of various economic professional groups. The Conseil would have 
the task of coordinating the national economy and enforcing mandatory 
consultation about all proposals of economic of f inancial character. A total 
ban on strikes and a crackdown on labour unions were to guarantee a more 
fluid functioning of the national economy. The plan also provided for the 
complete suspension of the constitution ‘under exceptional circumstances’, 
when full political power would be assumed by a ‘gouvernement de salut 
public’ consisting of ‘experienced and disinterested men’.37
34 Fabre-Luce, J’ai Vécu Plusieurs Siècles, 170.
35 Amzalak, Fascists and Honorable Men, 110; Dard, Le Rendez-Vous Manqué, 194, 197.
36 Plan du 9 Juillet, 18.
37 Plan du 9 Juillet, 22, 23, 25.
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Through the Groupe du 9 Juillet and La Lutte des Jeunes, Fabre-Luce 
and Jouvenel came in touch with the plethora of groups and periodicals 
that Loubet del Bayle has dubbed ‘the non-conformists of the 1930s’, with 
some members of these movements expressing their opinions on the 
pages of Jouvenel’s weekly. As there were elements that both linked and 
distinguished Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce from these groups, it is useful to 
take a closer look at these contacts. According to Loubet del Bayle, the 
‘non-conformists’ can be divided into three groups: those connected with 
the journal Esprit around the Catholic philosopher Emmanuel Mounier; 
those associated with the journal Ordre Nouveau around Alexandre Marc, 
Robert Aron, Arnaud Dandieu and Denis de Rougemont; and a group that 
Mounier called ‘La Jeune Droite’ consisting of young right-wing intellectuals 
close to L’Action Française such as Thierry Maulnier, Jean de Fabrègues and 
Jean-Pierre Maxence. Most members of these groups were young intellectu-
als roughly of the same age as Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce and subscribing to 
a similar generational perspective. They saw their periodicals as part of an 
intellectual revolt against a crisis of civilisation that was manifesting itself 
in the ‘désordre établi’ of individualism, capitalism and communism. They 
were looking for ways to overcome this ‘established disorder’ by supplanting 
it with a more organic model built on authority and a sense of community, 
which had to be ‘neither left nor right’. To a certain extent, all three groups 
subscribed to Mounier’s personalist philosophy, which rejected both liberal 
individualism and communist or fascist collectivism. Rather, a ‘spiritual 
revolution’ would pave the way for a new relationship between man and 
his environment. The school of thought known as personalism claimed to 
respect individual human rights but stressed that a ‘person’ could only truly 
exist as an organic part of a community.38
Loubet del Bayle estimated that these groups, short of achieving im-
mediate political influence during the 1930s, made an important – and 
generally positive – intellectual contribution to French politics. By contrast, 
Sternhell has taken the position of associating the non-conformist move-
ment with the ‘fascist impregnation’ of French society.39 More recently 
and in concordance with Sternhell, the Canadian scholar John Hellman 
has stated that personalism was an anti-democratic, anti-republican and 
authoritarian philosophy, closely related to the German Conservative 
Revolution that helped carry the Nazis to power.40 Dard is more cautious 
38 Loubet del Bayle, Les Non-Conformistes des Années 30, 173, 315.
39 Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, 235.
40 Hellman, The Communitarian Third Way, 3.
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in his judgments, even shunning the use of non-conformism and fascism 
as terminological categories of analysis. He prefers to use the deliberately 
empty concept of the ‘nouvelles relèves’ and concludes that their story is 
generally one of failure. Within the non-conformist milieu, Dard primarily 
distinguishes between ‘spiritualists’ and ‘materialists’, the former being 
primarily interested in philosophical and metaphysical solutions to the 
perceived crisis of civilisation, while the latter preferred concrete techni-
cal reforms, often inspired by corporatist and technocratic ideas. From 
this perspective, while the reformist Catholic Esprit environment clearly 
belongs to the spiritualist side, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce might be counted 
as belonging to the materialistic group at least from their days at Notre 
Temps.41 But it must be stressed that this distinction is not rigid, as some 
of the two intellectuals’ writings of the late 1930s and early 1940s show a 
clearly metaphysical tendency.42
Jouvenel wanted La Lutte des Jeunes to play a federating role, opening his 
periodical to all initiatives of the young generation under the sole condition 
that they were not linked to any existing political party. This attempt soon 
resulted in a cacophony of rivalling and mutually hostile movements and 
groups, most of whom were unwilling to recognise Jouvenel as one of theirs. 
Robert Aron wrote a particularly angry contribution, violently attacking 
Jouvenel and Luchaire as opportunistic members of the political establish-
ment belatedly turning to revolutionary rhetoric. An earlier discussion 
between members of the ‘Jeune Droite’ and Esprit had already escalated 
into open conflict.43 The most problematic aspect of Jouvenel’s attempt was 
that it came precisely when the ‘non-conformist’ milieu was becoming more 
and more divided. After a short period of centripetal tendencies in 1933, 
the aftershocks of the 6 February riots began to tear the groups apart, and 
instead of being ‘neither left nor right’, they became more and more split 
along traditional political lines.44
Within a few months’ time, Jouvenel had to conclude that his weekly had 
been a failure. In its last edition, he admitted that, having already taken up 
more debts than he could, he was unable to f inance the journal any further. 
He drew pessimistic conclusions about the prospect of uniting French 
41 Dard, Le Rendez-Vous Manqué, 286.
42 Especially: Jouvenel, Le Réveil de l’Europe; Fabre-Luce, Journal Intime 1937; idem, Anthologie 
de la Nouvelle Europe.
43 Emmanuel Mounier, ‘La Troisième Force’, La Lutte des Jeunes (6 May 1934); Georges Izard, 
‘La Troisième Force’, La Lutte des Jeunes (20 May 1934); Robert Aron, ‘L’Ordre Nouveau’, La Lutte 
des Jeunes (27 May 1934).
44 Loubet de Bayle, Les Non-Conformistes des Années 30, 192; Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 78.
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youth around a single political programme. Henceforth, like Fabre-Luce, 
he f ixed his hope on a synthesis of the ‘virility’ of the Croix-de-Feu and 
the social programme of Marcel Déat’s neosocialism, Gaston Bergery’s 
Front Commun and a possible future initiative by Jacques Doriot.45 This 
synthesis, Jouvenel admitted, could come down to a French fascism. 
When Le Cahier Bleu enquired among several intellectuals what position 
they would take in the case of a fascist revolution, Jouvenel provocatively 
stated that he would participate in it. He was quick to stress that many 
left-wing intellectuals were def ining it incorrectly: fascism was not an 
‘armed reaction of capitalism against those who attack its privileges’. To 
Jouvenel, fascism meant ‘violence to conquer power, authority to exercise 
it’. It meant ‘creation of a revolutionary state of mind among the masses 
by every means of propaganda to f ight fatalism and inertia [quiétisme], 
which are so undeservedly called Marxism’. Fascism, above all, was a 
method that could be used for different ends. But since a revolution would 
mean the destruction of all existing institutions, particularly the ‘master 
institution’ of capitalism, Jouvenel knew on which side of the barricades 
he would be.46
Within this line of reasoning, fascism is not something desirable for its 
own sake but a useful method to break the stalemate of French politics. 
As a means of achieving a revolution that was both anti-capitalist and 
anti-Marxist, Jouvenel’s interpretation of fascism was not so different from 
how Fabre-Luce saw the phenomenon. In an ‘open letter’ to André Gide, 
Fabre-Luce criticised the famous writer for his compliance with Soviet 
communism, even after having openly denounced its grim reality after a 
trip to the Soviet Union. Instead of easily dismissing their opponents as 
‘fascists’, Fabre-Luce argued, Gide and his anti-fascist friends would do bet-
ter to understand the circumstances under which fascism had become an 
attractive alternative for many French intellectuals, who normally shunned 
anything reeking of authoritarianism. Fascism, according to Fabre-Luce, 
was a necessary ‘counterweight’ to the Soviet system, only desirable because 
‘in the order of tyranny, fascism is less barbaric than communism’. Fascism 
did not lead to the socialisation of the means of production, it respected 
‘moral and religious forces’ and allowed itself to be ‘tempered’ by them. 
He wrote: ‘Our “fascists” know all this. Forced to choose, they would prefer 
fascism to communism. But they still hope that we will be spared this 
45 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Bilan’, La Lutte des Jeunes (14 July 1934).
46 Bertrand de Jouvenel et al., ‘Réponses à Notre Enquête: Quelle Serait Votre Position et Votre 
Attitude devant une Révolution Fasciste?’, Le Cahier Bleu (10 June 1934).
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choice.’47 Besides a weapon against the communist menace, Fabre-Luce 
saw fascism as a necessary alternative to a democracy in crisis. Half a year 
later, he remarked that Belgium did not need a fascist revolution because 
it had managed to ‘discipline’ its democracy, like the United Kingdom: 
‘For fascism, if needed, against communism? Yes. For fascism, against a 
disciplined democracy like in England or Belgium? No!’48 The omission of 
his own country was clear: in the case of France, Fabre-Luce was not so sure 
the country could do without a fascist revolution.
Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce realised that their revolutionary agenda could 
only be realised if a credible popular leader were available. Writing for the 
non-political mass press and for Fabre-Luce’s L’Europe Nouvelle, Jouvenel 
initially had high expectations of La Rocque and his veteran league that 
had turned into an anti-parliamentary mass movement. His Croix-de-Feu 
movement grew quickly at the time, achieving such momentum that some 
saw La Rocque as a candidate to become France’s authoritarian leader.49 
During 1935, however, increasingly disappointed with La Rocque’s social 
conservatism and his hesitation in making a political move, Jouvenel turned 
more towards those who had left his movement due to a longing for ‘ac-
tion’. Like Déat, Doriot and Bergery, who had all turned their backs on the 
conservatism of the established parties, Jouvenel expressed hope that a 
‘chef’, a charismatic leader, could be found to lead these ‘démissionnaires’.50
With or without such a ‘chef’, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel did run for parliament 
in 1936, as candidates for the Union Socialiste Républicaine (USR), essentially a 
vehicle for personalities close to Déat, Paul Marion, Adrien Marquet and other 
neosocialist renegades who had split off from the SFIO or the PCF. Both had 
already been candidates for the Parti Radical in 1932, and Jouvenel had also 
run in 1928 – always unsuccessfully.51 In 1936, Fabre-Luce presented himself as 
a candidate in the Ain department, close to Lyon. Jouvenel ran in a Bordeaux 
47 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Lettre Ouverte à André Gide, Trotskiste’, L’Assaut (24 November 1936). 
Gide’s very critical travel account (Retour de l’URSS) was published that some month.
48 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Rex et l’Assaut ’, L’Assaut (13 April 1937).
49 See, for example, Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, ‘Si J’Étais La Rocque…’, La Lutte des Jeunes 
(20 May 1934); Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘France Is Stirred by “Crosses of Fire”’, The New York Times 
(29 September 1935).
50 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Scission chez les Croix-de-Feu: Pourquoi ils ont Dèmissionné’, Vu 
(17 July 1935); idem, ‘Démissions chez les Volontaires Nationaux’, L’Europe Nouvelle (20 July 
1935); idem, ‘Un Rassemblement des Démissionaires?’, L’Europe Nouvelle (10 August 1935); idem, 
‘L’Angleterre et le Conflit Italo-Abyssin’, L’Europe Nouvelle (26 October 1935).
51 Several drafs of speeches and electoral programmes from 1928 (when Fabre-Luce eventually 
decided against candidacy) and 1932 can be found in: Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1 and 10. Fabre-Luce 
did manage to get himself elected into the Conseil Général (departmental assembly) of the 
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district instead of in his native Corrèze, where he could have counted on 
influential support from family connections. Both intensively toured their 
districts, holding electoral rallies and presenting their political programmes, 
a mixture of pacifism in international relations, reconciliation with Germany, 
protection of farmers’ interest and a stronger national government. Jouvenel 
was beaten in the first round, Fabre-Luce in the second, because a Parti Radical 
candidate refused to step down in his favour. This left two progressives in the 
race and thus paved the way for a victory of the sole conservative candidate, 
a bar owner from Trévoux. While the few USR candidates that did win their 
mandates prepared themselves to become a small fragment in the Popular 
Front coalition, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel left the party.52
This repeated political failure further embittered Fabre-Luce and Jou-
venel about the functioning of parliamentary democracy. In his memoirs, 
Fabre-Luce poured scorn on his victorious opponent Marius Gallet, whom 
he described as a ‘marionette’ and a typical product of provincial republi-
canism. According to Fabre-Luce, Gallet, ‘barely able to speak and write’, 
had spent his uneventful life in front of the stuffed fox at his bar, joylessly 
accepting drinks from mediocre costumers. Despite his election, Gallet did 
not even move to Paris and he ‘never spoke a word’ in Parliament. Looking 
back on his own experience as a candidate, Fabre-Luce admitted to having 
felt like a ‘prostitute forced to solicit’ an electorate that instead should have 
been ‘put in its right place’ by an authoritarian leader like Doriot.53 Jouvenel 
shared his feelings of humiliation. His electoral campaign had been ‘an 
effort to seduce’ rather than a glorious electoral battle, and his defeat left 
him feeling ‘ridiculous like a dancer failing to draw applause’. Jouvenel had 
nothing but contempt for the ‘animal stupidity’ of voters, ready to follow 
‘the animal with the strongest smell’.54
Party Intellectuals at the Service of Fascism
By the spring of 1936, these conceptions had been formed. With only 
the ‘chef’ missing, it is hardly surprising that the foundation of the Parti 
Ain department in May 1935. He held this relatively unimportant off ice until 1940, travelling 
to Trévoux several times a year to attend the council’s seasonal meetings.
52 Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel were not alone, as even leading neosocialist Déat was beaten in the 
second round. Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 134; Alfred Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté 
I, 18.
53 Alfred Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 18, 157.
54 Fonds BdJ, NAF 28143 (59).
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Populaire Français by Jacques Doriot, on 28 June 1936, just a month after the 
electoral victory of the Popular Front, unleashed such enthusiasm among 
Fabre-Luce, Jouvenel and other non-conformist intellectuals. Pierre Andreu 
has described this spirit in his memoirs. At the end of June 1936, he received 
a phone call from Drieu, who had just attended the birth of the party, telling 
him that ‘What we have been waiting for has f inally happened. Doriot 
has founded his party. We’re waiting for you; you will f ind all your friends 
here: Jouvenel, [Paul] Marion, [Jean] Fontenoy, [Claude] Popelin…’55 Jou-
venel and Fabre-Luce were present at the founding ceremony of the party, 
during which both the Marseillaise and the Internationale were sung and 
the audience was confused over which way to greet their leader: with the 
communist or the fascist salute.56 Drieu was deeply impressed by Doriot’s 
three-hour-long speech, during which he sweated abundantly, leaving upon 
Drieu the impression of health and masculine strength: ‘Doriot is big and 
55 Andreu, Le Rouge, 125.
56 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 294; Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 156; Kestel, La 
Conversion Politique, 135.
Figure 3  Jacques Doriot speaking at the founding ceremony of the PPF, 
28 June 1936
source: Agence meurisse / Public domain
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strong. Everything inside him breathes health and plenitude: his thick hair, 
his mighty shoulders, his large belly.’57
During the 1920s, Doriot was seen as the rising star of the French Com-
munist Party (PCF). In 1931, he won an easy election and became mayor of 
the ‘red’ Parisian suburb of Saint-Denis. His ambitions to head the party 
were thwarted, however, as he lost the leadership battle to his rival Maurice 
Thorez. During the spring of 1934, Doriot openly began to rebel against the 
PCF and the Komintern. With the collapse of the German KPD after Hitler’s 
seizure of power, and with the incidents of Le Six Février on his mind, he 
opposed the Komintern doctrine that disallowed any collaboration with 
socialists. Doriot stated that fascism could only be stopped if all forces of the 
left joined hands against it. Although Stalin would encourage his followers 
less than f ive months later to work together with the socialists formerly 
branded as ‘social fascists’, Doriot’s views were considered treason to party 
discipline. Doriot responded by quitting the PCF. During the 1936 elections, 
Doriot could narrowly defeat a communist counter-candidate and retain 
his position as the mayor of Saint-Denis, but his position was manifestly 
under pressure from the left-wing parties that were now working together 
in the Popular Front, excluding him.58
Confronted with rising political and financial problems and realising that 
his plan of unity of the left against fascism had been brought into practice 
without him and against him, Doriot took drastic measures. He founded 
the Parti Populaire Français, a party that rejected Marxism and instead 
called for class collaboration. He soon became strongly anti-communist and 
increasingly anti-Semitic, while also advocating a programme of European 
peace through friendship with Nazi Germany. During its f irst years, the PPF 
received f inancial support from Fascist Italy and from f inancial backers in 
the French banking and business world. Members swore an oath to their 
leader Doriot and greeted each other with the fascist salute.59 In 1937, after 
violent clashes with communist militants, the party also developed a ritual 
martyr cult for members who had died f ighting for its cause.60 The PPF, 
which probably counted about 100,000 members at its climax in 1938, was 
f irst dominated by former communists like Doriot, but their percentage 
decreased slowly. When in 1936 La Rocque changed his dissolved CdF to 
57 Drieu la Rochelle, Doriot ou la Vie d’un Ouvrier Français, 31.
58 Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, 172
59 Brunet, Jacques Doriot, 238, 249.
60 Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, 319.
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the seemingly more moderate PSF, several prominent far-right members 
left the party and joined Doriot.61
Considering Doriot and his associates’ past communist credentials, 
Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce had reason to believe that, unlike the Croix-de-Feu 
and the other right-wing leagues, the PPF would be a fascist movement with 
a serious social dimension. Jouvenel, who had already been on friendly 
terms with Doriot since 1935, was convinced that the PPF embodied his 
dreams of realising a ‘French socialism’ without class warfare within an 
organic, authoritarian state.62 In 1954, attempting to explain and justify 
his PPF engagement in a letter to the American historian Rudolph Binion, 
Jouvenel even compared Doriot to Marshal Tito (as a fellow renegade Stalin-
ist) and claimed:
my association with Doriot at its inception marks my extreme-left high-
mark! We were then a strange little band of intellectuals fascinated by 
our association with real manual workers!! A feeling of the team grew up 
which bound us together and Doriot shifted us to the extreme right in 
no time at all to our amazement and disappointment: still so close were 
the personal links which had grown up that one hated to break them.63
Evidently, these claims are to be taken with more than just a grain of salt 
as far as the supposed left-wing character of the PPF is concerned, as well 
as Jouvenel’s falsely naïve ‘amazement’ at Doriot’s move to the extreme 
right and his claim that this was the reason he left the party. But the ele-
ments Jouvenel highlighted are striking: the association of intellectuals 
and manual workers, a ‘feeling of the team’ and a reluctance to cut ties 
and quit the party. Andreu and Jouvenel suggest that the PPF offered them 
something they had been looking for for a long time.
Fabre-Luce praised Doriot as the ideal, universally admired ‘Chef’, ap-
plauding his directness, his simplicity, his ‘eloquence that doesn’t care about 
eloquence’. Under PPF leadership, Saint-Denis had become a place where 
‘the words national and social, so often used in vain in so many speeches, 
have regained a vital meaning’.64 In practice, the PPF soon had to walk a 
tight rope between its obligations to its f inancial backers in big business 
and its alleged social agenda. Doriot’s electoral victory in Saint Denis in 
61 Soucy, The Second Wave, 217, 256.
62 Jacques Doriot to Jouvenel (27 November 1935), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (298).
63 Jouvenel to Rudolph Binion (August/September 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (294).
64 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Interview de Jacques Doriot’, L’Assaut (16 March 1937).
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the second round of the May 1936 elections had been by a narrow margin 
and had been mainly thanks to the right that had called upon its followers 
to vote for him against his communist opponent. Thus, Doriot was forced 
to attack the Popular Front even as it was busy realising large parts of his 
own traditional agenda. This impossible situation may have contributed to 
Doriot quickly severing his left-wing aff iliation.65
Nevertheless, the PPF was, at least during its early days, a party that 
indeed seemed to cross the class divide, uniting workers, the middle classes 
and non-conformist intellectuals all in the service of the uncontested ‘chef’ 
Doriot. Both Jouvenel and Andreu stressed the importance of their new 
experience of being in touch with completely different social environments 
in their enthusiasm for the new party.66 Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce but also 
Drieu, Andreu, Pierre Dominique, Paul Marion, Jean de Fabrègues, Robert 
Brasillach and Ramon Fernandez became party intellectuals and joined 
the PPF press, which permitted their ideas to reach a much larger and more 
diverse audience than ever before. As prominent intellectuals in a party 
that took both its nemesis and its inspirational model from the French 
Communist Party, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were supposed to serve the PPF 
in every possible way. Apart from writing for the PPF press and sitting on 
its central bureau, they were also expected to tour the country and speak at 
party rallies in every corner of France. Convinced that his party would cre-
ate a new elite for the French nation, Doriot set up student sections in Paris 
and other larger cities in France and Algeria, dispatching Drieu, Fernandez 
and Jouvenel to hold propaganda lectures at several universities.67
When the Popular Front government banned all paramilitary ligues, 
Doriot hoped to f ill the void left by their disappearance, especially that of 
La Rocque’s mass-based Croix-de-Feu. The successful rebirth of the CdF 
as the seemingly more moderate and parliamentary Parti Social Français 
marked Doriot’s failure to do so, although he did manage to attract a few 
disillusioned former followers of La Rocque, including Robert Loustau and 
Pierre Pucheu. Noticing that his movement was failing to grow any further, 
Doriot then tried to play a federating role. In March 1937, he proposed to 
unite all right-wing parties in a ‘Front de la Liberté’ that was supposed 
65 Soucy, The Second Wave, 216; Kestel, La Conversion Politique, 128, 174.
66 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 294; Andreu, Le Rouge, 128.
67 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 132. Dard wrongly claims that Jouvenel only joined the PPF’s 
central bureau in the summer of 1938, shortly before he left the party. Jouvenel’s personal notes 
show that he sat on the bureau right from its creation at the f irst party congress in November 
1936, frequently attending its meetings during the following two years. See ‘chrono-f ile’, Fonds 
BdJ, Don 90 39 (11).
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to f ight the Popular Front in an organised way, under his leadership. The 
initiative drew support from the Action Française, the Jeunesse Patriote 
and the centre-right Fédération Républicaine, but La Rocque, who was 
eager to preserve his full independence, rejected it. With the single largest 
anti-Popular Front party not participating, the Front de la Liberté did not 
materialise. After the government forced advanced mayoral elections in 
Saint-Denis in May 1937, which Doriot lost to the communist candidate, the 
PPF was increasingly marginalised and began losing support from its major 
f inancial backers. By late 1937, the PPF started to move increasingly to the 
extreme-right fringes of French politics, aligning itself with the pro-Nazi 
course that would continue to mark its activities during the occupation 
years.68
This loss of signif icance initially did not lead Jouvenel or Fabre-Luce to 
break with Doriot. On the contrary: in June 1937, Fabre-Luce announced that 
he would be discontinuing his weekly L’Assaut to merge it into La Liberté, a 
68 Passmore, The Right in France, 329; Soucy, The Second Wave, 118.
Figure 4  Jacques Doriot delivering a speech at a PPF rally in Marseille, 
27 July 1936
source: Rue des Archives / Hollandse Hoogte
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well-known mass daily bought by Doriot with Italian subsidies. Formerly an 
opinion weekly that was led by Fabre-Luce and that published contributions 
from Jouvenel, Drieu, Brasillach, Maurice Bardèche, Robert Poulet, André 
Thérive, Claude Popelin and others, L’Assaut became a weekly supplement 
of the PPF newspaper, and its subscribers were offered to start receiving 
La Liberté at a discount price. Fabre-Luce dismissed the importance of the 
Saint-Denis elections and identif ied Doriot as the incarnation of the ideals 
of class collaboration and national recovery that his weekly had campaigned 
for. Above all, he admired Doriot’s strength: ‘Doriot has built around himself 
a force comparable to the one he freed himself from [i.e. the Communist 
Party]. That’s enough to measure the value of this man.’69 During the same 
month, Jouvenel, who frequently published in La Liberté, became editor-
in-chief of the other party newspaper L’Émancipation Nationale. Jouvenel’s 
articles betrayed his complicated task of having to attack the Popular Front 
while at the same time defending a social policy very similar to the one 
followed by the Blum government. In a series of articles, he tried to explain 
that the financial chaos that the government was supposedly causing would 
effectively lead to the evaporation of all the benefits it had just granted to 
French workers, although it is likely that his complicated economic analysis 
was lost on many of his readers.70
Jouvenel did not limit himself to dry economic analysis. Especially his 
attacks on socialism and communism received bodily and racial connota-
tions that are normally associated with the fascism of authors like Drieu la 
Rochelle and Céline. Socialists wanted to rob France of its ‘masculinity’, of 
its capacities to be proud of itself. They were an ‘illness’ that France had to 
get rid of ‘in any possible way’.71 Calling communists ‘the Russian microbe’ 
plotting to destroy France by provoking a war with Germany, Jouvenel 
wondered: ‘are we wrong for wanting to throw them out of the country?’72 
Jouvenel was not afraid to explicitly state the superiority of racist theory 
over historical materialism, favourably comparing Arthur de Gobineau 
69 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘À Nos Lecteurs’, L’Assaut (8 June 1937).
70 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La Déflation, pour Stimuler l’Économie Nationale, doit être faite 
par un Gouvernement ayant la Conf iance de Tout le Pays’, L’Émancipation Nationale (3 October 
1936); idem, ‘De Combien la Vie va-t-elle Renchérir?’, L’Émancipation Nationale (10 October 1936); 
Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Le Ministère des Dupes’, L’Émancipation Nationale (11 February 1938).
71 See Kestel, ‘L’Engagement de Bertrand de Jouvenel au PPF’, 116. Kestel wrongly claims that 
Jouvenel reserved his attacks for Blum and socialism while leaving communism alone – he 
violently attacked both.
72 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Éviter à la France une Saint-Barthelemy ou un Sedan’, L’Émancipation 
Nationale (9 January 1937).
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Figure 5  Bertrand de Jouvenel in 1938
source: Roger Viollet / Hollandse Hoogte
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to Karl Marx. He considered the two philosophers the most important 
thinkers of the twentieth century, since two of the world’s most powerful 
states had adopted their respective theories as their national ideologies. But 
Marx had been ‘completely wrapped in the mechanistic superstition of his 
century’, confounding ‘material progress with progress of civilisation’, while 
Gobineau ‘based his pessimism on the degeneration of manly virtues. One 
was only addressing the tool. The other addressed man.’73
In Jouvenel’s mind, racial and class stereotypes were not mutually 
exclusive. In January 1937, he visited a large communist rally in the Paris 
Vélodrome d’Hiver, and he was struck by the foreignness and the ‘perfect 
homogeneity’ of the crowd. Instead of the usual collection of subtly disa-
greeing individuals, this was an anonymous, amorphous mass, pushing 
and pulling to get inside the already packed cycling stadium. When he 
took a closer look, he saw ‘a pale, dwarf-like race, with soft mouths and 
red eyelids’. They made him think of the living conditions in the banlieue 
that, ‘within two or three generations’, had produced these characteristics. 
Then he thought about Marx’s prediction that ‘the bourgeoisie brings forth 
the proletariat that will eventually kill it’. There was also something more 
directly foreign about the crowd. Foreign faces – Spanish, German, Russian, 
Jewish – did not contrast with the French ones, who seemed as foreign, 
under the spell of a kind of ‘national decolourisation’. This, he concluded in 
a striking racialisation of class elements, was the result of unchecked labour 
immigration promoted by irresponsible industrialists: ‘The banlieue has 
become a melting pot where, under the influence of blood mixing and the 
conditions of the environment, a particular race is constituted. This race is 
now invading Paris.’ Jouvenel now understood why anti-communism was so 
strong among French banlieue workers. For them, it was not about opinions 
but an attempt to f ight against the ‘Lithuanisation of the Île-de-France’.74
When Andreu left the party at the end of 1936, having become quickly 
disillusioned by Doriot’s alliance with f inancial backers in business and 
industry, Jouvenel was furious at him, accusing him of not daring to engage 
himself fully and preferring to watch from the sidelines with his hands 
in his pockets. With such an attitude, Andreu could return to writing for 
‘reviews that no-one reads’ and abandon all prospects of making a political 
difference – a striking example of the way Jouvenel reflected on his own 
current and past activities. According to Andreu, Jouvenel told him: ‘Look, 
with my articles, I’m reaching every week hundreds of thousands of people 
73 Bertrand de Jouvenel, [untitled], L’Émancipation Nationale (17 July 1937).
74 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Hors de France’, L’Asaut (26 January 1937). Italics in original.
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who would never read me if I weren’t in the Party.’75 Fabre-Luce repeatedly 
claimed, both in his memoirs and in his statement of defence during his 
1948 collaboration trial, that he was never formally a member of the PPF. 
This could be true. Since the PPF administration papers have been lost, 
there is probably no way to answer this question. It is also questionable 
whether it matters if Fabre-Luce held a membership card or not, given 
that he sat on the party’s central bureau and frequently published in its 
newspapers. Moreover, were it true, it would have been a weird exception 
for a non-member to hold such a prominent position inside the PPF.76 As we 
have seen, it was to take almost two more years before Jouvenel, Fabre-Luce 
and Drieu were willing to follow Andreu’s path – without fundamentally 
changing their political orientation.77
75 Andreu, Le Rouge, 131.
76 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 160; Fabre-Luce, J’Ai Vécu Plusieurs Siècles, 170; 
Fabre-Luce to the Juge d’Instruction (10 January 1948), Dossier d’Épuration FABRE-LUCE Alfred, 
Archives Nationales de France, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
77 In his post-war memoirs, Fabre-Luce also claims that he had been ‘the f irst’ to break off all 
contact with Doriot and the PPF, in 1937. Despite receiving support for this claim in Jouvenel’s 
memoirs, this is a double lie: Andreu had already left the party in 1936 and Fabre-Luce remained 
strongly involved with the party until the autumn of 1938. See Fabre-Luce, J’Ai Vécu Plusieurs 
Siècles, 170; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 302. Dard mistakenly believes Fabre-Luce’s claim: Dard, Le 
Rendez-Vous Manqué, 243.

3 Facing a Fascist Europe: 1939-1943
Defeat and Readjustment
On 10 May 1940, eight months of Phony War gave way to just six weeks 
of Blitzkrieg, during which Germany achieved a quick victory over the 
Benelux countries and France. Advancing through the Ardennes, the 
German army avoided the heavily fortif ied Maginot Line along France’s 
eastern border and managed to cut off French and British forces stationed 
in Belgium from their main army corps. While large numbers of British 
troops could do no more than evacuate at Dunkirk, abandoning large 
amounts of materiel, the German army quickly advanced into northern 
France. The approaching German armies caused six to eight million French 
citizens to flee southwards, making it even harder for the French military to 
regroup. By this time, the failing French general Maurice Gamelin had been 
replaced by Maxime Weygand as supreme commander. Paying frequent 
visits to frontline troops and trying to restore morale, but also calling off a 
counter-offensive strategy proposed by his predecessor, Weygand unsuc-
cessfully attempted to reorganise French defence lines. On 10 June, Paris 
was declared an open city, while the French government established itself 
in Bordeaux. To Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel, who had been just too young to 
f ight for France in the First World War, the Battle of France offered the f irst 
opportunity to defend their country against foreign invasion. Although 
both were mobilised during early stages of the Phony War, they saw no 
combat. Jouvenel spent a few months in Alsace as ‘the oldest and by far 
the clumsiest soldier’ in his battalion, before being wounded in an accident 
and sent home. Fabre-Luce served in Paris at the ‘Second Passive Defence 
Regiment’, charged with demonstrating the use of gas masks to protect the 
city’s population from an attack that never came.1
Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, who had succeeded Daladier in March, 
quickly lost faith that the German advance could be stopped. Bringing 
Marshall Pétain into his government as well as Charles de Gaulle (as un-
dersecretary of state), who had distinguished himself on the battlef ield, he 
tried to reach a decision on what had to be done. When it became clear that 
the army staff and most of his government not only opposed the British 
proposition to unite Britain and France for the duration of the conflict but 
also refused to retreat to French North Africa and continue f ighting from 
1 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 364; Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 10.
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the empire, Reynaud resigned. He was succeeded by Pétain, who had already 
stated that it was ‘useless’ to f ight on. Pétain had been part of Doumergue’s 
national union government in 1934, after which he worked as ambassador in 
Franco’s Spain. The ageing marshal had generally kept himself at a certain 
distance from French politics, sometimes raising his voice to warn against 
‘moral degeneration’ and the supposed danger of the left. Even so, from 
1935, Pétain’s name was repeatedly mentioned as a possible authoritarian 
leader for France.2 His status as a First World War hero combined with 
his charismatic, grandfatherly aura to create an image of a trustworthy 
‘saviour’ that France could call upon in times of trouble. Pétain now rose to 
the occasion. His f irst step as a prime minister was to announce on French 
radio that he had asked for an armistice.3
Since Pétain had announced the end of hostilities almost a week before 
the armistice was signed, large numbers of French soldiers laid down their 
weapons and let themselves be taken prisoner by the Germans. More than 
1.5 million of them were deported to Germany and locked up in POW camps 
or sent into forced labour in German agriculture or industry. Instead of 
the quick release they were counting on, by the terms of the armistice 
Germany continued to consider the French soldiers as prisoners of war 
until the eventual signing of a peace treaty.4 This massive cull of prisoners 
gave Hitler an extremely powerful bargaining instrument during future 
dealings with France, as he could make the partial release of prisoners 
dependent on the collaborative attitude of the French government. During 
the occupation years, Pétain could buy the release of several hundreds of 
thousands of prisoners at the price of increasing subservience to Germany 
and implication in its crimes.
Under the armistice conditions, France saw three-f ifths of its territory 
occupied by German troops and it had to pay high reparations to support 
the German occupation regime. The French franc was fixed at an artif icially 
low exchange rate vis-à-vis the reichsmark, assuring strong buying power 
for all Germans stationed in France. Though not mentioned in the armistice, 
Alsace-Lorraine was annexed to Germany while France’s northwestern 
territories around Lille and Dunkirk were provisionally transferred to 
the German military administration of Belgium, raising fears of a further 
partitioning of France. In an exact ref lection of the Versailles treaty of 
1919, the French army was confined to a maximum of 100,000 men, with 
2 See Hervé, C’est Pétain qu’il Nous Faut!; Burrin, La France à l’Heure Allemande, 15.
3 Von der Goltz & Gildea, ‘Flawed Saviours’, 446; Fischer, Le Mythe Pétain, 201.
4 For example, see Pierre Andreu’s personal account in idem, Le Rouge et le Blanc, 156.
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the sole task of maintaining order. The French fleet – undamaged at the 
time and still a force to reckon with – was ordered back to its home ports 
for disarmament while remaining under French authority. Fearing that 
this last clause would not be upheld and seeking additional guarantees 
against the French navy falling into German hands, the UK acted militarily 
against its former ally. In the Algerian port of Mers-el-Kébir, after the French 
admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul had refuted an ultimatum to join British or 
American ports, the British bombed the French fleet, killing 1,297 French 
servicemen. The Mers-el-Kébir attack provoked an outburst of anti-British 
sentiment in France and became a propaganda success for the Germans.5 
‘In one day’, Fabre-Luce wrote, ‘England killed more French marines than 
Germany during the entire war’.6
Pétain was allowed to govern the French colonial empire, which survived 
intact, as well as France’s remaining southeastern two-f ifths, establishing 
his government in the tranquil Auvergne spa of Vichy, a town rich in hotels 
and casinos. Assisted by the resentful right-wing politician Pierre Laval, 
who would become his recurrent prime minister, Pétain soon asked for 
special powers and announced a reform of political institutions. On 10 July, 
a favourable vote by a joint meeting of the French Parliament and Senate 
granted him the authority to declare a new constitution, effectively voting 
the Third Republic out of existence. The next day, Pétain declared himself 
head of state and assumed full legislative powers. His government soon 
replaced the republican system with an authoritarian one (dubbed ‘État 
Français’) and announced a ‘National Revolution’. Besides implying a clear 
break with the Third Republic, the exact meaning of this revolution was 
vague enough to reflect the political aspirations of a plethora of different 
groups in French society. Especially during the f irst years of its exist-
ence, Vichy France could count on support from traditional nationalists, 
Catholics, political conservatives and agrarians as well as non-conformists, 
technocrats, neosocialists and fascists.7
The shock of such a quick and crushing defeat favoured Pétain’s projects, 
for many people held the country’s politicians, and often the entire republi-
can system, responsible for France’s ruin. Jouvenel recalled that, during his 
last days of military activity, his group of soldiers had been assigned the task 
of guarding a road in central France. When a governmental convoy passed, 
carrying various politicians on their way to Vichy, one of his fellow soldiers 
5 Jackson, The Dark Years, 126.
6 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 361.
7 Passmore, The Right in France, 352; Burrin, La France à l’Heure Allemande, 78.
98 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
raised his bayonet and pretended to shoot Édouard Herriot.8 Herriot’s status 
as long-time prime minister and leader of the Parti Radical (as well as his 
notorious corpulence) made him an ideal target of all the grievances the 
French had against the system that had fallen into disgrace. Pétain himself 
was eager to encourage feelings of hatred and revenge towards the Third 
Republic and its representatives. He created a Supreme Court of Justice 
and gave it the sole task of judging republican personalities such as Blum, 
Daladier and Reynaud, who were accused of weakening national defence 
and provoking the war with Germany. The accusation was limited to the 
period between 1936 and 1940, clearly making it a trial directed against the 
Popular Front and subsequent Daladier governments. Pétain was careful 
to distinguish between these ‘guilty’ politicians and his own leadership, 
which supposedly could not be blamed for the defeat. In a radio speech on 
25 June 1940, he famously declared: ‘Je hais les mensonges qui vous ont fait 
tant de mal. La terre, elle, ne ment pas. Elle demeure votre recours. Elle est 
la patrie elle-même.’9
The text of this speech, in which a supposedly honest Pétain distanced 
himself from the ‘lies’ of France’s republican politicians and announced 
Vichy’s cult of the soil as the very expression of the French fatherland, was 
written by Emmanuel Berl. Berl was an unlikely candidate to celebrate any 
conservative earthly idyll, to say the least. Of Jewish origin and a decorated 
veteran from the First World War, he was a long-time friend of Fabre-Luce 
and Jouvenel. During the 1920s, he had been a bohemian anti-bourgeois in-
tellectual, close to the surrealists and partner-in-crime of Drieu la Rochelle, 
with whom he experimented with opium and frequented brothels. In 1927, 
Berl and Drieu had created the famous avant-gardist review Les Derniers 
Jours, the leading idea of which was, according to Drieu, that European 
culture was doomed and that, in general, ‘everything is fucked’.10 Shortly 
before, Berl had also made plans with Fabre-Luce to start a political and 
philosophical weekly that failed to materialise due to lack of funds.11 During 
the 1930s, Berl turned to political journalism and became chief editor of the 
prominent left-wing weekly Marianne, to which Jouvenel contributed until 
1936. During the 1930s Berl, unlike Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce, remained on 
the French left and supported the Popular Front, but he became equally 
8 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 367.
9 Pétain, Discours aux Français, 66.
10 [‘Tout est foutu’]. Morlino, Emmanuel Berl, 72, 77, 93.
11 See ‘Notes en Vue de la Création Éventuelle avec Emmanuel Berl d’une Revue’, Fonds AFL, 
472 AP 10 dr. 1.
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interested in neosocialism and radical pacif ism. France’s defeat found him 
receptive to the Pétain myth, admiring the old marshal’s leadership and 
becoming his off icial speech writer. However, Berl soon became disillu-
sioned with Vichy and spent most of the war years at a certain distance from 
politics. He retreated to Argentat in the Corrèze region, where he worked 
on a history of Europe. Jouvenel joined him there in 1942.12
Support for the Vichy regime was not so short-lived in the cases of Jou-
venel and Fabre-Luce. War, defeat and occupation marked the beginning of a 
period during which intellectual activity could have direct consequences for 
one’s own position or sometimes even life. More than in peaceful republican 
times, life under occupation and dictatorship was modelled by one’s politi-
cal position towards the authorities. Opinion and choice mattered more 
than ever. For intellectuals tired of gratuitous opinionating in insignif icant 
journals and repetitive discussions with other intellectuals, this new situ-
ation had its charms. Fabre-Luce almost rejoiced in the observation that 
‘From now on, everyone will have to suffer the consequences of his actions. 
We are entering a true world.’13 Nevertheless, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce had 
not been masters of prudence in the past, and continuing on the same foot 
implied high risks for themselves and for their families. Jouvenel generally 
refrained from publishing in the Paris-based or Vichy-based press, while 
Fabre-Luce only published articles during the f irst two years of occupation, 
making it harder to track the evolution of their ideas on a day-to-day level. 
This lack of articles is partially compensated by Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s 
increased wartime production of books, many of which had direct political 
signif icance. Especially Fabre-Luce’s chronicle-like book series Journal de 
la France (1940-1944) make it easy to follow the directions of his political 
ideas through the war years. Jouvenel was almost as productive. In two 
studies of French interwar diplomacy and especially in Après la Défaite, 
which was written during the summer of 1940 under the immediate shock 
of the defeat, he reflected extensively on France’s current situation and the 
history of its downfall.14
Before going into the details of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s wartime 
thoughts, it is necessary to f irst explore certain aspects of their later 
interventions with regard to their own publications from these years. A 
12 Morlino, Emmanuel Berl, 159, 324, 344.
13 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 309.
14 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940); idem, ed., Anthologie de la la Nouvelle Europe; idem, 
Journal de la France II (1942); idem, Journal de la France III (1943); idem, Journal de la France IV 
(1944); idem, Journal de la France (1946); Jouvenel, De Versailles à Locarno; idem, Après la Défaite; 
idem, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale.
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substantial problem consists of post-war attempts by both intellectuals 
to cover up, thwart and rewrite parts of their own intellectual history. 
Apart from the cases of selective memory and retroactive justif ication that 
are typical for war memoirs that were written decades later,15 Fabre-Luce 
in particular has played a more active role in attempting to modify his 
own past through new editions of his wartime books. Both in the 1946 
and 1969 reprints of his collected Journal de la France books, the text was 
substantially altered to present the author as a neutral observer rather 
than the convinced collaborationist, anti-Semite and fascist intellectual 
he was.16 A systematic comparison between the post-war reprints and his 
four original Journal de la France books (from 1940, 1942, 1943 and 1944) 
reveals countless cases in which statements against Gaullism or in favour 
of collaboration, National Socialism and Vichy have been rewritten so as to 
appear neutral or even critical of the German and Vichy-French authorities.17 
From each of these books, one or several entire chapters have disappeared 
in later editions. In the f irst of these – tellingly called ‘Hitlérisme Français’ 
(1940) – Fabre-Luce argued that Nazism had French philosophical roots and 
regretted that French fascists had not been able to seize power during the 
1930s, expressing the hope that the shock of defeat would help spread fascist 
ideology in France. He also stated that his country had too long ignored 
its ‘Jewish problem’, giving free rein to ‘Léon Blum and the Jewif ication of 
ministerial cabinets’.18
The second chapter that has gone missing in later editions, ‘Regard sur 
Vichy’ (1942), deals with Fabre-Luce’s opinion of Pétain and his regime. 
Despite criticising Vichy’s conservatism, its bureaucracy and its race laws 
– while stating that France should have dealt with its ‘Jewish problem’ in 
a more elegant way – Fabre-Luce was overwhelmingly positive about the 
National Revolution. He especially appreciated the personality of the marshal 
who incarnated ‘the continuity of the fatherland’; the attempts at national 
resurrection through work, family and education; and the clear choice in 
15 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur; Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II; idem, J’ai Vécu Plusieurs 
Siècles. See also Sternhell’s devastating comments on Jouvenel’s ‘memory problems’ f iguring in 
the introduction of Un Voyageur Dans le Siècle: Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, 11.
16 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France (1946); idem, Journal de la France (1969).
17 For a typical example about London-based Gaullism, compare the two versions of the same 
text from the chapter ‘Double France’ in: Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 36; idem, 
Journal de la France (1969), 301. See also Fabre-Luce’s enthusiastic celebration of Operation 
Barbarossa as a civilizing crusade in the chapter ‘Troisième Hiver’ of Journal de la France II 
(1942), 266, as well the absence of these lines in Journal de la France (1969), 431.
18 [‘Léon Blum et l’enjuivement des cabinets des ministres’], Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France 
I (1940), 229.
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favour of collaboration with Germany for the sake of building a united and 
organised European ‘Empire’.19 The third volume of Journal de la France (1943) 
is a specif ic case. Despite later priding himself on having been imprisoned 
by the Gestapo for bypassing censorship and for his critical stance towards 
Vichy and collaboration in the book, Fabre-Luce still found it necessary to 
erase no less than two chapters from later editions. And understandably so: 
in the chapter ‘Spectateurs’, he praised Hitler as the greatest man of his times 
and the only political leader who had understood that ‘biology is the centre 
of the political sciences’ – though he had regrettably ‘gone too far’ in his 
anti-Semitism. A few pages later, Fabre-Luce attacked Churchill for delivering 
Europe to communism and for refusing to compromise in reaching a peace 
agreement with Hitler that would have permitted a joint crusade against 
Bolshevism. He found Roosevelt worse still: essentially a marionette in the 
hands of ‘a team of Jews’ who used him to ‘manipulate the American people’.20
In the new preface to the 1946 edition, Fabre-Luce admitted to making 
textual changes, but he claimed that the omitted parts were either ‘purely 
polemical’ or related to his prediction of German defeat and his protests 
against persecutions of Jews. These lines ‘had their value during the Occupa-
tion, but today they would appear as f lattery’ for the author – a surprising 
reading of his omitted ‘Regard sur Vichy’ chapter, to say the least.21 In 1969, 
Fabre-Luce even dared to suggest that he had kept the text unaltered. He 
admitted that, from a post-1945 perspective, his longing for peace – born out 
of the traumatic experience during the First World War of having seen some 
his older high-school classmates leave for the front and never return – had 
led to certain ‘excesses’ of his judgment. But ‘I have maintained them for 
my text to keep its full documentary value’.22 Not a single historian seems 
to have dealt with Fabre-Luce’s later reshaping of his wartime positions. 
Some have even let themselves be misled more explicitly by his claims. 
Julian Jackson, only citing the 1946 edition of Journal de la France, wrote 
that one had to ‘scratch the surface of Fabre-Luce’s polish’ to grasp his 
collaborative mentality. This would not have been necessary had he used 
19 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 293, 300, 306.
20 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France III (1943), 225, 228, 235, 236. The fourth volume (1944) 
also contained a chapter that disappeared from later editions. In ‘Le Genie de la Monarchie’, 
Fabre-Luce called for the instituion of a ‘new monarchy’ in France, different from Maurras and 
the Action Française and more willing to incorporate ‘the lessons of Nazism’ while at the same 
time protecting the French from ‘totalitarianism’. Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France IV (1944), 51. 
For a longer treatment of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s monarchist ref lex, see the next chapter.
21 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France (1946), 11.
22 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France (1969), 10.
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the original versions.23 The same goes for Dietrich Orlow and for Anthony 
Beavor, who used the same reworked 1946 edition and called Fabre-Luce a 
‘Pétainist’ who wrote ‘an anti-Nazi book’.24
The care with which Fabre-Luce tried to reshape his past can only be 
understood within the light of his situation after the war. The liberation 
of France found him ostracised as a collaborator, excluded from French 
publishing houses and persecuted for ‘collusion with the enemy’ but also 
admired by many fellow Pétainists and former collaborators, who recog-
nised him as one of their most prominent and courageous spokespersons.25 
Apart from the direct legal reasons to cover up certain elements of his 
own recent past, Fabre-Luce was also aware of the possible advantages 
that his position implied. This resulted in a double strategy. On the one 
hand, he presented himself as a maverick freethinker who had accepted 
imprisonment by both the Germans and the Gaullists as the price to pay for 
his complete independence from all kinds of political power. On the other 
hand, he was very careful not to reveal every aspect of his collaborationism, 
anti-Semitism and admiration of Nazi Germany, while making excellent 
use of selective citation from his books. A typical example of this strategy 
is a citation from the second volume of Journal de la France that f igured 
prominently in Fabre-Luce’s trial defence, in which he condemned col-
laboration as a ‘black stock market, where crooks are selling a fake France 
to the Germans’.26 Understandably, Fabre-Luce omitted to say that this 
indictment was only aimed at collaborators motivated by opportunism. 
The original text continued by contrasting these base profiteers with real 
‘Europeans’ who had chosen to support collaboration out of the idealistic 
conviction that the defeat could be ‘surmounted’ by the construction of a 
united Europe under German leadership. Fabre-Luce did not fail to imply 
that he ranked himself among this second group.27 The same strategy was 
applied with regard to Fabre-Luce’s condemnations of the deportation and 
23 Jackson, The Dark Years, 207.
24 Orlow, The Lure of Fascism in Western Europe, 173; Beavor & Cooper, Paris After the Liberation, 
93, 511. Though the issue is less important for his Jouvenel biography, Olivier Dard may have 
made the same mistake about Fabre-Luce, since he only cites the 1969 edition: Dard, Bertrand 
de Jouvenel, 483.
25 For a more detailed treatment of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s post-war position, see the next 
chapter.
26 [‘une Bourse noire, où des escrocs vendent à l’Allemagne une fausse France’], ‘Projet de 
Défense’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1. See also Jérôme Sauerwein, ‘Notes sur l’Activité de Monsieur 
Alfred Fabre-Luce’, Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
27 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 31; Raymond Aron made the same observation in 
his war diaries: Raymond Aron, Chroniques de Guerre, 537.
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persecution of Jews, without mentioning the anti-Semitic parts of especially 
his 1940 Journal de la France book.28
An additional nuisance for Fabre-Luce was that several of his wartime 
publications had sold very well and were still widespread after 1944. To-
gether with the long anti-Semitic pamphlet Les Décombres by the French 
fascist Lucien Rebatet (1903-1972), the f irst two volumes of Journal de la 
France rank as France’s greatest bestsellers from the occupation years. They 
received permission by German and French censorship to appear both in 
the ‘free’ (Vichy) zone and in the zone under German occupation, and the 
f irst editions were sold out almost immediately. During the f irst two years 
alone, despite a troubling lack of paper, the f irst volume went through 45 
reprints, while there have been at least 52 print runs of the second volume.29 
The books also did not fail to provoke reactions from readers. Fabre-Luce 
received countless letters from diverse personalities ranking from Joseph 
Caillaux to Jean de Pange and from Bernard Faÿ to Jean Montigny, who 
generally congratulated him with his analysis but sometimes criticised 
his collaborationist stance. Together with La Victoire (1924), the f irst 
two volumes of Journal de la France are not only the most successful of 
Fabre-Luce’s books but probably also the ones with the largest impact on 
French society.30 The situation was slightly less complicated for Fabre-Luce 
regarding the third and the fourth volume of Journal de la France. The third 
book had only appeared in a single print run, half of which was confiscated 
unsold from Parisian bookshops by the Germans after they found out he had 
bypassed censorship by using a false authorisation number. Fabre-Luce’s 
subsequent arrest and imprisonment, as well as the fame of his f irst two 
books, assured the book of a large audience, and there are indications the 
surviving copies were passed on between readers, but the book had only 
been on sale for a week and therefore the number of copies on the market 
was very limited. The fourth volume, published by Fabre-Luce personally 
without an editor around the time of the liberation of Paris, probably had 
an even smaller reach. Most post-war readers interested in the last two 
volumes of Journal de la France had only the substantially modif ied 1946 
reprint to refer themselves to.31
28 ‘Aide-Mémoire Personnel’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1. For a treatment of Fabre-Luce’s anti-
Semitism, see the next section of this chapter.
29 Loiseaux, La Littérature de la Défaite et de la Collaboration, 81; Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années 
de Liberté II, 68, 88.
30 Letters included in Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
31 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 135, 164, 194; idem, ‘Projet de Défense’, Fonds 
AFL, 472 AP 1. Fabre-Luce claimed that a thousand copies of the third book had been sold.
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This permitted Fabre-Luce, if he was unable to entirely deny the content 
of the f irst two Journal de la France books, to at least claim that by the end 
of 1942 he had completely distanced himself from anti-Semitism, collabora-
tion and fascism, his imprisonment serving as convincing proof of this 
new attitude. Although a change did occur, this claim fails to do justice to 
Fabre-Luce’s very dubious position in 1943, but this will be discussed in a 
later paragraph in this chapter. The lasting notoriety of Journal de la France 
obliged Fabre-Luce to uphold his double strategy consistently every single 
time his wartime activities were invoked, possibly to the point of believing 
it himself. A 1978 episode of the French television programme L’Homme 
en Question, during which a panel including René Rémond, Marie-Pierre 
de Brissac and Alexandre Sanguinetti confronted Fabre-Luce with his 
collaborationism and his anti-Semitism, saw him repeating basically the 
same arguments from his 1940s trial, underlined with the same selective 
self-quotations.32
32 Television programme L’Homme en Question: Alfred Fabre-Luce (25 June 1978), France Régions 
3, availabe on www.ina.fr (retrieved 23 March 2013).
Figure 6  Victory parade of the Wehrmacht in Paris, 14 June 1940. Infantry troops 
on the Avenue Foch, in front of Alfred Fabre-Luce’s house
source: süddeutsche Zeitung Photo / Hollandse Hoogte
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Tracing the Origins of Defeat
On 14 June 1940, the victorious German army paraded in Paris. German 
newsreels show German troops assembled at the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier at the Arc de Triomphe, holding a small ceremony in honour of 
the defeated enemy ‘who fought bravely’, after which endless columns 
of Wehrmacht soldiers march off through the tree-lined Avenue Foch, 
Paris’ widest and most prestigious street.33 From the windows of his own 
apartment at number 56, Fabre-Luce would have had a good view of the 
spectacle. But like most of the capital’s population, he had not waited for the 
Germans to arrive, instead joining the southward exodus and following the 
French government towards Bordeaux, leaving the Germans to celebrate 
their victory in a largely empty city. Fabre-Luce spent most of the summer 
in Trévoux, which ended up in the unoccupied zone, regularly travelling 
to Vichy to witness key events such as the f inal vote of Parliament and 
Senate on 10 July. He returned to Paris at the end of the summer, only to 
f ind that the Gestapo had established its general headquarter at number 
84, Avenue Foch, just two blocks away from his place – a presence that led 
witty Parisians to rebaptise the street ‘avenue boche’ (‘Kraut avenue’).34 Like 
Fabre-Luce, Jouvenel, whose release from military service in the unoccupied 
zone probably saved him from war captivity, was also quick to establish 
connections at Vichy. He acquired a diplomatic pass that permitted him 
to cross the demarcation line and return to Paris in July.35
While Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel had long since envisaged the eventuality 
of an overthrow of the Third Republic, the swiftness of the defeat took both 
intellectuals by surprise and left them free to draw their own, far-reaching 
conclusions. At a practical level, the defeat released them from any obliga-
tions they had during the war, providing them with ample time to meditate 
on their country’s situation while in the relative security of the unoccupied 
zone. Thanks to their family’s wealth, they were able to survive without 
having to rely on professional engagements, though Jouvenel did suffer some 
f inancial diff iculties during the war.36 Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel engaged in 
fundamental reflections on France, its history and its place in Europe. They 
were convinced that the war was over and that a durable new European 
33 Footage from Die Deutsche Wochenschau (22 June 1940), widely available on www.youtube.
com but often posted and commented upon by people with Nazi sympathies (retrieved 25 April 
2013).
34 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 398; idem, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 41, 132.
35 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 380.
36 Ibid., 390.
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order had established itself, of which a victorious Germany was naturally 
entitled to be the organising authority. This German new order was not just 
the result of an accidental military victory the kind of which Europe had 
seen many times but was the result of more fundamental developments 
in history, philosophy and economy. This section will f irst treat Jouvenel 
and Fabre-Luce’s explanations of the underlying causes of the downfall 
of France, after which the next section will address their understanding 
of German superiority and their attitude towards a German-dominated 
Europe.
Obviously, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were not the only French intellectu-
als at the time who felt the need to meditate on the underlying causes and 
consequences of their nation’s downfall, but the general mood of their 
writings stood out. Instead of fear and pessimism, their texts generally 
reflect ambition, optimism and a certain fascination with the vast new 
opportunities offered by the complete collapse of the traditional structures 
of French and European politics as they had known them since their ado-
lescence. This sudden tabula rasa tapped their 1930s longing for a radical 
new beginning and their wish to dismantle the structure and symbols of 
the Third Republic from the bottom up. Fabre-Luce described the misery of 
the masses of refugees flocking the roads leading southward from Paris as a 
‘picturesque’ punishment for French decadence. Amusedly, he noticed that 
an entire insane asylum was on the run, too. ‘Oh no, they have not forgotten 
them; France loves her madmen, multiplies them through alcohol, fattens 
them at the cost of taxpayers’ money, it is the only curve that is on the rise in 
our demographics.’37 Despite their obvious differences, this attitude brings 
Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce closer to the schadenfreude of Charles Maurras, 
who famously spoke of a ‘divine surprise’, than to Marc Bloch’s equally 
famous defence of republican and democratic values.38
Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce not only considered the defeat a victory of fas-
cism over liberalism but also that of one generation over another. Jouvenel 
regretted that interwar France had not seen the coming to power of his own 
generation, which he associated with dynamism, ‘physical virtues’ and a 
willingness to dedicate oneself to a political myth. In his mind, admiration 
for Nazism could f it with the generational discourse from his Notre Temps 
and La Lutte des Jeunes days. Fascism became synonymous with a ‘youth 
37 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 336.
38 Bloch, L’Étrange Défaite; Judt, ‘“We Have Discovered History”’, 155. Maurras’ ‘divine surprise’ 
was cited approvingly by Fabre-Luce as a f irst sign of national recovery: Fabre-Luce, Journal de 
la France II (1942), 50.
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revolution’, a generational revolt against capitalism and parliamentarianism 
which had succeeded in Italy and Germany, while in France and Britain, 
political leaders had been able to temporarily stabilise bourgeois society 
before its downfall in 1940.39 This also led Jouvenel to associate liberal 
democracy with an older bourgeois generation, rooted in the comforts of an 
easy life and the lazy preference of security over heroism and improvisation. 
The wave of democratisation that had followed the end of the First World 
War acquired the characteristics of a ‘bourgeois revolution’ with restora-
tive accents. Outside Bolshevik Russia, the revolutionary experiments of 
Béla Kun, Kurt Eisner and Karl Liebknecht soon had to make way for the 
establishment of parliamentary systems: ‘everywhere, the bourgeoisie has 
to take the lead. For it belongs to her to rule Europe.’40
By acting as the guardians of this bourgeois order, France and Britain 
had unwittingly mobilised Central Europe’s young generations against them 
during the huge generational struggle that, in Jouvenel’s interpretation, the 
interwar period had become. This youth had embraced a new way of life 
marked by ideals of speed, technology, straightforwardness and risk. Only 
Lenin, Kemal, Mussolini and Hitler had been able to understand the revo-
lutionary implications of this generation and mobilise its energy, acquiring 
a huge advantage vis-à-vis the democratic nations.41 This is where Jouvenel 
saw the ‘genesis of fascism’ and the origin of German victory over France:
A brutal reaction against a way of living, feeling and thinking that is no 
longer adapted to the new times. There is a revolution of the machine and 
a revolution of the body. Those who understand these two revolutions, 
putting young athletes in fast trucks, will triumph over those who have 
refused to understand and who can only mobilise pedestrians wearing 
ridiculous caps and a heavy gear.42
This perceived superiority of German athletes over French pedestrians led 
Jouvenel to another psychological and possibly very personal explanation 
of defeat. After rejecting the thesis of a ‘f ifth column’ that had helped the 
Germans during their invasion, he stated that the real f ifth column had 
39 ‘Une Révolution de la Jeunesse’ is the title of one of his chapters: Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 
34, 39; idem, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 323.
40 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 13.
41 Jouvenel, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 432; idem, Après la Défaite, 36.
42 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 37. Fabre-Luce shared Jouvenel’s observation of the physical 
superiority of the German youth: Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 178.
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been ‘something subtler’: ‘some kind of curiosity in the very minds of the 
soldiers […] about the customs and beliefs of the enemy’.43
In his epilogue, Jouvenel specif ied that things had not needed to go 
this way. A fascist youth revolution might have also succeeded in France 
in the aftermath of the February 1934 riots, if it had been possible to unite 
the left-wing and the right-wing youth much in the way his own La Lutte 
des Jeunes had attempted to do.44 Fabre-Luce agreed, while also providing a 
surprisingly accurate analysis of the weaknesses of fascism in 1930s France. 
He stated that French fascism had failed not because of Doriot or any other 
leader but rather due to the ‘lack of ambition’ in the country, the success of 
foreign fascisms and the fear they inspired, as well as the relatively moderate 
course of the Popular Front under Léon Blum. While regretting that France 
had been unable to mobilise the energy of its ‘young fascists’, Fabre-Luce 
rejoiced in the observation that these had kept themselves safe from the 
‘emasculating’ influences of republican politics. Now their time had come: 
‘their youth, suppressed for too long, will burst free. It will be the life juice 
of France. But one terrible question arises: in the meantime, won’t France 
already have received from abroad the doctrine of renovation that they 
want to bring to her?’45
Seen from a defeated France, twentieth-century history started to look 
very different. Before the outbreak of the war, Jouvenel was already working 
on a large diplomatic history of post-1919 Europe, but the defeat provided 
him with a title – D’Une Guerre à l’Autre – and a narrative strongly coloured 
by notions of decline and decadence. The first volume, subtitled De Versailles 
à Locarno (1940), was dedicated to the 1920s during which France had been 
the predominant European power, although ‘neither its position at the outer 
end of Europe nor its shrinking population entitled it to be the master and 
organiser of the continent’.46 An interventionist foreign policy would have 
been necessary to maintain this unnatural position of dominance, but 
France had retreated behind its purely defensive Maginot Line. According 
to Jouvenel, the ‘experience of history’ showed that this was a suicidal 
strategy: ‘If it [the nation] ceases to intervene, it ceases to dominate. If it 
ceases to dominate, it loses its allies it owed its position of mastery to. If it 
loses its allies, it f inds itself weak in front of invasion.’47
43 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 45.
44 Ibid., 244.
45 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 223.
46 Jouvenel, De Versailles à Locarno, 409.
47 Ibid., 411.
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In the second volume, originally meant to bear the name ‘De Briand 
à Hitler’48 but f inally called La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale (1941), 
Jouvenel extended his analysis to the period between 1926 and 1933, 
interpreting it as the time of ‘the big retreat’ of French diplomatic and 
economic power. Like Fabre-Luce, he defended the idealist Europeanism 
of Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi and blamed the liberal bourgeoisie 
in charge of French politics. This ‘classe égoïste et mesquine’ had failed 
miserably at its two main tasks: to maintain French preponderance and to 
construct a united Europe.49 This position led Jouvenel to an elitist critique 
of French parliamentary democracy: while the mental horizon of the com-
mon people was clearly too limited to understand matters of international 
and European politics, the same had been true of most French politicians. 
The Third Republic was led by ‘a class of lawyers and teachers with me-
diocre provincial backgrounds’ who only came in contact with foreign 
countries ‘superf icially’ and at an old age, understanding nothing of their 
language, habits and history. Jouvenel contrasted this republican political 
class with the inborn cosmopolitanism of the higher echelons of society, 
which happened to correspond perfectly to his own family background: 
‘une aristocratie qui voyage, qui reçoit chez elle de notables étrangers, que 
des alliances matrimoniales, des lectures, de fréquentes correspondances, 
tiennent en contact permanent avec les autre pays!’50 It was ‘the great drama 
of post-war Europe’ that the democracies had replaced this aristocracy ‘at 
the moment it was most necessary’ with incapable middle-class politicians 
who were electorally bound by ‘the control of classes naturally ignorant of 
everything happening beyond the frontiers’.51
Jouvenel not only found fault with his own country’s politicians, as his 
writings also took on an anti-British tone. He held the ‘Anglo-Americans’ 
responsible for the ‘big retreat’ of French power through their insistence 
on disarmament. The British, led by their ‘mercantile spirit’, had naïvely 
believed that the natural ‘will to power’ of communities could be diverted 
from the political to the economic realm, replacing ‘the Age of War’ with ‘the 
Age of Competition’. This had a devastating influence on France’s capacity 
48 Cited as the upcoming second volume on the title page of Jouvenel’s Aprés la Défaite. Two 
more volumes covering the period after 1933 were planned but never published. See Jouvenel, 
Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée, VI.
49 Jouvenel, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, I, IV, 78, 277; Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France 
I (1940), 329.
50 Jouvenel, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 439.
51 Ibid., 440.
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to resist: ‘Le maréchal Foch a abdiqué en faveur de J.-P. Morgan.’52 This at-
tempt to tame a violent natural order via economic competition was paired 
with an equally naïve and bourgeois belief in the importance of written 
treaties. As an example of this mentality, Jouvenel evoked the character 
Shylock from the Shakespearean comedy The Merchant of Venice. Shylock, a 
Jewish moneylender, insisted on receiving one pound of flesh from his rival 
Antonio’s body, to which he was entitled by the terms of a signed contract, 
even though this would mean Antonio’s death.53 Interestingly, Fabre-Luce 
also used the Shylock metaphor at around the same time, applying it to 
Winston Churchill, who in June 1940 had not wanted to release France 
from the duties of its British alliance, even though the war with Germany 
had already been lost. This attitude, according to Fabre-Luce, was typical 
of British dealings with France: ‘The English have never looked at the South 
with anything else but contempt. In their eyes the French are half Italians, 
a quarter Negroes. They have ruled over them for some years with a skill 
acquired through long imperial practice, with the same economy of violence 
that ensures a larger power.’54
Through his cruelty, evil and greed, Shylock epitomised some of the most 
prominent topoi of classical anti-Semitism. Regardless of the fact that the 
original play also allows for more sympathetic interpretations of Shylock and 
Jews, modern anti-Semites did not fail to exploit these elements, including 
Nazi Germany which may have produced around f ifty stage productions of 
The Merchant of Venice.55 In his comparison, Fabre-Luce used these negative 
images of the Jew and made them overlap with anti-British stereotypes: like 
the Jews, the British were also a greedy, mercantile race hungry for ways to 
exploit and subtly dominate others. Furthermore, both the Jews and the Brit-
ish had self ishly incited France to go to war with Germany, making France 
shed its blood while they watched from a safe distance. Had not the British 
hastily evacuated at Dunkirk, abandoning its ally to the German onslaught?56 
The last-ditch proposal for a Franco-British union had been nothing less than 
52 Ibid., V, 64.
53 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 32. Elsewhere, Jouvenel also cites foreign newspapers comparing 
France to Shylock after the French government’s objections to the Hoover Moratorium in 1931: 
idem, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 357.
54 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 359.
55 Shapiro, Shakespeare and the Jews, 228; Yaffe, Shylock and the Jewish Question, 2, 163. Zeno 
Ackermann disagrees, arguing that The Merchant of Venice did not f igure prominently in Nazi 
theatre: idem, ‘Shakespearean Negotiations in the Perpetrator Society’, in Shakespeare and the 
Second World War, eds. Makaryk & McHugh, 36.
56 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 351.
FACING A FAsCIsT EUROPE: 1939-1943 111
a ‘rape attempt’, a badly concealed form of French ‘serfdom’ that fortunately 
went too far even for the most ‘devoutly’ pro-British politicians in the French 
government. When Churchill suggested that France cede its fleet to Britain 
as a warranty against future hostilities, Fabre-Luce felt ‘the weight of the 
iron hand that was for a long time hidden underneath a velvet glove’.57
Similarly, Fabre-Luce saw a column of rich Jews at Hendaye hastily trying 
to cross the frontier into Spain. They were ‘an anti-France’ that had never 
truly been part of the nation. Meditating on Hitler and the Jews, Fabre-Luce 
observed: ‘When Hitler started his propaganda, they [the Jews] f irst revolted 
against the monstrous description he made of them. But after a while, they 
realised with fear that they were beginning to resemble it.’ It was ‘only 
natural’ that menaced Jews had looked for soldiers to defend them, but by 
doing so, they had become ‘frauds and warmongers’ responsible for plunging 
France into an avoidable war.58 According to Fabre-Luce, the best-integrated 
Jews had been able to hide these character traits during peacetime, but the 
war was now revealing the size and importance of the ‘Jewish world’ in 
France. He argued that this world not only consisted of the Jews themselves 
but also of those they had ‘corrupted or seduced’:
This painter has a Jewish lover, this stock market trader would be ruined 
by racism, this polyglot journalist does not dare to offend the American 
Jews. […] Don’t listen to their discourses, just look at them: somewhere on 
their bodies, you will f ind the claw of Israel. During these days of panic, 
basic passions conduct the world, and there are no stronger passions than 
the fear or the desire of a pogrom.59
In this light, it is astonishing that Fabre-Luce did not approve of the French 
government’s anti-Semitic persecutions and race laws. In October 1940, 
Vichy France introduced its Jewish Statute, a series of anti-Semitic legisla-
tion that was gradually extended during the following years, excluding 
Jews from ever more professions, from access to public facilities and from 
their entitlement to ordinary citizens’ rights. Three months earlier, a de-
naturalisation law had already robbed recently naturalised foreign Jews 
of their French citizenship, while all foreign Jews residing in France could 
be immediately arrested and locked into concentration camps. Of this last 
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Hitler’s Final Solution had started. All of these measures were introduced 
on the initiative of the Vichy authorities without direct German pressure, 
albeit with an ‘emulative zeal’ to imitate Nazi anti-Semitic legislation.60
Despite the many displays of anti-Semitism in the f irst volume of Journal 
de la France, which antedated most Vichy anti-Jewish legislation,61 Fabre-Luce 
remained relatively vague on what kind of solution he advised France to 
adopt with regard to its ‘Jewish question’. He admitted that many great 
French thinkers from the past had been Jews, ‘but it is not less true that an 
overabundance of Jews in the essential machinery of the state almost always 
causes trouble’. Instead of persecuting them, which he dismissed as a servile 
imitation of ‘a foreign nationalism’, he stated that ‘just the vigilance of public 
opinion would be enough’. Thus, it would have suff iced to despise and dis-
trust the Jews instead of arresting them.62 The second volume was published 
in the summer of 1942, after trains had already begun deporting Jews from 
France to the extermination camps. Despite attacking the Gaullists as led by 
‘Jewish propagandists’ (which was a badly concealed personal attack against 
his future friend Raymond Aron) and accusing the Jews of having tried to 
run the world through some kind of ‘Judeo-Masonic’ world government, 
Fabre-Luce’s anti-Semitic outbursts were slightly less frequent.63 In the f inal 
chapter, in which he drew a provisional conclusion on Vichy, he approved 
of the denaturalisation of foreigners and repeated that a ‘Jewish problem’ 
existed in France. ‘But we have witnessed the birth of a Jewish Statute that 
contains useless infringements on humanity, property, veterans’ rights – and 
the world is astonished to learn that it is a work of French genius.’64
And besides, not all Jews were bad. Fabre-Luce praised his friend Emma-
nuel Berl as ‘almost the only Jew’ who had been against the war in 1939 and 
who had stayed in France at the time of defeat, ‘hoping that a small zone will 
remain in which it is allowed to be both a Jew and a pacifist’.65 In an obituary 
included in the second volume of Journal de la France, Fabre-Luce also did 
not fail to pay his respect to the Jewish philosopher Henri Bergson, who 
60 Jackson, The Dark Years, 355. For a more detailed study of the origins of the Jewish Statutes, 
see Joly, ‘The Genesis of Vichy’s Jewish Statute of October 1940’, 276-298.
61 Only the denaturalisation law had been introduced at the moment the book was published.
62 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 227, 229.
63 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 36, 173.
64 Ibid., 300.
65 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 373. In a strikingly similar manner, Marcel Déat also 
accused the Jews of having plunged France into war with Germany, with the same ‘honourable 
exception’ of Emmanuel Berl, who had remained faithful to his pacif ist principles. Cited in 
Amzalak, Fascists and Honorable Men, 143.
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had died of bronchitis at the beginning of 1941. He also included a fragment 
of one of Bergson’s texts (on the unnatural character of democracy) in his 
Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe (1942).66 Like many intellectuals of his gen-
eration, Fabre-Luce was a long-time admirer of the spiritualist philosopher, 
who had pitched intuition and élan vital against the supposed shallowness 
of scientif ic rationalism. Fabre-Luce had read Bergson’s Les Deux Sources de 
la Morale et de la Religion and solicited to interview him for L’Assaut in 1937, 
although Bergson declined while expressing his sympathy for Fabre-Luce’s 
articles.67 When the Vichy regime offered to exempt Bergson from the Jewish 
Statutes because of his merits for France, he refused, preferring to step 
down from all his academic honours. Although Bergson admitted that the 
development of his thought had brought him close to Catholicism, he chose 
not to convert since he did not want to turn his back on the Jewish people 
in its hour of suffering. While already ill, Bergson even had himself carried 
to the police commissariat to register as a Jew. Fabre-Luce recognised the 
‘grandeur’ of these decisions, but he could not keep himself from criticising 
Bergon’s choice for Judaism in the same breath. Bergson neglected that 
Judaism had been ‘opposed’ to Christianity ever since the days of Saint 
Paul. In the end, Fabre-Luce wondered, was Bergson’s mystical universalism 
anything other than ‘an attempt at revanche by a people that has not been 
able to win its unity on the national level and now hopes to achieve it on a 
global level by dominating the thought of all other peoples’?68
By the time the third volume of Journal de la France appeared, in July 
1943, some 50,000 French and foreign Jews had already been deported from 
France. While the French population had initially reacted largely with ap-
proval or indifference to the anti-Jewish Vichy legislation,69 the start of the 
Holocaust in France did not fail to provoke an outcry amongst the French 
population about the treatment inflicted on the Jews. In July 1942, during 
the notorious Vel’ d’Hiv’ round-up, 13,000 mostly foreign or stateless Jews 
were arrested in the Paris area, 7,000 of whom were subsequently held in the 
Vélodrome d’Hiver cycling stadium for three to six days with no food and 
hardly any drinking water. Almost all the arrested Jews, more than a third of 
whom were children, ended up in French transition camps, from where they 
were deported to Auschwitz during August. Less than a hundred of them 
66 Fabre-Luce, Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, 93; idem, Journal de la France II (1942), 173.
67 Henri Bergson to Fabre-Luce (10 July 1937), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 6; Reading notes from 1932 
included in Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 2.
68 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 173, 174.
69 Julian Jackson notes that ‘Vichy’s anti-Semitism in 1940-1 was the aspect of the National 
Revolution which seems to have aroused the least opposition’: Jackson, The Dark Years, 380.
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would survive the death camps. During the round-up, many non-Jewish 
Parisians witnessed children being separated from their parents, public 
displays of despair and misery on the part of the victims and brutality 
on the part of the German and French off icers. The raid would have been 
impossible without the assistance of 9,000 French policemen, who carried 
out the arrests and were involved in every stage of the operation. As a result 
of this and other round-ups, during the summer of 1942, a turning point 
occurred in public opinion, which became more sensitive to the treatment 
of the Jews. There was a considerable rise in support for clandestine rescue 
organisations, and individuals, including some influential members of the 
Catholic Church, did not fail to publicly oppose Vichy’s involvement in the 
arrests, cruel treatment and deportations of Jews.70
Despite these developments, Fabre-Luce struck an only slightly different 
tone in his 1943 volume. In a discussion of the main tenets of Hitler’s politics, 
he stated that anti-Semitism had originally been ‘an admirable political 
instrument’ since it had forged the unity of the German people ‘at the 
expense of a very small minority’ suitable for the role of the scapegoat. But 
the whole enterprise had ‘gone beyond its limits’, not because of Hitler but 
due to the influence of ‘subordinates’ and blackmailers who wanted to profit 
from the Jews’ misery. The paradoxical result was that ‘the Jew of Europe, 
yesterday a parasite of nations, has today become a symbol of human suf-
fering that one bows before’.71 This phrase was cited by Fabre-Luce as an 
argument for acquittal during his collaboration trial, and in that function 
it might have served as a convincing manifestation of empathy from an 
author who was willing to risk imprisonment for openly proclaiming his 
convictions. Read within its entire paragraph, however, its alleged humane-
ness suddenly appears less solid. Fabre-Luce continued by discussing the 
reactions of various people to the fate of the Jews: Christians wondered 
whether the Jewish ‘pariah’ was not an instrument of God for testing their 
charity, opportunistic anti-Semites started to fear a coming ‘revenge of 
Israel’ that would make them ‘succeed’ the Jews in the concentration camps. 
Generally, Fabre-Luce concluded:
Christ and Nemesis join hands to create around the persecuted Jew a 
kind of respectful fear. The emigrated prof iteer [i.e. the emigrated Jew] 
capitalises on that. He uses the sufferings of his fellows to become, ever 
70 Poznanski, Les Juifs en France Pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 318, 354; Marrus & 
Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 251, 270; Jackson, The Dark Years, 360.
71 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France III (1943), 225.
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more, the cement of the Allied coalition. And one can wonder whether 
the provisional result of the ‘liquidation of the Jews’ is not an increase of 
their influence and harmfulness in the entire universe.72
This text raises several significant questions. Was Fabre-Luce, generally well-
informed about the events of his times and well-connected to several Paris-
based German officers, aware of how literally this ‘liquidation of the Jews’ 
had to be taken in mid-1943?73 And was his criticism of the Holocaust really 
grounded on humanitarian considerations? The last sentences seem to suggest 
that Fabre-Luce opposed the Holocaust primarily because of its ineffectiveness 
and counterproductivity: instead of ridding the world of the Jews, which might 
have been a good thing, its ‘provisional result’ would be a ‘universe’ in which 
the surviving Jews would be pulling the strings even more than they had done 
before the war. Seen in this light, even the seemingly sympathetic sentence 
about the Jew as a ‘symbol of human suffering’ now looks like a rather neutral 
observation of the changing image of the Jew in French public opinion. It also 
suggests Fabre-Luce believed the Nazi propaganda myth that emigrated Jews 
were leading the Allied coalition and making it serve their interests.
Nevertheless, whether out of recognition of Fabre-Luce’s half-hearted 
condemnation of the Jewish Statute or out of despair (or simply because he 
was deemed well-connected to the German authorities), some French Jews 
considered him a possible source of help. In September 1942, Fabre-Luce 
received a letter from Jacques Ber, a Jewish Frenchman who expressed his 
surprise that the second volume of Journal de la France contained ‘barely 
a word about the Jewish question’. While stating that Fabre-Luce had ‘pro-
foundly honoured’ himself by condemning the Jewish Statutes, Ber wondered 
how well-informed he was about their actual impact on Jewish life in France:
ce que je peux vous dire, moi, Juif, c’est que nous sommes devenues des 
morts vivants, tout nous est interdit: Restaurants, cafés, bars, théâtres, 
72 Ibid., 226.
73 It is not unthinkable that – despite claiming in his memoirs that he f irst heard about the 
death camps in May 1945 – Fabre-Luce received at least some information through Ernst Jünger 
or his other German contacts. A perpetrators’ study by Ahlrich Meyer establishes that, though 
the exact system of the extermination camps was only known to a small number of off icials, 
there was little doubt among the Germans based in France what fate awaited the Jews who 
were deported to the east. Jünger’s war diaries suggest that in late 1942, during a short visit to 
the eastern front, he heard about the use of ‘poison gas tunnels, through which the trains f illed 
with Jews pass’. In April 1943 Jünger noted that mass executions of Jews were no longer in use, 
‘since we [“man”] have passed to gassing the victims’. Jünger, Strahlungen, 199, 246; Meyer, Täter 
im Verhör, 282; Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 234.
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cinéma, concerts, téléphones, marchés, foires, piscines, plages, Musées, 
bibliothèques, champs de courses, campings, parcs, squares, … Les 
aryens, même ceux qui sont contre nous, reconnaissent combien tout 
cela est atroce et exagéré! Et, le but de cette lettre, Monsieur, est de vous 
demander de faire comprendre cela aux autorités d’occupation, parce que, 
ceux qui ne sont pas Juifs, ont l’angoissante intuition (vraie ou fausse?) 
que leur tour à eux, français, pourrait bien arriver! Et je suis persuadé, que 
toutes ces persécutions ont, absolument, tué ‘l’esprit de collaboration’.74
Half a year later, Fabre-Luce received a letter from Madeleine Fajon, a Jewish 
Frenchwoman whose husband, a French-Romanian Jew, had been deported 
‘to Silesia’. After thanking Fabre-Luce for his ‘courageous’ criticism of the 
Jewish Statutes and listing the military awards (the Croix de guerre, the 
Légion d’honneur) that her husband, ‘a patriotic Frenchman’, had received, 
she begged Fabre-Luce to help her acquire ‘special authorisation’ to send 
her husband clothes and food. She had not heard from him for a long time 
and was worried about his health.75 The Fabre-Luce papers do not contain 
answers to these letters.
Fabre-Luce’s brand of anti-Semitism is absent from Jouvenel’s writings. 
Partially of Jewish origin himself through his mother’s family, Jouvenel 
would have counted as a ‘half-Jew’ according to Nazi race laws. Even so, he 
was not entirely devoid of remarks echoing anti-Jewish clichés. Before the 
war, during the spring of 1939, Jouvenel had visited Palestine, where he was 
shocked by the sight of ‘f ilthy’ orthodox Jews praying at the Wailing Wall. 
He contrasted these wretched worshippers with the positive impressions 
he gained from a visit to a kibbutz: ‘in the same country where Jews with 
corkscrew curls keep the habits of the ghetto, young Jewish pioneers are 
living an exhilarating adventure’. He was delighted to see a ‘nervous and 
gesticulating race’ f inally work the earth and acquire ‘the sure malicious 
smile of the earthly people’. But this idyll was disturbed by the realisation 
that the kibbutzim were unable to f inance themselves and depended on 
money provided by Jewish communities abroad: ‘for each young couple 
joyously working the fertilised earth in the sunshine, there is a fat-bellied 
Jew sitting at the desk of a shop or a bank piling up pieces of money. One 
redeems the other… The race is going to change.’76
74 Jacques Ber to Fabre-Luce (14 September 1942), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 6. 
75 Madeleine Fajon to Fabre-Luce (1 March 1943), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
76 Long article written for Candide, May/June 1939, included in the folder ‘Candide’, Fonds 
BdJ, Don 90 39 (12), folder 11.
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Jouvenel’s wartime publications bear witness to what could at most be 
called a philo-anti-Semitism that saw him legitimise particular people’s 
hatred of the Jews without directly agreeing with it personally. Jouvenel 
mentioned how successful the Nazi party had been in winning the sup-
port of German shopkeepers ruined by the arrival of a ‘Jewish warehouse’ 
in their quarter and industrialists beaten by big business ‘supported by 
Jewish banks’. He also explained how during the days of hyper-inflation, 
to be able to eat, the Viennese high society had had to prostitute itself 
or auction off all its valuable furniture to ‘a certain number of bandits, 
who were often Jewish’.77 This unwillingness to oppose anti-Semitism is 
possibly reflected in Jouvenel’s notorious interview of Hitler in 1936. Among 
the many reactions that the interview provoked in the French press, the 
Jewish review Univers Israëlite criticised Jouvenel’s uncritical attitude in 
the following words:
It is not ours to comment on the interview that Chancellor Hitler has 
accorded to Mr. Bertrand de Jouvenel, representing Paris-Midi. But 
was the Führer aware that his spokesperson was not a ‘pure’ Aryan? 
What to think of a journalist who is able to repress in his heart – for 
realistic reasons – all the emotions certainly shared by some of his 
relatives? Instead of a theatrical prostration, one reference to racist 
persecutions, even a single word would have been an act of courage 
worthy of France.78
Jouvenel was not blind. He did notice the very visible manifestations of 
Nazi anti-Semitism when he was a guest at the 1938 Nuremberg party rally, 
but they seemingly failed to have a large impact on him. In a long article 
written for Gringoire, he mentioned the demonic caricatures of ‘the Jew’ 
on the propaganda posters and the threatening warning signs painted on 
the Jewish shop windows of a city that had repeatedly seen pogroms and 
anti-Jewish violence since the Middle Ages. But ‘like the other Frenchmen 
attending the congress’, he noticed these signs ‘while passing by, without 
giving them all my attention’, occupied as he was by the question of whether 
the Germans would risk another world war. In the resulting article, these 
observations were almost entirely buried in Jouvenel’s fascination with the 
77 Jouvenel, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 409; idem, Après la Défaite, 19.
78 [‘un acte de courage… bien français’]. Article from Univers Israelite (13 March 1936), included 
in folder ‘1-8’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (12).
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‘religious’ force of Nazi mass ceremonies and the ‘immense constructive 
effort’ that he saw as the essence of National Socialism.79
Jouvenel’s family origins did not remain unknown to the Nazis for long 
and, in late 1937, Abetz had come under attack in Germany for being a 
‘judeophile’ and for having confronted the Führer without prior notice 
with a journalist who was a ‘half-Jew’. He defended himself by arguing that 
Jouvenel, despite his ‘weak, inconsistent’ character, was a ‘stylistically highly 
talented writer’ whose Hitler interview had been ‘a huge political success 
in France’. Moreover, Abetz stressed that Jouvenel had a bad relationship 
with his Jewish mother, while his outer looks were such that even Hitler 
had complimented him on his ‘fabulous race’.80
‘On the Threshold of a New World’81
As we have seen, in their reaction to France’s defeat, Fabre-Luce and Jou-
venel fell back upon the metaphysical directions of their political thought 
that had revealed themselves during the late 1930s. This was even more the 
case in their search for the underlying causes of the German victory. The 
continental, imperialist and pro-German accents that their Europeanism 
had gained also made them prone to identify with the idea of a new Europe 
under Hitler’s leadership. Germany should lead Europe not because of its 
military superiority, they explained, but because it had developed the 
historical, material and spiritual means to do so. From a kind of a longue-
durée perspective, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel attempted to provide National 
Socialism with the historical and philosophical roots of a major revolution 
in human history, equal or even superior to the French Revolution of 1789.82
According to Jouvenel, the ‘German Revolution’ and its victory over 
France were the lasting outcome of centuries of preparation that had shaped 
a particular German conception of Europe. He distinguished between 
historical, political, economic and social conceptions. In his explanation 
of the historical dimensions, Jouvenel engaged in an extended treatment of 
German historiography since the late eighteenth century, paying special at-
tention to the perverse role France had supposedly played in Germany since 
79 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Nuremberg’, Gringoire (9 September 1938), included in idem, La 
Dernière Année, 16, 24.
80 Cited in Ray, Annäherung an Frankreich im Dienste Hitlers?, 234.
81 [‘Au seuil d’un monde nouveau’]. Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 404.
82 Fabre-Luce, Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, XXVII; idem, Journal de la France I (1940), 404; 
Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 166.
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the Peace of Westphalia (1648). For more than a millennium, the Holy Roman 
Empire had embodied the ideal of universal monarchy and the defence of 
Christendom against attacks from Huns and Turks, while the French kings 
had been essentially particularistic, assuming the role of ‘the dissociative 
element in Europe’.83 Ironically, Jouvenel observed, it was precisely the Holy 
Roman Empire’s liquidation by Napoleon that had paved the way for the 
transformation of German nationalism from the imperial myth into its 
modern variant, without it losing its European aspirations. This is where 
the political conception of Europe came in, which Jouvenel saw grounded 
in the specif icities of German unif ication, including the long-cherished 
desire of ‘vital space’ in the East. He explained that, if Germany wanted to 
aspire to world power and compete with the United States, it had no choice 
but to appropriate large territories in Eastern Europe for itself, expel the 
non-German populations there and ‘settle pure Germans in their place’.84
Private notes from 1940 show just how well-read Jouvenel was in German 
völkisch and Nazi texts about these topics, including the genocidal implica-
tions of a colonial policy oriented at the creation of Lebensraum in Eastern 
Europe. After citing texts by Rudolf Kötzschke and Paul Rohrbach and quot-
ing from Mein Kampf, Jouvenel concluded: ‘the more merciless the vae victis, 
the greater the security of the peace that follows it; in antiquity, defeated 
peoples were destroyed completely. Today, this is materially impossible, 
but one can imagine conditions that come very close to total destruction.’85 
Jouvenel’s reading notes from this period reveal his admiration for the 
direction of the German economy under Hjalmar Schacht and Hermann 
Goering, his fascination with the prospect of German control over ‘almost 
180 million people’ and continental Europe’s entire metal, mechanic and 
electrical industry, and a combination of fascination and horror regard-
ing the consequences of Nazi colonialism.86 He mentioned that within 
the Nazi party, theorists were discussing what to do with non-German 
‘aliens’ living within the Greater German Reich. Some proposed erecting 
‘“reserves” similar to the ones given in North America to the Redskins’, 
while others stated that these ‘aliens’ could live next to the Germans ‘not 
as citizens but as “foreign nationals” [“ressortissants”]’. His correct estima-
tion of the importance of Lebensraum within National Socialist ideology 
83 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 142.
84 Ibid., 149, 157, 211.
85 Untitled notes included in folder ‘Allemagne’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (23).
86 For a longer treatment of these ideas, see Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 180, 199. Mazower does 
not cite Jouvenel.
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also led Jouvenel to a far-fetched interpretation of Hitler’s Führer title: ‘He 
proclaimed himself “conductor” in remembrance of the age of migration, 
the times during which “conductors” of the Germanic race led the Goths 
from the icy shores of Sweden to the warm beaches of the North Sea and the 
Vandals from the Pomeranian birch forests to the olive groves of Tunisia.’87
Jouvenel situated the German economic conception of Europe in its readi-
ness to go beyond the outdated ‘orthodoxy’ of free trade and develop a policy 
of autarky. During the 1930s, Germany had superseded France as the privi-
leged trading partner of Central and Eastern Europe, as it could guarantee 
the purchase of a f ixed quantity of primary commodities in exchange for the 
sale of an equally f ixed quantity of end products. Combined with military 
conquest, Jouvenel envisioned ‘the constitution of a large autarchic sector, 
stretching from the Rhine to the Pacific’. He was fascinated by the similarity 
between this situation and the Continental System from the Napoleonic Age. 
Like Napoleon, Hitler was in control of a European empire pitched against 
Britain dependent on its colonies, while the two blocks tried to exhaust 
each other commercially. In 1942, Jouvenel published a lengthy study of the 
Continental System titled Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée in which he also 
observed that the blockade had contributed signif icantly to the develop-
ment of German metallurgy, which was sheltered from British competition 
during its vulnerable start-up years. The German Zollverein later played the 
same role, erecting tariff walls that allowed German industry to prosper, 
while France, swayed by free-trade ideas that only benefited Britain, lagged 
behind.88 Fabre-Luce also alluded to this Napoleonic comparison, writing in 
February 1941: ‘these years 1802-1807 offer curious analogies with the days 
we are living. The Boulogne Camp, the Continental System, the Empire of 
Europe: all these topics have been reopened in 1940.’89
Finally, in his treatment of the German social conception of Europe, 
Jouvenel returned to his view of National Socialism as essentially a superior 
form of socialism. His elaboration came strikingly close to Zeev Sternhell’s 
ideal type of fascism as the anti-Marxist revision of socialism. Jouvenel 
criticised Marxism for having completely ignored the psychological aspects 
of the social question. The nineteenth-century proletariat suffered not only 
from material poverty but also from isolation and fragmentation, both in the 
87 Untitled notes included in folder ‘Allemagne’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (23).
88 Jouvenel, Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée, XI; idem, Après la Défaite, 167, 174, 185.
89 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘L’Avènement de l’Empire: Vers l’Empire d’Occident par Louis Madelin’ 
(book review), Nouvelle Revue Française (February 1941), 376. Boulogne was the French port 
where Napoleon assembled his army and f leet for a planned invasion of England.
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city and inside the factory, where it was not allowed to organise itself or even 
to gather. While utopian socialism and anarcho-syndicalism did address this 
problem, Jouvenel regretted that Marxism had taken over large sections of 
the workers’ movement during the late nineteenth century. He cited Georges 
Sorel, who criticised the Marxists for having ‘bureaucratised’ the socialist 
movement, creating a separate class of representatives and professional 
politicians. ‘Come the revolution, these personnel will replace the capital-
ists and direct the factories in their place. For the workers, not much will 
have changed.’ Like anarcho-syndicalism, fascism instead offered to forge 
workers together in ‘a moral body’, creating a bond between them and their 
work that permitted them to feel pleasure and accomplishment through it. 
‘What determines the success of communist and fascist parties more than 
that they have permitted modern man to escape from his isolation?’90
French and British traditions of utilitarianism and individualism had 
led both countries to ignore man’s psychological need for collective be-
longing, while in Germany traditions survived that provided people with 
frameworks that went beyond the individual level. From the ‘intuitive 
transcendence’ of Germanic tribes worshipping their dead via the medieval 
guilds (which were only abolished in Germany in 1869) to the many clubs 
and organisations of early-twentieth-century Germany, Jouvenel saw these 
collective traditions as an important element in the German victory of 1940. 
The Third Reich had merely extended this organisational structure and 
given it an even more prominent place in society. Jouvenel even considered 
this framework to be a possible check on totalitarianism: ‘In our recent 
admiration for the totalitarian state, we still have not understood that the 
absolutism of the state is corrected by the constitution of small collectivities 
that satisfy the human instinct of loyalism, creating feelings that profit the 
state but that the state itself is unable to generate.’91
According to Jouvenel, one more aspect made National Socialism a supe-
rior form of socialism: state control over national resources. As an example, 
he stated that, although France had more automobiles, all German vehicles 
were used by the army, while in France, hundreds of thousands of private 
vehicles f illed with people fleeing the German offensive had blocked the 
roads, making it even harder for the ill-equipped French army to resist. ‘In 
totalitarian regimes’, Jouvenel concluded, ‘the national strength is not only 
built on public but also on private resources. In this way, the fascist regime 
accomplishes the “conscription of fortunes” that is written in the socialist 
90 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 191.
91 Ibid., 195.
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programme.’ Jouvenel found consolation in this observation, since this 
meant that the defeat was less one of France by Germany but rather ‘that 
of a system that incompletely mobilised the resources of our fatherland, 
by a system that fully used the adversary’s potential.’92 This underlined 
the revolutionary novelty of the Third Reich. Foreshadowing what would 
become the main analysis of his post-liberation magnum opus, Du Pouvoir, 
Jouvenel came to another analogy with the Napoleonic age centred on the 
growing power of the state. The victories of the Corsican general had been 
based on the mobilisation of people, resources and money on a scale that 
early modern Europe’s dynastic rulers had never seen. Hitler’s victory was 
built on a revolutionary extension of the same principle: a state that controls 
all the national resources, including business and industry.93
Fabre-Luce agreed with Jouvenel (and Sternhell) that National Socialism 
was an ‘anti-Marxist socialism’, which he saw as part of an international 
fascist revolution directed against both Marxism and ‘reactionary’ capi-
talism. He named Mussolini’s Italy, Portugal’s Salazar, Franco’s Spain and 
Pétain’s France as other manifestations of this revolution.94 The fascist 
revolution matched the French Revolution in another aspect: it had so 
strongly transformed society and politics that no restoration could undo it 
anymore. Just as Napoleon had ‘digested’ the French Revolution, repressing 
its chaotic consequences while making its revolutionary achievements an 
integral part of his imperial European project, Hitler had ‘digested’ social-
ism.95 Although Napoleon eventually lost control of the territories he had 
conquered and raised Europe’s national sentiments against him, Fabre-Luce 
was unconvinced that the same would happen with Hitler’s empire. After all, 
Hitler had the party at his disposal, an ‘instrument of inner cohesion’ that 
Napoleon lacked, as well as an air force that was ‘an effective weapon against 
maritime powers’. If Germany were to prove itself able to recognise the New 
Europe’s ‘authentic national forces’ and collaborate with them loyally, ‘one 
can say that Napoleon’s dream has finally come true’.96 The probability of this 
destiny was enlarged by the genius of Hitler, whom Fabre-Luce described as a 
formidable brain ‘that easily dominates the large spaces of history’. A reading 
of Hermann Rausching’s anti-Nazi book Hitler Speaks only confirmed for 
him Hitler’s quality as an ‘Übermensch’ whom France’s democratic leaders 
92 Ibid., 218.
93 Ibid., 216.
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could never defeat.97 Two years later, Fabre-Luce made Hitler even more 
superhuman, comparing him to ‘Jupiter’ frowningly looking down from his 
Alpine Olympus upon the petty rivalries and conflicts of Vichy France.98
Among the German authors cited by Jouvenel, a plethora of romantics, 
nationalists, conservatives and racial theorists f igure, including Friedrich 
Schiller, Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Johan Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Haushofer, Ernst 
Hasse, Friedrich Naumann and Friedrich Lange. Despite obvious disagree-
ments between these authors, Jouvenel still saw them united in the service 
of the German state. Unlike French intellectuals, Jouvenel explained, Ger-
man scientists and intellectuals were acutely conscious of their national 
duties. Like the Jesuits, German intelligence was ‘an Order, working for the 
greater glory of the fatherland’.99 Fabre-Luce also explored the philosophical 
and historical basis of the Nazi victory while placing a stronger accent on the 
European character of the New Order and its origins. In 1942, this resulted 
in the publication of Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, essentially an eclectic 
collection of texts that Fabre-Luce found had contributed to the emergence 
of a ‘New Europe’ along National Socialist lines.100
This anthology included predominantly French and German authors, gar-
nished with two Italians (Machiavelli and Mussolini), two British (Thomas 
Carlyle and D. H. Lawrence) and one Spaniard (Miguel de Unamuno). Na-
tionalist, conservative, fascist and racist authors such as Maurras, Gobineau, 
Haushofer, Barrès, Alfred Rosenberg, Nietzsche, Bergson, Oswald Spengler, 
Drieu and Ernst Jünger f igured alongside Paul Valéry, Goethe, Caillaux and 
even the young communist novelist Paul Nizan. Fabre-Luce had some of the 
German authors that were still unknown in France translated into French 
by the Dutch literary translator Dolf Verspoor. In a long preliminary essay, 
Fabre-Luce admitted that there was substantial disagreement between 
the included authors, ‘but as I assembled the texts, the authors started to 
dialogue. […] What I saw being born in front of my eyes, in its solidarity 
and diversity, was Europe itself.’101 A letter to Jünger in which Fabre-Luce 
requested permission to include an extract from his personal war account 
Das Wäldchen 125 in his anthology probably laid the basis for the long-lasting 
friendship between him and the Paris-based Wehrmacht captain.102
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The major aim of Fabre-Luce’s anthology was to prove that French litera-
ture and philosophy had made an essential contribution to the New Europe 
that had been born in 1940. At the end of his essay, Fabre-Luce observed 
that British authors were almost absent from his anthology because the 
country had only marginally contributed to the intellectual genesis of the 
new Europe. ‘If one recognises this fact, one has to conclude that the Franco-
German couple is the dominating element of the European synthesis.’103 
Separate chapters were dedicated, amongst others, to ‘the respect of force 
and aristocratism’, ‘biological politics’, ‘towards a new religion’, ‘anti-Marxist 
socialism’, ‘national revolution’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘Europe’. Fabre-Luce hon-
oured Gobineau and Sorel as the ‘spiritual fathers’ of Hitler and Mussolini. He 
stated that French idealism was in dire need of some ‘inconvenient truths’, 
citing Blaise Pascal that ‘historically, law is nothing but the justif ication of 
force’. With his work on the force of political myths, Sorel had contributed to 
the elaboration of the Führerprinzip and to the struggle against ‘intellectual 
devirilisation’, since ‘ideas degenerate when they are no longer nourished 
by heroism’.104 Goethe, Carlyle and Napoleon had proven that a natural elite 
consisting of Übermenschen needed to lead the masses, establishing a kind of 
feudal bond: ‘Between disciple and master, between man and superman, the 
bond of vassal and lord is sublimated and recreated.’ Nietzsche and Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon had inspired National Socialist doctrine in their attack 
on religion for having burdened man with the ‘Jewish’ notion of sin and for 
having established a religious hierarchy separated from political power. 
Fabre-Luce considered ‘the decline of Christianity’ and ‘the conscription 
of religious energies in the service of the nation’ one of the most important 
elements of the new fascist Europe. He concluded that ‘the essential signi-
f ication of the fascist revolutions is maybe of having resituated to the leader 
the religious character that Christianity took away from him’.105
Fabre-Luce also ventured into racial theory, social Darwinism and eugen-
ics. While Ernest Renan had already dreamt of ‘humanity creating out of 
itself a race of gods’, racial science was about to bring this ideal within arm’s 
reach. Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Barrès had laid the basis 
for biological thought, which Hitler and the French biologists Jean Rostand 
and René Quinon elaborated into a programme of genetic improvement of 
man by means of selection. With Quinon, Fabre-Luce stated that war was ‘as 
much a necessary instrument of selection as reproduction itself. One is the 
103 Fabre-Luce, Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, XLIII.
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task of females, the other must be the task of males.’ Hitler had introduced 
state policy based on eugenic principles, making procreation ‘for some an 
obligation, for others a shameful act that has to be forbidden’.106 In two letters, 
Fabre-Luce asked Rostand for supplementary information on the practical 
use of eugenics on humans and the possible use of X-rays to provoke muta-
tions. Despite Rostand’s relatively discouraging reply – he wrote that the 
only useful application of human eugenics was to encourage reproduction 
of individuals disposing of ‘exceptional qualities’ – Fabre-Luce concluded 
that Rostand basically agreed with Hitler. Although Rostand had stated that 
the mixing of races was not negative, Fabre-Luce still found that it disrupted 
social order and that ‘the results of crossbreeding are often disastrous’.107
According to Fabre-Luce, Rostand also fully approved of the Nazi law of 
14 July 1933 on the sterilisation of ‘idiots’, which indicated ‘a more profound 
agreement’ between Hitler and the French biologist. The German sterilisa-
tion law made Fabre-Luce doubt the viability of democratic states, since 
these still allowed people to reproduce who otherwise would have been 
‘ruthlessly eliminated’. This led to a ‘progressive weakening of the species. 
Our “civilisation” f inishes by turning against itself. It is unable to transform 
our individual acquisitions into biological progress.’ On the contrary: a 
‘counter-selection’ was taking place against which legitimate action needed 
to be undertaken. Hitler was the only person powerful and free enough to 
organise this, which made him a powerful ally ‘against democratic and 
Christian humanitarianism’.108 Although less willing to go into details, 
Jouvenel thought along the same lines. He called for the new science of 
‘biopolitics’ to replace the traditional French republican politics, addressing 
‘men’ instead of parties, institutions and electorates. The f irst task of the 
biopolitician was to ‘redress the weakening tendencies of the French race’, 
which Jouvenel found ‘in a state of inferiority vis-à-vis its contemporaries 
in other countries’ both in terms of numbers and physical f itness. After 
this stronger French race had been ‘forged’, these human cattle had to be 
oriented towards the work ‘that it is most f it for’.109
In addition to biopolitics, Jouvenel was aiming for a more fundamental 
transformation of French science and politics. He stated that the whole 
fabric of republican science, which he felt was contaminated by the idealistic 
106 Ibid., VII, XIV, 
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formalism of the law faculties where the country’s political elite was trained, 
had to be replaced by ‘new political sciences’ rooted in concrete facts and 
inspired by recent progress in racial biology, geopolitics and psychology. He 
called for the establishment of ‘biopolitics, geopolitics and psychopolitics’ 
as three distinct new disciplines within French academia, ‘with their 
professors and their chairs’.110 While biopolitics had to address the qual-
ity of the French race, he presented geopolitics as the continuation of the 
thought of Richelieu that had been lost in France, while in Germany Karl 
Haushofer had inspired a whole new science on the basis of the study of the 
political value of soil, natural resources and coastlines. Jouvenel’s interest 
in Haushofer’s ideas preceded the war. Already in May 1939, Jouvenel had 
cited Haushofer abundantly and even borrowed maps from Haushofer’s 
monthly Geopolitik, while stressing the importance of geopolitical thought 
behind each of Hitler’s political moves.111 During the interwar period, 
France’s failure to seize geopolitical occasions such as the construction of 
a channel between the Rhine and the Rhone, which would have laid the 
basis for a true Franco-German ‘community of interests’, illustrated how 
much France needed to learn from Germany.112 Psychopoliticians had to 
study the ‘national temperament’ as well as the unknown needs and desires 
of the masses to be able to better lead them, ‘exiting their strengths and 
healing their weaknesses’. So long as a great leader had not revealed itself, 
at least an ‘intellectual elite’ could prepare the ground by studying great 
men from the past and establishing ‘a solid base of political knowledge’ 
rooted in these three disciplines.113
New Rulers, Old Acquaintances
Besides these philosophical and historical reflections, the war years also 
confronted Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce with concrete political choices. In 
the context of Vichy, the presence of Germans in Paris, collaborationism 
and – especially after 1942 – the Resistance, questions of adherence, as-
sociation and abstention became paramount to French intellectual life. As 
we have seen, the general direction of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s thought 
was unequivocal in its admiration for Nazi Germany, its certainty of the 
110 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 229.
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inferiority of France and its political system, and its wish to give France a 
new regime and a new doctrine inspired by the fascist example (without 
necessarily being an exact copy of the German or Italian model). There 
was, however, a certain difference in the conclusions the two intellectuals 
drew from these reflections. Due to fragmentary information, incomplete 
archives and untrustworthy post-war accounts, it is impossible to provide 
a complete overview of the activities and contacts of the two intellectuals 
during the war years, but at least some conclusions can be drawn.
In occupied Paris, several close friends of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel rose to 
important positions within the world of collaboration. The key figure within 
the Paris collaboration network was Otto Abetz, who had triumphantly 
returned to Paris in the Wehrmacht’s wake as the German ambassador to 
occupied France. Until the end of the 1930s, he had been active in France via 
the Comité France-Allemagne and its periodical, maintaining contact with 
Jouvenel, Fabre-Luce, Drieu and other pacif ist, fascist and Germanophile 
French intellectuals like Fernand de Brinon, Jacques Benoist-Méchin and 
Jean Fontenoy, many of whom were members of the PPF. Married since 
1932 to Jean Luchaire’s personal secretary, Abetz also remained close to 
Luchaire and the Notre Temps group. From 1934, both the committee and 
Abetz were on the payroll of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, the foreign policy 
department of the Nazi party which played a major foreign propaganda role 
in competition with the German foreign ministry.114 The CFA also received 
occasional subsidies from successive French governments, including the 
Popular Front.115 When Ribbentrop became foreign minister in 1938, he took 
Abetz with him to his new position. Abetz joined the SS in 1935 and the party 
in 1938. One year later, he was promoted to the rank of Sturmbannführer.116
In early 1939, Abetz’s activities came under increased criticism in the 
French press, where he was denounced as a German spy (correctly, as it turns 
out) attempting to divide French public opinion and play France off against 
her British ally. As the pre-war international tensions approached boiling 
point, the press campaign against Abetz intensif ied. Luchaire and Jouvenel 
tried to defend their old friend by publicly testifying to Abetz’s ‘sincerity’ 
and stressing his long-standing activism for Franco-German reconciliation, 
but the French government evicted him in July 1939.117 A few months earlier, 
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Fabre-Luce had defended Abetz within the CFA, which was falling apart 
under the threat of war. After the German occupation of Prague, many 
influential members – including Louis Bertrand, Jules Romains and Émile 
Roche – wanted to leave the committee in protest against this open violation 
of the principle of self-determination. At a meeting on 22 March 1939, only 
Fabre-Luce and Fernand de Brinon spoke out in favour of continuing to work 
towards friendship between France and Germany. A majority of the members 
held the opposite opinion, as a result of which it was decided to suspend 
all activities and investigate the possibility of dissolving the committee.118
One year after his eviction from France, Abetz was back in Paris in a 
new position of power. Off icially, since there was no French authority in 
Paris, Abetz was the ambassador to the German military commander [Mil-
itärbefehlshaber in Frankreich] in Paris. His competence included Vichy, 
where his embassy held a branch office that he frequently visited.119 Like the 
Third Reich in general, the German occupation authorities in France gave a 
polyocratic impression, with representatives of leading Nazi personalities 
bitterly competing for overlapping responsibilities and the Führer’s favour. 
The highest authority in France was held by the Wehrmacht general Otto 
von Stülpnagel, later to be succeeded by his cousin Carl-Heinrich, who 
was responsible for security, supplying the German forces, maintaining 
order and exploiting the French economy. Off icially under the authority of 
the military commander but in fact taking their instructions from Berlin, 
Goebbels’ Propaganda-Abteilung wanted to establish German control over 
the French spirit, while Himmler’s representative Helmut Knochen led an 
SS commando ready to f ight and destroy Nazism’s ‘ideological enemies’ in 
France.120 As the pawn of Ribbentrop, Abetz could have become just one out 
of many rivalling German off icials in Paris. But his ambition, maneuvering 
talent and connections in France, as well as the relative independence of 
the embassy from other institutions, gave him an important advantage over 
his rivals, at least during the f irst years of occupation.121
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Abetz, at the age of 37 the youngest active German ambassador, was as-
sisted by a number of predominantly young officials with a good knowledge 
of France and the French. Most notably, his assistant Rudolf Schleier (41) ran 
affairs concerning veterans and prisoners of war, while Ernst Achenbach 
(31) led the political section of the embassy. Eager to establish control over 
cultural, press and radio affairs at the expense of the Propaganda-Abteilung, 
Abetz set up a German Institute in Paris with the mission to mobilise in-
fluential French intellectuals and cultural personalities in the enterprise 
of collaboration. Its director Karl Epting (35), who had headed the French 
branch of the German academic service before the war, promoted German 
culture in France through language courses, expositions and conferences 
Figure 7  Philippe Pétain, Otto Abetz and François Darlan in Vichy, 18 November 1941
source: Rue des Archives / Hollandse Hoogte
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while attempting to win over French intellectuals and socialites with lavish 
receptions at the Institute. Epting could count on the help of the well-
known journalist Friedrich Sieburg, the former French correspondent of 
the Frankfurter Zeitung who had published the best-selling book Gott in 
Frankreich in 1929 – translated into French as Dieu Est-Il Français? – as 
well as the support of Friedrich Grimm, an international law expert from 
the University of Münster who gave frequent lectures at salons in support 
of collaboration. Apart from these human resources, Abetz’s embassy also 
had at its disposal a well-f illed treasury of one billion French francs, directly 
taken from the ‘occupation costs’ that France had to pay by the terms of 
the armistice.122
During several meetings with Hitler, Abetz elaborated on his plans for 
France. It was in the German interest, he told the Führer, to reduce France 
to the status of a ‘satellite state’ ready to wilfully accept the ‘permanent 
weakening’ of its position in Europe. In order to effectively divide the French 
and to prevent them from ever uniting against their victor, Germany would 
have to simultaneously support rivalling parties and groups of various politi-
cal colours. But it was not enough to divide and rule by force alone. Despite 
Hitler’s hesitations and against the hostility of Himmler and Goebbels, Abetz 
was convinced the French could be won over to the idea of collaboration and 
the acceptance of their own subservience to a German world order. He told 
Hitler that the Germans had to occasionally put up a friendly face and make 
vague promises regarding a future peace treaty that would guarantee the 
territorial integrity of the country. Abetz claimed that ‘the French masses’ 
already had a great admiration for Hitler and that, with the right propaganda, 
it would be easy to make them blame their misery on the right scapegoats: 
MPs, Freemasons, Jews, clergymen and others who were ‘responsible for the 
war’. The French elite and intelligentsia could be seduced by exposing them 
to German culture and especially by stressing ‘the European idea’. In Abetz’s 
words: ‘In exactly the same way as the idea of peace was usurped by National 
Socialist Germany and served to weaken French morale, without undermin-
ing the German f ighting spirit, the European idea could be usurped by the 
Reich without harming the aspiration to continental primacy embedded by 
National Socialism in the German people.’123
Although Abetz disliked Pétain’s conservative entourage, within the 
Vichy government he established a good relationship with Laval, whom 
he supported after his removal from power and temporary house arrest by 
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Pétain as the result of a Vichy intrigue in December 1940.124 But Abetz was 
careful to also develop alternative options by supporting several Paris-based 
collaboration movements, most predominantly Marcel Déat’s Rassemble-
ment National-Populaire (RNP) and Doriot’s PPF. Abetz could more easily 
manipulate Pétain by creating the impression that the Germans might at 
any moment replace him by a government consisting of more radically 
pro-German collaborators. In his dealings with Laval, Déat and other col-
laborators, Abetz kept presenting himself as a Francophile and an admirer 
of French culture and lifestyle who wanted the best for France but needed 
to compete with anti-French hard-liners within the Nazi administration. 
This implied that Abetz, Laval and Déat had a common interest in sincerely 
working for Franco-German collaboration as a direct continuation of pre-
war activities, albeit under different circumstances. Setbacks could be 
conveniently blamed by Abetz on the influence of other hostile currents 
within the Third Reich.125
In the world of the Paris press, Abetz had just as few diff iculties f inding 
collaborators. Jean Luchaire, who had continued his Notre Temps until the 
end of the 1930s despite f inancial diff iculties, was ambitious, unscrupulous 
and bankrupt enough to work for the Germans at any paid position in 
journalism. After a short-lived editorship of the newspaper Le Matin, Abetz 
appointed him as head of the French Press Corporation, the organisation all 
journalists in the occupied zone were required to join. Encouraged by Abetz, 
Luchaire also founded a new daily newspaper, Les Nouveaux Temps, which 
was meant to reflect the opinion of ‘the left’ of the world of collaboration. 
Together with Déat’s L’Oeuvre and La France au Travail – both of which were 
also supported or even created on behalf of Abetz – Les Nouveaux Temps 
was supposed to counterbalance the weight of right-wing (i.e. Maurrassian 
or fascist) newspapers such as Je Suis Partout, Au Pilori and La Gerbe and to 
convince progressive Frenchmen to support collaboration. There are some 
indications that Abetz f irst wanted Jouvenel to assume its editorship, but 
he declined.126 Although both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel generally refrained 
from contributing articles to their old friend’s collaborationist newspaper, 
they did allow Luchaire to publish promotional extracts of their f irst books 
appearing under occupation. The extracts of Après la Défaite and the f irst 
tome of Journal de la France appeared one after the other in January 1941.127
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After a six-month interruption, December 1940 saw the reappearance 
of the Nouvelle Revue Française (NRF), the flagship of the pre-war French 
intellectual and literary world. Founded in 1909 by André Gide, during the 
interwar period it had opened itself up to new literary currents, publishing 
contributions from upcoming authors like André Malraux, Louis Aragon, 
Drieu la Rochelle, Jean-Paul Sartre and Julien Benda. When Jean Paulhan 
resigned as its editor-in-chief, unwilling to run the periodical under occupa-
tion and German censorship, he was succeeded by Drieu who by this time 
had fully embraced the idea of a fascist Europe under German leadership. 
Abetz supported the return of the NRF under the condition that it would 
be headed by a man who could be trusted ideologically, and Drieu was 
his perfect candidate. Although at f irst, Drieu’s new NRF also published 
contributions by authors who did not share his enthusiasm for the German 
new order – Paulhan remained involved behind the scenes while Gide and 
Paul Valéry contributed to the f irst issues – it increasingly came to reflect 
his personal interpretation of collaboration and fascism as a revolutionary 
enterprise to free Europe from ‘Jewish’ decadence and communism. Despite 
his choice to collaborate unconditionally, Drieu retained a certain solidarity 
with authors who were ideologically his enemies. He used his contacts with 
the Germans to protect Malraux and Aragon from persecution and even 
arranged for Paulhan to be freed from prison after his arrest for Resistance 
activities.128
Fabre-Luce held a prominent place in the f irst edition of Drieu’s NRF, 
and he continued to publish regularly in the periodical until the summer of 
1942.129 His presence seems to have not only been due to his friendship with 
Drieu but also inspired by common points in their view of the European 
dimensions of collaboration. In a ‘Letter to an American’, Fabre-Luce advised 
an unnamed and possibly imaginary trans-Atlantic friend not to feel sorry 
for the French. First of all, occupied Paris was more beautiful than ever: the 
noise of cars had disappeared and one did not risk his life anymore when 
crossing the street. The city’s monuments had regained ‘a new majesty’ and 
a purity reminiscent of Baalbek or Angkor Wat rather than a modern city. 
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And what, Fabre-Luce wondered, had the French really lost in the war? 
Their freedom? Addressing his friend directly, he asked:
Do you really believe that a man enslaved by alcohol, a man enslaved by 
gambling can become, by virtue of a ballot paper, a free man? This sum-
mer, we have abolished the apéritifs and regulated our stock exchange… 
Another race is beginning to take shape, one that will maybe later be able 
to fully enjoy its freedom, because it will be worthy of it.130
In Journal de la France II, Fabre-Luce elaborated on this comparison of a 
reborn authoritarian France and a ‘decadent’ United States. The Americans 
were wrong to think they were free, subjected as they were to ‘a Jewish press 
consortium’, puritan leagues and omnipresent advertising. And the French, 
who still enjoyed certain ‘zones of traditional freedom’ – echoing Fabre-
Luce’s persistent view of fascism as less totalitarian than communism – had 
also discovered an entirely new kind of liberty: that of a young man in a 
youth camp who ‘learns to believe’. Altogether, these considerations made 
the French feel ‘less like slaves than our eventual “liberators”. Their victory 
would maybe bring us back the institutions that bred our decadence, but 
it would convert us in forced clients of their trusts.’131
Apart from bringing a necessary end to the nation’s alcoholic decadence, 
laying the basis for a new kind of freedom and improving road security in the 
capital, Fabre-Luce saw another merit of defeat. It had cut France off from 
Britain and the ocean and f inally made it ‘look towards Europe’. ‘France 
is like a house of which the walls and windows have changed their place’. 
This new perspective allowed him to address his American friend ‘from 
continent to continent, in an equality that we have never known before, 
and you will not feel the same contempt that you had for our old Balkanised 
Europe’.132 Fabre-Luce supported the National Revolution under the condi-
tion that it would not neglect its international dimensions: ‘Isn’t it mostly a 
global revolution? From now on, France is an element of a larger assembly. 
It is not upon her to command, but to collaborate, to inspire and above all 
to be…’133 Two years later, citing Jacques Bainville, Fabre-Luce described 
France as a pivotal country that had always hesitated ‘between sea and land, 
130 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Lettre à un Américain’, Nouvelle Revue Française (December 1940), 65, 
71. Italics in original.
131 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 122, 123.
132 Fabre-Luce, ‘Lettre à un Américain’, 67, 72.
133 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 404. Italics in original.
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between England and Germany’. The French climate, ‘in which continental 
drought and Atlantic humidity alternate’, reflected this attitude. Now, the 
time had come to make a def initive choice for a continental European 
empire: ‘It is a collective Rome that we must build. At this work, we will 
not be subjects but collaborators; we can even become – as the result of 
evolution – co-emperors.’134 This choice was easier, as its alternative came 
down to national slavery. Combining threat and reward, Fabre-Luce stated 
that ‘the choice offered to us is simple. A new Europe is being built. We are 
invited to participate in its construction. If we accept, we will become part 
of the aristocracy of blood, we will enjoy its privileges. If we refuse, a place 
of slaves will be prepared for us after the war.’135
For Fabre-Luce, collaboration even became a kind of a f inal ersatz for 
French international grandeur. He stated that France could take a leading 
role in convincing other countries who held her in high esteem. After all, it 
was from France that ‘during the last centuries, the big slogans of European 
thought have started. The moral support of France is important to anyone 
willing to launch new ones. […] If France “collaborates”, the whole of Europe 
will collaborate. If she resists, there will only be slaves.’136 Militarily, France 
could even play such a decisive role as to end the war and save the world 
from further bloodshed. By resolutely choosing the German side, France 
could effectively bring the Mediterranean under Axis control, after which 
the Allies would realise that a total victory was impossible and search for a 
diplomatic solution. The peace could then take the form of ‘a ratif ication of 
the state of affairs: Germany in Europe, the Anglo-Saxons on the other side 
of the Ocean. France, by practicing collaboration, recognises its geographi-
cal and moral belonging to Europe.’137
While both the British (through RAF bombings) and the Germans 
(through forced labour) demanded sacrif ices of the French, at least the 
latter were ‘f ighting for Europe. If he [the German] triumphs, he will bring 
her [Europe] unity, security, economic organisation. Since he will bring us 
all of that, he is entitled to our butter, to our horses, to our workers. He will 
give it back to us a hundred times after the war.’ The British had, by contrast, 
always played a destructive role, doing everything in their power to prevent 
Europe from organising itself.138 Singing the praises of the Europeanist wing 
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of the collaboration, Fabre-Luce described what this new Europe should look 
like: ‘a large economic area in which peoples, formally partitioned, thrown 
back upon themselves and tired of endless quarrels, will f ind themselves 
back with an unknown feeling of security and the intoxication of space. 
[…] She [France] will not be enslaved, because Germany needs clients, not 
slaves. Machines will be the only slaves.’139
Fabre-Luce’s interpretation of collaboration as a way to rid France of 
decadence, create a new race and new political institutions, and organise 
the continent under German leadership are strikingly similar to what 
motivated Drieu la Rochelle. A surviving letter from 1942 in Fabre-Luce’s 
personal papers suggests the two regularly exchanged letters during the 
war.140 Drieu illustrated this ideological closeness by dedicating an NRF 
article to Fabre-Luce in November 1942. In his description of Fabre-Luce as 
living proof that a rich man could have talent and as essentially ‘a liberal 
liberally open to the opposite of liberalism’, he mixed irony with sympathy.141 
Even as late as 1944, when the national socialist Europe he had wished for 
was falling apart in front of his eyes, Drieu still counted Fabre-Luce as on 
his side. Amidst the depressed avowal that he found himself ‘almost alone 
to think what I think and to say what I say’, he took comfort in knowing that 
at least ‘Giono, Montherlant, Céline, Jouhandeau, Chardonne, Fabre-Luce, 
Fernandez’ were still with him.142
Apart from Drieu, Fabre-Luce was close to other collaborationist intellec-
tuals like Jacques Chardonne, who was not primarily motivated by the same 
continental Europeanism but instead appreciated the German occupation 
for protecting an idealised rural France against the communist menace.143 
Fabre-Luce had known Chardonne since 1924, but their friendship grew as 
a result of their shared wartime positions. Chardonne complimented Fabre-
Luce on the first volume of Journal de la France and Anthologie de la Nouvelle 
Europe, which he admitted reading like ‘a Bible for this moment’.144 In 1941, 
Chardonne praised Fabre-Luce as ‘the most intelligent man of France’ – a 
quotation that was to have a long life.145 His wartime books also won Fabre-
139 Ibid., 31, 32.
140 Pierre Drieu la Rochelle to Fabre-Luce (March 1942), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 6.
141 Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, ‘Libéraux’, Nouvelle Revue Française (November 1942), 606.
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144 Two letters of Jacques Chardonne to Fabre-Luce (15 July 1942 and date unknown), Fonds 
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Luce the admiration of Régis de Vibraye, the advocate of Franco-German 
reconciliation; the Pétainist historian Daniel Halévy; and even Bernard Faÿ, 
a historian obsessed with Masonic conspiracies who became the head of the 
French National Library after the sacking of its Jewish director Julien Cain. 
Faÿ was so impressed by the f irst two volumes of Journal de la France that he 
was willing to revise his earlier negative judgment ‘when your book about 
La Victoire gave me such a f it of bad temper’.146 Fabre-Luce was also in touch 
with Georges Albertini, the former pacif ist socialist who had embraced 
fascism and become the second man in Déat’s RNP. In a letter to Fabre-Luce, 
Albertini told him not to expect too much from Uriage, Vichy’s elite school 
that Fabre-Luce had enthusiastically described in Journal de la France. In a 
review, Albertini also praised Fabre-Luce’s Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, 
describing it as a book that laid the basis for a new European order.147
As in the writings of other collaborationist intellectuals like Drieu, Marcel 
Jouhandeau and Henry de Montherlant, Fabre-Luce’s view of collaboration 
sometimes took on sexual or gendered connotations, with France playing 
the female role.148 He argued that, from a historical perspective, ‘occupations 
are voyages of peoples’ in which the ‘receiving’ party travelled as well, gener-
ally with positive results. Just like the West rediscovered Aristotle thanks 
to the Arab invasions and Switzerland owed its democratic law system to 
occupation by Napoleon’s armies, even France itself was ‘the product of a 
rape’: the one of Gaul by Rome. ‘The f irst sign of civilisation of our ancestors 
has been to let themselves be fertilised by a victor who enriched himself 
through their contribution’. Everywhere in occupied France, Fabre-Luce 
saw scenes reflecting this historical cross fertilisation: German off icers 
enjoyed the hospitality of French families and made sure their men behaved 
correctly, while ‘in the darkness of side streets’ all kinds of ‘illegitimate 
love’ were consumed. During their conquest of France, the Germans had 
behaved like ‘respecting, almost timid conquerors’. When called to the 
eastern front, the German soldiers were sad to exchange a beautiful French 
village for the eastern plains, and the French farmers were almost as sad 
to see them leave. Citing a peasant, who may have been just as imaginary 
as the American friend he addressed his open letter to, Fabre-Luce stated: 
146 Two letters of Bernard Faÿ to Fabre-Luce (20 July 1942 and 28 November 1942), Letters of 
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‘“Ils faisaient marcher le commerce. Et puis, ils n’étaient pas méchants. C’est 
tout de même dommage qu’ils aillent se faire tuer.”’149
Strikingly, Fabre-Luce’s main problems with German censorship (before 
1943) were caused by his anti-communist attitude.150 While he had been 
forced to delete a few lines in the f irst volume of Journal de la France out 
of respect for the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact, the start of Operation 
Barbarossa freed Fabre-Luce from such considerations and gave an even 
stronger impetus to his collaborationism. Fabre-Luce interpreted the Ger-
man offensive against the Soviet Union as a victory ‘of the f ield over the 
steppe […], of the German over the Slav, of hierarchy over undistinguished 
community. If a soldier born on the banks of the Rhine crosses the Vistula, 
the border of our civilisation moves with him. It is from France too that he 
repels the danger of the horde.’151 When Jacques Doriot left for the eastern 
front to f ight in the ranks of the Légion des Volontaires Français (LVF), a 
special Waffen-SS division founded on his initiative, Fabre-Luce celebrated 
him as a rare case of ‘a statesman who completes his political f igure and 
takes a decision for the future’. Fabre-Luce criticised the ‘lukewarm’ attitude 
of the Vichy government, which formally supported the LVF but did noth-
ing to help it recruit members.152 Even in an NRF review of Montesquieu’s 
Cahiers, he was able to f ind arguments in favour of collaboration. Citing 
Montesquieu’s statement that under problematic circumstances, no mistake 
is more harmful than inaction, Fabre-Luce proudly concluded that in the 
twentieth century, Montesquieu ‘would not have been an attentiste’.153
Collaboration and Attentisme
In contrast to Fabre-Luce, traces of attentisme (wait and see) can be found 
in the writings of Jouvenel. He did not publish in the NRF or in any other 
collaborationist newspaper,154 but he was involved with the founding of 
the new periodical Le Fait in the autumn of 1940. In his memoirs, Jouvenel 
claims he used this as a cover-up for intelligence activities, and there is 
some evidence for this. During his trips to Eastern and Central Europe in 
149 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 25, 26, 28.
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early 1939, Jouvenel had already been active as a voluntary correspondent 
of the French military Service de Renseignement, to which he reported 
his observations on the dispositions of political leaders and populations 
towards France and Germany.155
On several occasions after the war, Jouvenel showed considerable frustra-
tion with the accusations of collaboration that were raised against him. In a 
letter written in 1946, in his memoirs and, most famously, during the lawsuit 
against Sternhell, Jouvenel claimed that he went to Paris, renewed contact 
with Abetz and moved around in French collaborationist circles – all at 
the explicit request of General Henri Navarre of the Service de Renseigne-
ment, whom he had met in Vichy in July 1940 and who asked him to f ind 
out what plans the Germans had with France and her empire.156 Dard has 
established the truth – ‘dans les grandes lignes’ – of these claims. Jouvenel 
was indeed in contact with Navarre, never published in Le Fait despite being 
one of its founders, and the report which Jouvenel included in his memoirs 
– addressed to Navarre, Laval and Pétain – is probably authentic.157 The 
report, drafted on 2 August 1940, neither supports nor rejects the prospect 
of Franco-German collaboration. Jouvenel wrote that the Germans did not 
believe France had truly rid itself of its republican politicians and wanted 
the country to establish a more genuinely fascist regime. If so, the Germans 
might be willing to do business with the French, though German dominance 
had to be acknowledged. In his memoirs, Jouvenel opportunistically titled 
the report ‘La collaboration impossible’, but it seems he was anything but 
sure about this when he wrote it.158
This ambivalent attitude towards full-scale collaboration is also reflected 
in the last chapter of Après la Défaite. Jouvenel rejected the idea that France 
should propose a plan for a new Europe: ‘The initiative belongs to him 
who holds the authority. That’s not us. Is this the time for French intel-
ligence to embrace the continent? Let it f irst discover France.’159 A more 
elaborate version of this ambivalence can be found in a long letter that 
Jouvenel sent to Fabre-Luce on 1 February 1941, the f irst surviving part of 
their correspondence. Jouvenel included the unpublished manuscript of a 
155 Two reports written by Jouvenel during February-April 1939: (‘Notes sur une Tournée en 
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critical review of Fabre-Luce’s Journal de la France I that he had written at 
Drieu’s request, probably for the NRF. In response to a preceding letter by 
Fabre-Luce in which he had criticised Jouvenel’s reluctance to name and 
shame the political leaders of the Third Republic in Après la Défaite, Jouvenel 
wrote that he had expressly refrained from such attacks. While assuring his 
‘dear Fabre-Luce’ of all his admiration for his style and his talent, Jouvenel 
remarked that in his book, ‘I would have wanted to f ind a complaint that is 
not there’. Jouvenel’s unpublished review specif ied these objections:
The defeat has inspired Fabre-Luce too much. A kind of joy enters his 
verve. He has, I know, foreseen this collapse. And his book proceeds, 
starting from spotless premises, like a brilliant demonstration. But, since 
the fatherland [‘patrie’] is concerned, it seems that the pleasure of having 
been right should cede to sorrow at our subjection. And one does not feel 
that at all. We have to discover France as it has been made to be. That is 
a necessary thing. But in the act of tearing away the cloak, there is a bit 
too much impiety, to my taste.160
In his letter, Jouvenel was quick to stress that he had written the review in 
a vengeful mood, convinced that Journal de la France contained a negative 
description of himself, which was not the case. Now, he was ‘happy that this 
article does not appear’. He had also been told that Fabre-Luce had ‘a less 
simplistic view’ of the future than ‘our builders of Europe, amongst whom 
I hate to see my very dear Drieu’. Jouvenel ended his letter by expressing 
the wish to exchange private notes with Fabre-Luce in which they would 
‘try to def ine what the comportment of France should be’. ‘Abandoned 
in the hands of Germany by the Paris collaborationists, reduced to the 
agricultural age by the absentees of Vichy, promised to the Anglo-Saxon 
Perseus by the BBC listeners, France needs us […] to rethink politics for 
her.’161 The Jouvenel papers, very incomplete concerning this period, do not 
contain a reply by Fabre-Luce. But the degree of familiarity suggests this 
was not the only letter they exchanged during the occupation, while they 
also moved in the same circles.
This is not all that can be said about Jouvenel’s wartime positions. 
Between 1940 and 1942, there is more agreement in the text between 
Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel than the letter suggests. As described in earlier 
160 Review by Jouvenel of Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), included in a letter by 
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paragraphs, there were clear similarities in their analysis of defeat, their 
conviction of the inferiority of parliamentary democracy and their wish for 
France to be inspired by the fascist example. In an interesting historical 
metaphor, both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel compared the German conquest 
of France to the Roman conquest of Greece during the second century BC. 
Like the Greek city-states of antiquity, France boasted a superior culture 
and civilisation, but its interior divisions and lack of military spirit had 
made it unable to oppose a serious resistance. Though the rivalling Greek 
city-states were no match for the Roman legions, they continued to prosper 
under Roman rule and passed on much of their culture, religion and science 
to their conquerors.162 Like Fabre-Luce, Jouvenel welcomed certain aspects 
of defeat and occupation. He observed that all over Europe, city-dwellers 
suffered from food shortages, while the farmers were better off, regaining 
their ‘old primacy’ through the disappearance of competition from colonial 
imports. Jouvenel rejoiced in the fact that by physically experiencing the 
consequences of defeat, the French citizens were f inally forced to discover 
the importance of national solidarity. ‘Abundance has made Europe liberal, 
shortage will make Europe totalitarian.’163
Politically, scientif ically and socially, France had much to learn from 
Hitler, Jouvenel suggested. He saw France ‘longing for new institutions’ and:
As after any large setback, we are automatically inclined to implant in 
our country those of the victor. Some complain we are not adopting them 
fast enough as they are. Others, to the contrary, excite our pride against 
any imitation of Germany: these people do not realise that it is our old 
repugnance to take the initiative for a French reform that is condemning 
us today to repeat foreign experiences. But the former are wrong too, 
since they neglect the psychological problem our leaders are facing.164
After all, Hitler had also built his success on foundations laid by his pre-
decessors. Jouvenel suggested that, instead of plunging head-f irst into a 
German-led national socialist Europe, the French elite should f irst meditate 
on French identity, history and the ‘national temperament’ of the French 
people. Innovations inspired by foreign fascist regimes were welcome, 
even necessary, as long as they were compatible with the ‘psycho-political’ 
characteristics of the French people. He claimed that, during the autumn of 
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1940, France found itself ‘in the eye of the storm’. In this ‘deceptive calm, as 
if enclosed between powerful walls of air’, a wise captain should navigate 
carefully. ‘The closing of France is essentially of intellectual order. The 
constitution of a coherent and compact national thought is necessary to 
guide our leaders, form our educators, inspire our press.’165
This emphasis on the national element seems to have been the major 
difference between Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s attitude to collaboration. 
While for Jouvenel a rediscovery of nationalism put a brake on his willing-
ness to collaborate, Fabre-Luce fully welcomed collaboration as a way ‘not 
to confirm our defeat, but to surmount it’. He saw Europeanist collaboration 
as the task of an ‘elite’ that had embraced the future, while he associated 
nationalism with the backwardness of the common people that kept hating 
the Germans regardless of what happened, even if their misery was actually 
caused by the British. It was as impossible to bring these people back to 
reason as it was ‘to reason with a madman’. Gaullism constituted their 
irrational ‘compensating dream’, a ‘mythology’ the British eagerly supported 
‘while starving us’.166 Fabre-Luce conceded that De Gaulle’s Free French 
included a few heroic men, but they had let themselves be exploited by the 
British national interest. And he mockingly wondered how their leaders 
could ever claim to represent the true France while in fact consisting of ‘a 
wayward general, a discredited admiral, Jewish propagandists – a general 
staff for which even the English themselves have little respect’.167
Fabre-Luce was as derisive about the Parisian ‘bourgeois’ who slipped 
into their basements during the evening to secretly listen to Radio London. 
He compared them to drug addicts needing their daily portion of mor-
phine, naughty children disobeying their governess or a sect performing 
incomprehensible rituals.168 While such activities could be done away with 
by mockery, Fabre-Luce reacted much more strongly to the f irst cases of 
armed resistance, which began to occur after the German invasion of the 
Soviet Union. He condemned communist resisters as a ‘handful of terrorists’ 
who were trying to sabotage Franco-German relations. When the Germans 
carried out mass executions in reprisal, Fabre-Luce justif ied this decision by 
arguing that at least their victims were prisoners accused of other criminal 
acts.169 In 1943, Fabre-Luce continued to stress that the Resistance had very 
165 Ibid., 236, 238.
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little support among the population, most of all because its actions were 
insignif icant and only led to German violence. Only communists and Jews 
were willing to ‘cynically sacrif ice’ others of their kind for their ‘hatred of 
the invader’.170
Instead of resistance, Fabre-Luce favoured French participation in the 
war on the German side. Although he was against the dismissal of Prime 
Minister Laval in December 1940, he welcomed the visit that his successor, 
Admiral François Darlan, paid to Hitler in Berchtesgaden, during which 
Darlan offered the Germans the use of French airbases in Syria. He was 
also enthusiastic about the fact that Benoist-Méchin, Marion and Pierre 
Pucheu were joining Darlan’s government. All three had been members of 
the PPF before the war, which allowed Fabre-Luce to declare that Doriot’s 
party had been a good learning school for ‘a new generation of statesmen’ led 
by a ‘preference for direct action’ and a ‘contempt for old habits’, especially 
the one of ‘prostration for London’. These new faces were thoroughly ‘col-
laborationist’ and had already ‘inhaled the fascist atmosphere in their party’, 
which made them better able to understand German politics than those 
who still fell under the influence of ‘Cartesian logic’.171 When Vichy forces 
did battle in Syria against a British-Gaullist invasion during the summer of 
1941, Fabre-Luce celebrated these events as a consecration – by ‘a plebiscite 
of sacrif ice’ – of Pétain and collaboration: ‘On meurt pour Vichy!’ Through a 
‘ceremony of blood’ similar to the cult of the dead the Nazis had built their 
solidarity on, France had dedicated itself to collaboration.172
While Fabre-Luce clearly struck a different tone than that of Jouvenel, 
can we then conclude that the latter was against collaboration? Some of 
his activities suggest the opposite. If Jouvenel was merely in Paris to collect 
information and to report to general Navarre, one wonders why he played 
an active role in bringing Abetz into contact with pro-German French 
politicians and intellectuals and why he bothered submitting articles to 
the collaboration press. It was Jouvenel who convinced Déat and Bergery 
to come to Paris and meet Abetz, Achenbach and Schleier at the German 
embassy on 20 August 1940 to talk about constituting an opposite power to 
a Vichy deemed too reactionary and insuff iciently willing to collaborate.173 
Similarly, he introduced Abetz to his long-time acquaintance Bernard Faÿ, 
the new director of the French National Library whom he had previously 
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met in Vichy.174 Around the same time, Jouvenel also dined with Abetz and 
three Belgian guests: Hendrik de Man, the ‘planist’ who had embraced col-
laboration, the extreme rightist journalist Pierre Daye, and Léon Degrelle. 
Abetz had taken them to Paris with several leaders of the Flemish move-
ment, hoping to convince them to join hands and form a Belgian national 
government that would reflect ‘the aspirations of the young generation’. De 
Man believed Abetz had comparable plans for France via a joint government 
by Doriot, Déat and Bergery.175
It also seems that Jouvenel’s refusal to publish in any newspaper ‘as long 
as the occupier stayed in France’ was not as categorical as he later claimed.176 
Apart from the aforementioned unpublished review of Journal de la France 
in the NRF, there is some evidence that Jouvenel also submitted articles 
to the extreme-rightist weekly Gringoire, which had established itself in 
southern France after the defeat. Its bourgeois aff iliation, Anglophobia and 
anti-Semitism had quickly earned Gringoire the reputation of being Vichy’s 
quasi-off icial mouthpiece.177 In November 1940, Jouvenel wrote a letter to its 
chief editor Horace de Carbuccia, whom he knew from the Comité France-
Allemagne and from pre-war contributions to Gringoire. He sent him an 
article ‘about a youth camp that I have seen on several occasions. Maybe 
it is of interest to you.’ Jouvenel also recommended Bernard Faÿ, whom he 
had met the day before and who ‘could write, on the base of unpublished 
documents, a truly sensational series of articles […]. I am sure this would 
interest you, and if he has your principle agreement, Bernard Faÿ will make 
them for you.’178
These articles were probably meant to be part of Faÿ’s anti-Masonic 
campaigns. Faÿ, a historian of eighteenth-century French-American rela-
tions, had been a professor at Columbia University and the University of 
Iowa before joining the Collège de France in 1932 as one of France’s prime 
américanistes. During the late 1930s, Faÿ increasingly held anti-liberal and 
pro-German opinions, and he became obsessed with Masonic conspiracies, 
which he suspected in places as unlikely as the episcopate. Faÿ used his 
wartime position as director of the French National Library to seize the 
Masonic archives and to study them intensively to prove the alleged power 
and perf idy of the secret societies.179 Two weeks later, Jouvenel addressed 
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another letter to Carbuccia in which he asked his advice on a subject for a 
possible article. Carbuccia had told him to limit himself to one paper, but 
with ‘so many things to say’, Jouvenel hesitated between a comparative 
analysis of France’s ‘great lost battles, Crécy, Poitiers, Azincourt, Padua, 
Waterloo, Sedan and the Somme’ and ‘a reminder about the French political 
divisions, considered as the factor of decadence of our country’. Jouvenel 
added a draft article on this second subject.180
Despite his impressively elaborate analysis of Jouvenel’s wartime activi-
ties and his private notes, Olivier Dard says surprisingly little about Jou-
venel’s published works, especially Après la Défaite and La Décomposition de 
l’Europe Libérale. This omission allows him to suggest that Jouvenel had not 
anticipated or supported collaboration in any way. He also wrongly claims 
that Jouvenel restricted his attacks to the political system of the Third 
Republic and refrained from criticising ‘the Anglo-Saxon world’, apparently 
ignoring Jouvenel’s indictment of the British bourgeois ‘mercantile’ spirit 
as responsible for ruining France’s ‘will to power’ that f igured prominently 
in La Décomposition.181 And, though conceding that Jouvenel’s critique of 
French parliamentary democracy may ‘smell badly’ to a present-day nose, 
Dard takes pains to stress there was nothing exceptional about it. He resorts 
to the Catholic writer and former résistant Jean-Marie Domenach, who 
remarked in 1983 during the Sternhell affair that anti-democratic and anti-
republican feelings were widespread both among collaborators and those in 
the Resistance, to the point of constituting a ‘convergence of all that thinks 
and all that feels, amongst young Frenchmen. You can call that fascism… 
That may look provocative, but it’s wrong.’182 Although there is some truth 
to these claims – and it is indeed easy to mine the writings of Charles de 
Gaulle and other prominent members of the Resistance for harsh attacks 
on parliamentarianism – they seem to miss the point when the discussion 
is not about fascism but about Jouvenel’s attitude to collaboration.
Dard presents Jouvenel during the early 1940s as having two faces: a 
‘visible’ one and a ‘hidden’ one, the visible being that of a ‘Germanophile 
intellectual’ and the hidden that of a secret agent and crypto-résistant.183 
There is an obvious insinuation in this analysis, as it suggests that the 
‘visible’ face was a mere façade, while Jouvenel’s real attitude was reflected 
180 Jouvenel to Horace de Carbuccia (10 December 1940), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (295). Neither of 
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by his hidden activities. Dard ignores the possibility that, at least during 
the early phases of occupation, there may have been little or no opposition 
between these two ‘faces’. Through his intelligence activities, Jouvenel 
served a regime that was set on a course of collaboration with the Germans, 
especially after Pétain’s notorious handshake with Hitler in Montoire on 
22 October 1940. One week later, Pétain announced on radio that France 
was ‘entering the path of collaboration’.184 Despite all their petty internal 
rivalries – between Laval and Pétain, Laval and Darlan, Déat and Laval, 
Déat and Doriot, Doriot and Bergery – these leaders were all united in their 
willingness to do business with the Germans, albeit to different degrees 
and sometimes with different aims. Altogether, competition for power and 
for the Germans’ favour seems to have been a much stronger driving force 
behind these conflicts than existing political disagreements. Without too 
much exaggeration, one could state that Jouvenel was spying on Germans 
and Parisian collaborationists on behalf of collaboration.
When discussing the German translation of Après la Défaite, Dard sug-
gests that the Germans ‘instrumentalised’ Jouvenel without any active 
participation from his side. Similarly, he claims that Jouvenel’s supposedly 
purely scientif ic study Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée was the object of an 
‘ideological recuperation at the service of continental unif ication against 
maritime England’.185 This interpretation accords very little agency to the 
man himself. If Jouvenel was a passive victim of ideological recuperation, 
why did his statements f it German propaganda so well that he was included 
– alongside Fabre-Luce, Bénoist-Méchin and Alphonse de Chateaubriant – 
on the Militärbefehlshaber’s list of eleven French authors to be translated 
and published in Germany?186 Why did he allow for this translation to 
occur in the f irst place? While all other French authors were banned from 
publication in Germany, the translation of Après la Défaite appeared in 1941, 
the same year as the French original. A Dutch translation was published in 
1943 in the occupied Netherlands. German reviewers saw little difference 
between Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce, who held the privilege of being the only 
French author to have two books (the f irst two volumes of Journal de la 
France) published in German translation during the war.187 They generally 
interpreted the books according to Nazi doctrine as ref lecting France’s 
184 Jackson, The Dark Years, 173.
185 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 165, 167.
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decadence, its ‘Jewif ication’ and ‘negrif ication’, while constituting an 
encouragement for Germany to maintain a tough line towards France. 
Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were seen to share their national decadence, 
although they were occasionally complimented for at least having grasped 
the superiority of National Socialism and France’s subservient position in 
a German Europe.188
In May 1942, the f irst volume of Journal de la France received a plainly 
negative review in the Berliner Monatshefte. The reviewer considered that 
Fabre-Luce, just like France as a whole, had apparently experienced its 
recent history while merely ‘hesitating, interpreting and observing’ instead 
of being fully ‘transported’ by the dramatic events of its downfall.189 In 
annexed Alsace, the Strassburger Neueste Nachrichten was more positive 
about the second volume, which was deemed to offer serious possibilities 
for a Franco-German ‘European conversation’. Alfred Püllmann, citing 
abundantly from Fabre-Luce’s statements in favour of European collabora-
tion and France’s special role in convincing smaller nations to follow in 
its wake, was enthusiastic about his contribution to the spread of the 
right ‘imperial idea’. This idea would allow the constitution of a German-
occidental [‘abendländisch’] empire in which ‘the defeated, who are often 
already collaborators, will one day become co-creators’ – a clear reference 
to Fabre-Luce’s term of ‘co-emperors’.190 Around the same time, Joachim 
Freyburg, a journalist writing for Goebbels’ intellectual weekly Das Reich, 
paid a visit to Fabre-Luce in Paris. He complimented Fabre-Luce as an 
excellent ‘chronicler of France’ but, describing the ‘mundane’ interior of 
his apartment, also ironized the fact that he could afford to calmly observe 
‘the direction France is now taking, after its defeat, from the ever-safe place 
that his wealth allows him to occupy’.191
Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel were given a prominent place in Phönix oder 
Asche?, an anthology of French literary and political publications since the 
defeat published by Bernhard Payr, a close collaborator of Alfred Rosenberg. 
Payr praised Fabre-Luce for his ‘vivid and rich painting of the French politics 
of catastrophe’ that had led to his nation’s ruin. With his description of 
decadent bourgeois Parisian life in early 1940, Fabre-Luce had revealed 
‘why a people whose social structure was already in full decomposition, 
could have impossibly won this war’. Payr was almost as positive about 
188 Loiseaux, La Littérature de la Défaite et de la Collaboration, 97, 417.
189 Heining, ‘Fabre-Luce, Alfred: Französisches Tagebuch’, 241.
190 Püllmann, ‘Frankreich als Beispiel’.
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Après la Défaite. After giving a fairly accurate description of the main lines 
of Jouvenel’s book, he conceded that the author occasionally tended to ‘light 
relativisations’ but asserted that this must not obscure his ‘true insight in 
the essential elements of the French collapse and the victorious resurrec-
tion of Germany’. This made Jouvenel’s work a ‘positive contribution to a 
clarif ication of positions before the beginning of a European new order’.192 
In an article written for Das Reich, Payr was pessimistic about the extent 
to which the spirit of collaboration had caught on in France, which he saw 
conf ined to small circles of intellectuals who had often themselves not 
suff iciently understood the meaning of a national socialist Europe. He 
made a positive exception for two intellectuals, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel, 
whom he credited as the only authors who showed a ‘feeling of European 
responsibility’.193
The French reactions to Jouvenel’s work were not very different. In the 
fascist collaborationist journal La Gerbe, Jouvenel’s La Décomposition de 
l’Europe Libérale was positively reviewed by Ramon Fernandez, a former 
Marxist who had joined the PPF and sat on the party’s political bureau with 
Jouvenel.194 The same book won him the admiration of the extreme-rightist 
writer Jean-Pierre Maxence.195 In December 1941, in an article published in 
the isolationist American newspaper Chicago Tribune, Bernard Faÿ painted 
a rosy picture of the intellectual climate in occupied Paris, ranking the 
‘brilliant’ Jouvenel (Après la Défaite) and Fabre-Luce ( Journal de la France 
I) amongst the fine fleur of its unprecedented literary production. Faÿ’s 
article was part of a German-led press campaign to discourage the United 
States from intervening in the war. Published on the day of the attack on 
Pearl Harbour, which led to the United States declaring war on Germany 
four days later, these efforts were entirely ineffective.196
Jouvenel’s third wartime book, Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée, was also 
quick to win the admiration of collaborationists. While it is true that in its 
end result the book is a dry, academic study of the effects of the Continental 
System on French and European commerce, this may not have been Jou-
venel’s idea from the start, when he began working on the topic in the spring 
of 1941. In the introduction, Jouvenel warns against establishing ‘apparent 
analogies’ between the book’s subject and the present day, but it is easily 
192 Payr, Phönix Oder Asche?, 53, 55, 60.
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conceivable that he was originally motivated by these very analogies.197 It 
is also hardly surprising that this warning was largely ignored by reviews 
of the book in the collaborationist press, as Bruneteau rightly observed.198 
Jouvenel chose to publish his book at the Éditions de la Toison d’Or, a Belgian 
collaborationist editing house that was run by the Didier couple, contacts of 
Jouvenel who had been active in Europeanist circles before the war and who 
had also fallen under Abetz’s influence. The Didier couple, who had been 
interned in France as possible German spies during the German invasion, 
met Abetz in Paris in August 1940, after which they founded their editing 
house in Brussels, partially with money provided by Ribbentrop’s foreign 
ministry. As one of the prime publishers in the Belgian collaborationist 
world, the Toison d’Or published books by De Man, Friedrich Sieburg, Robert 
Brasillach, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel.199
Little doubt remains, however, that Jouvenel’s willingness to support 
collaboration was short-lived and often mixed with a certain attentisme. 
In December 1940, during a visit to Luchaire at the off ices of the Nouveaux 
Temps, he told Luchaire and Déat, who had railed against the ‘old fool’ 
Pétain, that France had only accepted collaboration because it was Pétain 
who undertook it. If the Germans were to force the marshal out, the French 
people would ‘unanimously’ follow him into resistance.200 When Déat 
founded his RNP in February 1941, which he intended to make France’s 
fascist-style ‘single party’, Jouvenel warned him that it was impossible to 
unite the French people on a collaborationist agenda. ‘In Germany, they 
have assembled the people against France; here, you can only do it in the 
opposite direction. If that’s impossible, one has to wait.’ In March 1942, 
a German diplomat reported Jouvenel’s ‘pessimistic’ and ‘embittered’ at-
titude towards collaboration, even admitting that he no longer believed in 
it. Jouvenel called Luchaire and his crew a bunch of traitors, comparable 
to the Rhineland separatists in 1920s Germany.201 In an April 1941 report 
written for his Vichy connections and entitled ‘France between Germany 
and the Anglo-Saxon World’, Jouvenel called for closer relations between 
Vichy France and the United States. Stronger ties with the US government 
would not only provide a partial solution to the problem of food shortages, 
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it would also make France look less bad in the case of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
victory against Germany. Jouvenel had low expectations of German offers 
to f ight food shortages through the construction of a continental economic 
system in exchange for French participation in the war against England. 
Instead, he advised his government to use this German offer as a bargaining 
instrument with the Americans.202
In early 1943, Jouvenel started keeping a personal diary in which he 
recorded his reading notes but sometimes also ideas for his book on power, 
political reflections and comments on his personal life. On one of the f irst 
pages, Jouvenel reflected on a certain ‘contradiction’ in his political thought. 
On the one hand, he pleaded for strong state involvement to develop the 
nation’s industrial capacity as a means of increasing national power, while 
on the other hand he was becoming more and more critical of state power 
in general. This, he explained to himself, was because at the moment he 
became aware of these means of state power, ‘my country did not have the 
biological conditions anymore’ to apply them. ‘From this moment, it was 
clear to me that the French interest is to denounce this political competition 
in which the French community can no longer f igure honourably.’ Almost 
surprisedly, Jouvenel concluded that at the heart of his contradictory opin-
ions ‘there is an excess of national sentiment that I can only take notice of’.203
While only fragmented and often distorted information exists about 
the social whereabouts of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce in occupied Paris, it 
seems that they were regular guests at the German embassy, the German 
Institute and collaborationist salons. According to Fabre-Luce’s memoirs, 
he saw Abetz only once and very briefly, during a reception at the embassy. 
He claimed he found the ambassador ‘arrogant’ and was ‘appalled’ with the 
behaviour of the other French guests, who hungrily stormed the buffet to 
stuff themselves with the exquisite food. Fabre-Luce quickly left, ‘without 
having eaten a sandwich or spoken a word with my host’.204 A photograph 
taken in June 1941 seems to contradict this claim. It shows Fabre-Luce 
standing almost next to Abetz during a reception given at the German 
Institute in honour of Winifred Wagner. While Fabre-Luce seems engaged 
in a pleasant conversation with the famous composer’s daughter-in-law, 
elegantly dressed in white, Abetz is standing just one metre away, talk-
ing to Jean-Louis Vaudoyer, a collaborationist writer who was director of 
the Comédie Française during the war. Other guests are the German star 
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conductor Herbert von Karajan and Karl Theo Zeitschel, responsible for 
‘Jewish questions’ at the embassy. Altogether, the guests in this photograph 
were a typical cross section of the Paris collaborationist world.205 Fabre-Luce 
seems to have been an early guest at German events in Paris. In a personal 
account from 1941, Jacques Chardonne described his f irst visit to the Ger-
man Institute to listen to a Franco-German concert. He admitted at f irst 
feeling uncomfortable about his presence amidst the invaders, but he was 
relieved at the sight of two prominent compatriots: the ‘infallible moralist’ 
Henry de Montherlant and Fabre-Luce, ‘the most intelligent man of France’. 
Vaudoyer and Abel Bonnard were also present at the concert.206
Fabre-Luce welcomed Germany’s cultural policy, which he found fairly 
tolerant, and actively enjoyed the victor’s cultural offensive. Just as the 
205 Photograph included in the photo section of Paxton, et al., eds., Archives de la Vie Littéraire 
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Figure 8  Reception at the German Institute in Paris, June 1941. Alfred Fabre-Luce 
is speaking with Winifred Wagner; in the background are Jean-Louis 
Vaudoyer and Otto Abetz; and on the right is Herbert von Karajan 
listening to Karl Theo Zeitschel.
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capital’s roads had been cleansed of noise and traff ic jams, newfangled 
plays had disappeared from its theatres, making way for a new appreciation 
of the classics. The German victory had rid Parisian cultural life of boring 
receptions, snobbish fashions and innane publicity. France’s new position at 
the western end of a German-dominated continental empire also reoriented 
the literary and cinematographic taste of its population. Cut off from Hol-
lywood and British literature, the French audience was now free to discover 
Ernst Jünger, Ernst Wiechert, Emil Jannings and Zarah Leander.207 In May 
1941, Fabre-Luce attended a Mozart and Wagner concert of the Berliner Phil-
harmoniker at the Paris Opera. He showed himself profoundly impressed 
by the conductor Von Karajan, whom he later met at the German Institute 
and hailed as a ‘magician who made frontiers fall’. Two months later, during 
an open-air Mozart concert in the garden of the Palais-Royal, Fabre-Luce 
experienced a similar Franco-German fraternisation through music: ‘The 
victor has come to charm the defeated. He has taught him how to make use 
of his city. […] What do the fortunes of politics matter?’208 Fabre-Luce also 
visited the famous Arno Breker exhibition in Paris, one of the highlights of 
the cultural collaboration. In the more sceptical third volume of Journal de 
la France, he recognised the ‘authentic talent’ of Hitler’s favourite sculptor, 
who had specialised in gigantic nudes, but he questioned the viability of the 
‘German renaissance’ that Breker was supposed to embody.209
Fabre-Luce did not only read Jünger and include him in his Anthologie 
de la Nouvelle Europe, he also regularly met the Wehrmacht captain, who 
was comfortably based in Paris throughout most of the Second World War. 
As a famous writer and highly decorated veteran from the First World 
War, Jünger enjoyed certain privileges among the German off icer corps. 
Largely free from military obligations, he was allowed to move around in 
Paris in civilian clothing and establish connections with the city’s high 
society. Jünger’s diaries and papers show meetings with Fabre-Luce as well 
as a correspondence stretching from 1941 into the late 1960s. Fabre-Luce 
remembered Jünger as ‘a superior spirit, able to surpass the nationalism 
that has animated his youth. For him, as for me, a united Europe was an 
inevitable fate, whatever the result of the war would be, restraining the 
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victors and consoling the defeated.’ They met in May 1941 and speculated 
about Rudolf Hess’ f light to Scotland, a hotly debated subject at the time 
that was also discussed between Jouvenel and Abetz.210 In February 1942, 
Fabre-Luce invited Jünger for dinner at his apartment to personally hand 
him ‘one of the f irst copies of the Anthologie, in which I have included one 
of your most beautiful texts’.211 The dinner was also meant as an occasion for 
Jünger to meet Drieu la Rochelle, after an earlier attempt had failed when 
Drieu had forgotten to bring his laissez-passer needed for entry into the 
building of the German military administration. But Drieu failed to show 
up once again, for which he later apologised. Jünger recalled that they dined 
in Fabre-Luce’s wood-clad study, next to a large world map: ‘it was kept all 
white, like terra incognita, and only the places its visitor had seen, were 
depicted’.212 Fabre-Luce wrote Jünger to express his admiration for Gärten 
und Strassen, Jünger’s account of his personal trials and tribulations during 
the Fall of France, which he found as impressive as his earlier fantasy novel 
Auf den Marmorklippen. He appreciated Jünger’s talent for describing ‘the 
eternal through the transient’ and admitted counting the discovery of these 
two books ‘among my most important events of the year’.213
Fabre-Luce also established warm relations with Sieburg and Epting, 
who brought him into contact with Carl Schmitt during one of the famous 
political theorist’s visits to Paris.214 He was frequently in touch with Gerhard 
Heller (1909-1982), who acted as the censor to the f irst volume of Journal de 
la France. A friend of Horst Wessel, Heller, like Abetz, had been involved in 
German youth organisations before joining the Nazi Party in 1934. Holding 
a university degree in Romanistik (Latin Studies) and having extensively 
studied and travelled in France during the 1930s, Heller was appointed 
literary censor at the Propaganda-Abteilung in 1940. In 1942, when censor-
ship was transferred to Abetz’s German embassy, Heller became the head 
of its literature department, while also having a desk at Epting’s German 
Institute. Heller made only small cuts in Journal de la France I and told 
Fabre-Luce that he was welcome to ‘freely’ write a sequel to the book. But 
he was more reluctant about the second volume after Epting had criticised 
him for not having prevented Fabre-Luce from including a few pages by 
210 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 106; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 427.
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Bergson, a Jew, in his Anthologie. Not daring to assume responsibility for 
the publication of a book that included Fabre-Luce’s criticism of the Jewish 
Statute, Heller forwarded the book to Achenbach, who authorised it.215 Like 
Jünger, Heller enjoyed the privilege of invitations to dinner at Fabre-Luce’s 
place, where he met Sieburg and the former minister Georges Bonnet.216
Although Fabre-Luce continued to hail Heller as ‘indisputably Fran-
cophile and personally sympathetic’ during the 1960s, their relations 
suffered a sharp decline in the early 1980s as a result of the publication of 
Heller’s wartime memoirs.217 By this time, Heller had become a well-known 
translator of French literature, especially of the works of Drieu, Céline 
and Patrick Modiano. He described his war years as a pleasant period 
of Franco-German fraternisation and amorous adventures with French 
people of both sexes (amongst whom f igured Marcel Jouhandeau), during 
which he had always retained a genuine admiration for French literature 
and lifestyle, and secretly for the Resistance too. The book included a 
less-than-flattering description of Fabre-Luce, whom he placed alongside 
Benoist-Méchin (and implicitly also Céline) in a group of hard-core col-
laborators he had not wanted to be in contact with. Heller cited from 
Fabre-Luce’s ‘Letter to an American’ – including the sentence about ‘a 
new race’ that was beginning to take shape – and expressed his ‘shock’ 
that a French intellectual could truly believe in ‘a new Europe under the 
sign of the Nazis’.218 Fabre-Luce reacted furiously, reminding Heller in a 
letter that he had been the one who invited him to one of the two notori-
ous propaganda trips to Germany in the autumn of 1942. Fabre-Luce had 
declined the offer but ‘apparently, had I accepted, you would have now 
reproached it to me’.219
It seems that Heller matched Fabre-Luce in the game of self-justifying 
historical falsif ication, especially when considering some other evidence. 
The wartime correspondence between Heller and Jünger suggests that both 
Germans considered their mission to be that of establishing German control 
over the French mind. During the winter of 1942-1943, while Jünger was 
spending a few months at the eastern front, Heller wrote him from Paris 
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that the Allied invasion of North Africa had had ‘a large effect’ on the French 
and even ‘on our friends’, making it ever harder ‘to walk the indicated path 
with them’.220 Jünger answered that he would soon be back in Paris, where he 
was hoping ‘to serve the fatherland well. The total mobilisation should now 
especially include the use of all spiritual reserves, a sharper consideration 
of everything that is necessary in the presence of threat.’221 In June 1943, 
Heller wrote Jünger that things were getting worse: ‘at this time, one has to 
seriously pay attention that our last friends don’t also defect’.222 Less than 
three weeks later, Fabre-Luce published the third volume of his Journal 
de la France. Though the book can hardly be considered anti-German or 
pro-Resistance, Jünger and Heller must have disliked reading one of their 
‘friends’ condemn the persecutions and deportations of Jews, envisage an 
Allied victory and openly announce that the politics of collaboration had 
failed the moment Germany occupied the ‘free’ zone.223 On 8 July, during 
an evening spent with Epting and the Déat couple, Jünger f irst heard about 
the book, which had caused ‘big annoyance’. He noted in his diaries: ‘I have 
the impression that this will lead to a police affair.’224
The same evening, Fabre-Luce was arrested and detained in the Cherche-
Midi prison in Paris. According to Fabre-Luce, he spent just over two months 
at the Cherche-Midi, where he shared his corridor with communists and 
black-marketers – some of whom were awaiting execution – before being 
transferred to a more comfortable cell in a Gestapo villa in Neuilly-sur-Seine. 
Fabre-Luce was reluctant to give much information as to how exactly he was 
treated, but in a later book he claimed he was beaten up by a German jailor, 
who took him for a Jew. Not all Germans treated him as badly, however. After 
the war, Fabre-Luce testif ied in defence of Karl Braun, the inspector of his 
Neuilly prison, claiming that Braun had helped him during his detention 
by pleading for his release and making it possible for his wife to visit him.225 
Fabre-Luce was released after another month in Neuilly upon payment of 
a f ine of 200,000 francs, but it seems things could have turned out much 
worse for him.226 The writer Maurice Martin du Gard, an acquaintance to 
whom Fabre-Luce had sent a dedicated copy of the third volume of Journal 
220 Heller to Jünger (5 January 1943), Jünger Nachlass, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Hs.1994.0009.
221 Jünger to Heller (31 January 1943), Jünger Nachlass, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Hs.2005-0060.
222 Heller to Jünger (12 June 1943), Jünger Nachlass, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Hs.1994.0009.
223 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France III (1943), 25, 29, 70.
224 Jünger, Strahlungen, 353.
225 Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 159; Statement by Fabre-Luce in favour of Karl Braun, Fonds AFL, 
472 AP 1.
226 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 135, 158, 163.
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de la France, heard the rumour that the Germans had been planning to 
send him ‘to a quarry in the General Government’, which he feared the 
frail-healthed intellectual would never have survived.227
Other, more hostile readers either did not believe Fabre-Luce’s life was 
at risk or simply could not care less what happened to him. Under the 
headline ‘Trop Tard!’, the influential clandestine Resistance newspaper 
Les Lettres Françaises surmised that Fabre-Luce had apparently described 
the approaching German defeat with just enough accuracy ‘to obtain his 
arrest by the Gestapo. This kind of operations is exactly what we used to 
call, in the language of parliamentary customs, “to have oneself exculpated” 
[“se faire dédouaner”].’ After a few collaborationist citations from the f irst 
two volumes of Journal de la France, the (anonymous) author concluded: 
‘Now, the ex-unif iers of Europe, the ex-Duce’s allies can put Mr. Fabre-Luce 
in prison or even give him hot feet. All that doesn’t matter to us. It’s just a 
settling of accounts between people from the underworld.’228 Similarly, a 
report drafted by Vichy’s intelligence service concluded that ‘left-wing and 
particularly communist circles’ were mocking Fabre-Luce’s new position. 
Calling the third volume of Journal de la France ‘a masterpiece of deceitful-
ness’, they stated that Fabre-Luce’s attempt to change sides would not win 
him any indulgence and that, ‘whatever he does now, his fate will be the 
same as that of all traitors’.229
Both Heller and Jünger claimed to have played a role in Fabre-Luce’s 
release. Jünger wrote that he was happy to hear from Heller, on 4 August, 
that Fabre-Luce’s prison regime had been alleviated and that he would be 
entitled to a normal trial, ‘after the information on him that I gave to the 
Militärbefehlshaber’.230 Heller described a joint meeting of representatives 
of the Propaganda-Abteilung, the embassy, the German Institute and 
the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) to decide the fate of Fabre-Luce. Heller and an 
unnamed acquaintance who also attended the meeting were convinced 
that ‘all should be done to avoid that anything happens to Fabre-Luce’, 
but they did not dare raise their voice when SD-leader Helmut Knochen 
mentioned the ‘Nacht und Nebel’ treatment, which would have implied 
the complete disappearance and possible death of Fabre-Luce in a German 
concentration camp. Heller was relieved when it was decided to let him go 
227 Martin du Gard, Chronique de Vichy, 379.
228 [author unknown], ‘Trop Tard!’, Les Lettres Françaises (September 1943), 6.
229 Report by Renseignements Généraux, 4ème section (22 November 1943), included in Dossier 
d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
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‘after a serious warning’.231 This relief may have been motivated by feelings of 
guilt. The historian Wolfgang Geiger has established that it was Heller who 
had reported Fabre-Luce as ‘anti-German’ on 5 July 1943 to consul general 
Wilhelm Knothe.232 During his post-war trial, Knochen himself mentioned 
the Fabre-Luce case as proof of his supposed leniency during the occupation: 
‘my service did not insist on strict measures’.233
Information on Jouvenel’s relations with Germans is even more frag-
mented, but there is evidence he was in close contact with Abetz and 
Epting, whom he found ‘interesting and friendly’. He also had a private 
dinner with Carl Schaefer, who functioned as the German commissary 
at the Banque de France.234 In early 1942, Jouvenel contacted the German 
Institute asking for permission to consult the conf iscated archives of the 
French foreign ministry for a series of documents relevant to his study of 
Napoleon and the Continental System. Jouvenel remained loyal to Abetz 
long after the war was over. In 1954, when Abetz was released from his 
French prison, Jouvenel sent a cheque of 100 French francs to the couple in 
Düsseldorf to alleviate their f inancial diff iculties.235 Even at an advanced 
age, Jouvenel continued to defend Abetz as a sincere lover of France who 
considered himself a Rhinelander and therefore ‘closer to the French spirit’ 
than to the ‘Prussian’ one. ‘I have known since a long time that Abetz is 
not an anti-Semite, and he also does not believe in the superiority of the 
Germanic race’.236 Whether Abetz believed in this superiority or not, it is 
a fact that he was deeply involved with the organisation and the execu-
tion of the Holocaust in France. On 17 June 1942, he met with Carl Oberg, 
the higher SS and police leader of France, to discuss the f irst wave of 
deportations. When Oberg asked him which Jews should be exempted ‘in 
the name of the political interests of the Reich’, Abetz named only three: 
Henri Bergson’s widow, the writer Colette (Jouvenel’s stepmother and 
erstwhile lover) and Jouvenel’s wife Marcelle Prat ‘in case it is proven she 
is really Jewish’.237
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While Jouvenel seems to have already stopped reporting to the Vichy 
secret services in the course of 1941, in November 1942 the Allied landings 
in North Africa and the subsequent German-Italian occupation of the 
southern zone brought a definite end to his intelligence activities. Jouvenel 
returned to his native Corrèze, where he frequently met Malraux and Berl, 
who was busy working on a history of Europe. He also received the visit of 
Jean Jardin, Laval’s Chief of Staff. Jardin’s son Pascal, who was nine years 
old at the time, later recalled meeting
a huge man, as handsome as a Greek god. He was sleeping naked under 
an apple tree. The early spring sunshine was gilding his skin. It was the 
economist Bertrand de Jouvenel, future author of that citadel nine hun-
dred pages long, Du Pouvoir. At the present time he was still something 
of a playboy, and since his mother was Jewish he had certain worries. He 
was a day-dreamer, incurably lost in the mazes of his thought.238
It was at this time that Jouvenel probably also became involved in support-
ing local Resistance activities, mainly by trying to appease farmers angry 
about the theft of chickens by hungry résistants, and possibly also retrieving 
Allied airdrops and helping men hide from forced labour in Germany. When 
Martial Brigouleix, his former platoon leader from the Phony War and one 
of the leaders of the Corrèze Resistance, was arrested in May 1943, Jouvenel 
was sent to Paris to try to obtain his liberation via Abetz or Brinon.239 Failing 
to meet either of them, Jouvenel was instead arrested by the Gestapo and 
questioned about his activities in Poland during 1939. A series of arrests 
that took place at the same time brought an end to the Corrèze Resistance 
network. Released after two days but convinced that his release was meant 
to lead the Germans to other resisters, he chose to go in hiding, f irst in a 
Burgundian abbey and later abroad. On 21 September 1943 around noon, 
Jouvenel and his wife illegally crossed the Swiss border.240
238 Extract from Pascal Jardin, Vichy Boyhood: An Inside View of the Pétain Regime (London: 
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chanté’ (PhD diss., Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, 2001), 291.
240 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 457.

4 A European Revolution?
Liberation and the Post-War Extreme Right
Liberation and Persecution
For Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce, emigration and imprisonment respectively 
precluded any journalistic or literary activities during the f inal year of the 
German occupation. Though a free man by October 1943, Fabre-Luce was 
intimidated enough to temper his incessant urge to comment on current 
events at least until the Germans were gone. Just how literally he took this 
imposed silence is illustrated by the fact that he published the fourth volume 
of Journal de la France on 18 August 1944, the very day the Germans were 
beginning to leave Paris – and almost immediately landed in trouble with 
the liberation authorities.1 In his Swiss exile, Jouvenel soon mingled with 
the growing French émigré community living on the north shore of Lake 
Geneva. He continued to work on the manuscript of his future magnum 
opus Du Pouvoir, but he was not to return to France for several years. At 
the moment of the liberation of Paris, he noted in his diary that there was 
‘nothing worse’ than feeling ‘cut off from the national communion’ like 
he did.2 The summer of 1943 not only put an end to both intellectuals’ 
prior activities at a practical level, it also marked the def initive end of their 
anticipation of a fascist Europe under German leadership. As we shall see 
in this chapter, this did not mean they welcomed the post-war order or that 
they distanced themselves thoroughly from their earlier engagements. The 
French Fourth Republic, the Épuration, the domestic appeal of communism, 
the Soviet expansion, the Cold War and the post-war European project 
fundamentally changed the political context of their intellectual activities.
Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s absence from the French political scene meant 
that they largely missed the most radical phase of the war. The f inal year 
before the liberation saw a radicalisation on all fronts. The German oc-
cupation of the southern zone – a reaction to the Allied landings in North 
Africa – had robbed the Vichy regime of what little agency it had and turned 
it into a de facto German puppet state led by a powerless and increasingly 
passive Pétain. Support for the Vichy government dwindled, but those still 
willing to serve it became ever more radical. In early 1944, Déat f inally 
1 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France IV (1944); idem, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 195.
2 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 463.
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became minister of labour, while the information ministry was given to 
Philippe Henriot, an anti-Semitic collaborator whose inflammatory radio 
speeches earned him the nickname ‘the French Goebbels’. The rising inter-
nal influence of the paramilitary Milice Française under the leadership of 
Secretary General Joseph Darnand (who also became SS Sturmbannführer 
after August 1943) is often taken as a sign of Vichy’s ‘fascist drift’ during its 
f inal year of existence, even by historians inclined to consider Vichy as es-
sentially conservative.3 In marked contrast to his earlier admiration of the 
LVF volunteer Doriot, Fabre-Luce described Darnand as a member of ‘such 
a weak International that it is just the f ifth column of a foreign nation’.4
The Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO), established in February 1943, 
further discredited Vichy and dramatically enlarged the ranks of the 
Resistance by driving large numbers of young men into illegality, unwilling 
to be forcefully enlisted to work in Germany. The Resistance manifested 
itself more openly, taking control of inaccessible rural areas and commit-
ting acts of terrorism and sabotage that were requited by brutal reprisals 
by the Germans (and the Milice). Especially after the Casablanca Confer-
ence in January 1943, the presence of a Free French authority in liberated 
North Africa created a supplementary pole of attraction for the French 
population, one directed against Vichy and collaboration. Although De 
Gaulle was initially forced by the Allies to share power with Henri Giraud, 
a senior general who was seen as a hero after escaping from a German 
prison during both world wars, the younger general was able to gradually 
outmanoeuvre Giraud and establish himself as the unquestioned leader 
of Free France.5
While the events were not directly linked, there is a symbolic side to 
Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s departure from the scene precisely when violent 
radicals like Darnand were on the rise. For all their frequenting of events 
and receptions on the bel étage of the collaborationist world, it seems that 
Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel rarely ventured into its less ref ined basement. 
Foul-mouthed fascists such as Rebatet and Céline – who considered himself 
the only true collaborator for having proposed already in 1938 to annihilate 
all Jews and sign a ‘colossal’ alliance with Hitler – probably seldomly en-
countered the two intellectuals during the war years.6 In Céline’s wartime 
writings, only one mention is made of Fabre-Luce, in a complaint about not 
3 Payne, A History of Fascism, 401; Jackson, The Dark Years, 232; Paxton, Vichy France, 231.
4 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France IV (1944), 11.
5 Jackson, The Dark Years, 228, 458, 480.
6 Céline, L’École des Cadavres, 283.
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having been included in his Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe.7 In a letter 
published in La Gerbe in February 1941, Céline attacked Jouvenel’s Après 
la Défaite for keeping all options open on France’s future and for refusing 
to talk about the Jews. According to Céline, if things had gone very differ-
ently, Jouvenel would have happily written ‘Après la Victoire, a remarkable 
225-pages work looking almost perfectly like the one he published’.8
Culturally sophisticated members of the occupation authorities like 
Abetz, Heller and Jünger (with the notable exception of Karl Epting) pre-
ferred Fabre-Luce over Céline, whose strong language, uncivilised behaviour 
and inadequate personal hygiene appalled them probably more than his 
anti-Semitic obsessions. The description in Jünger’s diaries of ‘Merline’ 
(Céline) as ‘a maniac who cannot really be made responsible for his declara-
tions’ speaks volumes.9 After the war, while in hiding in Denmark from 
the French authorities who he thought wanted to have him killed, Céline 
bitterly lamented his fate. He convinced himself that he had been made 
into a scapegoat – through some Jewish machination, of course – for the 
collaborationist crimes of others. In a letter to a friend, he expressed his 
disbelief that he had to fear for his life while people like Fabre-Luce walked 
around freely:
If it wasn’t him it must have been his brother. Fabre-Luce was collaborat-
ing and a lot. He wrote a big book, a kind of retrospective history of the 
collaborators, their merits etc. – IN WHICH I DID NOT FIGURE – and 
after Stalingrad, wanting to exculpate himself […], he starts pissing off 
the Germans, who lock him up. Oh just a bit! […] He counted among the 
most appreciated guests at the Embassy – [rue de] Lille – where they 
were drooling, having tenderness only for plutocratic and slightly Jewish 
collaborators […].10
There is no mention of Jouvenel in Rebatet’s fascist autobiographical novel 
Les Décombres, which competed with Journal de la France on the bestseller 
list of occupied France. The only mention of Fabre-Luce in the book is 
Alfred’s cousin Robert Fabre-Luce (1897-1966). An early convert to racism 
7 Godard, Céline, 318.
8 Céline in La Gerbe, 13 February 1941, included in Céline, Choix de Lettres de Céline et de 
Quelques Correspondants, eds. Godard & Louis, 618.
9 Cited in: Mitchell, The Devil’s Captain, 76. See also Jünger, Strahlungen, 63; Loiseaux, La 
Littérature de la Défaite, 541.
10 Céline to Albert Paraz, 9 March 1951, in: Céline, Choix de Lettres de Céline, 1397. Italics and 
caps in original. Céline was obviously refering to Fabre-Luce’s Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe.
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and National Socialism, ‘baron’ Robert Fabre-Luce had on several occasions 
lent his voice to Nazi propaganda during the 1930s. In June 1940, he was 
imprisoned on the orders of Minister of the Interior Georges Mandel for 
being a member of the pro-German ‘f ifth column’, along with a few other 
radicals. This crackdown turned Mandel – a Jewish conservative who had 
taken outspoken anti-Nazi and anti-appeasement positions during the 
1930s – into a hate object of the French extreme right, which led to his as-
sassination by the hands of the Milice in 1944. Released after the armistice, 
Robert Fabre-Luce went to Vichy and served the regime in various functions 
before being arrested again during the Liberation.11 In his memoirs, Alfred 
claimed that his cousin ‘was interested in the same questions as me, but took 
position more strongly’. Robert ‘had always caused trouble in the family’ 
and Alfred had avoided him since his youth, even to the point of refusing 
to see him while they were detained in the same prison camp in 1945.12
Jouvenel’s fascism certainly was more scrupulous than Rebatet’s, and not 
even the Fabre-Luce of the f irst Journal de la France came close to Céline’s 
hysterical, genocidal brand of anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, the distinction 
was probably due to a difference in style, milieu and social circles rather 
than ideology. Even Fabre-Luce’s remark on his pariah cousin, who shared 
his political interests but expressed himself too imprudently, illustrates 
this attitude. Moreover, both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel remained very close 
to their ultra-collaborationist friend Drieu la Rochelle throughout the war. 
Despite having made biting remarks about Jouvenel in his private diaries 
during the early war years – calling him a nervous ‘half-Jew’ and a pathetic 
‘bastard’ whose unstable mind was the product of ‘miscegenation’ – Drieu 
visited Jouvenel and his wife in Switzerland in late 1943 and spent several 
days having long, personal conversations with him. Jouvenel recalled his 
sadness when Drieu left and claimed he sensed it had been their last 
meeting.13 Living in hiding since the liberation and having already made 
several failed attempts, Drieu committed suicide in Paris in March 1945. 
In a letter to Drieu’s f irst wife Colette Jéramec, at whose apartment Drieu 
was staying when he ended his life, Jean Paulhan wrote that Drieu had 
sacrif iced himself in order to save his peers: ‘It is certain that Drieu’s trial 
would have also been the trial of Chardonne, Jouhandeaux, Fabre-Luce…’14
11 Rebatet, Les Mémoires d’un Fasciste I, 454; Jackson, The Dark Years, 579. For Robert Fabre-
Luce’s pro-Nazi activities, see, for example, Binding et al., Sechs Bekenntnisse zum Neuen 
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12 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 24.
13 Remarks cited in Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 156; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 462.
14 Cited in Lottman, La Rive Gauche, 436.
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Drieu was not the only one who had to go in hiding after the liberation. 
As the Allied armies approached Paris, some collaborationist intellectuals 
like Céline and Luchaire followed Pétain and the remnants of the Vichy 
administration to a castle in the southern German town of Sigmaringen, 
where the Germans set up a French government-in-exile that off icially 
strove to ‘liberate’ France from the Allied invasion. Those who remained 
in France faced the prospect of both legal prosecution and arbitrary acts 
of vengeance. Especially during 1944 and early 1945, with the war still 
underway, the authority of De Gaulle’s Provisional Government was 
feeble to say the least, and local impromptu liberation committees often 
took matters into their own hands, summarily executing any supposed 
collaborator they could f ind. Though f igures have often been inflated by 
writers sympathetic to Vichy or the collaborators, the more trustworthy 
estimations range between 9,000 and 15,000 summary executions – an 
illustration of the civil-war-like atmosphere that reigned in France during 
and in the immediate aftermath of the liberation. Both arbitrary violence 
and measures that took place within a legal framework of some kind are 
included under the French term Épuration [‘purif ication’], which is still a 
point of much debate in French society.15
As the French version of the almost Europe-wide phenomenon of post-
war transitional justice, the Épuration had a double aim: to punish those 
guilty of having collaborated with the enemy and to ‘purify’ French society 
as a whole by removing these unwanted elements. There was possibly also 
a symbolic side to the operation: the German invader having symbolically 
def iled French national territory, a ritual act of cleansing was necessary in 
order to re-establish French independence. This implied the temporary or 
permanent exclusion from society of all people who had worked with the 
enemy. Despite De Gaulle’s famous declaration in October 1944 that col-
laboration had been the work of only ‘a handful of miserable and unworthy’, 
the post-war purges quickly grew into a vast enterprise. Investigations were 
launched against 350,000 persons (including both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce) 
belonging to every branch of French society, of whom more than 125,000 
had to appear in front of a judge.16 Besides the Gaullist drive to preserve 
the myth of an undivided and heroic French nation by focusing on the 
punishment of a small number of traitors, other members of the Provisional 
15 Drake, Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France, 12; Cointet, Expier Vichy, 8, 124; Shields, 
The Extreme Right in France, 53.
16 Anne Simonin, ‘L’Indignité Nationale: Un Châtiment Républicain’, in Baruch, ed., Une 
Poignée de Misérables, 40.
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Government had different aims. The Communist Party sought to prof it 
from its unequalled level of popular support (capitalising on its leading 
role in the Resistance, it called itself ‘the party of the 75,000 shot’) to use 
the Épuration to reshape France and to extend its influence. A purge of the 
entire French state apparatus had the additional advantage of opening up 
positions to which communist militants could be appointed.17
For writers, journalists and intellectuals, the Épuration took on a 
distinctive form. This was partially linked to the special qualities of ink 
on paper. Since it was considerably easier to assemble written proofs of 
collaborationist statements than it was to reconstruct acts that had taken 
place years ago, writers were among the f irst to be tried – while the war 
was still going on – and tribunals were inclined to punish severely. Public 
intellectuals lacked the kind of position or technical expertise essential for 
the functioning of the state that would have saved them from persecution, in 
contrast to many higher public servants, lawyers and magistrates.18 Moreover, 
intellectuals themselves were largely in charge of the intellectual Épuration, 
people who almost by def inition believed in the utmost importance of the 
written word. Already during the occupation years, writers close to Les 
Lettres Françaises and the clandestine editing house Éditions de Minuit 
formed a Comité National d’Écrivains (CNE) that later played an important 
role in purging the French literary world of collaborators. The members 
of the CNE, intellectuals such as Vercors, Louis Aragon, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Jean Paulhan, François Mauriac, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean Guéhenno, 
established a ‘blacklist’ of ‘undesirable’ writers and announced they would 
collectively refuse to contribute to any newspaper, review or editing house 
that published articles by these proscribed authors. Both Jouvenel and 
Fabre-Luce f igured on the list, alongside Drieu la Rochelle, Montherlant, 
Chardonne, Jouhandeau and many others.19
While the CNE blacklist had the character of self-censorship that 
placed it outside the legal system, collaborationist authors were also hit 
by more direct criminal sanctions. The high-prof ile trial and execution in 
early 1945 of Robert Brasillach, the young journalist, novelist and former 
chief editor of Je Suis Partout, was meant to be a model for trials against 
intellectual collaborators of the worst kind – and was initially greeted as 
such by a majority of the French population. However, it rapidly became 
a symbol of unnecessary bloodshed that robbed France of a promising 
17 Drake, Intellectuals and Politics, 13.
18 Sapiro, La Responsabilité de l’Écrivain, 525.
19 Sapiro, La Responsabilité, 535; Assouline, L’Épuration des Intellectuels, 161, 163.
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writer. In addition to providing the post-war extreme right with a martyr 
and multiple-use poster boy, Brasillach’s death rapidly provoked an intel-
lectual debate in French society about a writer’s responsibility and his 
eventual ‘right to err’. After Brasillach’s condemnation, a petition asking 
for his pardon was signed by many intellectuals including Paul Valéry, 
François Mauriac, Paulhan, Colette and Camus, but De Gaulle refused to 
show clemency, presumably because he mistakenly believed Brasillach 
had worn a German uniform.20
The journalist Georges Suarez, a former PPF member and colleague of 
Jouvenel at Gringoire whose book about Briand had received a laudatory 
NRF review by Fabre-Luce in 1941, had already been tried and executed 
several months earlier.21 Fabre-Luce had had few contacts with Brasillach 
during the war, but the two had worked together at the periodical L’Assault 
back in 1936.22 The person dearest to Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel to face the 
f iring squad was Jean Luchaire. The former chief editor of Notre Temps, 
with whom Jouvenel had spent so many wine-f illed evenings during the 
1920s discussing youth movements, corporatism and the future United 
States of Europe, had become a hated symbol of collaboration and venality. 
Inspired by the same ‘realism’ that he saw as the def ining trait of his 
generation, Luchaire had taken advantage of France’s defeat to further 
his career. He headed the German-controlled Paris press corporation, 
founded his collaborationist journal Les Nouveaux Temps with German 
money and lived lavishly throughout the occupation years. After leaving for 
Sigmaringen, he served as propaganda minister in the French government-
in-exile led by Fernand de Brinon. In this function, Luchaire frequently 
spoke on the French airwaves, calling upon his compatriots to resist De 
Gaulle’s call to arms and announcing that the Allies were delivering France 
to a ‘Bolshevik’ takeover. Arrested on the run in his native Italy in May 
1945, ‘the Führer of the French press’ was brought back to France. Luchaire 
was condemned to death in January 1946 and executed one month later, 
his death marking the end of the most violent phase of the Épuration of 
intellectuals.23
Despite the emotion and media attention surrounding these trials, legal 
executions remained relatively rare. A total of 7,000 people were sentenced 
20 Assouline, L’Épuration, 88; Kaplan, The Collaborator, 212.
21 Assouline, L’Épuration, 34; Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Briand, tome V, par Georges Suarez’ (book 
review), Nouvelle Revue Française (August 1941), 251.
22 Fabre-Luce, Journal 1951, 91.
23 Alden, ‘The Road to Collaboration’, 268, 278; Geo London [Georges Samuel], ‘Jean Luchaire 
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to death during the Épuration, but fewer than 800 of these sentences were 
actually carried out.24 A far larger number of people were subjected to less 
def initive punitive measures, ranging from prison sentences and forced 
labour to the confiscation of property and the partial loss of their rights 
as citizens. In addition to the traditional crime of treason, a new crime 
known as ‘indignité nationale’ (‘national unworthiness’) was formulated. 
While treason was reserved for people who had collaborated directly with 
the Germans, ‘indignité nationale’ was aimed at the more indirect kind of 
collaboration of those who had merely served Vichy. Since legally the Pétain 
regime had been France’s off icial government, treason did not apply to this 
group. Though controversial in the eyes of legal scholars due to its air of 
ex post facto legislation,25 indignité nationale made possible the extended 
purge of collaborators while creating differentiated ways of punishing 
them. While the regular punishment for treason was death, those guilty 
of indignité nationale were to be punished with what could be called a 
form of ‘civic death’, now reformulated as ‘civic demotion’ (‘dégradation 
nationale’): the loss of active and passive election rights; exclusion from 
government service and the exercise of certain liberal professions (lawyer, 
advocate, notary); exclusion from the right to lead or regularly contribute 
to newspapers, editing houses, radio stations or cinemas; exclusion from 
the right to head a bank or an insurance company; alongside the possible 
confiscation of all their belongings and the loss of pension rights. Almost 
95,000 people were condemned to dégradation nationale, making it by far 
the Épuration’s most applied sanction.26
Both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce had every reason to fear persecution. While 
by the end of 1943 Jouvenel was already anticipating a post-liberation trial 
in France, his Swiss exile saved him from arrest during the ‘wild’ months 
directly following the liberation.27 In early 1945, when he considered coming 
back to France to defend himself against the allegations of collaboration 
and ‘collusion with the enemy’, he asked the advice of Philippe Boegner, a 
journalist friend from his La Lutte des Jeunes days with Resistance creden-
tials. Boegner strongly advised him to stay where he was, since a fair trial 
was improbable:
24 Judt, Past Imperfect, 59.
25 For a discussion of this theme, see Simonin, ‘L’Indignité Nationale’, in Baruch, ed., Une 
Poignée de Misérables, 50.
26 Simonin, ‘L’Indignité Nationale’, 40, 42, 47.
27 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 191.
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I believe that you currently enjoy a blessing that you have never known 
in your life, the one of being forgotten, and I don’t see any necessity to 
end this oblivion. […] In many ways we are in 1936 again. There are no 
facts, only interpretations, there is no truth but only emotion. One can 
say that four years of defeat and eight months of liberation have changed 
almost nothing. Perhaps if there had been precise charges against you, 
I would tell you to come and justify yourself, but since there is nothing, 
you would f ind yourself accused of being called J., of having had friends 
that they don’t like at this moment, and what can you do against that?28
If his plans to end his exile had been serious at all, this letter convinced 
Jouvenel to stay in Switzerland and quietly wait until legal investigations 
against him were closed without further action.29 In the meantime, Fabre-
Luce had a more serious rendezvous with French transitional justice. On 
26 August 1944, less than a week after publishing the fourth and last volume 
of Journal de la France, Fabre-Luce witnessed the triumphant entry of De 
Gaulle down the Champs Élysées. The American troops arrived three days 
later, giving him the impression of ‘an army of truck drivers […] throwing 
cigarettes to the spectators as to an African crowd’.30 French Resistance 
forces arrested him three days later, as part of a f irst wave of arrests target-
ing Chardonne, Jean-Pierre Maxence, Maurice Bardèche and about any 
other collaborationist writer or intellectual they could f ind.31 Fabre-Luce 
spent a month in an overcrowded prison cell in the Parisian suburb of 
Fresnes before being sent to the Drancy camp. Located in another suburb 
and originally intended as a modernist residential project, Drancy had 
functioned as the main transition camp of the Holocaust in France. Nine 
out of ten Jews arrested in France passed through Drancy on their way to 
the extermination camps. After the liberation, the camp was used by the 
Resistance to intern collaborators and criminals.32
Outraged with his arrest, the shabby treatment he received, the chaotic 
amateurism of the authorities who failed to tell him what he was accused of 
and who denied him access to a lawyer or a judge for several months, Fabre-
Luce found inspiration for several furious books and articles. In one of the 
28 Philippe Boegner to Bertrand de Jouvenel (21 March 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (295).
29 Sapiro, La Responsabilité, 546, 559. Elsewhere, Sapiro used the term ‘non-suit’ to describe 
the outcome of the investigations against Jouvenel.
30 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 193.
31 Sapiro, La Responsabilité, 540.
32 Poznanski, Les Juifs en France Pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 373; Fabre-Luce, Double 
Prison, 147, 156.
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f irst of these, titled Double Prison and published without an editor in 1946, 
he contrasted his ‘German’ with his ‘Gaullist’ captivity, while explaining 
both as the logical result of his position as a free-thinking intellectual who 
refused to make any concessions to political powers. Presenting himself as 
a humanist and a liberal in profoundly illiberal and inhumane times, Fabre-
Luce claimed he had almost accepted that such would be his fate. He went so 
far as to take pride in it. By refusing to go in hiding and by turning himself 
in after the police had come looking for him, he had forced the authorities 
to make a mistake, which was the best way to f ight them. At least he was 
showing more courage than ‘the “collaborator” who fled to Switzerland and 
will come back on a wagon-lit’. Such people, Fabre-Luce thought – possibly 
alluding to Jouvenel (who ended up doing both) – may have escaped prison 
but ‘will not dare to look in the eyes of those who have suffered’.33
Whether out of irony or ignorance, Fabre-Luce contrasted the treatment 
of Drancy’s former Jewish inhabitants with his own situation, arguing that 
at least the Jews had heating and more personal space in the barracks: ‘there 
used to be four Jews where there are now ten “collaborators”’. In terms not 
so different from those used in the third volume of Journal de la France, 
33 Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 148, 221.
Figure 9  Jewish prisoners in the Drancy transition camp during the occupation
source: Gamma Presse / Hollandse Hoogte
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Fabre-Luce continued to allude to the idea that the liberation was some 
kind of revenge of the Jews, in which they made the collaborators suffer the 
same treatment hitherto inflicted upon them. He noted that relatives and 
lawyers were not allowed into Drancy to visit the prisoners, while ‘com-
munists, Anglo-Saxons and Jews can inspect us as they please. They give 
them entry tickets, as to a zoo.’ Jewish visitors were especially vindictive, 
taking pleasure in witnessing the detainees’ humiliation. He wrote that he 
would have liked to believe that a Jew would speak out in defence of him 
and others, just like he had himself supposedly defended the Jews during 
their years of suffering, but he had the impression his hope was in vain.34
Fabre-Luce shared the camp with a colourful mix of other prisoners: Mi-
lice and PPF members, shaved women accused of ‘horizontal collaboration’ 
with German soldiers, madmen, petty thieves and collaborationist socialites 
with nobility titles. The comic actor Sacha Guitry was a long-time inmate of 
Drancy, as were Bernard Faÿ and Georges Ripert, a law professor and member 
of the Institut de France. The actress and model Arletty, who had famously 
defended her love affair with a German off icer by declaring ‘my heart may 
be French, but my ass is international’, made a short appearance.35 While 
Fabre-Luce liked to spend his time with Guitry and Ripert, he was not willing 
to meet his cousin Robert Fabre-Luce, who was at Drancy too. When the 
prison director summoned Alfred and offered to correct the ‘inhumanity’ 
of not even introducing him to his own relative, he declined politely.36
While Fabre-Luce had good reasons to paint the Épuration as black as he 
could, his trial record does give the impression of chaos and amateurism 
on the side of the ‘épurateurs’, although this did not always work to his 
disadvantage. In September 1944, notif ied by his wife, Fabre-Luce’s lawyer 
wrote the minister of justice to complain about being denied access to his 
client, which was ‘a violation of republican legitimacy’.37 Only in late October 
did the overburdened legal apparatus open investigations against him, after 
he had spent more than two months in captivity. Fabre-Luce was summoned 
for questioning for the f irst time on 13 November. But as his f ile was empty 
and an indictment was still lacking, the policeman in charge instead asked 
him what he had to declare.38 Five days later, Fabre-Luce was transferred 
34 Ibid., 158, 159, 163.
35 Jackson, The Dark Years, 335; Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 170, 177, 185.
36 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 25.
37 Daniel Viraut to ‘Monsieur le Ministre’ (30 September 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 
dossier 8648.
38 ‘Réquisitoire introductif ’ (28 October 1944) and ‘Procès-verbal’ by Jean Tesnière (13 Novem-
ber 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648; Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 205.
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back to the Fresnes prison. In the meantime, an indictment had been found: 
‘intelligences avec l’ennemi’ [‘collusion with the enemy’], formulated more 
specif ically (though still rather broadly) as ‘to have knowingly, in France 
or abroad, delivered direct or indirect help to Germany or its allies, or to 
have undermined national unity or the liberty and equality of Frenchmen’. 
This was a crime against the security of the state, punishable under laws 
voted in 1939 and early 1940, and considerably more serious than indignité 
nationale.39
On 25 November, Fabre-Luce finally appeared before a judge, who wanted 
to know why the Germans had not condemned him to death in 1943.40 
Unable to answer that question, he protested instead against his detention 
and refuted the charges by claiming that, instead of helping the Germans, 
he had been ‘one of the only, if not the only French citizen writer, to engage 
in an open resistance against the enemy’. In line with arguments used 
by collaborationist politicians such as Laval, he defended his support of 
collaboration during the f irst two years as a logical consequence of military 
defeat and an attempt to save as much as possible of what was left of French 
‘national independence’ – against which De Gaulle’s categorical non was as 
symbolically admirable as it was unworkable in practice, that is: in France as 
opposed to London. But he claimed his attitude had changed fundamentally 
in November 1942, when the entire occupation of France and the liberation 
of North Africa convinced him that collaboration had become ‘contrary to 
the French interest’.41
Additional notes drafted by his lawyer stressed Fabre-Luce’s absolute 
‘independence’ as a writer and his categorical refusal to engage in political 
activities during the occupation or to take part in propaganda trips to 
Germany. Furthermore, he had played a subtle game that only few could 
understand. Despite becoming bestsellers, the Journal de la France books 
had been originally intended for ‘a minority of cultivated readers able to 
appreciate the constraints imposed by censorship and the resulting value 
of nuances and stylistic reservations’. That is, if only people had been 
‘cultivated’ enough to read between the lines, there would have been no 
doubt about Fabre-Luce’s subtle yet open resistance. After reminding the 
judge that Fabre-Luce had criticised the Jewish Statutes and the enlistment 
of French workers, his lawyer stated that writers like Gabriel Marcel, André 
39 Sapiro, La Responsabilité, 540; Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
40 Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 239.
41 ‘Procès-verbal’ (25 November 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648. Crossing-
out in original.
A EUROPEAN REVOLUTION? 171
Siegfried and Édouard Bourdet, ‘most of whom are today members of the 
Comité National d’Écrivains’, had apparently been able to grasp Fabre-Luce’s 
real attitude, since they had ‘at the time congratulated Fabre-Luce with his 
work’.42
The judge ordered his provisional release on the same day.43A letter 
written by François Mauriac probably played a role in the judge’s decision. 
The famous Catholic writer, Académie Française member and future Nobel 
Prize winner was a founding member of the CNE and had put his signature 
underneath the blacklist that included Fabre-Luce’s name, but after the 
Liberation he soon became disillusioned with the consequences of the 
Épuration. In his regular contributions to Le Figaro, Mauriac criticised the 
‘vengeful spirit’ in which his colleagues were busy calling for each other’s ar-
rest and tried to vindicate an intellectual’s ‘right to err’. In doing so, Mauriac 
engaged in a passionate press debate with Camus (who initially demanded 
harsh justice). Mauriac had personally handed over the clemency request 
for Brasillach to De Gaulle. His indefatigable defence of those accused of col-
laboration earned him the mocking nickname ‘Saint-François-des-assises’ 
[‘St. Francis-of-the-Assizes’].44 One day before Fabre-Luce’s release, Mauriac 
wrote a letter reminding the judge that with the third volume of Journal 
de la France, he had braved German censorship and earned himself ‘f ive 
months’ of imprisonment at the Cherche-Midi. Considering this feat of 
bravery, Mauriac suggested, the judge might take Fabre-Luce’s ‘very fragile 
health’ into account and release him provisionally.45
Fabre-Luce went back home to his wife and children, but the investiga-
tions against him continued. When on 31 January 1945 two policemen came 
to his house to take him with them, he decided he had seen enough, despite 
his former resoluteness to challenge the authorities by letting them commit 
the error of persecuting him. Fabre-Luce asked to f irst make a phone call to 
his lawyer. When he was allowed to do so in a side room, he made a run for 
the back stairs and then for the street. Fabre-Luce spent the following six 
months in hiding, frequently changing places: f irst with different friends 
in Paris, then at home while staying away from the windows, in Biarritz, 
in provincial chateaux owned by acquaintances and even in a Benedictine 
42 Jérôme Sauerwein, ‘Notes Sur l’Activité de Monsieur Fabre-Luce’ (23 November 1944), Dossier 
d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
43 Declaration by the prison director (25 November 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 
dossier 8648.
44 Assouline, L’Épuration, 117.
45 François Mauriac to the Juge d’instruction (24 November 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, 
Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
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monastery in Solesmes.46 In his absence, the judge ordered the partial 
confiscation of his belongings and the freezing of his bank accounts.47
In the late summer of 1945, Fabre-Luce was back at his apartment and 
walked the streets of Paris undisturbedly, but he was still unsure as to what 
he could expect. If the authorities were alternating between repression and 
laissez-faire, it was because they were under pressure from different groups. 
Besides the slow functioning of the legal system and calls for clemency from 
Mauriac and others, communist and other left-wing journalists were putting 
pressure on the government to arrest more people and punish them more 
harshly, since anything else would be nothing but an insult to those who 
had paid with their lives during the occupation. Already during Fabre-Luce’s 
time at Drancy, l’Humanité had called the camp ‘a holiday resort for the f ifth 
column’ and called for the quick punishment of Guitry and Fabre-Luce, 
‘demimonde’ collaborators ‘without scruples and without a fatherland’.48 
Fabre-Luce noticed how the ‘tidal’ movement of French politics directly 
influenced the situation in the camp. Communist demonstrations meant a 
new wave of arrests, while the prison regime was eased as soon as bourgeois 
newspapers had begun to write critically about the Épuration’s excesses.49
The anger of Resistance newspapers against Fabre-Luce further increased 
as a result of his many publications in which he attacked the Épuration, 
mocked the importance of the Resistance and defended Marshal Pétain. 
Even from his prison camp, he succeeded in having an article published 
telling ‘The Truth about Drancy’ (it was not exactly a holiday resort, diseases 
were breaking out and some detainees had been tortured, tattooed or physi-
cally abused) by having it smuggled out of the camp.50 After his release, he 
continued to publish books and brochures at an unequalled pace. Initially 
unable to f ind an editor willing or daring to publish them, he decided to do 
so by himself. He invented the name ‘Éditions de Midi’, a mocking reference 
to the Resistance editing house Éditions de Minuit and in line with his 
statement that he was speaking out at clear daylight, not clandestinely 
at midnight.51 His prison memoirs appeared in 1945, initially little more 
than stencilled papers (just like the fourth volume of Journal de la France 
one year earlier) but soon republished in book form as Double Prison. He 
46 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 218, 230, 233, 237; Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 8.
47 Document by Juge d’Instuction Raoult (15 May 1945), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 
dossier 8648. It seems this conf iscation was not carried out.
48 Diquelou, ‘Drancy Deviendra-t-il Villégiature Pour la 5e Colonne?’.
49 Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 198, 211.
50 Alfred Fabre-Luce, [untitled] (11 October 1944), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2; idem, Double Prison, 215.
51 See, for example, Fabre-Luce, En Pleine Liberté, I.
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also self-published three brochures, which were eventually bundled in Au 
Nom des Silencieux, in which he paid homage to the ‘hommes du Maréchal’ 
who had sincerely followed Pétain and were now wrongfully accused of 
treason, while calling Gaullism a ‘new inquisition’ and comparing it to 
the Ku Klux Klan.52 During the summer, Fabre-Luce published a lengthy 
report on the Pétain trial that mixed appreciative comments on the Marshal 
with refutations of most of the accusations against him. In his concluding 
remarks, Fabre-Luce suggested that De Gaulle could be persecuted for the 
same kind of treason attributed to Pétain.53
During 1945, Resistance newspapers published outraged commentaries 
on Fabre-Luce, who was ‘abusing’ his freedom by publishing his admiration 
for Pétain and the ‘Krauts’ and his hatred of De Gaulle and other ‘patriots’. 
How was it possible that the police were letting such a man walk around 
freely, a member of the f ifth column ‘who, at the moment of the debacle 
of 1940, uttered a cry of triumph’?54 In fact, the police were not entirely 
inactive in stopping Fabre-Luce’s activities. The entire unsold print runs of 
Double Prison and Au Nom des Silencieux were confiscated from bookshops 
and storage, provoking protests by Fabre-Luce and a long-lasting legal f ight 
against this ‘censorship’.55 Fabre-Luce’s trial record contains a report about 
fruitless police attempts to obtain the other texts he published via the 
‘Éditions de Midi’, despite a declaration from the Juge d’Instruction that 
post-liberation material could not be part of the accusation. Bookshop 
owners questioned by the police declared that they had only ‘heard about’ 
those books and claimed they were not selling them.56
At the end of 1945, the Juge d’Instruction decided that Fabre-Luce was 
again to be held in administrative detention, but the police could not f ind 
him at his home. Fabre-Luce’s wife declared that they were late: her husband 
52 Fabre-Luce, Au Nom des Silencieux, 29, 154.
53 Fabre-Luce, Le Mystère du Maréchal, 47, 193. Fabre-Luce would f inally take on this challenge 
himself, with Haute Cour (1962), a play in which De Gaulle is brought to trial for high treason by 
a Supreme Court consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly sitting in joint session.
54 Buré, ‘Prenez Garde! Prenez Garde!’; Lecache, ‘Fabre-Luce ou le Juvénal Clandestin’; Le 
Huron, ‘Exhibitionisme’; Pierre Levebvre to the Commissaire Divisionnaire (10 October 1945), 
Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
55 Fabre-Luce would f inally get them back in 1951. See Fabre-Luce, Journal 1951, 8.
56 Reports on ‘Faits Postérieurs à la Libération’, Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648; 
Reports on house searches and confiscation of Double Prison and Au Nom des Silencieux included 
in folder ‘Épuration – Documents 1941-1951’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1; Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 
3. The sight of a Fabre-Luce book on display in the window of a bookshop was exactly what 
offended Resistance newspapers. See Le Huron, ‘Exhibitionisme’.
174 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
had gone to Switzerland.57 This was true. In the summer and autumn of 1945, 
several personal and more general events had convinced Fabre-Luce that his 
best option was to look for shelter abroad. At the October 1945 parliamentary 
elections – the f irst since the liberation and the f irst French elections in 
which women were allowed to vote – the communist and socialist par-
ties won an absolute majority. With more than 27 % of the votes, the PCF 
became the country’s largest party, raising fears of a long-lasting communist 
hegemony if not a direct political take-over. Around the same time, Pétain’s 
death sentence (commuted to life imprisonment by De Gaulle) and the 
execution of Laval proved that, despite the end of the War, the Épuration 
was still capable of showing its teeth. Together with the confiscation of 
his books and the attacks against him in the press, these developments 
prompted Fabre-Luce’s decision to apply for a visa for Switzerland. To his 
own surprise and surely also that of his Juge d’Instruction, his visa was 
granted by regular procedure, and he crossed the Swiss border by car in 
early November.58
Exile and Exclusion
Going to Switzerland to escape arrest in France, Fabre-Luce was making the 
same journey that Jouvenel had made just over two years earlier. In 1943, 
Jouvenel and his wife crossed the border as illegal immigrants request-
ing refugee status, and only the reputation of Bertrand’s father Henry de 
Jouvenel prevented them from being housed in a refugee camp. Instead, 
the couple were temporarily placed under house arrest in a luxury hotel, 
then moved into a more modest place in Fribourg before settling with their 
daughter in a three-room apartment in Saint Saphorin, a village on the 
shores of Lake Geneva, not far from Lausanne. Jouvenel was distrusted by 
the Swiss authorities, who considered him a collaborator and kept a close 
watch on him during 1944. As a condition of his residence in Switzerland, 
he had to promise he would refrain from any political or journalistic activi-
ties. This ban from what had until then been Jouvenel’s main occupation 
caused him serious f inancial diff iculties, which were partially alleviated 
when he received permission to publish books about economic subjects 
and articles in the Swiss press as long as he used a pseudonym. Signing his 
57 Report from Police Inspector Durand to the Juge d’Instruction (26 January 1946), Dossier 
d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
58 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 245; Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 1.
A EUROPEAN REVOLUTION? 175
articles with ‘Guillaume de Champlitte’, ‘G. de Monfort’ or ‘XXX’, Jouvenel 
became a regular contributor to Curieux and the Gazette de Lausanne, both 
conservative Pétainist newspapers.59
Jouvenel’s owed his most important support to his integration into the 
curious émigré community living on the shores of Lake Geneva. When he 
arrived, this community still consisted of a mix of those who had fled the 
occupation and those wanting to escape the post-war order. Pétainists and 
former collaborators soon started to dominate, including the Vichy diplomat 
Paul Morand, Pétain’s former chief of staff Henry du Moulin de Labarthète, 
René Belin, Coco Chanel, Georges Bonnet, René Gillouin, Raymond Abellio, 
Charles Rochat and many others. The Belgian Hendrik de Man was also 
part of these circles. The pre-war planist socialist, who had been strongly 
admired by Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel at the time, had become a leading 
collaborator during the war and fled to Switzerland to escape persecution 
in his native Belgium. His king Leopold III, equally exiled after his dubious 
role during the Belgian capitulation and the occupation years, was also 
living on the shores of Lake Geneva. The central f igure in this high society 
was Jouvenel’s old friend Jean Jardin. Jardin had been a member of Ordre 
Nouveau, one of the ‘non-conformist’ formations of the 1930s. After serving 
as Laval’s chief of staff during most of 1942 and 1943, Jardin joined the 
French embassy in Berne, where he established personal contacts with the 
Swiss authorities, Gaullists, the American Off ice of Strategic Service and 
German off icers conspiring to kill Hitler. As a neutral country, Switzerland 
provided excellent opportunities for these kinds of mixed frequentation. 
When Paris was liberated, Jardin resigned his diplomatic position, but he 
retained connections with France’s former and new authorities that would 
ensure him few problems with the Épuration and a long post-war career as 
an influential political background f igure in the Fourth Republic.60
Well-placed to provide f inancial and political services to his contacts, 
Jardin became the linchpin of the French émigrés. The weekly Saturday 
afternoon tea parties at the Jardins in Vevey was the occasion for everybody 
to meet, exchange novelties and escape the boredom of daily exile life. 
Aware of Jouvenel’s presence after reading one of his articles in Curieux, 
Jardin quickly included him in these circles and helped him by acting as an 
intermediary for money sent from France by the family of Jouvenel’s wife.61 
When Fabre-Luce arrived in Switzerland, he soon established contact with 
59 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 185, 189; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 463.
60 Assouline, Une Éminence Grise, 130, 177, 205.
61 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 463; Assouline, Une Éminence Grise, 202.
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his ‘dear friend’ Jouvenel and was naturally absorbed into the same milieu.62 
Fabre-Luce’s memoirs give a vivid description of the atmosphere reigning 
in this intact micro-Vichy. While remarking with irony that ‘there are many 
things I can blame on the liberation government, but not for failing to 
provide me with pleasant company in prison and in exile’, he described 
his encounters with Bonnet, Jouvenel, Morand, De Man and Jardin and 
their collective joy at being safe from the ‘madness’ of the Épuration. When 
they heard that one of them, Charles Rochat – according to Fabre-Luce an 
‘irreproachable functionary’ but also a long-time Vichy secretary-general 
for foreign affairs who had followed his government to Sigmaringen and 
then fled to Switzerland with Jardin’s help – had been condemned to death 
in absentio, ‘we were split between indignation and the giggles’.63
Jardin founded À l’Enseigne du Cheval Ailé, an editing house that became 
an important recourse for the French émigré community. Off icially led by 
the Swiss extreme-rightist editor Constant Bourquin but in reality directed 
by Jardin, the ‘Winged Horse’ specialised in books, memoirs and justif ica-
tions by fascists and collaborators, alongside a few nineteenth-century 
classics. These books were intended for export, resale and clandestine 
distribution in France, appearing in unrealistically large print runs for 
the Swiss francophone home market. Du Moulin de Labarthète published 
his account of the war years through the Cheval Ailé, as did Louis Rougier, 
René Benjamin, Georges Bonnet, Pierre Dominique, André Thérive, Hen-
drik de Man, and even Dino Alf ieri, Léon Degrelle and the Spanish fascist 
(and Franco’s brother-in-law) Ramon Serrano Suñer.64 Providing the only 
publishing opportunity for writers who were blacklisted, persecuted or 
otherwise excluded from the public sphere in France, the Cheval Ailé acted 
as a bridge between collaboration and the post-war French extreme-right.
Jouvenel published his magnum opus Du Pouvoir at the Cheval Ailé as 
well as an edition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Du Contrat Social that included 
his long introductory essay.65 With Jouvenel’s help, Fabre-Luce also obtained 
a contract with Bourquin – an attractive alternative to amateurish self-
publishing, given that most of the copies had been confiscated by the police. 
In Geneva, Fabre-Luce published Au Nom des Silencieux and Le Mystère 
du Maréchal, a longer version of his commentary on the Pétain trial, as 
62 Alfred Fabre-Luce to Bertrand de Jouvenel (28 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
63 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 251, 254.
64 Clavien ‘Les Intellectuels Collaborateurs Exilés en Suisse’, 87. Amongst others, see De Man, 
Au-Delà du Nationalisme; idem, Cavalier Seul; Du Moulin de Labarthète, Le Temps des Illusions; 
Serrano Suñer, Entre les Pyrénées et Gibraltar.
65 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir; Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, 13-165.
A EUROPEAN REVOLUTION? 177
well as a two-volume ‘f inal edition’ of Journal de la France, essentially a 
fundamentally cleansed and mutilated version of his four wartime books. 
He also published Journal de l’Europe, a series of political observations from 
post-war France, England and Italy and an attempt to continue his approach 
from the war years.66 These publications permitted Fabre-Luce to exchange 
his rented room in an insane asylum – the only place accepting French 
francs – for an apartment in Geneva that he could pay for in freshly earned 
Swiss currency. Especially Au Nom des Silencieux soon became a success 
in France, selling 40,000 copies in the f irst six months alone and inspiring 
an Italian translation published in 1946.67 In Montreal, a Canadian editor 
published Double Prison but balked at Fabre-Luce’s suggestion that he do 
the same with the ‘f inal’ Journal de la France, fearing the book might cause 
‘emotions’ and accusations of ‘defeatism and the spirit of collaboration’.68
Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s contracts at the Cheval Ailé brought them their 
f irst post-war successes while at the same time closely associating them 
with people who had plunged considerably deeper into collaboration than 
they ever had. In 1949, at Le Cheval Ailé, Degrelle published his memoirs 
from his time on the eastern front where he had fought as the leader of 
the Walloon SS brigade and become a ‘European’ hero celebrated by Nazi 
propaganda. The backside of the book listed Le Cheval Ailé’s ‘greatest suc-
cesses’: Du Moulin, Rougier, De Man, Bonnet, Serrano Suñer, Goebbels (his 
diaries) and Alf ieri f igured alongside Fabre-Luce ( Journal de la France) 
and Jouvenel (Du Pouvoir).69 Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce did not see this as a 
problem. Instead, they thought of their Swiss publications as providing a 
necessary correction to the censorship (self-imposed or otherwise) and one-
sidedness still prevailing in French journalism and publishing. In a letter to 
the chief editor of the Gazette de Lausanne, Jouvenel stated that, in Paris, 
his newspaper was held in great esteem for writing ‘what our newspapers 
don’t say’. According to Jouvenel, the Gazette was in fact playing ‘the role 
of the deliveries from Holland under the ancien régime’.70
66 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 201; Fabre-Luce, Au Nom des Silencieux; idem, Le Mystère du 
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Understandably, these publications initially did not contribute to an end 
to Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s ostracism in France. On the contrary: both the 
French authorities and the left-wing press continued to see them as pariahs 
or worse, and this antagonism only exacerbated as their Swiss books started 
pouring into France. When the University of Lausanne considered mak-
ing Jouvenel professor of political doctrine, the French diplomatic service 
in Switzerland intervened to prevent the appointment of someone with 
‘anti-democratic tendencies’ who had published books under the German 
occupation. In the end, a French member of the appointment commission 
made it clear that the chair should go to a Swiss national. Similarly, the 
new French ambassador in Berne was outraged with Fabre-Luce’s frequent 
trips to Paris and his ‘propaganda against the national interest’. He alerted 
the French foreign ministry and called for a re-examination of his visa for 
Switzerland.71 In 1947, when Fabre-Luce was planning a trip to Belgium, 
he received a letter from the Belgian authorities asking him to reconsider 
his visit. It is unclear whether this request had been inspired by the French 
diplomatic service.72
In August 1946, the communist newspaper Ce Soir started a full-fledged 
press campaign against those ‘traitors on the run’ leading a luxury life in ‘the 
most reactionary’ corner of Switzerland, with the help of police protection 
and secret funds provided by Vichy. The special reporter Serge Lang was 
outraged at seeing Fabre-Luce publishing his books with impunity, ‘three 
quarters’ of which were being spread in France. In a separate article, he 
tore Jouvenel apart:
This haughty character, with his monocle and his little chinstrap beard, 
is the laughingstock of the little village of Chexbres, above Vevey […]. 
The winemakers amidst whom he lives are frank and simple folks who 
cannot understand his pretentious manners […]. Sometimes, he tries to 
pose as a ‘resistant’, brandishing a certif icate written by a FFI off icer 
from Tulle, who has by the way been sacked for having given Jouvenel 
this certif icate of complacency.73
The bellicosity of these attacks could not eclipse the fact that the political 
climate in France had started to change. The summer of 1946 saw a turn 
away from the Épuration and the Resistance discourse dominated by the 
71 Assouline, Une Éminence Grise, 178, 214.
72 Letter included in folder ‘Doubles de lèttres d’Alfred Fabre-Luce’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
73 Cited in: Assouline, Une Éminence Grise, 211, 214.
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Marxist left and towards national reconciliation, centrist politics and a 
willingness to forget about the recent past. At the 5 May 1946 referendum, a 
proposed new constitution mainly backed by the communists and socialists 
was narrowly defeated, much to most people’s surprise. At subsequent 
parliamentary elections, these two parties lost their absolute majority, while 
the centre-right MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) replaced the PCF 
as France’s largest party. A tripartite coalition of MRP, PCF and SFIO sub-
sequently drafted a new constitutional project that was f inally accepted by 
referendum in October as the constitution of the Fourth Republic. Unhappy 
with the course of events and the choice for a parliamentary system instead 
of the strong executive he desired, De Gaulle had already relinquished his 
position as president of the provisional government in January 1946.74
Like many other former supporters of Pétain and collaboration, Fabre-
Luce was relieved when the news of the outcome of the f irst referendum 
reached him in Switzerland and considered it a sign that ‘the tide had 
started to withdraw’. Pierre Andreu, who was in Paris and in a similar 
mood, remembered clinging to the radio during the entire night as the 
results from all the corners of France poured in. He was convinced that 
with the f inal result, France had narrowly escaped a communist coup of 
the sort that Poland and Czechoslovakia had experienced.75 Despite some 
friends advising him to stay where he was, Fabre-Luce decided that it was 
safe to end his exile and go back to Paris at the end of summer. In August, 
he def iantly wrote to his Juge d’Instruction pretending that he had been 
surprised to hear that his investigation had not been definitively closed, 
especially since he had regularly obtained a visa for Switzerland ‘to follow 
a cure’. Now that things had turned out to be otherwise and with his health 
suff iciently recovered, ‘I will soon come back to France and will be at your 
disposal at my home, 56 Avenue Foch in Paris, 1 October the latest’.76
More exchanges took place during the next two years and Fabre-Luce 
was questioned several times, but it was not until 1949 that his trial took 
place – a sign that the authorities were by this time hardly more enthusiastic 
about the affair than Fabre-Luce himself. Furthermore, the amateurism 
that had marked the early days of his persecution continued to play a role. 
The Juge d’Instruction hired a translator for a German text by Fabre-Luce 
about collaboration, without realising that he already had the original: the 
74 Rioux, La France de la Quatrième République I, 146, 152.
75 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 259; See also Andreu, Le Rouge et le Blanc, 240.
76 Fabre-Luce to the Juge d’Instruction (16 August 1946), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 
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text came from the German translation of the f irst volume of Journal de 
la France.77 Fabre-Luce was repeatedly confused with his cousin Robert, a 
mistake that he did not fail to exploit in order to cast doubt about other, oc-
casionally correct, incriminating claims. Amongst other things, Fabre-Luce 
denied he had ever met Léon Degrelle and been a member of the PPF, both 
incorrectly. He claimed that his long article about Hitler’s European Empire 
as a more successful successor to Napoleon’s ‘dream’ and about the need for 
France to be inspired by the ‘teachings’ of Hitler had never been intended 
to be published in the Cahiers Franco-Allemands in 1942.78 The authorities 
had the greatest trouble f inding a copy of Fabre-Luce’s Anthologie de la 
Nouvelle Europe, and it had to resort to the French National Library to 
f inally get a copy. Altogether, the trial record seems to suggest that, except 
for introductions and summaries, the Juge d’Instruction did not bother to 
actually read the four to f ive Fabre-Luce books that would have normally 
been the focal point of any trial against him.79
These mistakes permitted Fabre-Luce to develop his double strategy of 
defence. Since the authorities often failed to pin him down on his manifest 
support for the German New Order and his admiration of National So-
cialism, he was able to largely bypass this inconvenient subject, limiting 
himself to selective self-quotations (the collaboration was a ‘black stock 
market’ full of ‘crooks’, Jews were ‘symbols of human suffering’, etc.), and 
switch to what had become his favourite topic: the political legitimacy 
of Vichy and Pétain. As in his publications from these years, Fabre-Luce 
built his defence on the supposedly positive role that Vichy – recognised 
by both the US and the Soviet Union as France’s legal government – had 
played in protecting as much as it could of the French population (including 
its Jews) against the Nazi onslaught, while keeping the fleet and military 
reserves safe until armed resistance was effectively possible. Although this 
policy became pointless with the German occupation of the ‘free’ zone 
in November 1942, it had been perfectly reasonable until that moment.80 
There is a marked contrast between the relatively secondary role of Vichy 
in Fabre-Luce’s wartime books and the importance it had suddenly gained 
in his trial defence and in his post-war books. This served both as a decoy 
77 Translated text and invoices by Léon Buée, Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
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and to cause a different kind of controversy, one that was associated with 
a dissenting view on France’s recent history rather than with treason.
Stressing the importance of his intellectual shift in the third volume of 
Journal de la France and of his imprisonment by the Gestapo, Fabre-Luce 
attempted to affirm his status as a free-thinking intellectual independent of 
any political power. In court, he ended his spoken defence with something 
that held middle ground between a challenge and a profession of faith:
My independence has already caused me several prison terms. I will 
persevere in the future. […] Last Sunday on the radio, I heard the President 
of the Republic speak about the ‘disgrace of the armistice’. A historian by 
Figure 10  Alfred Fabre-Luce during his trial at the Chambre Civique, 31 May 1949
source: Rues des Archives / Hollandse Hoogte
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profession, I studied all the documents relative to this question and I have 
formed myself a different opinion. I think the armistice was honourable, 
appropriate and useful. And as I think so, I say so. Since a few years, many 
people have ceased to express their real opinion, even if legitimate, out 
of fear to have ‘their f iles opened again’ or to make an unfavourable 
impression upon their judges. I will not, by adhering to what I consider 
a false history, buy the indulgence that I estimate I do not need. Let me 
be frank with you: I’d rather be condemned because of my ideas than 
acquitted out of ambiguity or renunciation.81
In the end, the French legal system was willing to do him this favour. On 
19 March 1949, the Court of Justice of the Seine department reached its 
judgment. While recognising that Fabre-Luce had kept his distance from 
the collaboration press, it concluded that in his books from the f irst two 
occupation years, he had ‘at least indirectly, served Hitlerian propaganda’. 
Especially in his Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, Fabre-Luce celebrated ‘the 
cult of force, aristocratism, racism, the critique of democracy, Germany’s 
predestination to hegemony’. The judge was less pronounced in his statement 
on Journal de la France, declaring that Fabre-Luce had expressed himself ‘in 
a very nuanced way’, although the f irst two volumes were ‘clearly oriented 
towards intellectual and material collaboration with Germany within the 
framework of a New Europe’. It was also to Fabre-Luce’s advantage that 
he had changed his course in late 1942, spent several months in German 
captivity and maintained ‘a certain independence from anti-national and 
pro-German organisations’. Moreover, ‘it has not been established that 
he was in contact with members of the occupation troops’. Taking these 
elements into account, the judge decided that Fabre-Luce’s case was not 
heavy enough to be treated by a Court of Justice, and he referred the trial 
to the Chambres Civiques.82
The Chambres Civiques were special sections of the Courts of Justice in-
tended for the persecution of collaborators who were not punishable under 
regular criminal law. This automatically meant that Fabre-Luce had escaped 
the verdict of ‘collusion with the enemy’ (and thus the potential sanction 
of forced labour, a long prison term or theoretically death) and could now 
only be condemned for the lighter crime of indignité nationale. Acquittal 
had also become unlikely, though, since the Chambres Civiques condemned 
81 Fabre-Luce, [untitled], Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
82 Transcription of jugdment by the Court of Justice (19 March 1949), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
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about three-quarters of the accused who appeared before them.83 On 31 May 
1949, the Chambre Civique heard his case. In his memoirs, Fabre-Luce wrote 
that he felt pity for his judge, who had probably himself sworn an oath to 
Pétain and was now supposed to persecute him for his loyalty to the same 
man. Fabre-Luce’s def iant defence plea had not missed its effect on the 
prosecutor, who placed pressure on the judge to show some severity: ‘If you 
think he has talent, condemn him severely.’ Fabre-Luce claimed that this 
left him feeling almost offended when the judge condemned him to ‘only’ 
ten years of dégradation nationale, without banishment from the country.84
This condemnation failed to have any concrete consequences for Fabre-
Luce. Apart from his confiscated books, his property was left untouched, and 
within two years the f irst of two amnesty laws put an end to his electoral 
and professional restrictions. Nevertheless, and despite his own indifferent 
comments, Fabre-Luce was perfectly aware of the weight that the sanction 
carried at a symbolic level. Like tens of thousands of other Frenchmen, he 
had been found ‘unworthy’ of his nationality because he had served the 
propaganda of the enemies of the French nation and turned against its most 
elementary values. Several of his citizens’ rights had been temporarily taken 
away from him. When friends wrote him letters to express their solidarity 
with him, they often did so with a certain reserve.85 In a book written in 
1945, Fabre-Luce had described the signif icance of dégradation nationale 
for a man who had enlisted for work in Germany in order to feed his wife 
and children: ‘he will have to suffer the sanction of ostracism. “Unworthy”: 
this word will haunt him for a long time. Around him, there will be a vague 
suspicion of treason.’86
‘Beyond Nazism’: Monarchism and the Heritage of Fascism87
Their Swiss exile brought Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce together again, with both 
in roughly the same circumstances. There are clear differences, however, 
between the position and experience of the two intellectuals during the 
early post-war years. Fabre-Luce’s Swiss exile was but a short intermezzo 
compared to Jouvenel’s, who only moved back to France at the end of the 
83 Sapiro, La Responsabilité, 540; Cointet, Expier Vichy, 503.
84 ‘Audience’ of the Chambre Civique (31 May 1949), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 
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1940s. Though Jouvenel was initially as blacklisted and ostracised as Fabre-
Luce, he was ultimately not the object of legal prosecution. He profited from 
his longer stay abroad to lay low and generally avoid provocation, mainly 
writing about economic subjects and political theory. This was partially 
because his permission to stay in Switzerland depended on it, but it was 
also due to changes at a personal level. Jouvenel’s more distanced attitude 
marked a major shift in his career as a public intellectual, especially with 
regard to his behaviour during the interwar period, but it did not preclude 
sharp political remarks in private.88 In the meantime, as we have seen, 
Fabre-Luce faced persecution and condemnation. Choosing a tactic that was 
the exact opposite of Jouvenel’s, he openly struck back at the authorities and 
became a vocal spokesperson of Pétainists, former collaborators and other 
‘victims’ of the Épuration. This conscious choice in favour of controversy 
brought him admirers and prominence in extreme-rightist circles as well as 
enemies and a more lasting exclusion from the mainstream press. Despite 
these major tactical differences, there are striking similarities in the two 
intellectuals’ political ideas and their aff iliation with several publications 
and associations of the post-war French extreme right.
Both intellectuals felt uncomfortable about the demise of fascism. As the 
Allies landed in Sicily and Southern Italy, the Russians advanced through 
Eastern Europe, and the German occupation of France descended ever more 
into civil war and arbitrary violence, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel became aware 
that the approaching defeat of Germany was turning into a mirror image 
of how they had interpreted the Fall of France just a few years earlier. It 
would mark not only the end of Axis rule in Europe but also the collapse 
of an ideological system that they had admired and identif ied with for a 
long time. They saw fascism fall into near-universal discredit, not because 
of the crematoria of Auschwitz, Bełżec and Sobibór – of which they seem to 
have been either unaware or unable to grasp the political signif icance – but 
due to its association with brutality and treason. The disappearance of the 
fascist alternative cleared the way for communism or a return to parlia-
mentary democracy – a less-than-appealing prospect for both Jouvenel and 
Fabre-Luce. A striking expression of this pessimism is found in the holiday 
greetings card that Fabre-Luce sent to Jouvenel in December 1945 in which 
he cynically congratulated his friend that, whatever would happen, the New 
Year ‘couldn’t be worse than the last’.89
88 For a longer treatment of the personal and intellectual elements of Jouvenel’s ‘metamor-
phosis’, see the next chapter.
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Mussolini was the f irst fascist leader to go. In early August 1943, just 
after the Duce had been deposed by the Grand Council of Fascism and 
imprisoned on the orders of King Victor Emmanuel III, Jouvenel reflected on 
his heritage. While many people saw Mussolini’s fall as proof of the victory 
of democracy, Jouvenel admitted to arriving at other conclusions. He noted 
that Mussolini had been in power for more than twenty years, about as long 
as the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire combined. Not only 
had Mussolini ‘shaped all the men who will play a role in his country for 
a quarter of a century to come’, he also ‘represented a principle that has 
manifested itself all over the world’. Furthermore, since his enemies had 
copied his tactics, Mussolini’s defeat was proof of the success rather than 
the failure of his ideology: ‘doesn’t the collapse of the providential man 
in Germany and Italy go together with the apotheosis of the providential 
man in the United States, in Great Britain and above all in Russia?’90 A few 
months earlier, seeing Mussolini’s ‘star fade’, Fabre-Luce remarked that 
people had forgotten how he had ‘pulled his country out of anarchy and, 
during eighteen years, brought order and peace.’ People were unwilling to 
see that ‘even his opponents are today inspired by the political formula 
that he has created’.91
The prospect of an Allied victory and a return to the Third Republic made 
Jouvenel sick with dread. In his diaries, he fulminated against ‘this horrible 
pre-war society without respect for essential values’ in which ‘off icers were 
despised […] until the moment people needed them’ and in which he ‘had 
to write chit-chat articles for Paris-Soir to survive’.92 He was equally unen-
thusiastic about the ‘fake’ heroism of the Gaullists – whom he described 
as a collection of renegades, gamblers and adventurers – and ‘the little 
moralists of democracy’, inspired by nothing but ‘sentimentality and lies’. 
Facing this prospect, Jouvenel claimed to even prefer the communists, who 
at least had ‘something virile and military that pleases me’, and of course 
the fascists, whose style he liked even more despite having ‘fought them as 
a nationally-minded Frenchman’. He admitted preferring ‘the fascist punch 
to the adipose and suffocating envelopment of the democrat.’93 Jouvenel 
was convinced that the victory of the Gaullists and democrats would be 
short-lived:
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I don’t believe that my country will fall prey to this clique for long. It has 
lived without them for three and a half years. New ways of feeling and 
thinking have taken root. By living with the Germans and by f ighting 
them, virtues similar to theirs have been awakened among us. We shall 
see what the returnees from London will do. […] I give them six months 
before they will be overwhelmed by the communists. Against the danger 
of the extreme left, they will then have to call upon the men of the right, 
like Noske did in Germany.94
Fabre-Luce imagined the return of Herriot as the ‘incarnation of collec-
tive foolishness’ at the head of a future government that was supposed to 
embody all the flaws of the Third Republic. He advised the f irst post-war 
session of parliament to start with an expiatory ceremony during which the 
MPs would have to wear dunce caps and write down ‘elementary truths’ 
on a chalkboard such as ‘It is impossible to win without working’, ‘A defeat 
forces one to take the victor into account’ and ‘It takes young people to 
nourish the old’.95
After the war, Jouvenel explained fascism as a counter-reaction against 
communism that was as regrettable as it was useful. Fascism copied and 
sometimes ‘exaggerated’ communist methods, since only these were capable 
of protecting society from the Bolshevik ‘poison’ against which a regular 
democracy was defenceless.96 Fabre-Luce went further than that, and once 
the Épuration’s most heated phase was over he was not afraid to say so in 
public. According to him, fascism had a larger positive legacy that could not 
be ignored by discarding it as a whole. Fascism was worthwhile both as ‘a 
reaction against [Soviet] totalitarianism’ and ‘a generous effort to render to 
the bourgeoisie its value as an elite […] and to unify the people, not through 
envy, civil war or foreign imitation, but through the admiration of a leader 
and the cult of the fatherland’.97 In another publication, he listed what he 
saw as the ‘best’ elements of National Socialism: ‘the cult of work, the sense 
of a community, the respect of natural hierarchies, and even a certain pride 
of white man that is the superior form of racism’.98
Referring to Salazar and Mussolini as examples, Fabre-Luce stressed that 
terror, racism and warmongering were neither exclusive nor necessary traits 
94 Cited in Delbecque, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel ou le Libéral Désenchanté’, 300.
95 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France III (1943), 255, 257. See also id, Journal de la France IV (1944), 
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of fascism.99 In a statement reminiscent of his 1942 distinction between good 
(Europeanist) and bad (opportunistic) collaborators, he claimed there had 
been good and bad fascists in France. While both groups had been sincere 
in their will to defend their country against the Bolshevik menace, the 
latter had ‘undergone the Hitlerian contagion to the point of preferring 
their political solidarity with Germany to the French interest’, while the 
former had only retained ‘certain assimilable elements’ of fascist ideology 
like unity, discipline and a strong executive with the objective of using these 
to establish ‘the French conditions of freedom’. While the former had been 
‘traitors’, the latter were ‘patriots’ who had an important contribution to 
make to post-war politics and society.100
Despite their lasting appreciation of fascism, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel 
could not entirely ignore the Holocaust and its moral implications. In their 
publications immediately following the end of the war, both intellectuals 
explicitly mentioned the death camps, albeit drawing very different conclu-
sions than those predominant today. Instead of the emphasis put today on 
the uniqueness of the Holocaust as a genocidal event of unprecedented 
scope and brutality, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel saw it as an integral part 
of larger developments in politics and civilisation.101 Fabre-Luce, whose 
brother-in-law François de Brantes had been arrested for Resistance activi-
ties and died in Mauthausen,102 welcomed the Nuremberg trials, especially 
as punishment for the ‘sadistic torture’ of the camp system. Although the 
Allies could have simply executed those responsible on the spot ‘without 
shocking anyone’, a trial was the better option because it showed to the 
world how these crimes had become possible. Only by letting the Nazi 
leaders speak could ‘their ignominy and their stupidity’ fully come to light: 
‘how they have killed their state in the name of the state, betrayed their 
fatherland while invoking it and committed, by “realism”, crimes that 
coalesced invincible forces against them’.103
Fabre-Luce, who managed to discuss Nuremberg and the camps without 
mentioning Jews, also stressed that ‘a single nuclear bomb destroys as many 
lives as a German extermination camp’. He was outraged that the Russians – 
the ‘inventors of the concentration camp’ – were present in Nuremberg solely 
as judges and not as accused. Referring to Jouvenel’s Du Pouvoir, Fabre-Luce 
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remarked that ‘Roosevelt (or his successor) has let the assassins of Katyn put 
on a judge’s cap’, something that ‘Wilson would not have dared to do’. This 
development illustrated how far morality had regressed between 1919 and 
1945.104 Fabre-Luce was unconvinced that the crimes of Nazi racism would 
necessarily lead to a lasting discredit of eugenics and what Jouvenel called 
‘biopolitics’. Though regretting that Hitler had ‘compromised’ it, he continued 
to be interested in negative eugenics as a way to improve the genetic make-up 
of the population. Again citing Rostand, who had already f igured in his 
1942 Anthologie, he stated that the ‘sterilisation of idiots’ remained a useful 
instrument to achieve the ‘extinction’ of certain ‘flaws of society’.105
With arguments very similar to those later used by Ernst Nolte, Fabre-Luce 
even suggested that the contagious influence of the Soviet Union – ‘a Slavic 
semi-barbarianism’ – was somehow to blame for the crimes the Germans 
had committed. In reaction to the violence of the Russian Revolution, Central 
Europe’s conservative forces had gradually borrowed its methods, thereby 
drifting away from Western civilisation. Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union 
had done the rest. In France, ‘the correct occupier that we have known in 
1940’ had by 1942 turned into a barbarian ‘drunken with blood’: ‘he came back 
from a country that refused to admit the Red Cross and to humanise war’.106 
Even the French Resistance had drunk from this well, since it had triumphed 
over ‘Hitlerism’ only to ‘repeat, to a certain extent, its excesses’.107 This made 
the Nuremberg trials a deserved, though very selective, punishment for 
crimes that Fabre-Luce linked to a plethora of other acts.
For Jouvenel, the concentration camps were yet another sign that he was 
living in profoundly barbaric and inhumane times. In a peculiarly pes-
simistic article, written for the Swiss Curieux in March 1945, he compared 
the Holocaust to the Allied bombing of German cities as two symptoms of 
a general rupture of civilisation. The f irst had been ‘the largest manhunt 
in history’ during which ‘hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of men, 
women, even children’ had f irst been ‘marked as prey’ by the wearing of 
the yellow star and subsequently arrested, separated and deported ‘as if by 
the slavers of the past’. And ‘a great people’, which had made ‘an immense 
contribution to our common culture, the people of Leibnitz, Bach and 
Goethe, has allowed this abomination to take place in its name!’ And now 
(with Jouvenel apparently still unsure about what had happened to the Jews 
104 Fabre-Luce, Le Siècle Prend Figure, 155, 156; idem, Hors d’Atteinte, 96.
105 Fabre-Luce, Journal 1951, 248.
106 Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 96, 97, 101.
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after their deportation) another ‘drama’ was unfolding, as Allied carpet 
bombing marked ‘the greatest extermination operation in history’. Noting 
that 51 % of Königsberg had been destroyed and 69 % of Darmstadt, he 
wondered if mankind had fallen back into savagery. ‘But savages themselves 
are incapable of this kind of f ierce cruelty. Their destructive rages are brief, 
ours is systematic.’108 Jouvenel stated that civilisation as such was not at 
fault, it was the gradual political usurpation of religion and morality and the 
subsequent development of political ‘pseudo-religions’ that was to blame:
How can one not see that […] it was by posing as a spiritual and moral 
leader that Hitler was able to excite the foolish fanaticism that Europe 
has fallen victim to? How not see that it was by promising a moral order 
that his adversaries have rallied the peoples? And who would dare to 
assure that these promises will be kept? For political reasons, propaganda 
has forged pseudo-religions of which the people are now possessed. The 
creators of these great emotions have lost control over them. And we 
see the destruction of cultural heritage in the name of civilisation, the 
massacre of women and children in the name of humanity, the rule of 
injustice in the name of justice and the death of intellectuals in the name 
of the mind [l’esprit].109
Apart from these lamentations, what kind of political future did Jouvenel 
and Fabre-Luce envisage for the post-war period? Although pessimism 
often predominated, the two intellectuals’ hopes and aspirations were 
reflected in two elements: a political synthesis of fascism and freedom, 
and a new attempt at European unif ication. During the last years of the 
war, Fabre-Luce rejected a return to parliamentarianism as essentially an 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ machination to forever prevent Franco-German rapproche-
ment. ‘To a pure Frenchman, parliamentarianism and Nazism appear both 
as foreign imports. If we have kept some pride, we will reject them equally 
and we will be the f irst to develop the political synthesis that the whole 
of Europe will end up looking for.’110 Jouvenel was less hopeful about these 
prospects, writing in his diary about his fear that ‘for all the brutality and 
108 XXX [BdJ], ‘La Confusion’, Curieux (29 March, 1945), included in Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (13). 
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the clumsiness of their approach, the Germans may have been Europe’s 
last chance’.111
At the national level, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce looked for a political alter-
native to parliamentarianism that would secure fascism’s ‘positive’ legacy 
– essentially understood as order, unity, authority and heroism – without 
plunging into the murderous chaos of war. At the same time, this peace-
loving ‘néo-fascisme assoupli’112 would have to be strong enough to f ight 
communism, and to effectively do so it needed the free use of methods that 
were not allowed within a democratic system. Fabre-Luce specif ied what 
measures he deemed necessary to counteract ‘communist sabotage’: the 
dissolution of trade unions and their replacement by state-led corporations, 
a ban on strikes, the interdiction of the PCF and the removal of communist 
MPs from parliament. Although these measures were ‘incompatible with for-
mal liberty’, universal suffrage and freedom of association, they would allow 
‘the vast majority of citizens to breath freely’. As an example, he referred to 
the constitution of Salazar’s Portugal, which promised freedom of expression 
while also providing for all kinds of ‘special laws to repress “any perversion 
of public opinion”. In fact, it is always possible to camouflage fascism as a 
“presidential republic”. That is the deep tendency of neo-Gaullism.’113
Yet Fabre-Luce was obviously not attracted to Gaullism. During the 
mid-1940s, a monarchy best reflected both intellectuals’ aspirations. In 
1943, Fabre-Luce f irst mentioned the possibility that Vichy’s failed National 
Revolution might succeed in a future liberated France under the authority of 
a fresh ‘leader or monarch’. One year later, he suggested that France needed a 
king both to re-establish order in society and as a rampart against totalitarian 
tyranny. All the ancien régime’s abuse of power was surely nothing compared 
to the revolutionary terror that succeeded it.114 In 1946, he admitted thinking, 
‘after having for a long time held a different opinion, that the overthrow of 
monarchy at the end of the eighteenth century has been a serious mistake’. 
He even interpreted this regicide as a psychoanalytical root cause of the 
hatred and violence that had henceforth characterised French politics: 
‘Vaguely, France continues to reproach itself for having murdered its king 
and queen, and it tries to justify itself with new violence.’115 Even in 1949, when 
the Fourth Republic had long since established itself, Fabre-Luce continued to 
111 Cited in Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 191.
112 Fabre-Luce, Le Siècle Prend Figure, 218.
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stress that France needed ‘a hereditary prince’ to re-establish ‘an exchange of 
feelings between rulers and ruled, a common consciousness of responsibility 
towards the ancestors, a presence of the sacred’.116 Fabre-Luce also published 
Une Tragédie Royale (1948), a book about the Belgian king Leopold III, whose 
behaviour during the occupation had given rise to the Royal Question and his 
replacement by a regent. He had nothing but praise for the exiled king – ‘le 
plus pur des épurés’ – whose ‘mystique’ he presented as the only thing that 
stood in the way of a communist takeover. Without the king’s influence as 
a ‘mediator’, Belgium was bound to fall prey to the sectarian politics and 
mutual hatred that had already marked the Épuration.117
Fabre-Luce avoided explicitly naming his candidate for king of France, 
but he was referring to Henri d’Orléans (1908-1999), ‘Comte de Paris’ and 
Orleanist heir to the French throne as King Henry VI. Banished from France 
like all pretenders under the Third Republic, Henri had lived in Belgium 
during the 1930s, occasionally visiting the country in secret and publishing 
a newspaper, Courrier Royal, which targeted his French followers. Despite 
the Action Française being the only serious political movement that 
campaigned in his favour, Henri d’Orléans gradually distanced himself 
from Maurras and his crew and in 1937 publicly condemned their doctrine 
of ‘integral nationalism’. This did not mean he lacked political ambition. 
Since the February 1934 riots had convinced him that regime change was 
possible, the Comte de Paris nourished the hope of somehow becoming 
France’s ‘providential man’ as a stepping stone to claiming the throne.118 
When Pétain usurped that position in 1940, Henri publicly announced his 
support of Vichy, hoping to eventually become his successor. Pétain and 
Laval, however, showed only minimal interest in the Comte de Paris, so he 
then tried his luck with the other side. Residing in Morocco, he established 
connections with Allies and members of the Resistance. In December 1942, 
he was involved in a royalist assassination plot aiming to put him in charge 
of French North Africa instead of Darlan. Though Darlan was shot dead 
by a monarchist member of the Resistance and Henri arrived in Algiers 
to claim power, his attempt was thwarted by the categorical refusal of the 
Americans to accept this fait accompli. Power went to Giraud, while the 
Comte de Paris was sent back to Morocco, suffering from an infection and 
discredited in the eyes of the Allies.119
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Jouvenel had been in touch with Henri d’Orléans since the mid-1930s, 
when they became acquainted via the Catholic agrarian syndicalist (and 
future Vichy agriculture minister) Jacques Le Roy Ladurie.120 Fabre-Luce first 
met him during a trip to Morocco in late 1941, and the young pretender’s 
modesty and charm made a very favourable impression on him. He regret-
ted that the 1942 plot had not succeeded in bringing the Comte de Paris 
back to power.121 In 1947, Henri was a frequent guest at his friend Jardin’s 
tea parties in Vevey, possibly meeting Jouvenel there and trying to win 
the support of the exiled Pétainists and collaborators for his plans for a 
French constitutional monarchy as part of a new European Holy Roman 
Empire. The Comte’s Swiss activities gave rise to speculations in the French 
press about a ‘Leman Connection’ and the existence of a ‘Maquis Noir’ of 
extreme-rightist resisters, monarchists and Vichyites plotting to overthrow 
the republic. An off icial inquiry by the French embassy in Berne concluded 
that no such conspiracy existed, but the prince felt obliged to deny the 
allegations in public.122
During the same years, with the Action Française out of the way due 
to its role in Vichy and the trial and condemnation of Maurras, the Comte 
de Paris made an attempt to revive the monarchist movement in France 
and tie it to his own ideas. Amongst other press initiatives, he founded 
the weekly Ici France that bore Henri’s motto ‘La mission essentielle du 
pouvoir est de rendre les hommes heureux’ as a second title. Contributors 
consisted essentially of close collaborators of the Comte de Paris (Pierre 
Longone), Catholic conservatives (Gabriel Marcel, Gustave Thibon) and 
extreme-rightists (Pierre Boutang, Antoine Blondin, François Le Grix). In 
its fourth edition, the front page of Ici France approvingly cited a statement 
by Fabre-Luce about the ‘nationalisation’ of the British royal family as the 
embodiment of the nation in which the people were happy to recognise 
themselves.123 Jouvenel contributed several articles to Ici France in which 
he criticised the popularity of revolutionary ideologies and defended the 
concept of order as the foundation of Western civilisation. All the talk of a 
‘Révolution permanente’ was nothing but ‘an inversion of aesthetic, moral 
and above all religious sense’. In line with these conservative ideas, Jouvenel 
also worried about the intellectual development of French youth, for the 
120 Walter, Paysan Militant, 222.
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f irst time not counting himself as part of it. In order to prevent young people 
from falling prey to cynical opportunism or ‘base Marxism’, intellectuals 
and teachers had an important role to play. But all too often these very 
intellectuals had themselves become recruiters in party service, which 
led Jouvenel to conclude that ‘M. Benda had not been wrong to denounce 
the “treason of the clercs”’. If there was a natural selection in the world of 
ideas, it worked not in the normal way but rather ‘virus-like’: ‘the newest 
ones often prove to be the most vigorous, and, as far as we are concerned, 
the most dangerous’.124
With their republican upper-bourgeois origins, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce 
lacked the conservative Catholic background that was the natural hotbed 
of French monarchism, but their post-war aff iliation with the Comte de 
Paris is not surprising if one takes a closer look at the political programme 
defended by Henri d’Orléans. First of all, Henri had shaken off the suf-
focating embrace of the Action Française while keeping certain corporatist 
ideas advocated by the right wing of the 1930s non-conformist movement. 
Claiming to oppose party struggle and the mutual hatred of left and right, 
his vision of monarchical restoration promised order, social peace and a 
certain degree of democracy. Like the two intellectuals and many other 
former collaborators, he was also a supporter of the European federalist 
movement. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce recognised their own political desires 
in the Comte de Paris’ promise that his royal ‘mystique’ – something the 
Fourth Republic entirely lacked – was the only way to reconcile France’s 
warring factions (republicans, socialists, Gaullists and former Pétainists) 
and unite them against the communist menace.125
Reinventing the Extreme Right
Ici France soon shipwrecked due to poor sales as well as competition from 
Aspects de la France, not only in its initials a reincarnation of L’Action Fran-
çaise. A few years later, the Comte de Paris entirely abandoned all royalist 
propaganda as a precondition for permission to return to France. This 
robbed Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel of only one out of many journalistic plat-
forms. Fabre-Luce also contributed to Aspects de la France – the newspaper 
124 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Le Contre Ordre’, Ici France (8 August 1947); idem, ‘Pour un Nouvel 
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that the young law student Jean-Marie Le Pen at the time was energetically 
hawking on the rue de la Sorbonne – but the two intellectuals’ main activi-
ties were for publications issued by the broader extreme right.126 Not that 
there was a big difference between the two. Despite its moderate tone, 
Ici France overlapped with other extreme-right periodicals in its themes 
– anti-communism, attacks on the Épuration, praise for Francoist Spain 
and other authoritarian regimes – and at least partially in its personnel. 
In France as well as in exile, monarchists, Pétainists, former collaborators, 
fascists and anti-republican Catholics were quick to reorganise themselves 
after 1944. Their very real political differences were largely sublimated by 
their shared troubles with the Épuration, their position as outcasts in the 
post-war order, and their rejection of the Fourth Republic and its ‘system’. 
Grouped together under the epithet ‘opposition nationale’, this community 
revolved around several ‘study centres’ bearing very general names in order 
not to arouse suspicion. To avoid covert censorship like being cut off from 
the paper supply, their press often started as members-only bulletins before 
becoming regular periodicals in 1946 or 1947. Contributors used multiple 
pseudonyms and had to resort to side activities to make ends meet.127
The most successful extreme-right press initiative in the late 1940s, Les 
Écrits de Paris, published contributions from both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel. 
Founded in 1946 as Questions Actuelles, the internal bulletin for members 
of the ‘Centre d’Études des Questions Actuelles, Politiques, Économiques 
et Sociales’ and initially camouflaging itself as a monthly of the moderate 
right, its true political colour had already begun to show before it trans-
formed into a regular periodical at the beginning of 1947. Chief editor René 
Malliavin oriented the journal along two main lines: the struggle against 
the ‘lynch law’ of the Épuration and the defence – close to veneration in 
practice – of Marshal Pétain and the Vichy regime. After Pétain’s death in 
1951, the Écrits continued to dedicate commemorative articles to him, often 
written by Jacques Isorni, the lawyer who had eloquently defended him 
at his trial. Many contributors were old (Pierre Dominique, Émile Roche, 
Jean Montigny, Maurice Martin du Gard) or new (Pierre Boutang, Henri 
Massis, René Gillouin, François Le Grix) acquaintances of Fabre-Luce and 
Jouvenel. The f iercely anti-Semitic Xavier Vallat, who had headed Vichy’s 
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General Commissariat for Jewish Questions, also contributed articles to the 
periodical. Under Malliavin’s leadership, the Écrits de Paris soon grew from 
a circulation of 4,000 to about 30,000 copies, making it by far the largest 
extreme-right press initiative of the late 1940s.128
From the beginning, its editors held Fabre-Luce in high esteem for his 
outspoken attacks against the Épuration. In December 1946, Questions 
Actuelles paid tribute to him as the ‘psychoanalyst of the Resistance’ for 
his dissecting analysis of the Resistance mentality in Hors d’Atteinte. In this 
book, Fabre-Luce interpreted the ‘hysteria’ of the Épuration and the Gaullist 
Resistance myth – ‘“I am big and strong, I have never been beaten, I liberated 
myself”’ – as symptoms of ‘overcompensation’ for a reality that was much 
less glorious and of which even the noisiest ‘résistantialiste’ was secretly 
aware: France had lost the war in record time in 1940, after which it had 
been ‘successively occupied by all the belligerents’, and all the Resistance 
had done was to make things worse by creating a vicious circle of mutual 
bloodshed. Pretending to put France on the Freudian sofa, Fabre-Luce 
concluded that the nation was not very different from the girl suffering from 
erotic dreams who punished herself with neuralgia. Similarly, France was 
‘secretly in love with Nazism’, and it punished itself for these ‘bad thoughts’ 
through political paralysis and food deprivation.129
Similarly, Fabre-Luce saw the Épuration as essentially a ‘biological 
struggle. It’s about sterilizing the opponent, through prison or ostracism, 
for the period of his life during which he can act and enrich himself with 
experience. They try to prematurely ossify him.’130 He was furious against 
left-wing intellectuals who approved of the Épuration, especially Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, whom he felt had blood on her hands for 
refusing to sign Brasillach’s clemency request because she claimed he had 
during his trial ‘conquered her respect’. By honourably recognising Brasil-
lach as an existentialist free to undergo the ultimate consequences of his 
choices, Beauvoir had proven the ‘inhumane rigidity’ of her principles. 
While Camus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty also initially defended harsh 
justice against collaborators and violence ‘in the name of the proletariat’, 
they had at least been willing to admit their mistakes, whilst Sartre and 
Beauvoir never had such scruples. For Fabre-Luce, Sartre symbolised the 
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‘résistantialiste’ whose own Resistance credentials were ‘very questionable’. 
‘During the Épuration, Jean-Paul Sartre published a defence of the Jews 
that would have been admirable during the occupation. But, at the same 
moment, he pinned the yellow star on other chests, the ones of the indignes 
nationaux, who were the Jews of the moment’.131
Starting from early 1948, Fabre-Luce soon became one of the most 
authoritative voices expressing themselves in the Écrits de Paris, publish-
ing an impressive 26 articles between 1948 and 1954. He published travel 
impressions, excerpts from his new books and commentary on foreign 
policy132 but also a criticism of the Fourth Republic dubbed ‘the reign of 
chaos’. While the biggest merit of Vichy had been to keep the country safe 
from ‘Polandisation’ (the famous idea that Hitler would have treated France 
in the same way as Poland if it hadn’t been for Vichy) and with an intact 
elite able to rebuild the country, the post-war situation came down to a 
carnivalesque travesty of values and hierarchies that had devastated France. 
Fabre-Luce held the republican regime responsible for lowering the nation’s 
gold reserves, rising inflation, sinking living standards for the ‘honnêtes 
gens’ (while all kinds of crooks could freely enrich themselves), the fall in 
productivity, the weakening of the army and foreign exploitation of French 
diplomacy. Since no one still believed in the regime, its collapse was only a 
matter of time. The communists had secured important positions within 
the regime ‘in preparation of the next war’, while the Gaullists were actively 
working to make the chaos worse, hoping that a f inal crisis would bring 
their icon to power.133
Apart from printing Fabre-Luce’s frequent articles, the Écrits de Paris 
also prominently announced his upcoming lectures and books.134 This 
was scant consolation for the near-complete silence of the mainstream 
press, which not only rarely reviewed his books but also often refused to 
publish paid advertisements for them. In reaction to one such refusal from 
Le Figaro, Fabre-Luce sent a personal letter to a number of readers of the 
newspaper, objecting to ‘a systematic operation of suppression’ against 
his work. At least one reader agreed, replying to Fabre-Luce that Le Figaro 
131 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 264, 267.
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was indeed unequalled in its ‘cowardliness and spinelessness’.135 This letter 
was yet another episode in a long-running feud between Fabre-Luce and 
the newspaper and especially its long-time chief editor Pierre Brisson. 
After supporting (and accepting subsidies from) Vichy between 1940 and 
1942, Le Figaro had ceased publication when the Germans occupied the 
southern zone. Fabre-Luce was outraged that after 1944, Brisson hypocriti-
cally tried to ‘buy an antedated “resistance” certif icate’ by attacking other 
Pétainists, including Fabre-Luce himself.136 When l’Humanité reminded 
Brisson of his former Pétainism, the editor, rather than standing by these 
positions, humbly acknowledged his own lack of ‘perspicacity’. Fabre-Luce 
furiously concluded that Brisson’s fabricated ‘super-Gaullism’ was nothing 
but ‘insurance’ against his own past: ‘He went to the “Resistance” just like 
Maurice Chevalier went to the communists, and he has been rewarded for 
that – because, as everyone knows, the “collaborator” is not the man who 
approved of Montoire or sang for the Germans, but whoever subscribed 
neither with Gaulle, nor with Thorez.’137
Fabre-Luce was angry enough to resort to menace. In 1953, in response 
to an article by Dominique Auclères in Le Figaro accusing him of being a 
member of a ‘fascist international’, Fabre-Luce demanded that his reply be 
published unabridged, threatening legal action if the newspaper failed to do 
so. When the publication of his letter (together with a reaction by Auclères) 
failed to satisfy him, he wrote another reply, personally addressing himself 
to Brisson: ‘For as far as my opinions are concerned, I do not recognise 
you any right to judge them. You have too much forgotten your support of 
Marshal Pétain to conserve its merit, and I only accept resistance lessons 
from the journalists I met in the Gestapo prisons.’ Demanding once more 
the full publication of these words, Fabre-Luce concluded with a threatening 
postscript: ‘If you desire to continue this controversy about the past – which 
I have not aroused – I am at your disposal, with a very complete record.’138 
In 1955, after he discovered that even the Swiss press was uninterested in 
his recent Histoire de la Révolution Européenne, a furious Fabre-Luce wrote 
Jouvenel asking him to signal his book to the Gazette de Lausanne: ‘That 
the work of several years […] is not even noticed by the French big press 
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(with one exception) does not need to surprise us. That is the way things 
are. But if Switzerland also participates in this conspiracy of silence, what 
hope do we still have?’139
Fabre-Luce did not share the uncritical veneration of Pétain that is 
present in the articles of Isorni and several other contributors of the Écrits 
de Paris. In his eyes and at least retrospectively, the Marshal had, despite 
his ‘good intentions’, made a mistake by staying in Vichy after November 
1942, and many of his later decisions were also questionable.140 But this did 
not stop Fabre-Luce from making his occasional contribution to the Pétain 
cult. When the Marshal died, Fabre-Luce was ‘by coincidence’ just spending 
a holiday weekend at the Île d’Yeu, the isle off the Vendée coast where 
the Marshal had been imprisoned since 1945. He watched the arrival of 
Pétainists, First World War veterans and a few off icials of the state and the 
Catholic Church, all emerging from the same small ferry that linked the 
island to the mainland. He met Pétain’s widow and attended the funeral 
service at the Yeu Marine cemetery. In a special mourning edition of the 
Écrits de Paris, Fabre-Luce reported from Yeu with an homage to ‘the man 
whom, in our times, the French have loved the most’. He expressed the hope 
that his inconsiderable grave, ‘amidst drowned sailors, crashed English 
pilots and German occupiers who died of neurasthenia’, would be only 
temporary, in preparation for his glorious reburial at the Douaumont Os-
suary near Verdun.141
Jouvenel started publishing in the Écrits de Paris in early 1947, one year 
before Fabre-Luce. During his two-and-a-half-year involvement with the 
review and in line with his general post-war attitude, he stuck to his careful 
avoidance of political provocation, mainly addressing economic topics or 
political ideas and treating these subjects in an analytical, distinguished 
style. Nevertheless, the concrete political dimension of his contributions is 
evident. In November 1947, Jouvenel favourably contrasted the ‘happy impo-
tence’ of royal power during the ancien régime – held at bay by traditional 
beliefs and feelings of responsibility – to the ‘arbitrary despotism’ of popular 
sovereignty. In April of the same year, he stated that the British Labour 
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Jouvenel cited the book in one of his own articles in the Gazette de Lausanne.
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M. Schlumberger Commente le Procès Pétain’, Écrits de Paris (January 1950), 94; idem, Journal 
1951, 307, 390.
141 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘À l’Île d’Yeu’, Écrits de Paris (July 1951), 35, 38; idem, Vingt-Cinq Années 
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government’s interventionist economic policy was inevitably leading the 
country towards Soviet authoritarianism.142
Jouvenel also contributed to La France Catholique, a right-wing weekly 
linked to the Action Catholique (the successor to Édouard de Castelnau’s 
Fédération Nationale Catholique from the interwar years) that catered to 
conservatives, monarchists and many former or unrepentant Pétainists. 
Its chief editor, Jean de Fabrègues, was a 1930s ‘non-conformist’ and former 
supporter of the AF, PPF and Vichy whom Jouvenel knew from La Lutte des 
Jeunes and their joint activities for Doriot. Although he may have published 
in La France Catholique before, Jouvenel’s contributions only started to 
become a regular feature in early 1950 when Fabrègues offered him 3,000 
francs per article.143 Their correspondence shows a mutual admiration and the 
conviction of f ighting for a common cause but also frequent clashes about 
the general line of the weekly, especially regarding the wars of decolonisa-
tion. In early 1952, after discovering that a sentence had been deleted from 
one of his articles, Jouvenel angrily complained about the periodical’s utterly 
un-Christian ‘right-wing howling’ and announced he saw no choice but to 
cease his collaboration, even if that meant a ‘f inancial sacrif ice’ for him.144 
Jouvenel’s contributions did not cease, however, and in September 1952, 
his criticism of French policy in Tunisia led to him receiving angry letters 
from readers. More clashes followed in 1955 and one year later, Fabrègues’ 
refusal to publish an article in which Jouvenel expressed his shock about 
the French bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakhiet Sidi Youssef led to a 
lasting break between the two.145
Jouvenel was in touch with other Vichy nostalgics, united in the As-
sociation des Représentants du Peuple de la Troisième République (ARPTR). 
Camouflaging as a generic association of Third Republic politicians and led 
by Catholic priest and former MP Jean-Marie Desgranges, the ARPTR in fact 
represented those who had been declared ineligible to run for political office 
due to their vote in favour of full powers for Pétain in 1940. The organisation’s 
main objectives were to campaign against the ‘illegal’ ineligibility law and 
142 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘L’“Heureuse Impuissance” du Pouvoir Royal et l’Arbitraire de la 
Volonté Populaire’, Écrits de Paris (November 1947), 13, 23; idem, ‘Diriger le Flux des Revenus’, 
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144 Jouvenel to Fabrègues (undated, 1952). See also Fabrègues to Jouvenel (25 September 1950); 
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against the system of the Fourth Republic, plead for a general amnesty and 
an end to the Épuration, f ight communism and defend the heritage of Vichy 
by stressing the legal continuity between the Third Republic and Pétain’s 
regime. The ARPTR published a journal, sought and received the support 
of French and foreign politicians and organised a petition to the United 
Nations.146 Desgranges, who had himself been exempted from ineligibility 
because of his Resistance activities, also authored a book about the ‘Hidden 
Crimes of Résistantialisme’. This concept, originally coined by Malliavin, 
conveniently created a distance between the actual wartime Resistance and 
the ideology that exploited its heritage after the liberation. In the eyes of 
Desgranges and many other extreme-rightists, while the Resistance had its 
merits, résistantialisme was a base ideology of hatred and persecution that 
was the driving force behind the Épuration, mainly adhered to by people 
with fairly limited or no real Resistance credentials. A recurrent theme in 
the ARPTR campaigns was to describe Vichy and the Resistance as two 
equally honourable reactions to the defeat, with both sides counting a few 
criminal individuals amongst them.147
The highlight in the existence of the ARPTR was the ‘Banquêt des Mille’ 
that it organised in March 1948. This massive ‘banquet of a thousand ineligi-
bles’, marking the centenary of the 1848 revolution, featured speeches by a 
dozen prominent ineligible politicians, including former Third Republic and 
Vichy minister Pierre-Étienne Flandin. In his speech, included in an off icial 
ARPTR brochure among Jouvenel’s papers, Flandin positively contrasted 
the patriotism and unity of the Third Republic with the ‘present disorder’ 
of the Fourth, while stating that the liberation had only exchanged Hitler’s 
imperialism for Stalin’s. Unless a strong European federation quickly took 
hold and received American support, Flandin concluded, ‘mankind’s only 
choice is between the totalitarian mill and death!’ The banquet ended with 
a short speech by Desgranges, during which he requested a minute of silence 
for ‘the thousands of innocent’ who were still in prison. In terms befitting 
a defender of the Third Republic, he called them ‘the new Dreyfuses’ and 
compared their sort to that of the Jews during the War: ‘Remember that the 
people of Paris have eased the ignominy of the yellow star by paying the 
highest respect to those who were forced to wear it.’148
146 Côtillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 172; Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 106.
147 Côtillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 172, 174. Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 103. See also Michel 
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Jouvenel’s own ideas were politically close to the ARPTR, especially 
when it came to denying the legitimacy of the post-war order by describing 
Vichy and the Resistance as equally honourable, or collaboration and the 
Épuration as equally reprehensible reactions to the course of events. In 
1946, he characterised the Fourth Republic as essentially a system of lies 
of opportunism: in a ‘society bereft of foresight or principles’, people were 
mainly occupied with proving that they had been ‘neither a collaborator, 
nor munichois, nor anti-communist’ just like they had asserted in 1940 that 
they were ‘neither Jewish, nor freemason, and that they had never been a 
warmonger’. Continuing this comparison, Jouvenel stated that under the 
tripartite coalition of PCF, SFIO and MRP, people had cowardly accustomed 
themselves to the illusion of ‘a quasi-communism that would not be com-
munist, just like they did under Vichy with a quasi-fascism that would not 
be fascist’.149 In a letter to Rudolph Binion in 1954, he described the Épuration 
and the collaboration as ‘two periods of autocracy and madness’.150
Olivier Dard, Jouvenel’s biographer, seems a bit too eager to justify Jou-
venel’s contributions to the Écrits de Paris by pointing to his ‘marginalisation’ 
in the mainstream press, downplaying the importance of Jouvenel’s ideo-
logical proximity to the post-war extreme-right.151 Nonetheless, Fabre-Luce’s 
position in these circles was more prominent than Jouvenel’s. Fabre-Luce’s 
journalistic productivity, his outspokenness and his position as a ‘victim’ of 
the Épuration earned him the admiration of many members of the extreme 
right, who often asked for his help. The Belgian fascist journalist Robert 
Poulet, an acquaintance of Fabre-Luce from the 1930s who was arrested after 
the liberation and put in prison awaiting an execution that was ultimately 
not carried out, was forever beholden to Fabre-Luce for enabling him to 
publish an excerpt from his prison memoirs in the French press. In several 
long letters, he expressed his gratitude to Fabre-Luce and emphasised how 
important he had become for him and his fellow prisoners:
Should I repeat to you how strongly, inside this hell and around it, we 
admire you, love you? We thought that your career would be that of a 
superior but cerebral and aloof writer. For f ive or six years, your books, 
and the man who appears through it, have found the hearts of countless 
readers. Something has magnif icently grown in your person, in your 
heart, in your destiny. If one looks for the origin of this change, one f inds 
149 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Le Prétendant’ (26 July 1946), in idem, Les Passions en Marche, 193, 195.
150 Jouvenel to Rudolph Binion (August/September 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (294).
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this: you have been courageous at the moment when all your colleagues 
were cowardly. You alone have not stepped back from certain truths.152
Fabre-Luce’s prominence was also recognised outside this milieu. In 1955, 
Jean Paulhan named three men who were important for the resurgence of 
the extreme right since the Liberation: Pierre Boutang, Maurice Bardèche 
and Fabre-Luce.153
Fabre-Luce received a letter, addressed ‘from the French border’, from 
Pierre Clementi, a French fascist who had founded a tiny fascist fringe party 
in 1934 that became one of the supporting pillars of the LVF during the war. 
Having fought on the eastern front in 1942-1943, Clementi chose to go into 
hiding in Italy and Germany when the war was over to escape the death 
penalty. Clementi expressed his admiration for Fabre-Luce’s work and asked 
him for a copy of Au Nom des Silencieux and other books published through 
the Cheval Ailé. Through Clementi’s tips about the Italian press, Fabre-Luce 
seems to have come into contact with the famous Italian journalist Indro 
Montanelli, who discussed his books in an article published in Oggi. In a 
cordial but distant letter, Montanelli expressed his interest in a meeting ‘be-
tween Europeans united not by similar ideas, but by a similar “civilisation”’.154
Fabre-Luce’s apogee as an extreme-rightist journalist and political writer 
came during the early 1950s with the foundation of the weekly Rivarol. Named 
after the anti-revolutionary writer Antoine de Rivarol (1753-1801) who had in 
his days criticised the Reign of Terror, Rivarol was launched on the initiative 
of René Malliavin together with Fabre-Luce, Thérive, Blondin, Dominique, 
Boutang and many other members of the Écrits de Paris team. Under the 
chief-editorship of former Vichy youth secretary Maurice Gaït, Rivarol soon 
grew to a circulation of 45,000, making it the French extreme right’s most 
successful and most influential weekly. This success was due to the quality of 
its contributors, its effective use of derision and provocation, and its extremist 
political positions. While the Écrits de Paris often defended the heritage of 
Pétain and Vichy and the supposedly good intentions of those who served 
them, Rivarol did not eschew associating itself outright with collaboration, 
Nazism and anti-Semitism, including regular flickers of Holocaust denial.155 
Adhering to a variant of Europeanism that f igured prominently in the 
152 Robert Poulet to Fabre-Luce (24 March 1947), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
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programme of early-post-war neo-Fascism – during the 1950s it adopted the 
subtitle ‘Hebdomadaire de l’Opposition Nationale et Européenne’ – Rivarol 
was also quick to establish connections with like-minded movements and 
reviews in other countries, primarily in Italy and Germany.156
Fabre-Luce wrote the front-page article for the f irst issue of Rivarol, in 
which he struck a conciliatory tone between supporters of Pétain and De 
Gaulle. Denouncing the Épuration as a machination of the Left to play 
out the Right against itself in a useless ‘civil war’, he called for an end to 
‘yesterday’s quarrels’ and a united front of all nationally minded Frenchmen. 
This meant putting an end to the persecution of collaborators, opening all 
‘political prisons’ and the ‘elimination of the f ifth column in the whole 
of Western Europe’. He deemed all these measures necessary to save the 
country from a communist coup and to protect Western Europe from an at-
tack from the East.157 The risk of France falling prey to a Soviet takeover from 
the inside or outside was a recurrent theme in Fabre-Luce’s contributions 
to Rivarol. He repeatedly pointed out that the country had been inf iltrated 
by Stalin’s future collaborators – sometimes quoting Léon Blum’s dismissal 
of the PCF as essentially a ‘foreign nationalist party’ – and how quickly it 
could become a Soviet ‘satellite’. While Jacques Duclos or Maurice Thorez 
were ready to be France’s next Laval, even the non-communist press was 
already anticipating its ‘gleichschaltung’.158
Fabre-Luce’s contributions to Rivarol ceased after three months, probably 
due to conflicts between him and the neo-fascist hardliners among the edi-
tors. When Le Figaro linked him in 1953 via Rivarol to a ‘fascist international’ 
consisting, amongst others, of Europa Nazione (Italy) and Nation Europa 
(Germany), he was quick to stress that he had ‘withdrawn’ from Rivarol 
and had only published one article in Nation Europa.159 A friend (possibly 
Gaït) reacted angrily to this statement, after which Fabre-Luce wrote him 
back to explain what had made him leave:
You will surely remember my remarks about the anti-Semitic articles, 
a certain obsession with the past, the systematic praise for any fascist 
156 Mammone, ‘Revitalizing and De-Territorializing Fascism in the 1950s’, 306.
157 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Les Maux dont Souffre l’Europe s’Appellent Peur et Neurasthénie’, 
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regime, even when the leader rules against good reason (example: Peron). 
[…] Such a pity that Rivarol often combines good insights and legitimate 
protests with outrages that to me appear as hardly tenable.160
As much as this sounds like a clean ideological break, Fabre-Luce returned 
to lead Rivarol at the end of 1954. When Gaït gave up his chief-editorship 
to pursue a teaching career, Malliavin asked Fabre-Luce to take over as 
head of the weekly. In his memoirs, Fabre-Luce – remaining silent about 
his initial contributions in 1951 – claimed that he mainly joined Rivarol 
because no other newspaper allowed him to express his opinions with 
the same freedom. Though he ‘disliked the tone’ of Rivarol and tried to 
‘introduce more nuance’, he soon discovered that his real influence was 
limited. Editors told him that this was a suicide strategy since readers only 
wanted to see their pre-established opinions confirmed. ‘It was a no-win 
situation. Once more, I was going to look like a fascist to the liberals, like a 
liberal to the fascists.’161 Still, Fabre-Luce was to lead Rivarol for a full year. He 
later claimed that his friendship with Dominique, Poulet and Jean Madiran 
kept him at the weekly, as well as his fascination for Malliavin:
a strange, slightly diabolic man. […] One day, he told me the depths of 
his thought. According to him, history was made by the groups of people 
who were determined to persevere in their being. This general view led 
him to admire authoritarian regimes, to feel a certain indulgence for 
racism (including Israel’s), to f iercely oppose anything that could lead 
to the weakening of our traditions and the disappearance of our elites.162
He also felt that the Rivarol ‘fanatics’ had their purpose: ‘Their narrow-
mindedness was often paired with much loyalty and selflessness. Amongst 
them, I sensed a reserve of strength that could be of use to France in days 
of trouble.’163
It is probable that in retrospect Fabre-Luce overemphasised the distance 
between himself and the other editors of Rivarol. While his subtler intellec-
tualism clashed with the weekly’s propensity for extremist provocation and 
his positions were indeed more nuanced than those of authors like Rebatet 
and Madiran, Fabre-Luce f itted within the range of positions adopted by 
160 Fabre-Luce to Maurice Gaït (?) (date unknown, 1953?), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
161 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté III, 199, 201.
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periodicals like Rivarol and the Écrits de Paris. The ‘opposition nationale’ 
was a loose coalition of royalists, collaborators, neo-fascists, authoritarian 
Catholics, Pétainists and conservatives who were often more united by what 
they were against (the Fourth Republic, De Gaulle, Marxism) than by what 
they were for. Of very different backgrounds but forged together by their 
common experience of exclusion and persecution in the period after the 
Liberation, they relied on a press that could only exist by including a variety 
of opinions and positions. This pluriformity is illustrated by readers’ differ-
ent reactions to Fabre-Luce’s return to Rivarol. The Swiss writer Aldo Dami, 
who had submitted articles to Rivarol before but had fallen out of grace after 
criticising its ‘outdated fascism’, congratulated Fabre-Luce and hoped that 
he would ‘kick out a few extremists’.164 Fabre-Luce’s papers include a copy of 
a letter to Malliavin in which a reader from Rouen complained about the 
chief editor. Claiming to speak for ‘a certain number of your readers’, he 
called upon the board of editors to more clearly distance themselves from 
Fabre-Luce’s ‘multiple theses’.165
Despite Fabre-Luce apparent distaste for Rivarol’s anti-Semitism, his own 
contributions were not entirely devoid of anti-Semitic references. Especially 
in a commentary on Pierre Mendès-France, who was prime minister from 
June 1954 to February 1955, Fabre-Luce alluded to his Jewish identity as 
well as the high numbers of Jews in his ‘brain trust’ of young functionaries 
and politicians. Quasi-innocently, he also mentioned the glass of milk that 
Mendès drank at a reception in Washington.166 Mendès-France’s Jewish 
background as well as his role in the decolonisation of Indochina, Tunisia 
and Morocco made him one of the extreme right’s favourite hate objects. 
Despite being a member of the Radical Party, not a socialist, Mendès 
was often paired with Léon Blum, that other Jewish prime minister and 
favourite target of the anti-Semitic right. When as part of a government 
campaign against alcoholism, Mendès-France drank a glass of milk during 
a high-profile reception in Washington, Pierre Poujade lashed out at him 
as a dangerous foreigner without ‘one drop of Gallic blood in your veins’ 
who was ruining the country’s wine and champagne producers.167 In his 
memoirs, Fabre-Luce caricaturised Mendès as a nervous Jew who ‘only felt 
secure inside his little ghetto’ of Jewish counsellors. In a resurgence of his 
anti-Semitism from the war years, Fabre-Luce took Mendès’ leadership as an 
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occasion to blame the outbursts of anti-Semitism on the Jews themselves. As 
in his wartime diatribe about ‘Léon Blum and the Jewification of ministerial 
cabinets’, he reproached Mendès and his counsellors for not having under-
stood the capital lesson of the Popular Front, during which the ‘indiscreet 
invasion’ of the government by too many Jews had laid the foundations for 
the racial hatred that Hitler’s propaganda could all too easily tap.168
Fabre-Luce preferred Antoine Pinay to Mendès as prime minister, as he 
made clear in a book he published in 1953.169 Pinay, a conservative industrialist 
from the Rhône department, was a member of the Centre National des 
Indépendants et Paysans (CNIP), a loose coalition of right-wing politicians 
who identif ied neither with the MRP nor with Gaullism. In the political 
landscape of the Fourth Republic, the CNIP often held the key to govern-
mental majorities. Despite calling itself ‘moderate’, the CNIP displayed a 
relative openness towards ideas from the far right. Jacques Isorni, a promi-
nent extreme-rightist and a regular contributor to the Écrits de Paris and 
Rivarol, had been included in the party together with a few other Pétainist 
MPs. Seemingly out of nowhere, Pinay rose to prominence in the early 1950s 
to become minister for public works and subsequently prime minister in 
1952. After the fall of the Mendès-France government in February 1955, he 
became foreign minister under Edgar Faure. Pinay’s mass appeal was based 
on his unpretentious looks and manners. While cartoonists despaired over 
his near-complete lack of characteristics, many Frenchmen valued him 
as an everyman whose modesty was in every sense the opposite of the 
ambitions and personality cult of Gaullism and Stalinism.170 In November 
1953, Fabre-Luce declined a dinner invitation from Jouvenel because he 
had to go to Bordeaux ‘to deliver a eulogy of Pinay’.171 Jouvenel appreciated 
both Pinay and Mendès, whom he knew from his Notre Temps days and 
with whom he corresponded in the early 1950s. The former sent him a letter 
in which he expressed his admiration for ‘a Frenchman who, during cruel 
and diff icult circumstances, has voluntarily placed himself at the service 
of the country’.172
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Fabre-Luce and other members of the extreme right had additional 
reasons for appreciating Pinay. A right-wing senator during the late 1930s, 
Pinay had voted in favour of giving full powers to Pétain on 10 July 1940 and 
had subsequently sat on Vichy’s Conseil National. Ineligible as a result of his 
vote for Pétain, Pinay profited from the 1951 amnesty law to return to politics 
and stand for elected off ice. Although he had hardly been a prominent 
servant of Vichy, Pinay’s election as prime minister nevertheless marked an 
important step in the rehabilitation of Pétainists and Vichyites in post-war 
France. In addition, despite looking back on a decades-long uninterrupted 
political career, Pinay presented himself as an apolitical candidate, as a 
man who ostentatively ‘hated politics’ but ‘loved administration’ and for 
whom the categories of ‘left’ and ‘right’ had no meaning. Richard Vinen has 
remarked that this apolitical attitude could be interpreted in two possible 
ways: as a pragmatic distaste for ideology and a preference for concrete 
problem-solving, much like the attitude of the Parti Radical at the time, 
or as a revulsion against the political system as such. This latter variant 
came remarkably close to the opposition nationale’s attacks against ‘the 
system’ of the Fourth Republic and its supposedly all-permeating ideology 
of ‘résistantialisme’.173
Fabre-Luce repeatedly tried to interest his friend Jouvenel in writing 
for Rivarol, but it seems the latter maintained a certain distance towards 
the review.174 In March 1955, Fabre-Luce sent out a large survey around 
the question: ‘Can France get rid of the “system”? With what means?’. An 
announcement in Rivarol asked readers to give their opinion, while Fabre-
Luce sent letters asking for contributions to a number of prominent writers 
and journalists, including Jouvenel. In his letter to Jouvenel, he specif ied 
that by the word ‘system’ he meant the Fourth Republic characterised by ‘a 
parliamentary regime and a deep penetration of communism and progres-
sivism in the governmental and administrative machinery’. Describing 
Rivarol as the principal bulwark of the ‘opposition nationale against this 
system’, Fabre-Luce concluded: ‘a large number of citizens Frenchmen today 
recognise and sense the relevance of our criticism. Maybe even the hour of 
construction is close.’175 If Jouvenel agreed at all, he abstained from partici-
pating in the survey. The resulting publication in Rivarol was a cacophony 
of different views on France’s situation and the possibilities of gradual or 
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revolutionary change, both from readers and from the intellectuals who 
did take part (René Gillouin and Jacques Plassard, among others). In the 
conclusion, Fabre-Luce faced the diff icult task of f inding common ground 
between the desires of his conservative, monarchist and neo-fascist readers. 
Navigating carefully, he concluded:
We can have […] different views on the ideal regime that should be 
established in the future. That is legitimate and even desirable. Rivarol is 
not and must not be the device of any faction. No totalitarianisms against 
totalitarianism! But whatever our particular preferences […] we all want 
to defend our Western and Christian civilisation against materialism 
and against the law of the numbers. There is a combat, small or big, that 
needs to be fought every week.176
The many contributions of Fabre-Luce to Rivarol ended abruptly in De-
cember 1955. In his published resignation letter to Malliavin, he explained 
that his main reason for quitting was his loss of faith in the possibility of 
‘constructive action’ in the near future. Having wrongly believed that men 
like Pinay and Faure would pursue a politics different from Mendès, in 
which France would retain its colonial empire and take the initiative for the 
military integration of Western Europe, Fabre-Luce admitted that he was 
arriving ‘at the end of the road that we could follow together’. Having lost 
all hope for improvement within the regime, he saw only two remaining 
possibilities: fundamental protest against the authorities, including ‘an 
appeal to a France of the past that might be resurrected in an indeterminate 
future’, or ‘retreating in the shadows’. While he saw Malliavin had chosen 
the former option, Fabre-Luce preferred the latter. He stated that France had 
become nothing but ‘a fortress under siege’, and he predicted the foresee-
able collapse of the European project, NATO, the Empire, the French franc 
and the Republic. Only after this deluge, Fabre-Luce thought, ‘in front of 
humiliation and a vital threat, old quarrels can become meaningless and 
many Frenchmen will be ready to surmount them together. I wish – without 
being certain – that these new chances will f ind us in agreement.’177
Fabre-Luce’s departure and the return of Gaït to the head of Rivarol 
marked a step in the periodical’s evolution to even more extremist positions 
and the burning of bridges towards the established political system. In the 
176 Fabre-Luce, ‘La France Peut-Elle se Débarasser du Système? Par quel Moyen?’, Rivarol (12 May 
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wake of Gaït’s return, collaborationist hardliners like Rebatet, Henri Lèbre 
and Guy Crouzet joined the Rivarol team. Although his observation fails to 
do justice to Fabre-Luce’s collaborationist attitude during the occupation, 
the historian Jérôme Cotillon considers his departure a key moment in ‘the 
marginalisation of Pétainists to the advantage of journalists who were much 
more marked by their collaborationist engagement’.178 To this day, Rivarol 
has specialised in revisionist views on the history of the Second World 
War. More straightforwardly, it is one of France’s principle channels for 
Holocaust denial and the glorif ication of fascism and collaboration. While 
its editors are regularly faced with f ines and legal condemnations, Rivarol 
has on several occasions lent its columns to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s statements 
about the Nazi occupation as ‘not particularly inhumane’ and about Pétain 
as a French patriot unjustly treated during the Épuration.179 Today, Rivarol 
owns the Écrits de Paris and considers it its intellectual ‘brother’.180
Europeanism, Federalism and the Reconfiguration of the 
Extreme Right
In his study of the extreme right in Europe after 1945, Pierre Milza professes 
to be surprised by the Europeanist discourse of French neo-fascists during 
the early post-war years. At a loss to explain this sudden upsurge of interna-
tionalism among movements ‘whose identity was founded on a particularly 
narrow and rigid conception of the national fact’, he came up with the 
‘internationalisation of the Waffen-SS’ during ‘the two f inal years of the 
war’ as the phenomenon’s sole historical antecedent.181 One does not need to 
have extensive knowledge of the Europeanist thought of fascist intellectuals 
in interwar France, their relations with foreign intellectuals, movements 
and regimes, the conflict potential between French fascists and traditional 
nationalists and the shift of pacif ism to the right during the late 1930s to 
establish the short-sightedness of this statement. Nevertheless, Milza did 
signal an important post-war trend. After 1944, Europeanism became a 
key feature of large segments of the extreme right in France, Italy, the UK 
and many other countries. Partially, this was due to the strategic need to 
178 Côtillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 125.
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make fascism attractive within a post-war context and especially to escape 
association with aggressive nationalism and war. It can also be seen as an 
attempt of the extreme right to adapt to a changing global environment in 
which decolonisation, the Cold War and Western European cooperation 
played an important role. For the French extreme right, Europeanism had 
the additional advantage of harking back to an element of its own ideology 
that long predated the Second World War.182
The several attempts at the establishment of a neo-fascist ‘International’ 
were but one manifestation of the Europeanism of the extreme right and 
largely the work of its most radical fringes. After a previous meeting in 
Rome, neo-fascists from various European countries came together in 
Malmö in 1951 for a conference hosted by the Swedish fascist Per Engdahl 
and with important contributions from Giorgio Almirante’s Movimento 
Sociale Italiano (MSI), which was for a long time post-war Europe’s most 
important extreme-right party (until the rise of the Front National). Par-
ticipants at the Malmö conference were inspired by ‘universalist’ ideas 
from Fascist Italy, Nazi Pan-European romanticism and the writings of 
Europeanist fascist intellectuals like Drieu, Brasillach and Julius Evola. 
Maurice Bardèche, Brasillach’s brother-in-law and political heir, headed 
the French delegation to the Malmö meeting, during which the European 
Social Movement was founded. This ‘Malmö International’, as it was soon 
called, inspired by the MSI but ideologically closest to Bardèche’s periodical 
Défense de l’Occident, off icially strove for a European ‘Empire’ with a central 
government, army and economic zone and without parliamentarianism 
and Russian or American influences.183
Jouvenel was entirely uninvolved with these initiatives, while Fabre-
Luce’s involvement – albeit hard to grasp due to fragmentary information 
– seems to have been limited to links via Rivarol and his single contribution 
to Nation Europa, the German review created in the wake of the Malmö 
congress. Nation Europa, like its short-lived Italian MSI cousin Europa 
Nazione, took its name from the ‘Europe-a-Nation’ campaign launched in 
1947 by Oswald Mosley. Founded in 1951 and edited by former SS Colonel 
Arthur Erhardt, Nation Europa became Germany’s foremost right-extremist 
press platform. During its f irst years it published articles from Hans Grimm 
and Karl-Heinz Priester, a prominent member of the Deutsche Reichspartei, 
alongside an important contingent of foreigners: Engdahl, Mosley, Bardèche, 
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Pierre Dominique and Fabre-Luce. In addition to its dream of a neo-fascist 
Europe with Africa as its colonial ‘Lebensraum’, Nation Europa campaigned 
for German rearmament and the rehabilitation of the Waffen-SS, considered 
a bare necessity in a future war against the ‘Soviet hordes’. Mosley frequently 
published in Nation Europa and provided it with f inancial aid during its 
f irst years.184 Fabre-Luce’s article, titled ‘Frankreich und Deutschland’, was 
published in mid-1951. During the early 1950s, the aforementioned Le Figaro 
article was not the only one to cite Fabre-Luce as a ‘sympathiser’ or even a 
member of the Malmö International.185
Fabre-Luce was in touch more directly with Mosley, whom he knew from 
their contacts during the 1930s, and they regularly met after Mosley’s move 
to Paris in 1953. In his book on Mosley’s post-war activities, the historian 
Graham Macklin even claims the English fascist had an affair with Fabre-
Luce’s wife.186 Fabre-Luce was also an attentive reader of Bardèche, and he 
approvingly cited his attack against the retroactive character of the Nurem-
berg trials in his revisionist pro-Nazi tract Nuremberg ou la Terre Promise. 
He criticised his younger colleague, though, for attempting to revive the 
‘Maurrassian tradition’ and for equating all kinds of internationalism with 
a Jewish conspiracy, ‘as if the old notion of national sovereignty weren’t 
obsolete in any case’.187 With his participation in the Malmö International, 
Fabre-Luce must have been happy to see Bardèche subsequently shake off 
this ‘outdated’ nationalism.
Unrelated to and arguably more important than these Eurofascist fringe 
groups was the connection between important segments of the French ex-
treme right and more mainstream Europeanist initiatives. Several authors 
have signalled the striking numbers of former Pétainists and collaboration-
ists who ended up as champions of post-war European unif ication.188 Both 
Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel were early supporters of the European project, 
which they saw as the logical continuation of their pre-war thought, made 
more urgent by the experience of the Second World War. Despite being in 
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no way an admirer of Winston Churchill, Fabre-Luce was thrilled by his 
speech in Zürich in September 1946 in which he called for a ‘United States 
of Europe’ based on Franco-German rapprochement and with the UK as its 
friendly neighbour. The man he otherwise described as the ‘gravedigger of 
capitalism and the British Empire’, whose dogmatic insistence on uncondi-
tional surrender had unnecessarily prolonged the war and facilitated Soviet 
expansion, who had not shrunk back from carpet-bombing Dresden and 
killing ‘135,000 civilians in one day’ and who was mendaciously denying 
his secret negotiations with Pétain and his own earlier statement that the 
armistice had been ‘useful’ to the Allies, was suddenly worthy of his praise.189 
Whereas the French government initially showed little enthusiasm for the 
proposal, Fabre-Luce dedicated a book responding to ‘Churchill’s project’.190
Agreeing with Churchill that there was no time to lose, Fabre-Luce saw 
ways to realise the United States of Europe within a short time. He imagined 
an initial campaign by a few great men in every country who would mobilise 
electoral mass support for the idea, after which it would depend on ‘techni-
cians’ to organise the transition process and to provide ‘the embryo of a 
common government’ with the right institutions. Fabre-Luce was happy to 
hear from Coudenhove-Kalergy, whom he met in Switzerland during the 
summer of 1946, that even De Gaulle was sympathetic to his Paneuropean 
Movement, which had associated itself with Churchill’s proposal.191 Fabre-
Luce dedicated a large part of his book to refuting various arguments against 
European union. To ‘the liberal objection’ he responded that ‘Europe will 
not be an autarky’; to ‘the communist objection’ that ‘Europe will be an 
intermediary between the Great Powers’; and to the ‘résistantialiste’ that 
‘Hitler did create Europe, but despite himself’. He saw Europe’s socialist 
and Christian democratic parties as the natural supporters of European 
integration. If these two ‘strongest political forces of the West’ joined hands, 
the inevitable opposition of communists and narrow-minded nationalists 
could be overcome. On his concluding pages, written in February 1947, 
Fabre-Luce noted that in the f ive months between Churchill’s speech and 
the publication of his book, the idea had gained momentum. The support of 
various groups and intellectuals, amongst whom were René Courtin, Arthur 
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Koestler and Raymond Aron, confirmed his hope that ‘United Europe will 
f inally – after two big defeats – be the victory of the men of our century.’192
Fabre-Luce specif ically cited the action of a group called La Fédéra-
tion, led by André Voisin and Alexandre Marc, as a hopeful sign that the 
European ideal was winning support.193 Since 1946 and at least until 1952, 
Jouvenel was an active member of this circle of European federalists, often 
contributing to its press and maintaining regular contact with its leaders. 
Its eponymous monthly only became a regular periodical at the beginning 
of 1947, after initially lacking government authorisation and appearing 
as the internal information bulletin of the associated ‘Centre d’Études 
Institutionelles pour l’Organisation de la Société Française’. La Fédération’s 
diff icult start and the very vague and general name of its associated ‘study 
centre’ may sound familiar to the attentive reader of this chapter. There were 
more commonalities between La Fédération and reviews like the Écrits de 
Paris, as many of its members belonged to the same group of right-extremist 
outcasts of the post-war order. André Voisin, whose real name was André 
Bourgeois, had been the personal secretary of the Comte de Paris, while 
many other members were Pétainists who had formerly belonged to the 
Action Française or the PSF: Jean de Fabrègues, Louis Salleron, Jacques 
Bassot, Daniel Halévy and even François Mitterand and Jouvenel’s PPF 
colleague Pierre Andreu. There was also an important component of 1930s 
‘non-conformists’ in La Fédération who, still inspired by Mounier’s ‘per-
sonalist’ philosophy, supported the idea of a federal and ‘communitarian’ 
Europe: Alexandre Marc, Denis de Rougemont, Robert Aron and Thierry 
Maulnier. La Fédération’s version of Europeanism was strongly inspired by 
corporatism and anti-parliamentarianism.194
Despite its modest membership f igures, La Fédération proved highly 
influential during the early post-war years. In addition to the intellectual 
qualities of some of its early members and its effective political lobbying 
work, it was successful in gradually attracting people less tainted by their 
past political activities, many of whom had been members of the Resist-
ance. La Fédération was also quick to build an international network of 
like-minded European federalists, which led to the foundation in December 
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1946 of a European Union of Federalists at its off ices in Paris. With the help 
of a joint agenda of anti-communism and the relatively vague principle 
of federalism, La Fédération even managed to draw contributions from 
neoliberal intellectuals like Raymond Aron and Wilhelm Röpke.195 Jouvenel 
participated in the organisation’s f irst International Congress of Federalists 
held in Montreux in August 1947. A draft of his speech demonstrated both 
his prominence in the movement and the degree to which he identified with 
its ‘communitarian’ ideology. Rejecting both the principle of nationalities 
and ‘the partisan spirit’, which led states to move from ‘the oppression 
of ethnic minorities’ to the ‘even more brutal oppression of ideological 
minorities’, Jouvenel celebrated federalism as ‘a return to the true notions 
of command’. According to Jouvenel, federalism meant ‘neither the enslave-
ment of man to political powers, which is tyranny, nor the enslavement 
of political powers to the human will, which is disorder, but the accord of 
these powers as docile servants of a same master, all of which are sanctif ied 
and humanised’.196
In October 1946, Jouvenel published his f irst article in La Fédération’s 
internal bulletin as ‘B. de J.’, in which he stated that in 1938 ‘the Sudeten 
question would have never arisen […] if Czechoslovakia had been a federal 
state’ assuring the Sudeten Germans the protection of their rights.197 A year 
later, this time using his full name, Jouvenel sceptically described European 
history not as a march towards union but as a fatal drifting apart of its 
peoples under the pressure of particularism, culminating in the post-war 
triumph of ‘national socialism’ in every country. If Europe’s present-day 
‘national socialist representative governments’ sincerely wanted to build 
Europe, they merely had to ‘undo what they have done’: relinquish their 
currency rights, denationalise their education systems and recognise the 
authority of a natural law transcending their own temporary interests.198
Jouvenel considered the human rights declaration of 1789 a suitable 
candidate for this transnational law system. A ‘European tribunal’ could 
protect Europe’s citizens against violations of this ‘superior law’ by ‘particu-
lar governments’. He rejected the idea of a European parliament, though, as 
an unrealistic and unnecessary imitation of the United States, whose history 
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had taken a fundamentally different course. Instead, Jouvenel hoped that 
‘a revulsion of public sentiment’ would put an end to ‘the prison regime’ 
of the nation-state.199 The historian Marco Duranti has established the 
importance of La Fédération for the post-war human rights revolution, and 
especially its successful lobbying for the creation of a supranational human 
rights court during the 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague. According 
to Duranti, the French extreme right had two reasons to play a key role 
in the establishment of a transnational European human rights regime: 
it correctly estimated that such a regime would create opportunities to 
undermine the entire legal system of the Épuration, and it saw the regime 
as a bulwark against the despised principle of parliamentary sovereignty. 
France’s ‘prison regime’ was indeed altered drastically as a result of these 
actions. At the turn of the 1950s, anticipating the risk of the European Court 
of Human Rights toppling indignité nationale as an illegal retroactive law, 
the French parliament was quick to adopt several amnesty laws.200
Fabre-Luce stressed that his abiding faith in Europe was the cornerstone 
of his thought, and he was not afraid to contrast it in very essentialist terms 
with the supposed omnipotence of money in America, the inhumane cruelty 
of Asia and Africa’s lack of civilisation.201 At the concrete political level, Fabre-
Luce jumped to action in defence of the European Defence Community 
(EDC) in the spring of 1954, when it became clear that the French parliament 
might reject it. Lacking a journalist platform, Fabre-Luce decided to send a 
series of eight long letters to ‘thousands’ of acquaintances and influential 
persons, including Jouvenel, whose personal archives contain a full collec-
tion. The EDC was a French suggestion, developed to make the controversial 
issue of West German rearmament, which the United States was insisting 
on, part of the foundation of a Pan-European army. Fabre-Luce considered it 
essential to ensure the security of Western Europe against Soviet aggression. 
In his third letter, he told his readers that in the long run, NATO forces would 
also be able to achieve victory against Russia without West German military 
participation, ‘but you won’t live to see that day, since you would have been 
f irst deported to a mine in Siberia where you would have died working’.202
In other letters, Fabre-Luce tried to address possible objections against 
the EDC while stressing its absolute necessity to prevent the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ 
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from taking their hands off the continent and Germany rearming on its 
own. A vote against the treaty could have far-reaching consequences: ‘By 
rejecting the treaty, you overthrow […] Dulles or Adenauer. Do you believe 
that their successors will be more favourable to our interests? I already 
see you run after them to propose sacrif ices that today you withhold from 
them, just like you gave to Hitler what you refused the Weimar Republic.’203 
When De Gaulle expressed his opposition to the EDC, thereby bringing 
about exactly the double communist-nationalist opposition to Europe that 
Fabre-Luce had anticipated in 1947, Fabre-Luce reacted furiously. After 
accusing the general of conspiring with the communists against the Fourth 
Republic and mocking his vanity and ‘circus-like’ public appearances, he 
took consolation in the certainty that even if the EDC were to fail, at least 
De Gaulle would never come to power. Although the communist danger 
remained strong, at least ‘we do not in any case have to fear a victory of the 
general’.204 Fabre-Luce’s f inal two letters were a last-ditch effort to convince 
the fifty MPs who were still in doubt about their vote, reminding them that a 
refusal to ratify the treaty meant the triumph of ‘France’s enemies, and those 
of the regime you represent’: the USSR, the communists, the ‘neo-Nazis’ 
and the ‘neo-Bonapartists of Gaullism’. A vote for the EDC was a vote to 
help France in its essential mission: ‘to defend, in close cooperation with 
its neighbours, her own territory and its African extensions’.205
Both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce initially imagined Africa as the colonial 
backyard of their project of European integration. In 1946 and in accordance 
with his geopolitical ideas of the early 1940s, Jouvenel explained the present-
day power of the United States and Russia as the result of their historical 
capacity to expand towards immense, sparsely populated territories in their 
West and East. This unchecked ‘centrifugal’ expansion, which he compared 
with the conquest of Mexico by Hernán Cortés, was the exact opposite 
of the behaviour of Europe’s Great Powers, who had engaged in endless 
attempts to expand ‘centripetally’ in the middle of Europe, always clashing 
with each other on ‘the eternal battlef ields of Flanders, Lombardy and the 
upper Danube’. Whilst the former kind of expansion harboured enormous 
gains, Europe’s had largely been a zero-sum game. Crediting England as 
the only European power to have suff iciently understood the importance 
of centrifugal expansion, Jouvenel stated that France would inevitably be 
reduced to the status of a ‘dwarf amidst giants, if she fails to do in the South 
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what the Russians have succeeded doing in the East and the Americans in 
the West’.206 Similarly, in a long article in 1952, Fabre-Luce called for the 
construction of ‘Eurafrica’ based on the joint European exploitation and 
industrialisation of the ‘almost virgin’ territories of French North Africa.207
While Fabre-Luce claimed this project was also in the interest of the 
North Africans, who would be given ‘the order, justice and prosperity 
satisfying their aspirations’ instead of ‘the toys of a verbal democracy and 
an ephemeral independence’, racism and feelings of Western superiority 
were manifestly present in his thought.208 In 1947, he mockingly discussed 
the ‘unease’ caused by the presence of ‘blacks’ in France’s parliament during 
a debate about the French Union. The behaviour of several overseas depu-
ties aroused the question: ‘is this assembly entirely French?’ A lady in the 
audience wondered if it were not better to ‘give them their independence, as 
long as they don’t bother us in our country’, but Fabre-Luce disagreed with 
her suggestion. ‘There are, despite everything, still indigènes who remain 
loyal and France has a mission to fulf il amongst them. But she could maybe 
give them a little more clothes and a little less “democracy”.’209
Jouvenel was the earliest of the two to realise that the empire could 
not be maintained. He was worried about the success of the Soviet Union 
in exploiting the colonised nations’ desire for independence and the in-
ability of Western countries to respond to this challenge. In private notes, 
he complained about the British sympathy for Sukarno and indignation 
against the Dutch, while he found the Netherlands to have accomplished 
‘a civilising work’ in Indonesia that was ‘materially important for the 
West’. In an article, he concluded that given the circumstances, the only 
reasonable foreign policy was to ‘gently engage these [colonial] peoples 
on the road towards liberty’. He even stated that France was better able to 
pursue such a policy than the British, since ‘we do not feel differences of 
colour’, whereas for the British ‘feelings of superiority’ made them less able 
to succeed in the ‘necessary fraternisation’.210 Although at the time Jouvenel 
still shared Fabre-Luce’s hope that North Africa could be preserved through 
the more eff icient exploitation and development of Africa as a part of the 
European project, he soon relinquished this hope. When Prime Minister 
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Mendès-France signed a Franco-Tunisian agreement granting autonomy to 
its former colony, Jouvenel congratulated him: ‘I persist in thinking that it 
is a duty of a Frenchman who cherishes his country’s honour, to get us out 
of an attitude that is contrary to our principles and our commitments, in 
which we appear as malevolent and unjust. This merit has been yours […]’211
In mid-1954, despite France’s crumbling empire; the persistent anti-
European opposition of communists, Gaullists and other nationalists; and 
the approaching failure of the EDC, which was eventually rejected by the 
French parliament, Fabre-Luce was confident about the success of Euro-
pean unif ication. Looking back upon the ten post-war years, he concluded 
that Europe’s different peoples had, ‘unbeknownst to themselves, made a 
revolution’. After a long period of destructive warfare and mutual hatred, 
the Cold War had given them the ‘sobering cold shower’ that made them 
‘wake up as brothers’. The heart of this united Europe should not consist of 
a European parliament, which Fabre-Luce – like Jouvenel – rejected as the 
‘sum of weaknesses’, but of ‘an open elite, nourished by the life-juice of the 
people, impregnated with the notion of service’. By embracing international 
parliamentarianism, Europe would turn its own ‘errors, because Hitler 
denounced them, into a counter-religion’, thereby ‘robbing itself of the ways 
to arrest its decadence’.212
In an interesting revival of his metaphors of love from the occupation 
years, Fabre-Luce stated that the prime ingredient of European unity was 
to be the ‘fusion’ or even the ‘marriage’ of France and Germany. In 1950, in 
a lecture in Hamburg that was subsequently published in the Zeitschrift 
für Geopolitik, he presented the same idea to a German audience. Citing 
Plutarch’s description of the mass wedding of 10,000 Greek-Persian couples 
following Alexander the Great’s conquest of Babylon, after which the ‘lives 
and customs of the different races melted together’, causing them to ‘forget 
their old feuds’, he called the European Coal and Steel Community the 
occasion for the same kind of ‘blending’. ‘One day, I hope, the unif ication 
of France and Germany will be celebrated in a symbolic feast reminiscent 
of the ceremony […] that the Great Alexander celebrated more than two 
thousand years ago.’213
During the ten years following the liberation, the French extreme right 
reinvented itself, emerging from a situation of near-complete discredit and 
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marginalisation. This resurrection, limited by its lasting organisational 
weakness, was based on a profound transformation of its ideology. The two 
traditional Maurrassian dogmas of aggressive nationalism and contempt 
for republican legality, which had also been dominant in many circles unas-
sociated with the Action Française, were largely discarded and replaced by 
something more fluid: an attachment to the legal framework of the Republic 
and a suspicious attitude towards national delusions of grandeur. Three 
elements were the driving force behind this transformation: the experience 
with persecution during the ‘civil war’ of 1944-1946, the defence of the legacy 
of Pétain and his supporters, and hostility to Gaullism.
As Vinen has remarked, during the Épuration, the legal system was often 
the only thing that stood ‘between right-wingers and political banishment, 
prison or the f iring squad’.214 With leftist militants calling for the harsh 
punishment of collaborators and for revolutionary action, the extreme 
right’s natural reflex was to focus its hope on the judges (most of whom 
had also served under Vichy) and on governmental authority to uphold a 
system of due process. The attacks on the Épuration were mainly aimed at 
demonstrating how it was a violation of republican legality.215 After 1947, 
the calls for amnesty, reconciliation and forgetting the ‘quarrels of the past’ 
were often paired with an appeal to human rights and international law, 
while republican diversity and the right to free speech were invoked to 
defend the fledgling extreme-right press against censorship measures.216 
In 1951, Fabre-Luce noted the obvious incompatibility of ‘the defence of 
human rights with the monopolisation of information, retroactive laws, 
exceptional jurisdiction, ineligibility because of crimes of opinion [délits 
d’opinion], etc.’217
As we have seen, Fabre-Luce played a leading role in defining his and his 
peers’ choice of Vichy (while obfuscating his own pro-German collabora-
tionism) by developing a ‘realist’ interpretation of France’s position during 
the war. With France having lost the war and political power having been 
legally transferred to Pétain, the armistice was honourable and necessary. 
While Pétain sacrificed his reputation and his aura of invincibility to protect 
French lives, De Gaulle, safe in his London exile, enjoyed the freedom to 
persist in his theoretically impeccable but practically impossible position of 
refusal and resistance. While the Resistance had merely caused bloodshed 
214 Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 105.
215 Fabre-Luce, Au Nom des Silencieux, 102; idem, Double Prison, 161.
216 Duranti, ‘The Holocaust’, 172; Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 242.
217 Fabre-Luce, Journal 1951, 171.
220 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
among Frenchmen, its military contribution to the liberation of the country 
had been marginal given that the country had been liberated by foreign 
powers. Though neither as outspoken nor as prominently published as 
Fabre-Luce’s, Jouvenel’s ideas were not far removed from this analysis. The 
same line of thought was continued into the post-war years, with both 
intellectuals often stressing the extent of France’s downfall. The country’s 
supposed weakness not only rendered it defenceless in the face of a Soviet 
attack, it also illustrated both the impossibility of De Gaulle’s politics of 
national grandeur and the urgent need for European integration.218 Fabre-
Luce and Maurice Bardèche depicted De Gaulle as vainglorious and cruel, 
willing to sacrif ice French lives and the future of the nation in order to 
pursue abstract notions of France and victory.219 In Fabre-Luce’s eyes, only 
European unif ication and NATO protection could save France from again 
falling prey to invasion and disintegration.
While the ‘opposition nationale’ found many allies in its campaign for 
the release of prisoners and the abrogation of the ineligibility law, espe-
cially after the break-up of the tripartite coalition in 1947, its own political 
organisations remained weak. Partially this is a distorted image, however, 
since the CNIP and other parties who were at the centre of political power 
showed considerable interest in the extreme right’s personnel and ideas.220 
This openness of the centre to the extreme right was due to the specif ically 
uneasy situation of governmental politics during the Fourth Republic, which 
was based on a fragile coalition of interests. Since 1947, governments had 
faced the double opposition of the communists and the Gaullists, who were 
both hostile to the system as such, which increased the need to do business 
with whoever was willing to work with them. Despite its revulsion against 
the republican system, the ‘opposition nationale’ still largely preferred it to 
the two main alternatives of communist revolution or personal rule by De 
Gaulle. While for the extreme right, the late 1940s were marked by survival 
and ideological innovation, the 1950s were to offer new perspectives for 
political success. Decolonisation, European integration, the Algerian War 
and the regime crisis brought opportunities that the extreme right did 
not fail to exploit. With Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s Europeanism and their 
‘realism’ reaching back all the way into the 1920s, they were extremely 
well-situated to contribute to this ideological transformation.
218 Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 62, 66; Jouvenel, Les Passions en Marche, 95.
219 Cited in Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 109.
220 Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 102.
5 Europeanism, Neoliberalism and the 
Cold War
On Private Life and Facial Hair
The private lives of our two protagonists have so far hardly been touched 
upon in this study. In order to explain some factors related to the post-war 
positions of Fabre-Luce and especially Jouvenel, it is necessary to consider 
them. Based on their post-war identity as, respectively, an outspoken and 
unrepentant extreme-rightist risking prison sentences under different 
regimes and a political scientist avoiding provocative statements while 
reading Thomas Hobbes in his Swiss village, one would expect Fabre-Luce’s 
private life to be unruly and Jouvenel’s to be that of a sedate family man. For 
a large part of their adult lives, the exact opposite seems to have been the 
case. While there is little information about his early years, in 1928 Fabre-
Luce married Charlotte de Faucingy-Lucinge, a princess from a prominent 
French noble family who was an appreciated guest in France’s interwar 
high society.1 Although the announcement of the wedding led notorious 
womaniser Drieu to write a ‘jealous’ letter of congratulations, Charlotte 
managed to escape Drieu’s charms and the marriage seems to have been 
both happy and fairly uneventful.2 Charlotte often accompanied Alfred 
on his travels, and they jointly published a book calling for the legalisation 
of contraception.3 The couple had two children, born in 1941 and 1942.
Jouvenel’s case was different. When he was sixteen years old, his father 
Henry’s second wife, the famous writer Colette, began a love affair with 
him. Soon after the affair started, she published Chéri, a book about a 
beautiful young boy being seduced by an older woman. This initiation 
into love by his 47-year-older stepmother, described by Jouvenel himself as 
a Flaubertian ‘sentimental education’, continued for f ive years. It did not 
1 For elegant pictures of ‘Madame Fabre-Luce’, see, for example, Vogue (November 1930), 53; 
Vogue (January 1935), 27.
2 Pierre Drieu la Rochelle to Fabre-Luce (spring 1928), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 6. Reluctantly, Daniel 
Garbe addresses the possibility that during the late 1930s Charlotte slept with Alexis Leger, the 
secretary general of the French foreign ministry (and successful poet under the pseudonym 
Saint-John Perse), who wanted to take revenge against Fabre-Luce for attacking him in an article. 
See Garbe, Alfred Fabre-Luce, 142.
3 Fabre-Luce, Pour une Politique Sexuelle. See also Charlotte Fabre-Luce, ‘L’Exemple Hol-
landais’ and Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Nous Proposons…’, Pamphlet (12 May 1933).
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fail to provoke a scandal, contributing to Henry’s divorce from Colette, and 
it only ended in 1925, when Jouvenel married Marcelle Prat, another writer 
who was seven years his senior.4 The marriage, which took place under 
considerable pressure from Jouvenel’s family who wanted to wrest him from 
Colette’s embrace, seems to have been an unhappy one, and Jouvenel had 
several affairs. The most serious of these was with the American writer and 
journalist Martha Gellhorn, whom he first met in Paris in 1930. Jouvenel and 
Gellhorn lived together in Paris, went on Swiss and Mediterranean holidays 
(where they once ran into Marcelle and her lover) and travelled across the 
United States in the ‘Lady Jane’, a platinum-coloured Dodge that they had 
bought for 25 dollars. Their marriage plans, mostly pursued by Jouvenel, 
were dashed by Marcelle’s refusal to agree to a divorce.5
In 1937, as a prominent member of the PPF, Jouvenel spoke at a protest 
meeting in defence of general Edmond Duseigneur, a First World War hero 
who had been arrested for his implication in the fascist terrorist Cagoule 
conspiracy. His eyes fell on the general’s daughter Hélène, who was sitting 
in the front row. The two soon fell in love and would spend the main part of 
the rest of their lives together. It was with Hélène and their baby daughter 
Anne (born in 1943) that Jouvenel settled down in Switzerland, and from 
1950 (with two more children) in Anserville in France.6 Jouvenel’s f irst years 
in exile were not only diff icult in material terms, they probably also marked 
a personal crisis. While he enjoyed the quiet family life with Hélène, his past 
political engagements and adventurous behaviour continued to haunt him. 
In his private diaries, he painfully reflected on the intellectual mistakes of 
his ‘generation’ and those of his friends (Luchaire, Drieu, Bergery), while 
linking them to his own irresponsibility. After meeting with ‘Madame E.’, 
Jouvenel criticised his own ‘puerile’ habits of seduction that he claimed 
he could not escape practicing ‘every time’ he was ‘alone with a woman’.7
The death of his f irst son Roland, born out of his union with Marcelle, 
probably further contributed to Jouvenel’s personal crisis. In May 1946, aged 
fourteen, the boy died of an unknown disease. While Jouvenel stayed in 
Switzerland, Emmanuel Berl visited Roland at his sickbed every day and 
4 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 54, 58; Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 22, 46.
5 Letters by Gellhorn to Jouvenel included in: Moorehead, ed., Selected Letters of Martha 
Gellhorn, 6, 14, 18, 29, 47. See also the surviving post-1945 correspondence between Jouvenel 
and Gellhorn included in Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (300).
6 Kestel, ‘L’Engagement de Bertrand de Jouvenel au PPF’, 106; Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 10.
7 Cited in Delbecque, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel ou le Libéral Désenchanté’, 296, 299; Dard, 
Bertrand de Jouvenel, 187, 196; Journal de travail, cahier 1 [2 August 1943], Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 
(37).
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informed Bertrand of his son’s situation. There is little information on the 
bond between Bertrand and his f irst-born son. A year after Roland’s death, 
he accused Marcelle in a letter to Berl of having estranged his son from him, 
which he considered the main reason why he had not been a responsible 
father. Marcelle had given Roland ‘instructions to talk about her’ when 
they met and demanded that she always be present at their meetings: ‘it 
wasn’t me who charged him with a burden too heavy for a child, it was 
her.’8 Jouvenel’s bitterness may have been inspired by his frustration with 
Marcelle, who, still refusing to divorce, was causing serious problems for 
Jouvenel and his new ‘illicit’ family. In a series of letters to Berl, all written in 
the last months of 1947, Jouvenel elaborated on the problems with his wife. 
Optimistic at f irst, he told Berl that he felt more tenderness for Marcelle than 
ever before, ‘as I wake up from the buzzing thoughtlessness of my youth’. He 
just wished that she would agree to end the ‘legal f iction’ of their marriage, 
for the sake of his children and their good relationship. ‘Anne grows and 
develops an intelligence that is reminiscent of her grandmother: soon she 
will ask why her mother doesn’t have the same name as her father’.9
Since Berl was in touch with Marcelle, Jouvenel hoped that he would 
talk to her on his behalf. While Berl was reluctant to become involved 
in the connubial conflict, Jouvenel grew increasingly exasperated with 
Marcelle’s refusal to even answer his letters. When Jouvenel visited the 
United States and found out that his wife had followed him there, he wrote 
to Berl that he was fed up with the situation. Marcelle was free to travel 
wherever she pleased but should stop doing so as ‘Miss Jouvenel’. As late 
as 1952, when preparing for a stay in the United States and wanting to take 
his family with him, Jouvenel worried about possible problems due to his 
marital status. He asked Gellhorn for advice, who warned him that due to 
the ‘protestant puritanism’ predominant in American society he would be 
considered living ‘in sin’.10 Just two months after Roland’s death, Hélène gave 
birth to a healthy son, Hugues. The contrast between the two events was 
almost unbearable to Jouvenel, who noted in his diary: ‘between Hélène’s 
success and Marcelle’s total failure there is a disproportion that haunts me’.11 
8 Jouvenel to Emmanuel Berl (undated, late 1947), Fonds Emmanuel Berl, BNF, NAF 28216 
(28); Morlino, Émmanuel Berl, 359.
9 Jouvenel to Emmanuel Berl (9 November 1947); Jouvenel to Berl (undated, November/
December 1947), Fonds Émmanuel Berl.
10 Jouvenel to Emmanuel Berl (undated, November/December 1947), Fonds Émmanuel Berl; 
Martha Gellhorn to Jouvenel (1952), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (300).
11 Cited in Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 202; Jouvenel to Wilhelm Röpke (undated, July 1946), 
Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
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Roland’s death had a different effect on Marcelle, who became interested 
in communicating with her deceased child and started to experiment with 
automatic writing. Convinced that her son had saved her from suicide and 
was sending her important messages from beyond, she published several 
books about their exchanges.12
12 Marcelle de Jouvenel, Au Diapason du Ciel.
Figure 11  Bertrand de Jouvenel with beard, in 1973
source: Rue des Archives / Hollandse Hoogte
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Any attempt to determine the extent to which these personal elements 
influenced Jouvenel’s political and intellectual positions is speculative. 
Nonetheless, it is striking that his professional transformation went along 
with a transformation at a personal level. The pre-war raging journalist, 
ever in the vanguard of political action, open to f ighting duels, meeting the 
important men of his times and seduced by the idea of an anti-bourgeois 
fascist youth revolution, changed into a cerebral political scientist who 
preferred a quiet life away from political turmoil.13 Physically, the change 
was dramatic too. The pre-war ‘playboy’ (in the words of Pascal Jardin) 
adopted the unfashionable looks of a sage. Although the 1946 newspaper 
reports about the monocle and the chinstrap beard were baseless com-
munist propaganda, Jouvenel did grow a beard that was notable enough for 
his friends to comment upon it with disdain and disbelief. While Boegner 
was sure that the beard would affect his chances of a fair Épuration trial 
even more negatively, Colette found that it belonged in a movie rather 
than on his chin. Berl merely hoped that Hélène would catch Jouvenel in a 
moment of sleep to shave it off.14
This was not the f irst time Jouvenel changed his course, as we have seen. 
Despite his fascist engagement, at the turn of the 1940s the rediscovery of 
a sense of national belonging prevented him from fully embracing col-
laboration within the framework of a German-dominated national socialist 
Europe. In the same way, half a decade later it was probably a combination 
of a personal crisis and a feeling of collective failure – of his ‘generation’, his 
friends and the political ideology he had identified with for a long time – that 
led Jouvenel to reconsider his positions and even his identity. This new 
identity was built upon the remains of the old, however, and in some respects 
his political thought changed little. Having discussed Jouvenel’s proximity 
to the post-war extreme right in the last chapter, it is now necessary to ask 
how these elements relate to Du Pouvoir, the magnum opus that won him 
a new notoriety and set off the academic career that would dominate the 
second half of his life, as journalism had dominated the f irst. In a larger 
sense, it brings up the question of the relationship between Jouvenel’s (and 
to a lesser extent also Fabre-Luce’s) aff iliation with fascism and the extreme 
right, and his integration into the world of early post-war neoliberalism.
13 On the duel, see ‘Film Producer Refuses Duel with a Foe in Paris’, The New York Times 
(22 February 1935).
14 Philippe Boegner to Bertrand de Jouvenel (21 March 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (295); Colette 
to Jouvenel (undated, 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (297); Emmanuel Berl to Jouvenel (undated, 
1945/1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (295).
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On Power: Pessimism, Aristocracy and the Distrust of Democracy
Published in 1945, the almost 600 pages of Du Pouvoir: Histoire Naturelle 
de sa Croissance were the result of years of work. During the war years, 
Jouvenel spent a large part of his time reading and researching at the 
French national library, and the unf inished manuscript was among the 
few personal belongings that he carried across the Swiss border in 1943. To 
a large extent, Du Pouvoir was a continuation of the ideas and research that 
were already present in his preceding books, but two things were radically 
different: its unprecedented scale and the political conclusions that can be 
drawn from the work. Essentially a political history of humankind since 
the very beginnings of civilisation, the book analysed history as a story of 
rampantly growing state power, eating its way through institutions, human 
collectivities and ultimately individuals. Although translated as On Power, 
the English word fails to convey the full meaning of the French term. In 
the words of Dennis Hale, while the English term ‘power’ generally refers 
to a quality or an attribute, le pouvoir is ‘a thing, a force and ultimately an 
institution’.15
In a modern context, Jouvenel’s pouvoir meant state power, but it also 
included all pre-modern kinds of power and authority of a ruler over his 
subjects and territories. The concept had the convenience of bypassing ques-
tions of regime and form of government, which according to Jouvenel were 
of secondary importance. In his analysis, what was key was state power, a 
largely independent category with a particular agency that surpassed all 
others. This pouvoir, described as a ‘minotaur’ in the introductory chapter, 
has manifested itself throughout human history, constantly extending 
its grip on society and on individual citizens. Regardless of its particular 
structure or supporting ideology, Jouvenel asserted, state power in the end 
only served itself, its own growth and survival. Changes of government were 
often the occasion for an extension of state power and the replacement of 
weak rulers by stronger ones. Paradoxically, revolutions, albeit begun in 
the name of freedom, always led to a heavier kind of pouvoir: ‘First, there 
was the authority of Charles I, Louis XVI, Nicholas II. Afterwards, the one of 
Cromwell, Napoleon, Stalin.’16 Profoundly pessimistic on Western society’s 
15 Hale, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel’, 653.
16 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 322. This observation about revolutions may have originally been 
Lenin’s. In his working diaries from 1943, Jouvenel relates how he received this Lenin citation 
from André Malraux, who read a part of his manuscript. Journal de travail, cahier I [20 April 
1943], Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (37). Citations, French or translated, are taken directly from the 
French-language version of Du Pouvoir.
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capacity to invert this trend, he concluded by suggesting that the same 
powerful impetus that had led to its f lowering would also bring about its 
downfall, after which there would be nothing but ‘an amorphous mass, 
bound for despotism or anarchy’.17
Written during the war, Du Pouvoir was inspired by Jouvenel’s experience 
of the conflict, with the French debacle of 1940 and the (impending) defeat 
of Nazi Germany four years later as the two main events. Jouvenel shared 
Hobbes’ view of war as the natural state of affairs ‘between two powers of 
the same kind’, while he also saw it as intrinsically linked to the growth 
of state power through history. War inevitably acted as a catalyst of state 
power (and vice versa) by the means of competition between states. In the 
modern era, this competition took the shape of an arms race and more 
importantly of a struggle for the mobilisation of national resources, both 
material and human. This law of political competition prescribed that any 
state that failed to mobilise its resources on the same scale as its enemy was 
bound to perish.18 Repeating the same explanation of the French defeat that 
had f igured prominently in Après la Défaite, Jouvenel used this approach 
to explain how, during the f irst phase of the Second World War, Germany 
– a streamlined war society that mobilised all private and public national 
resources – was able to crush the Western democracies ‘like a cruiser’ at-
tacking ‘a transatlantic passenger ship equipped with canons, on board 
of which the stewards continue to serve drinks to idle passengers’. Things 
went differently for Germany as soon as it came up against its totalitarian 
nemesis: ‘a country where, since twenty years, individual tasks are assigned 
by public authority: Russia.’19
Jouvenel’s pessimism was also ref lected in his view on the direction 
Western societies were planning to take once the war was over. The plans 
for a post-war order based on social security would only deliver new ways 
for the state to extend its influence, and thereby its grip, on the lives of men. 
To make the state ‘responsible for all individual destinies’, it was necessary 
to equip it with tremendous means, with dire consequences:
Unfortunately, we cannot believe that by breaking Hitler and his regime, 
we’re f ighting evil at its source. […] How can we not feel that a state that 
binds men to itself by every link of needs and feelings, would be the abler 
to devote them to martial means. The greater the attributions of power, 
17 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 560.
18 Ibid., 207, 215.
19 Ibid., 229.
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the greater also the material means for warfare; the more manifest the 
services it renders, the swifter the obedience to its call.20
It would take only one new Hitler to reactivate the whole infernal machine 
of political competition, with all other states forced to extend their military 
might and their control over the population in his image. To give, in the name 
of social progress, even more responsibility to the state, ‘as reassuring as its 
face is today’, meant risking the ‘nourishing of the war to come’. Waged by a 
still stronger and more totalitarian state, this future war would ‘compare to the 
present war like the present war compares to the French Revolutionary Wars’.21
This view on war and the law of political competition was not the only 
thing that linked Du Pouvoir to Après la Défaite and other works from around 
1940. The original version of Du Pouvoir carried the subtitle ‘Natural History 
of its Growth’, an indication of the lasting importance of biological and 
organicist impulses in Jouvenel’s thought.22 Both in his treatment of early 
civilisations and in his interpretation of recent history, Jouvenel showed 
a propensity for Darwinist explanations. He acknowledged the existence 
of peaceful societies but stated that all human progress came about as 
the result of belligerent ones with a strong ‘will to power’. Only in these 
societies could a ruling ‘gerontocracy’ be replaced by a young warrior 
elite, achieving power and prestige through victory on the battlef ield. He 
criticised monogamy for giving the weak, who belonged to ‘the lower strata’ 
of society, the possibility to reproduce, while in a situation of polygamy 
this privilege would have been largely reserved for the strongest warriors, 
considered the forebears of the aristocracy.23 Noting that most revolutions 
broke out under weak kings rather than their despotic predecessors, Jou-
venel observed that they were ‘not the moral punishment of despotism 
but the biological sanction of impotency [impuissance]’. While the people 
feared and instinctively respected strength and authority, they had noth-
ing but contempt for softness, just like ‘a hesitant rider makes even the 
most obedient mount ferocious’. Equating political struggle with natural 
selection, Jouvenel concluded that the merit of revolutions was to replace 
these ‘sceptical and tired’ rulers with ‘athletes emerging victorious from 
the bloody qualif iers of the revolution’.24
20 Ibid., 26.
21 Ibid., 27.
22 In the English translation, the subtitle was reformulated as: Jouvenel, On Power: Its Nature 
and the History of its Growth.
23 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 126, 130.
24 Ibid., 326.
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There is a striking resemblance between this last sentence and Jouvenel’s 
description in Après la Défaite of the way German ‘athletes’ triumphed over 
the crumbling remnants of France’s tired and obsolete bourgeois society.25 In 
the same way, his rejection in Du Pouvoir of parliamentarianism as a ‘lower-
ing’ mechanism that selected its politicians for their docile obedience to 
the party line, their incapacity of independent action and their willingness 
to be part of a ‘political machine’ echoes similar statements made in 1941 
about the mediocrity of France’s political class under the Third Republic.26 
Similarly, Jouvenel lamented how, as a result of the 1789 Revolution, France 
had lost its guilds, social bodies and all other ‘associative instincts’ acting 
as countervailing powers to the state. This echoed his emphasis in Après 
la Défaite on the survival of these organisations in Germany as a reason for 
that country’s superiority.27
Jouvenel was especially scornful of democracy and those who expected 
salvation from it. Rather than naïvely seeing it as the end of despotism and 
oppression, Jouvenel saw the rise of democracy as the occasion for a further 
dramatic increase of state power at the expense of freedom. The principle 
of popular sovereignty led the power of the state to become associated 
not with a specif ic will but with the general will. As soon as the state was 
supposed to no longer represent somebody’s interests but the interests of 
society as a whole, there could be no more challenge to its authority or a 
reasonable limitation of its power, opening up the ‘age of tyranny’.28 Thus, 
revolutionary France soon saw a range of measures that would have been 
utterly unachievable during the heydays of absolute monarchy: heavy taxa-
tion, conscription and the abolition of provincial autonomy. While under the 
ancien régime, royal power was limited by established traditions and divine 
sovereignty based on unchanging laws, the fundamentally variable nature 
of popular sovereignty gave the state potentially unlimited manoeuvring 
space that could easily result in ‘popular absolutism’.29
Popular sovereignty in fact came down to parliamentary sovereignty, via 
the ‘bold f iction’ that parliament should actually be seen as a gathering of 
the people itself. Approvingly citing Rousseau’s rejection of parliamentary 
democracy as a system in which men were ‘citizens for one day and subjects 
for four years’, Jouvenel argued that elections were the only ‘very loose 
25 Bertrand de Jouvenel, Après la Défaite (Paris, 1941), 37.
26 Bertrand de Jouvenel, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 440; id., Du Pouvoir, 402.
27 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 428; idem, Après la Défaite, 195.
28 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 380.
29 Ibid., 47, 68, 389.
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umbilical cord’ still linking the people to power. Instead of ‘power by the 
people’, there was rather ‘power over the people’ – a power, however, that 
was ‘the greater as it authorises itself through this cord’.30 Worse still, with 
the rise of political parties and the extension of clientelist networks, elec-
tions increasingly became ‘plebiscites’ during which the people delivered 
themselves to a ‘team’. Deputies could no longer operate independently 
and became bound to a party leader exercising control over their num-
bers. Jouvenel saw the ‘military’ behaviour of the Nazi fraction in the 1933 
Reichstag as this development’s culmination point, while stressing that 
the communists would have done the same in French parliament had 
they had the same numeric weight. Democracy thus bred totalitarianism, 
since totalitarianism was nothing but a team that had – thanks to better 
organisation, propaganda, brutality and more shameless lies – overtaken 
its rivals and seized its ‘prey’ without wanting to let it escape again.31
Once this take-over happened, Jouvenel had little respect for the ‘out-
raged complaints’ of the members of the losing ‘teams’. Had they not ‘all 
contributed to this result’?
One man, one team disposes of immense resources accumulated in the 
power’s arsenal. Who successfully piled them up if not the others who 
never found the state developed enough when they were its occupiers? 
In society there exists no counterforce capable of stopping the pouvoir. 
So who destroyed these powerful bodies that the monarchs of yore did 
not dare touch? A single party makes the entire national f lesh feel the 
master’s claws. So who was the f irst to f latten individualities under 
the crushing weight of the party? And who dreamt of his own party’s 
triumph? The citizens accept this tyranny and only start to hate it when 
it is too late. But who made them lose the habit to judge by themselves, 
who replaced the independence of the citizen with the loyalism of the 
party militant? There is no freedom anymore, but freedom only belongs 
to free men. And who has worried about educating free men?32
According to Jouvenel, the fundamental mistake was to believe that a 
political system could be built on the principle of popular sovereignty alone. 
Under such a regime, Montesquieu’s separation of powers was nothing but 
a façade behind which the pouvoir was supposed to hold itself in check, a 
30 Ibid., 375, 388.
31 Ibid., 405, 410.
32 Ibid., 411.
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situation that gave free rein to ‘a crushing of liberty like Europe had never 
known before’.33
Only two elements had been able to alleviate the historical trend towards 
ever more despotic state power: the authority of divine or otherwise im-
mutable law and the existence of a strong aristocracy. If the legal system was 
considered changeable according to the will of the people, Jouvenel saw it sub-
jected to the pouvoir, whereas divine law, which was traditionally supposed to 
be above the king, could maintain a certain autonomy. Praising the Catholic 
legal scholar Léon Duguit, Jouvenel specified this autonomy as possible only 
if society consisted of ‘a profound community of feelings rooted in a common 
faith, giving rise to an uncontested morality and supporting a divine law’.34 In 
other words, an uncontested religious mystique was needed against division 
and democratic despotism, just like the mystique of constitutional monarchy 
was necessary to end the political division of the Fourth Republic. Jouvenel 
recognised that universal human rights could theoretically play the same 
role, but he stated that they were much less effective.35
In line with statements both he and Fabre-Luce had made during the 1930s, 
Jouvenel continued to exempt the British parliament from his critique of 
democratic society. In England, he explained, the Bill of Rights had permit-
ted the aristocracy to retain its historic role as a parliamentary check on 
‘statocracy’. Due to its continued relevance as the guarantor of civic freedom, 
the British aristocracy never lost its prestige amongst the masses, as was 
demonstrated by its continued electoral support. The French aristocracy had 
been too divided and too stupid to play a comparable role, with the old nobility 
shielding itself from the new and both groups snubbing the higher bourgeoisie 
of state servants. As a result, France’s ‘plebeian elite’ had become ‘jacobinised’, 
turning its back on the nobility and working closely with the monarch, ‘so 
naturally a servant of royal power that it could only continue it, without a 
king’.36 Jouvenel cited a statement by John Stuart Mill about the essential dif-
ference between the English and the French people. Whereas the French were 
all too willing to sacrifice their individual freedom for the mere appearance 
of power, the English were less interested in exercising power but the more 
willing to oppose a power transgressing its traditional boundaries. Jouvenel 
concluded that in England freedom was a ‘generalised privilege’, the result of 
a process by which aristocratic privileges had gradually been extended over 
33 Ibid., 431, 441.
34 Ibid., 456, 461.
35 Ibid., 453, 460.
36 Ibid., 286, 290, 409.
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the entire plebs, which had been ‘aristocratised’ as a result. In revolutionary 
France, the absolutist instrument of state had fallen into the hands of a people 
that understood itself as a mass and saw individuals as subjects.37
Throughout human history, Jouvenel considered the aristocracy as the 
incorporation of its etymological meaning: rule by the best men. In the 
chapter ‘The Aristocratic Roots of Freedom’, he described how the aristocracy 
traditionally represented society’s strongest and most courageous individu-
als, who had alone been able to limit state power in its despotic voracity. He 
contrasted these ‘virile’ and ‘sanguine’ people with the weaker ‘securitarians’, 
who were overrepresented in the lower echelons of society. While the former 
group, dubbed ‘libertarians’, valued freedom above all and was willing to take 
risks, the latter put security f irst and appealed to the state for protection. 
Only the people with the f irst mentality could put up the pretense of real 
freedom, while the ‘securitarians’ contributed to the de facto subversion of 
liberty by seeking shelter with the state. Jouvenel specif ied that, while the 
effects of ‘heredity’ tended to conserve the character of the two groups, he 
did not consider them as hermetically closed. The aristocracy could develop 
‘securitarian’ tendencies, just like the lower classes occasionally produced 
individuals of an outstanding ‘libertarian’ character. In the normal situa-
tion, however, the ruling classes consisted of the bravest men, while ‘timid 
souls’ sought protection in a ‘subjugation almost exactly matching their 
fears’. While recognising its fundamental inequality, Jouvenel still called 
this situation a ‘social equilibrium, because freedoms correspond to risks’.38
In modern society, the aristocracy had either lost its power (as happened 
to the nobility) or become bound to the state apparatus (as was the case with 
a new elite of higher civil servants), thereby losing both its independence 
and its ‘libertarian’ mentality. These aspirations were adopted by the middle 
class, which mistakenly tried to extend liberty to all social classes, including 
the ones that could not carry the weight. The exploitation of workers in the 
nineteenth century was a direct consequence of the abstract application of 
the principle of human rights, since it had imposed a freedom so absolute 
that there could be no more protection of the weak or restriction of the 
strong, leading to an ‘intolerable’ level of insecurity for the lower classes. 
After the First World War, with both the aristocracy and the proletariat 
looking to the state for protection, only the middle classes remained to 
defend freedom, but they too became insecure as a result of inflation and 
unemployment. This resulted in an ever stronger appeal for state protection 
37 Ibid., 497, 498.
38 Ibid., 507, 510, 511.
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in the form of social security, which came down to ‘men handing over to the 
state their individual rights in exchange for social rights’.39 Western societies 
became ‘social protectorates’ like the United States under Roosevelt and 
Germany under Hitler, in which the state held all power:
The Minotaur is indefinitely protective, but it also needs to be indefinitely 
authoritarian. It needs to never doubt itself, and to convince in order to 
be obeyed: it unites the spiritual and the temporal. It combines the two 
powers that Western civilisation always kept separated.40
With this description of the monstrosity of an inf initely protective state, 
Jouvenel directly contradicted his own longing in 1938 for an early-Islam-like 
fusion of the spiritual and the temporal under the authority of a revolution-
ary fascist regime. Likewise, there is a clear opposition between his nega-
tive reference to Hitler and Roosevelt’s state interventionism as inf initely 
authoritarian and his mid-1930s call for France to be inspired by the German 
and American examples.41 To a certain point, Jouvenel was aware of these 
contradictions himself. While working on Du Pouvoir, he wrote in his diary 
about his hesitation as to whether it would ‘at f irst sight’ not be considered 
strange for the author of L’Économie Dirigée to presently write an ‘indictment 
against the state’. While remarking that the ‘abuses of the state should not 
eclipse the economic disorder as we have known it in the period 1920-29’, he 
decided that he should analyse the interwar economy more systematically to 
determine whether its collapse was a consequence of excessive laissez-faire 
or the opposite. In resignation, he decided: ‘I will have to explain myself 
about the économie dirigée. It is the most unfortunate adventure that can 
happen to an author to see his formula receive an immense publicity mean-
ing something different than what he was aiming for.’42
For many other statements, Jouvenel would be spared the obligation 
of having to explain himself, since they were hardly different from his 
earlier positions. In a statement seemingly anticipating Zygmunt Bauman’s 
thesis of the quintessentially modern ‘gardening state’, Jouvenel described 
the ‘noble temptation’ of any ruler confronted with mankind’s ugly insuf-
f iciency to ‘garden in the disorder’ of society: ‘What a world ours is, in which 
39 Ibid., 514, 519, 523.
40 Ibid., 529.
41 Jouvenel, Le Réveil de l’Europe, 279, 283; idem, Un Voyageur, 114; idem, La Crise du Capitalisme 
Américain, 343.
42 Journal de travail, cahier I [25 April 1943], Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (37).
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children conceived by accident grow up like weeds, in which cities grow 
on the impulse of sordid speculations like blind beasts crawling among 
their own excrement.’ As big as the temptation was to ruthlessly intervene 
in this mess to build ‘cities of the sun, inhabited by a nobler race’, Jouvenel 
warned against such thoughts. Intoxicated by such grand designs, a ruler 
may decide that ‘the happiness of a continent demands the full suppression 
of fermented drinks, or worse, the extermination of an entire race accused 
of having impure blood’.43 In Jouvenel’s view, only the ‘mundane wisdom of 
an ancient aristocracy can protect against enthusiasms that intend to be 
constructive but risk being incendiary’. These last words were remarkably 
close to his praise in 1941 of the virtues of an aristocracy that should have 
led France instead of its political elite of mediocre middle-class politicians.44
There is considerable ambiguity in Jouvenel’s attitude towards force and 
power as expressed in Du Pouvoir. He felt little more than contempt for the 
intellectual capacities of the masses, who were permanently inclined to 
sacrif ice freedom by seeking shelter with the state and allowing themselves 
to be exploited by its propaganda. Rebellious only against weak rulers, 
the plebs almost longed to be dominated, accepting ‘any masters as long 
as they show themselves courageous and severe towards themselves’.45 In 
Jouvenel’s description of rulers, caution about the consequences of un-
checked state power was occasionally eclipsed by outright admiration for 
authoritarian leadership. Citing Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, 
whose fundamental pessimism about the course of Western civilisation 
he shared, Jouvenel stressed that there was always and inescapably an 
‘egoistic’ component to state power. Any ruler, as altruistic or democratic 
as his motives may be, would be transformed intellectually ‘and almost 
physically’ through the exercise of power, to the point of becoming an 
Übermensch-like version of himself. It was lonely at the top:
The command is an attitude. One breathes a different air there, one dis-
covers other perspectives than down in the valleys of obedience. The pas-
sion of order, the architectural genius that our species has been endowed 
with, deploy themselves. From high up in his tower, this enlarged man 
sees what he could forge from the squirming masses that he dominates.46
43 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 527. See also Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 13; Griff in, 
‘Modernity under the New Order’, in A Fascist Century, ed. Feldman, 43.
44 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 528; idem, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 439.
45 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 518.
46 Ibid., 179.
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Just as Jouvenel evolved little in his contempt for the weak and powerless 
and his admiration for the courage, power and physical strength of an elite, 
so too was there little change in the people whom he deemed deserving 
of admiration. He dropped his earlier fascist praise of the land-working 
peasantry, the ‘families rooted in the earth’, at the expense of traders. Rather 
than attacking the ‘mercantile spirit’ of the English, Jouvenel now ranked 
intrepid risk-taking merchants amongst his aristocratic heroes.47 At the 
same time, in a distinction also inspired by Spengler, he remained dismiss-
ive about capitalism’s industrial elite, which he accused of having lost its 
mass support due to f inancial speculation and risk-avoiding behaviour, 
just like the Roman patriciate who had been defeated by the emperors 
after degenerating from austere military leaders into greedy capitalists 
illegally enriching themselves and practicing usury.48 There remained a 
certain similarity between Jouvenel’s glorif ication of courageous, severe, 
quasi-military aristocratic leaders – superior men avoiding the comforts 
of an easy life and being rewarded for that choice with freedom – and 
his earlier praise of the bravery of fascist youth avoiding the comforts of 
bourgeois society and preferring a life of risk, joy and heroism.
A Mountain in Switzerland: Neoliberalism and the Mont Pèlerin 
Society
Published in Geneva as part of the Cheval Ailé’s collection of fascist and 
collaborationist books, Du Pouvoir initially failed to draw much attention 
in France. Hardly a bestseller, the book also suffered from unavailability 
in France, and it took Jouvenel decades (and a long-running f inancial con-
flict with Bourquin) to solve this problem by buying back the rights and 
republishing Du Pouvoir with a French editor.49 The Écrits de Paris was one 
of the few newspapers to publish a (largely positive) review of the book. 
Fabre-Luce repeatedly cited the book with approval, and a few friends 
wrote Jouvenel to congratulate him with his magnum opus (or to tell him 
47 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 518; idem, ‘Comment on Restaure un Pays’, L’Émancipation Nationale 
(1 October 1937).
48 Jouvenel, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 64; idem, Du Pouvoir, 489; Merlio, ‘The 
Critique of Liberal Democracy in the Works of Oswald Spengler’, in The Intellectual Revolt Against 
Liberal Democracy, ed. Sternhell, 182.
49 See the correspondence between Jouvenel, Constant Bourquin and Le Cheval Ailé (1952, 
1954, 1964) included in the folder ‘Éditions du Cheval Ailé’, Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (296). Du Pouvoir 
was f inally published in France by Hachette in 1972.
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they had not yet f inished reading it). The book’s breakthrough came from 
outside the French-speaking world.50 In Italy, the renowned philosopher and 
president of the liberal party Benedetto Croce was immediately interested 
in Du Pouvoir, and he discussed it (albeit critically) in two articles. Thanks 
to Croce’s support and an intervention by the German economist Wilhelm 
Röpke, who also lived in Switzerland and had become a close friend of 
Jouvenel, several Italian editors became interested in the book, publishing 
a translation in Milan in August 1947. Röpke also tried to interest his Swiss 
publisher in a German translation, but in vain.51
In his criticism of the ‘voracity’ of state power in Du Pouvoir, Jouvenel 
described how the state would not tolerate any other societal power to exist 
besides itself. If unchecked, this process would result in ‘social atomisation, 
the rupture of all particular links between men only held together by their 
common serfdom to the state’.52 Although it is almost certain that when 
writing these lines, Jouvenel was unfamiliar with Friedrich Hayek and 
his Road to Serfdom (1944), readers who were could not help but notice 
the similarity of the two books. Both Hayek and Jouvenel analysed fas-
cism and communism not as political aberrations but as the results of a 
larger trend in Western societies towards ever greater state power. Both 
saw totalitarianism as a permanently looming presence inside democratic 
society and warned that planning and social security represented a major 
step towards it. In terms of positioning and self-image, both claimed to 
represent the voice of reason, a tiny minority in an age of passions and 
fanaticism.53 Hayek himself enthusiastically reviewed Jouvenel’s book in 
Time and Tide, praising it as a ‘monumental study’ that provided a ‘masterly 
and frightening picture of the impersonal mechanisms by which power 
tends to expand until it engulfs the whole of society’.54
To a large extent, this explains why, upon its publication in the United 
States in 1949, On Power had such a large impact. By that time, The Road to 
Serfdom had become a bestseller that had provoked reactions from both sides 
of the political spectrum, and Jouvenel’s book was immediately interpreted 
as an important Hayekian publication. Within months of its publication, On 
Power was reviewed in all the major American newspapers, with reactions 
ranging from enthusiasm (including the obligatory Tocqueville comparison) 
50 Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 110; idem, Le Siècle Prend Figure, 156.
51 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 243, 247; Wilhelm Röpke to Jouvenel (20 September 1945), Fonds 
BdJ, Don 96 01 (305); Jouvenel, Il Potere.
52 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 255.
53 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 70, 185, 239.
54 Cited in De Dijn, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel and the Revolt Against the State’, 382.
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to outright dismissal as capitalist propaganda, depending largely on the 
newspaper’s political orientation.55 This is not to say that Jouvenel and Hayek 
agreed on everything. Besides needing only a third of the number of pages of 
Jouvenel’s book, Hayek also did not share Jouvenel’s distrust of party politics, 
and he was less pessimistic about democracy’s chances of survival. Whereas 
Hayek cited Spengler (especially his Preuβentum und Sozialismus) only to 
describe the danger of his ideas and to associate Nazism with socialism, 
Jouvenel approvingly used his analytical concepts. While Hayek concluded 
with a plea to return to something not far removed from classical liberalism, 
Jouvenel dismissed classical liberalism as ‘fully utopian’ for its completely 
mistaken idea of state power and how to limit it.56
In the UK, On Power was published in October 1948 and was almost as 
successful. British interest in the book was considerable, mainly thanks to 
a laudatory commentary on Du Pouvoir by D. W. Brogan (who also prefaced 
the English translation) published on the f irst page of the Times Literary 
Supplement in early 1946. Jouvenel received a less f lattering review in The 
New York Times, where Hugh Trevor-Roper ripped the ‘pretentious’ book 
apart and called its author ‘a laboriously learned man who has not learned to 
think’.57 Hans Morgenthau had very mixed feelings about the book, praising 
Jouvenel’s ‘relevant diagnosis’ of the totalitarianism present within modern 
masses-oriented democracy while criticising his partiality and ‘backward-
looking romantic artistocratism which follows in the footsteps of Bonald, 
de Maistre, de Tocqueville, and Taine’. All in all, Morgenthau’s impression 
was ‘not unlike Spengler’s: irritation over much that is obviously one-sided 
and false and admiration for a political thinker of the f irst order who has 
something important to say’.58
The American and British success of Jouvenel’s magnum opus marked an 
important step in Jouvenel’s career. It opened doors for him at ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
universities, starting with Manchester and Cambridge’s Corpus Christi 
College, where he lectured on socialism and income redistribution during 
the autumn of 1949. This was soon followed by stints at Yale and Berkeley. 
The Cambridge lectures, in which he criticised socialism’s ‘disastrous’ 
fall into ‘enlightened despotism’, were published in 1952. In the preface, 
Jouvenel thanked Ely Devons, Willmoore Kendall and Milton Friedman 
55 De Dijn, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel and the Revolt Against the State’, 381; Dard, Bertrand de 
Jouvenel, 245, 247.
56 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 177, 240; Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 535.
57 Trevor-Roper, ‘Aspects of Power’.
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for proofreading and helping eliminate the ‘economic barbarisms’ from the 
text – a striking illustration of his degree of integration into an international 
community of mostly conservative economic scholars.59 In an exchange of 
letters from the time, Friedman reprimanded Jouvenel for several ‘erroneous 
statements’ about national income and welfare economics. He told Jouvenel 
that even if his ‘heart’ was with him, his ‘instinct of workmanship in this 
instance’ was not.60
The overseas fame of Jouvenel’s book soon combined with his chance 
presence in Switzerland to make him one of the key personalities in the 
international network of early post-war neoliberalism. This is remarkable 
given that, despite neoliberalism’s important French roots, Jouvenel had 
almost no connections with this milieu until 1944. At the unoff icial birth 
hour of neoliberalism – the Colloque Walter Lippmann held in Paris in 
August 1938 – Jouvenel was a prominent member of the PPF and seemingly 
far removed from the small community of academics, industrialists and 
journalists who wanted to revitalise a liberalism that they cherished but 
deemed unadapted to modern challenges. The colloquium met at the initia-
tive of Louis Rougier, a philosophy professor at the University of Besançon 
who advocated an eclectic mixture of logical positivism, anti-rationalism, 
anti-Bergsonism and anti-democratic elitism borrowed from Vilfredo Pareto 
and Gustave Le Bon. The only French member of the Vienna Circle, Rougier 
differed from most other logical positivists in his political convictions, 
which were markedly on the right. In a critique of ‘the democratic mystique’ 
published in 1929, he attacked the democratic ideal’s egalitarian messian-
ism, which he blamed for paving the way for Marxism and Bolshevism.61 
Rougier f irmly believed in the fundamental distinction between the elite 
and the masses, denouncing the latter as ‘ignorant and self-important’ and 
their reign as ‘synonymous with commonness, vulgarity and boredom’. 
According to Rougier, liberal societies ultimately faced the choice between 
the rights of the citizen and the principle of popular sovereignty, and he 
urged them to choose the former.62
As equally hostile to the planning agenda of the French left as to the 
right’s admiration of fascist state intervention, Rougier was convinced by the 
coming to power of the Popular Front that he needed to mobilise his consid-
erable international academic network and lead ‘an international crusade in 
59 Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistribution, ix, 47.
60 Milton Friedman to Jouvenel (15 April 1952), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (300).
61 Denord, Néolibéralisme Version Française, 96, 97.
62 Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 68, 69.
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favour of constructive liberalism’.63 In 1938, he seized the opportunity of a 
Paris visit of the American journalist Walter Lippmann, author of The Good 
Society, to organise a colloquium to discuss the book with the author and 
like-minded intellectuals. Lippmann was reluctant at f irst, especially after 
hearing that Rougier was planning to also invite Paul Baudouin and Marcel 
Bourgeois, who had both f inanced the PPF and other fascist movements in 
France, but the presence of Hayek and Ludwig von Mises f inally convinced 
him to agree to a ‘restricted and closed conference’ to discuss his book’s 
‘main thesis’. Meeting in the last days of August amidst high international 
tensions, the colloquium was attended by French economists, businessmen, 
academics and higher state off icials (Louis Baudin, Ernest Mercier, Auguste 
Detoeuf, Louis Marlio, Jacques Rueff, Raymond Aron, Robert Marjolin) and 
what in retrospect was a very prestigious community of foreign academics 
and intellectuals: Hayek, Röpke, Mises, Alexander Rüstow, Michael Polanyi, 
Stefan Possony and Alfred Schütz. Politicians were the only group explicitly 
excluded from this almost ecumenical meeting.64
Notwithstanding the diversity of ideas expressed at the colloquium and 
its often lengthy and inconclusive discussions during which Lippmann drew 
sketches to amuse himself, the meeting did lead to lasting results. Firstly, a 
name for the new creed was intensively discussed. Out of all the different 
names suggested – including ‘individualism’ (Baudin), ‘positive liberal-
ism’ (Rougier) or even ‘left-wing liberalism’ (Rueff) – Rüstow’s proposal of 
‘neoliberalism’ gradually established itself in the wake of the colloquium.65 
Despite its potentially troubling association with neosocialism, the term has 
proven its staying power up to the present day, possibly also because very 
few people are familiar with Déat’s search for an anti-Marxist and national 
kind of socialism. Secondly, a manifesto was unanimously accepted that 
established several principles that went beyond classical liberalism. This 
‘Agenda of Liberalism’, taken directly from Lippmann’s presentation at 
the colloquium, gave the state the duty to determine the legal framework 
for the national economy and asserted that the state should not only bear 
responsibility for internal security and national defence but also for social 
insurances, social services, education and scientif ic research.66
63 Denord, Néolibéralisme Version Française, 117.
64 Denord, Néoliberalisme Version Française, 112, 118; idem, ‘French Neoliberalism and its 
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Thirdly, the colloquium led to the foundation of an international organi-
sation to support the new ideology. Both a study centre and a propaganda 
organisation, the Centre International d’Études pour la Rénovation du 
Libéralisme (CIRL) organised several meetings in the Paris Musée Social 
during 1939 and published a journal of which only one edition ended up see-
ing the light of the day, which contained the minutes of the colloquium. By 
June 1940, a second edition was in preparation featuring an article by Hayek 
that was a f irst sketch of what would become The Road to Serfdom. Presided 
by Rougier, the CIRL was based in Paris, while chapters were planned in 
the United States, England and Switzerland, headed by Lippmann, Hayek 
and Röpke respectively. Although the outbreak of war soon brought an end 
to the activities of the CIRL, its framework allowed the neoliberal network 
to survive through its designated national representatives, who acted as 
gatekeepers determining who was to be part of the movement. Thus, despite 
its short life, the CIRL provided the layout for a neoliberal International that 
could easily be revived once the war was over.67
In 1938, to be a ‘neoliberal’ meant to recognise the insuff iciency of 
laissez-faire and the need for the state to develop an economic policy.68 
In a metaphor by Rougier that Hayek borrowed in his Road to Serfdom, to 
be a neoliberal ‘does not mean to be a “Manchesterist” who leaves the cars 
circulating in all directions, if such is their will, which can only result in traf-
f ic jams and incessant accidents; it does not mean to be a “Planist” who gives 
every car its exit time and its route; it means to impose a highway code’.69 
This statement was vague enough to act as the greatest common denomina-
tor of the neoliberal movement, f inding the support of its different currents. 
From those convinced of the need for social security (Rougier, Lippmann) to 
those who saw these views as dangerous and for whom neoliberalism often 
came close to classical liberalism (Mises, Hayek), from future supporters 
of the Chicago School to architects of the post-war German ‘social market 
economy’ (Röpke, Rüstow): all had their own interpretations of what shape 
this ‘highway code’ ought to take.70
Both within and outside France, the Second World War led to a political 
split and a reconfiguration of the f ledgling neoliberal movement. While a 
minority of French neoliberals joined De Gaulle or the Resistance (Raymond 
67 Denord, Néoliberalisme Version Française, 113, 123.
68 Ibid., 120.
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Aron, Marjolin), most either supported Vichy (Joseph Barthélemy), chose 
not to commit (Charles Rist) or left the country (Marlio).71 Rougier played 
a shady role. Exploiting his connections with Vichy and the London School 
of Economics, he convinced Pétain to send him on a secret mission to 
London in October 1940 with the aim of negotiating a ‘gentlemen’s agree-
ment’ between him and Churchill. This episode later gave rise to a bitter 
feud between Rougier and the British government, which denied that 
any such agreement had ever existed.72 Two months later, Rougier left 
for New York where he joined the New School for Social Research with a 
grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. His Vichy activities as well as his 
refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the Free French discredited him 
in the eyes of his French colleagues, however, and ultimately even led 
to him losing his teaching position. Concluding that Rougier had proven 
to be ‘a rather malleable type’, Hayek and Röpke became increasingly 
reluctant to maintain relations with him. Lippmann, whose prominence as 
a neoliberal diminished due to his own shift in attention to other concerns, 
grew frustrated with Rougier’s many activities in New York, while he had 
advised him to remain quiet.73
With Rougier discredited and Lippmann less interested, Hayek and 
Röpke were left as the central f igures of the neoliberal movement. At the 
end of the war, both launched new initiatives for an international organisa-
tion, and both involved Jouvenel in their plans. While Röpke’s plans for a 
trilingual (English, French, German) periodical catering to a cosmopolitan 
intellectual elite fell through due to a conflict with investors, Hayek’s took 
longer to ferment but were more successful. After initially being distracted 
by obligations in the United States, where the success of The Road to Serfdom 
prompted him to tour the country and make countless public appearances 
in front of enthusiastic conservative crowds, Hayek was able to organise 
a new international gathering of neoliberals in early 1947. Convening on 
1 April 1947 in a hotel on the slopes of the Mont Pèlerin, a low mountain 
bordering Lake Geneva and Vevey, the conference was attended by journal-
ists, businessmen and academics – roughly the same sort of community 
that had met in Paris nine years earlier, albeit with a stronger American 
contingent. Of the thirty-nine men and one woman (the British historian 
Veronica Wedgwood) present, f ifteen (including Raymond Aron, Baudin, 
71 Denord, ‘French Neoliberalism and its Divisions’, 51.
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Hayek, Mises, Polanyi, Röpke and Rüstow) had taken part in the Walter 
Lippmann colloquium. Amongst the new faces were Karl Popper, Walter 
Eucken, Frank Knight, Fritz Machlup, William Rappard and Milton Fried-
man. The conference programme provided for ten days of discussions, meals 
and excursions into the Swiss countryside. It marked the establishment of 
the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), the reincarnation of the CIRL.74
By complete chance, Jouvenel’s house in nearby Saint Saphorin was 
practically a stone’s throw away from the conference venue. His presence 
at the foundational meeting of the MPS marked his consecration as a neo-
liberal intellectual, and thanks to his English skills he was the most active 
French participant in the discussions. While Rougier had been excluded 
for his connections with Vichy and was only allowed to join the MPS in the 
1950s, Jouvenel’s acceptance was seemingly fluid, although there were limits 
placed on this acceptance. For example, there was no question of appointing 
someone with Jouvenel’s political past as head of the French section of the 
society, as was discussed for a moment. As William Rappard told André 
74 Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe, 73; Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 84, 102; Plehwe, 
‘Introduction’, 13.
Figure 12  The view on Vevey and Saint-Saphorin from Mont Pèlerin, 2015
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Siegfried, whom he wanted to take that position: ‘everyone realised – and 
he himself the most, I believe – that for reasons you will surely understand, 
it would not be appropriate to ask him to represent your country at the 
council’.75 Jouvenel’s successful integration into the MPS can be traced back 
to some prior steps he had taken. After the war, Jouvenel had been quick to 
establish contacts with Jacques Rueff, whose work he praised.76 He profited 
from his f irst post-war English journey to meet Hayek, probably in late 
1945, and the two maintained a regular correspondence starting in the late 
1940s. Hayek was keen on inviting Jouvenel to the Mont Pèlerin gathering, 
and Jouvenel subsequently became his preferred counsellor on all matters 
French. In return, Jouvenel retained an abiding gratitude to the MPS, and 
especially to Hayek, for including him. In 1951, when Hayek asked if he 
would be present at the Society’s next meeting in Beauvallon in southern 
France, Jouvenel replied: ‘Seriously, as long as I am on my legs I won’t miss 
your gatherings to which I am in every way indebted.’77
The Beauvallon meeting resulted in a book edited by Hayek, Capitalism 
and the Historians, containing an article by Jouvenel in which he castigated 
‘continental’ intellectuals for their increasingly critical attitude to capital-
ism, whereas the ‘business community’ had been ‘strikingly bettering the 
conditions of the masses, improving its own working ethics, and growing 
in civic consciousness’. Jouvenel agreed with Hayek’s analysis, expressed 
in the same volume, that historians had falsif ied history by creating ‘the 
legend of the deterioration of the position of the working classes in con-
sequence of the rise of “capitalism”’, while a ‘more careful examination 
of the facts’ proved that the exact opposite had been the case.78 Jouvenel 
concluded by suggesting that the problem lay not with capitalism but with 
the ‘intellectual class’ itself. In modern society, intellectuals had lost their 
old primacy to an ‘executive class’ of producers who gave the consumers 
the ‘goods’ they desired most – an attitude that intellectuals eschewed 
almost by def inition. Thus, jealousy mixed with an inferiority complex 
resulted in the intelligentsia pitting itself against capitalism with unjusti-
f ied anger.79 In an earlier letter to Hayek, Jouvenel explained that the aim 
75 Denord, Néoliberalisme Version Française, 225.
76 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 274.
77 Jouvenel to Friedrich Hayek (June/July 1951), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (301). See also Jouvenel, 
Problèmes de l’Angleterre Socialiste, 97; idem, L’Amérique en Europe, II.
78 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘The Treatment of Capitalism by Continental Intellectuals’, in Capital-
ism and the Historians, ed. Hayek, 122; F.A. Hayek, ‘History and Politics’, in Capitalism and the 
Historians, 10.
79 Jouvenel, ‘The Treatment of Capitalism’, 123.
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of his contribution was to analyse ‘the moral condemnation of Capitalisme 
[sic]’ by various intellectuals:
As I see it, the success of Capitalism is linked to the admission of certain 
traits of man, those which were strongly and exclusively stressed by 
Hobbes (and Locke). Critics of Capitalism are those which [sic] either 
are unsympathetic to those traits (the Christian and Carlylean strains 
of criticism) or who do not accept the unfolding of the logic of favouring 
these traits.80
With these kinds of statements, Jouvenel aligned himself with a general 
critique of intellectuals that was developed by a larger group of academics 
affiliated with neoliberalism. Writers like Hayek, Raymond Aron and Joseph 
Schumpeter, convinced that they were engaged in an ideological combat 
in which the overwhelming majority of intellectuals had picked the side 
of Marxism, wrote influential works in which they attacked the role of 
intellectuals in society as such. While Aron famously described icons like 
Marxism as ‘the opium of intellectuals’ in search of a ‘secular religion’, Hayek 
notably denounced intellectuals as ‘second-hand dealers in ideas’ whose 
‘all-pervasive’ influence had paved the way for ‘socialist totalitarianism’ in 
the entire Western world.81
Schumpeter saw the subversive behaviour of intellectuals as a function 
of the capitalist system itself. In his popular tract Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, he complained that ‘capitalism inevitably and by virtue of the 
very logic of its civilization creates, educates and subsidizes a vested interest 
in social unrest’. While under earlier systems of rule, intellectuals had been 
constrained by a menacing state power, the capitalist order was neither will-
ing nor able ‘to control the intellectual sector effectively’.82 Despite sharing 
many positions with the neoliberal movement, Schumpeter never joined the 
MPS, and some of its members had reservations about his ideas. In a letter to 
Jouvenel, Röpke called his work a ‘disgusting book’, but Jouvenel read it with 
interest and discussed it in several articles.83 Although he seemed to struggle 
with Schumpeter’s assertion that a socialist system could function in reality, 
Jouvenel concluded that it could never be reconciled with individual liberty: 
80 Jouvenel to Friedrich Hayek (June/July 1951) and other parts of their correspondence from 
1951 and 1952, Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (301).
81 Raymond Aron, L’Opium des Intellectuels, 274; Hayek, ‘The Intellectuals and Socialism’, 417, 
419, 432.
82 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 146, 151.
83 Wilhelm Röpke to Jouvenel (3 July 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
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‘We are moving towards socialism. But there is little reason to believe that 
it will signify the advent of the civilisation the socialists dream of. It is more 
probable that it will bear fascist traits.’84
His MPS connections and the success of On Power provided Jouvenel 
with important ties to intellectual milieus of the American right. Directly 
following the conference at Mont Pèlerin, the American journalist and 
fellow MPS founding member Felix Morley involved him with Human 
Events, a conservative weekly he had founded together with Frank 
Hanighen and Henry Regnery. Between June 1947 and the end of 1951, 
Jouvenel wrote twenty-eight contributions for Human Events, f irst in 
the form of long articles and later as a monthly ‘European Supplement’.85 
In one of his early articles, he criticised both state intervention and 
laissez-faire, essentially repeating his arguments from Du Pouvoir. Since 
the assumption ‘that the collective interest would also be served by the 
pursuit of the various personal interests’ was proven wrong, the ‘vigilant 
wisdom of a statesman’ was necessary to make ‘modes of conduct which 
are disadvantageous to Society also disadvantageous to the individual’ 
and vice versa.86
Jouvenel also published an attack against Soviet communism and every-
body in the West who was indulgent towards it – including Churchill, ‘who 
raised Tito from bandit status’, and De Gaulle, who ‘acquitted Communism’ 
of ‘sabotage’ during the f irst year of the war and allowed ‘Thorez, the war 
deserter’ to sit at the government table. For Jouvenel, recent history showed 
how dangerous this indulgence of communism really was, especially when 
combined with the f inancial ruin of the middle classes:
When these people have been despoiled, when it is understood that 
private property is not to be respected but that whatever faction gains 
the upper hand can alter the distribution of the national income to 
suit its partisans, when politics fall to the level of a tug of war between 
vote-getting machines. Extremists on both sides then resort to violence. 
The Communist army marches violently to the complete destruction of 
84 XXX [BdJ], ‘Penchons-Nous sur le Chaudron Allemand: Pourquoi le Nazisme? Et Après le 
Nazisme, Quoi?’, Curieux (undated); Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Kann der Sozialisme Funktionieren? 
Ein Bedeutsames Buch des Professors Schumpeter’, Die Weltwoche (28 October 1945). Both articles 
included in folder ‘Articles, 29 Mars 1945-26 Avril 1946’ in Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (13).
85 William Buckley Jr., ‘1950: When Conservatism Began to Stretch its Limbs’, Human Events: 
The National Conservative Weekly (1 May 1998), 15.
86 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘The Moral Danger of Planned Economy’, Human Events: A Weekly 
Analysis for the American Citizen (5 November 1947).
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society, and some Fuehrer or other always arises to rally those who seek 
the restoration of order.87
In spite of these depressing perspectives, Jouvenel saw hopeful signs as 
more and more people were f inally becoming aware of the danger of the 
‘savage imperialism’ of the communist block: ‘only last spring, when a little 
group of true liberals assembled from various countries at the Mont Pèlerin 
Conference in Switzerland, it still seemed as though we could not break 
through the curtain of haze, however much we tried. But now, with 1948, 
the break-through has come.’88
Even more radically anti-Marxist than Jouvenel, the editors of Human 
Events occasionally summarised his conclusions for the American reader. 
In December 1951, at the end of a long article in which Jouvenel explained 
the lasting influence of Labour in England, even after losing the elections 
to the Conservatives, the editors concluded that socialism was ‘a disease 
that penetrates the very marrow of the nation that tries it’. They reminded 
their readers that there could be ‘no compromise with Socialism. It must 
be fought at every step.’89 In the early 1950s, possibly via Raymond Aron, 
Jouvenel became involved with the periodical Confluence, founded and 
headed by the Harvard PhD candidate Henry Kissinger, who was at the time 
working on his dissertation on Metternich and Castlereagh. Kissinger, who 
counted on Jouvenel, Aron and Gabriel Marcel to provide his periodical with 
regular contributions from France, met Jouvenel in Paris in January 1953. 
The two established a long-lasting friendship that would lead Kissinger to 
testify in favour of Jouvenel during his lawsuit against Sternhell in 1983.90
During these years, Fabre-Luce lacked the international neoliberal con-
nections of Jouvenel. He was in regular contact with neither Hayek nor 
Röpke, and he never joined the MPS – let alone that he would have been 
allowed to.91 Nevertheless, his public and private writings show striking 
commonalities with Jouvenel’s ideas and aspirations of the time. Fabre-Luce 
attentively read Du Pouvoir, and his reading notes show a propensity to focus 
on its political conclusions. From Jouvenel’s praise of the English aristocracy, 
87 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘The Curtain of Haze’, Human Events (31 December 1947).
88 Jouvenel, ‘The Curtain of Haze’.
89 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘European Supplement’, Human Events (December 1951).
90 Henry Kissinger to Jouvenel (13 November 1952); Jouvenel to Kissinger (17 November 1952) 
and their subsequent correspondence included in Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (302).
91 While there is no correspondence with Hayek, a single letter by Röpke from 1951 compliment-
ing Fabre-Luce on an article in the Écrits de Paris suggests that the two did not know each other 
prior to this date. Wilhelm Röpke to Fabre-Luce (11 March 1951), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 8.
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Fabre-Luce concluded that ‘the system of liberty was a class system’, and he 
saw the Épuration as the logical consequence of the abandonment of divine 
law: ‘in 1944, we left the shelter of the constitution that still linked us to 
our ancestors’.92 Fabre-Luce also read Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy and he discussed Hayek, Rueff and the Colloque Walter 
Lippmann in one of his f irst post-war books. He praised The Road to Serfdom 
for demonstrating that a regime of perfect social security would eliminate 
the Darwinian mechanism of ‘the selection of the best’ and that a system 
of rationing always led to censorship. Fabre-Luce was critical, however, of 
Hayek’s tendency to simply describe any appeal for state intervention as an 
intellectual mistake. ‘One can expect the people to suffer certain automatic 
adaptations, not to starve without reacting with demands of intervention’.93
At the national level, Fabre-Luce took the first steps leading to his gradual 
reintegration into the French right-wing mainstream. The most striking 
episode in this process was his passionate correspondence with Raymond 
Aron, which started as an icy exchange of letters about Pétain, De Gaulle and 
their own positions during the war, gradually becoming more cordial as the 
two intellectuals discovered their joint agenda for the post-war period and 
their agreement on the necessity of a united Europe against communism.94 
By 1951, their relations had improved to the point that they met for a beer 
in a Paris brasserie, enjoying the quality of their intellectual exchange.95 
Fabre-Luce also renewed his contacts with Hubert Beuve-Méry, chief editor 
of Le Monde, whom he possibly knew from Notre Temps and surely from 
his visit during the occupation to the Vichy elite school at Uriage, where 
Beuve-Méry was the assistant of director Pierre-Dominique Dunoyer de 
Segonzac. Despite their strong political disagreement, Beuve-Méry allowed 
Fabre-Luce to publish several articles in Le Monde during 1952 and 1953, ap-
pearing under the ‘libres opinions’ heading that explicitly did not represent 
the newspaper’s own political convictions.96
92 Reading notes included in folder ‘Notes de Lecture 1950-1975 (Environ)’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 
10 dr. 1. In 1954, Fabre-Luce listed Du Pouvoir among the twelve most important books for any 
reader interested in ‘the history of our times’. Fabre-Luce, Histoire de la Révolution Européenne, 
353.
93 Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 126, 127.
94 See the letters (1938-1954) between Fabre-Luce and Raymond Aron included in Fonds AFL, 
472 AP 2 and Fonds AFL, 472 AP 3. A selection of their letters was published in Aron’s own 
Commentaire, any scholar’s blessing considering the utter illegibility of Aron’s handwriting: 
Casanova, ed., ‘Correspondance entre Raymond Aron et Alfred Fabre-Luce’, 593-617.
95 Fabre-Luce, Journal 1951, 175.
96 Garbe, Alfred Fabre-Luce, 296; Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 175; Hubert Beuve-
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‘This General Feeling of Open Conspiracy’97
Wilhelm Röpke was one of Jouvenel’s earliest acquaintances in the neo-
liberal milieu, and their very rich correspondence, scarcely studied so far, 
provides insight into the doubts, pessimism, ambitions and obsessions of 
early post-war neoliberalism. It also offers an inside view of the practicalities 
of Jouvenel’s integration into the neoliberal community. A cosmopolitan 
liberal and an outspoken opponent of National Socialism, Röpke was f ired 
from his economics chair at the University of Marburg in April 1933 as 
one of the few non-Jewish academics targeted by the early phase of the 
Nazi Gleichschaltung. He subsequently served as a professor in Istanbul, 
where he had Rüstow as a colleague, before joining the Graduate Institute 
of International Studies in Geneva in 1937. During the Fall of France, unsure 
about what would happen to Switzerland, Röpke hesitated about whether to 
emigrate to the United States, and f inally decided against it. The desperate 
journey of Mises, his colleague at the Graduate Institute, who travelled with 
his wife through a France in turmoil and only managed to cross the Spanish 
border after Rougier intervened in Vichy to secure a special visa for him, 
probably played a role in convincing Röpke to stay in Geneva.98
Caught between his aversion to Nazism and a patriotic attachment 
to his fatherland, Röpke spent the war years in the relative security of a 
besieged Switzerland writing books reflecting his concerns. Internationale 
Ordnung (1945) was an energetic plea for a post-war international economy 
based on free trade and peaceful brotherhood and a vigorous attack against 
the ‘absurdity’ of planning. Rather than treating National Socialism as a 
uniquely German phenomenon, Röpke linked it to a totalitarian ideology 
that was at work in almost every country. For him, ‘fascism and National 
Socialism […] are socialism as much as communism; all are variants of the 
totalitarian system shaped in its modern form by the Russian Revolution of 
1917’.99 In Die Deutsche Frage (1945), Röpke applied this line of thought to the 
future of Germany. An attempt to convince a non-German audience of the 
possibility of a different Germany after the defeat of Hitler, his book was an 
exploration of the ‘historical and psychological roots of National Socialism’ 
and a sketch of a new Germany based on a de-Prussianised federal structure 
and a liberal economic system.100 Calling the concentration camps ‘a ques-
97 Jouvenel to Wilhelm Röpke (undated), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
98 Hennecke, Wilhelm Röpke, 93, 115, 126; Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 79.
99 Röpke, Internationale Ordnung, 109, 303. Italics in original.
100 Röpke, Die Deutsche Frage, 7, 226, 232.
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tion of system and human type, not of national spirit’, Röpke concluded that 
the aim for the future should be ‘to put an end to such systems and types, 
not to the nations in which they f ind themselves’. He found it ‘bizarre’ that 
ordinary Germans were now the object of an international outrage that 
would have been much more effective had it mobilised itself ‘twelve years 
earlier’. Röpke’s f inal chapter carried as a motto a Schiller citation: ‘Der 
bloβ niedergeworfene Feind kann wiederaufstehen, aber der versöhnte ist 
wahrhaft überwunden’.101
Jouvenel and Röpke met at the beginning of 1944, and the two soon 
started an intense correspondence, especially during the f irst years when 
their letters occasionally crossed each other.102 Writing in French during 
the f irst year before shifting to English in September 1945 – almost sym-
bolic of the shift during these years of neoliberalism’s centre of gravity 
to the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ world – Röpke and Jouvenel discussed the political 
and economic issues that occupied them, discovering their shared agenda 
and the possibilities for establishing a community of interests stretching 
from ideological issues to a very practical level. In addition to their written 
conversation, the two also met regularly. Röpke stayed several times at 
the hotel on Mont Pèlerin, using these occasions to pay a lunch visit to the 
Jouvenels. This is not to say that Röpke initially did not harbour any doubt 
as to Jouvenel’s past political activities. In 1948, looking back on the growth 
of their friendship, Röpke stressed that he had always had the greatest 
respect for him, ‘even at the earliest time of our personal relations when, 
as you will remember and as you will not have found unnatural, I had to 
make some efforts to do full justice to you and to get your personality into 
the right focus’.103
In one of his f irst letters, Jouvenel praised Röpke’s Internationale Ord-
nung, especially for its analysis of ‘the wrong ideas from which we suffer’. 
Flattered, Röpke returned the compliment for Jouvenel’s Du Pouvoir (or at 
least the f irst half that he had f inished reading) and announced that he 
had personally made sure the Geneva correspondent of the Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung would dedicate an article to the book. Jouvenel then convinced 
Bourquin to publish a French translation of Röpke’s Deutsche Frage at the 
Cheval Ailé, after which Röpke published an article about Du Pouvoir in the 
Journal de Genève. Röpke subsequently suggested that Jouvenel dedicate 
an article to the German version of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, translated 
101 Ibid., 219, 224n.
102 Röpke to Jouvenel (10 March 1944), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
103 Röpke to Jouvenel (6 April 1948), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
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by Röpke’s wife Eva.104 Jouvenel replied that Röpke’s laudatory article was 
‘inf initely precious’ to him since it ‘so strongly aff irms the convergence of 
our points of view’. He announced that he was more than happy to write a 
‘compte-rendu’ of Hayek’s translated book ‘in which I will try to establish the 
links connecting The Road to Serfdom to your work. It seems very important 
to me to aff irm in this way the existence of a liberal current of thought.’105
In the resulting article, Jouvenel treated the French edition of Röpke’s 
Deutsche Frage at great length. Röpke’s analysis of the historical growth 
of the Prussian state, ideologically supported by Hegel, Kant and the 
Lutheran tradition, illustrated how in Germany the state had become ‘an 
immense depot of material power and moral prestige’ ready to be hijacked 
by the ‘Hitlerians’ through regular elections. In full agreement with Röpke, 
Jouvenel stated that rather than blaming the Germans for this escalation, 
a more general lesson needed to be drawn: ‘certain poisons are capable 
of a prodigious effect on the modern masses. Vast crowd movements can 
be caused, not by appealing to reason, but through a stimulation of anger 
and hope that truly is a demonic art.’ This implied, according to Jouvenel, 
that those who, ‘motivated by generous intentions’, were busy extending 
the state apparatus for social means, should ask themselves ‘if they are 
not preparing a prodigious dungeon for other madmen. Just like M. Hayek 
[footnote: Hayek, Der Weg zur Knechtschaft, transl. Eva Röpke], professor 
Röpke stresses how strongly all the ideas currently in vogue come from Ger-
many and belong to a preparatory process that we can call Bismarckian.’106
So shortly after the end of the war, not all were ready to welcome Röpke’s 
German history lessons. When Emmanuel Berl publicly attacked Röpke as a 
champion of ‘la bonne Allemagne’ who cynically blamed Europe for crimes 
the Germans committed, Jouvenel tried to appease Röpke by explaining 
Berl’s perspective. Although Berl’s assertion that ‘you accuse totalitarian-
ism rather than Germany’ was essentially correct, he ought not to have 
condemned Röpke for it, since ‘the strength of your book lay in the fact that 
you represented totalitarianism as a malady which had struck Germany 
f irst, because that country had been rendered susceptible to it’. Jouvenel 
too had been ‘made uneasy in my mind by some streaks of German ferocity 
and sadism that are unimaginable to me’, but he was convinced that ‘visit-
ing those sins on the whole nation […] leaves little or no hope for Europe’. 
104 Jouvenel to Röpke (26 April 1945); Röpke to Jouvenel (25 May 1945); Röpke to Jouvenel (5 July 
1945); Röpke to Jouvenel (20 July 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
105 Jouvenel to Röpke (23 July 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
106 XXX [BdJ], ‘Penchons-Nous sur le Chaudron Allemand’.
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Furthermore, Berl’s harsh words on Röpke may have been motivated by his 
ethno-religious background. Whereas some of Jouvenel’s friends had been 
‘killed or tortured’ by the Germans ‘for having actively resisted German 
domination’, Berl ‘has had friends and parents turned into soap not for 
having fought Germany but because they were Jews. These unheard-of 
crimes are apt to give one a bad opinion of the whole nation which condoned 
them.’ Disagreeing with Berl, Jouvenel found Röpke to have suff iciently 
recognised German responsibility for these horrors.107
Jouvenel and Röpke indeed agreed on many things. In an earlier letter 
to Röpke, Jouvenel stated his ‘profound conviction: in order to save Europe, 
Germany has to be saved’. Since ‘all Western powers had their share of 
responsibility for the despair that f inally drove Germany into the arms of 
Hitler’, an international solution had to be found.108 Röpke thanked Jouvenel 
for his article on Internationale Ordnung, especially since he found the 
Allied occupation authorities to be ‘so terribly blundering in Germany’ 
and hoped his book would help ‘spread some reason’. He admitted feeling 
‘more depressed than I can say’ about the future of Germany, especially 
when thinking about ‘the Poles and the Russians who are making of Eastern 
Germany a super-Buchenwald’. For a moment, Röpke nourished the hope 
that, ‘as non-signatory of the ill-starred Potsdam agreements’, France would 
‘appear to be the real saviour of Germany by insisting on a federal solution’. 
Instead, De Gaulle and Georges Bidault had found ‘nothing better than the 
old separatist stuff’, leaving Röpke disappointed.109
In late 1946, a short trip to Freiburg (the f irst time he visited Germany 
since 1933) confirmed the worst of Röpke’s fears: ‘what the Allied quack doc-
tors are doing at the German sick-bed is nightmarish. It couldn’t have been 
done worse.’ He was especially angry with the British ‘Labour ideologues’ for 
refusing him entry into the British occupation zone because they considered 
him ‘a dangerous sort of Neo-Nazi. It simply does not get into their little 
skulls that somebody who is a non-Socialist and anti-Communist can have 
been at the same time one of the most uncompromising and militant anti-
Nazis. That is our world!’110 To comfort Röpke, Jouvenel reminded him of 
his personal achievements and the long-term perspective of their common 
cause: ‘it seems to me you have every reason to be pleased of the influence 
that you exert single-handed [sic]. You have become an adjective: “this is a 
107 Jouvenel to Röpke (28 August 1946?), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
108 Jouvenel to Röpke (30 May 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
109 Röpke to Jouvenel (20 September 1945, 16 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
110 Röpke to Jouvenel (21 November 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
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Röpkian outlook” is a not infrequent phrase.’ Besides, ‘we have got a long 
way to go intellectually before we shake liberalism free from Ricardianism, 
and it may be a good thing that the full flare of public attention is not turned 
upon the Third Way before the old structure it is meant to replace has been 
entirely swept away. This is the time to sow and not the time to reap.’111
By using the concept of the ‘third way’ in his letter to Röpke, Jouvenel 
was referring to an idea that played an important role in the specif ically 
German school of early post-war neoliberalism. Röpke, Rüstow, Eucken 
and other representatives of German ‘ordoliberalism’ (named after the 
periodical Ordo that acted as their platform of discussion) developed a 
variant of neoliberalism that diverged from Hayek and Mises’ Austrian 
School in its emphasis on a strong state. Röpke’s view of a third way between 
Keynesianism and laissez-faire was based on a combination of Spenglerian 
cultural pessimism, fear of the mass society and anti-modernism closely 
resembling Jouvenel’s ideas. It bore the traits of an elitism that was deeply 
suspicious of capitalism and democracy. Ordoliberals exerted consider-
able influence on the ‘social market economy’ policy that was adopted by 
the German Federal Republic under Konrad Adenauer and his long-time 
minister of economy Ludwig Erhard.112
From the beginning, Röpke involved Jouvenel in his plans for an inter-
national neoliberal journal, which he wanted to call Occident. He asked 
Jouvenel’s advice on other potential French contributors to ‘our periodical’ 
and suggested that he write ‘an article on Nationalism (in your beautiful 
French, of course)’.113 When Occident failed to materialise, both intellectuals 
had their doubts about Hayek’s alternative plan for what was to become 
the MPS. Röpke told Jouvenel:
I am not quite sure whether it would be wise to sail thus under Hayek’s 
f lag. I dare say you are right in your judgement on his book. Would it not 
be better to march separately, though to strike jointly? Hayek is perhaps 
too apt to stress the stupidity of the people he really ought to wish to 
convince and too little inclined to ask what the legitimate grievances 
of people are. I also would make some reserves before accepting his 
tendency to lump together Social Democracy and Nazism.114
111 Jouvenel to Röpke (28 November 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
112 Ralf Ptak, ‘Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations of the Social 
Market Economy’, in The Road from Mont Pèlerin, eds. Mirowski & Plehwe, 104, 106, 111.
113 Röpke to Jouvenel (20 October 1945); Jouvenel to Röpke (11 November 1945); Röpke to Jouvenel 
(16 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
114 Röpke to Jouvenel (1 March 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
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Jouvenel agreed. As ‘admirable’ as The Road to Serfdom was ‘as an aggres-
sive weapon’, he found Hayek’s work ‘too partisan, too one-sided, to carry 
conviction. At least in my mind it leaves as an after-taste the feeling that 
the other case had not been put, that the motives of the policy denounced 
are insuff iciently understood and sympathised with.’115 He called Hayek’s 
proposal for an international neoliberal conference an ‘excellent develop-
ment’, as long as the meeting would not become a ‘restatement of the Way 
to Serfdom [sic] but something new. Hayek seemed to me to be brimming 
with ideas.’ Both Hayek and Mises had spent too much time assailing their 
socialist opponents and too little time discussing their own positive ideas. 
According to Jouvenel, this was ‘good tactics’ but an unnecessary distrac-
tion from what should be their ultimate goal: the elaboration of a new 
liberalism.116
Like Fabre-Luce, both Röpke and Jouvenel were convinced of the need for 
reconciliation between former members of the Resistance and collaborators, 
since the new global confrontation between communism and liberty had 
made these past quarrels irrelevant. Confirming that he received a paper 
by Hendrik de Man, probably sent to him by Jouvenel, Röpke praised the 
exiled Belgian collaborator as ‘an exceptionally gifted man’ and expressed 
the hope that ‘we shall see here soon a new alignment of fronts in which 
those old quarrels will cede into the background. Every day, the clash 
between Bolshevism and everything which is on this side of the ditch is 
becoming clearer and clearer.’117 When Röpke expressed his hesitations 
about accepting a French invitation to deliver lectures in Freiburg and 
Tübingen, both situated in the French zone of occupation, Jouvenel drew 
an analogy to collaboration during the German occupation of France: ‘I am 
somewhat astonished that my compatriots, who have given to “collabora-
tion” such an extensive sense, cannot put themselves in the place of the 
now vanquished, of the now occupied, and understand that ever the best 
things, that especially the best things must not come to the Germans under 
the colours of a foreign flag.’118
Röpke hesitated between what he saw as his duty ‘to establish the contact 
between those intellectually starved people and the outside world’ and the 
fear of negative reactions if he made his f irst public appearance in Germany 
115 Jouvenel to Röpke (undated, 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
116 Jouvenel to Röpke (28 November 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
117 Röpke to Jouvenel (20 September 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
118 Röpke to Jouvenel (11 November 1945); Jouvenel to Röpke (November 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 
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since 1933 as the official guest of an occupying power. Jouvenel responded that 
he faced the same moral dilemma towards his own fatherland. Claiming that 
he had been asked to resume his activities as an international reporter for the 
Paris big press, he was unwilling to subject himself to signing a declaration 
of twenty-four points about his behaviour under the occupation. Although 
he fulf illed the criteria and the doors were ‘wide open’ to him, Jouvenel did 
not want ‘to cross a door which is unjustly closed to some. During the oc-
cupation I refused a subvention of a scientific character because it would not 
have been open to a jew or a free-mason. Since there was a discrimination, 
I didn’t want it. Now can we subscribe to another discrimination? I think 
not.’119 Three years later, Röpke had fewer scruples accepting an invitation 
to hold lectures as an off icial guest of Francoist Spain: ‘Despite everything 
the “incorruptibles” might say, I really think I ought to go.’120
Both Röpke and Jouvenel were frustrated with what they saw as the weak 
or overly sympathetic attitude of Western politicians and media towards 
Soviet communism, which for Jouvenel came down to ‘a policy of appease-
ment’. At the same time, they shrunk back from the risk of war implied by a 
f irm stance towards ‘the cynical imperialism of the East’, since this would 
come down to ‘a surgical operation which the ailing and weakened body 
of the Occident cannot well bear’.121 This dilemma led Jouvenel to draw a 
parallel with his own activities in favour of rapprochement with Hitler 
during the 1930s. He wrote to Röpke explaining that a decade earlier his 
own ‘pacif ism’ had made him try
to ‘understand’ Germany as others are trying today to ‘understand’ Rus-
sia. I was blamed then for this ‘understandingness’ by the very people 
who practise it with Russia to day. The outcome showed I was wrong 
and I could not preserve my attitude to the end. Munich was the turning 
point for me. Now if I was wrong, the people who do the same today must 
be wrong too.122
One is struck by the general tone of the Jouvenel-Röpke correspondence, 
in which pessimism about world affairs was mixed with the conviction of 
representing a tiny elite of reasonable people in a world possessed by madness 
119 Röpke to Jouvenel (14 November 1945); Jouvenel to Röpke (10 August 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 
96 01 (305).
120 Röpke to Jouvenel (16 December 1948), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
121 Jouvenel to Röpke (1 October 1945, 22 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
122 Jouvenel to Röpke (3 February 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
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and fury. Just like Hayek, who regretted that his movement lacked a ‘liberal 
Utopia’ and harboured a jealous admiration for the courage and dedication 
of the socialist militant, Jouvenel and Röpke were convinced that their ideas 
lacked the ‘mystique’ necessary to win the mass appeal and electoral support 
that the champions of planning and totalitarianism could easily mobilise.123 
Nonetheless, mixing fundamental pessimism with delusions of grandeur, 
they kept telling each other that if their faith was strong, they might prevail 
in the long run. In December 1945, in a particularly morbid Christmas letter, 
Jouvenel told Röpke that ‘even though injustice is rife, brutality rampant and 
imperialism arrogantly assertive, I feel that we may yet triumph over the 
forces of evil’.124 In a later letter, Jouvenel told Röpke that ‘it is an enormous 
comfort to feel that we are not alone in our effort’ and that their joint mission 
to move ‘this mass of untruths’ was beginning to bear fruit. ‘I cannot tell you 
how much I value our correspondence and meetings and this general feeling 
of open conspiracy, as my dear [H.G.] Wells would put it.’125
If the masses were irrational and easily influenced, capitalist propaganda 
might also have an effect on them. With this aim, Jouvenel inquired into 
the possibility of spreading Walter Sulzbach’s pamphlet ‘Capitalistic War-
mongers’ in a French version. Having already found a publisher interested 
(probably Bourquin), he stressed the necessity of such activities by referring 
to ‘the psychological conditions prevailing on this continent, which make it 
very diff icult to oppose the currents of irrational thinking’.126 Just how much 
Jouvenel and Röpke were in agreement on the dangerous irrationality of the 
masses is illustrated by another long article in Curieux in which Jouvenel 
introduced Röpke’s work to a French-speaking audience. Citing Röpke, 
Jouvenel lamented that the introduction of democracy in the nineteenth 
century had coincided with the decline of aristocratic individualism and the 
rise of the hordes. From that moment, it had become useless to ‘reason with 
individual common sense’ but one had to ‘excite collective fever’ instead. 
‘Citizens want laws and magistrates, the masses want myths and heroes: 
they tend towards totalitarianism with a movement required by their na-
ture as masses. Whoever wants to f ight this has to study the phenomenon 
of swarming [grégarisme].’127
123 Hayek, ‘The Intellectuals and Socialism’, 432.
124 Jouvenel to Röpke (22 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
125 Jouvenel to Röpke (undated, 1946/1947), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
126 Jouvenel to unkown (28 February 1946), Don 96 01 (305). See Walter Sulzbach, ‘Capitalistic 
Warmongers’: A Modern Superstition (Chicago, 1942).
127 XXX [BdJ], ‘La Crise de Notre Temps’, Curieux (28  June 1945), included in folder ‘Arti-
cles 29 Mars-26 Avril 1946’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (13).
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At first sight, this contempt for the masses and the anti-democratic insist-
ence on the work of a tiny elite seem out of place among liberal intellectuals, 
but Röpke and Jouvenel did not consider this a paradox. For both of them, 
liberalism represented the rule of law, free enterprise, individual liberties 
and the protection of a sharp social hierarchy associated with the ‘natural’ 
order.128 They associated democracy with very different things: mob rule, the 
subjection of the legal system to the tyranny of the majority, irrationality 
and the ever-looming danger of totalitarianism and war. As Jouvenel wrote 
in an article destined for Human Events, liberalism and democracy were 
‘far apart’. While liberalism started from the ideal of the ‘free agent’, only 
limited in his freedom by the smallest possible requirements of society, 
democracy meant ‘the absolute command of a majority’ legitimised by 
nothing but ‘the formalization of a reign of force’. The democratic system 
was defenceless against the establishment of a ‘team-will’ that considered 
itself entitled ‘to lead, drag or force along a willing or unwilling majority. 
The Führer-prinzip is in fact prevalent in the party spirit.’129
Fabre-Luce applied the same distinction between democracy and 
liberalism. In 1946, using Abraham Lincoln’s def inition of democracy as 
‘government by the people’, he dismissed it because ‘that government 
never remains liberal. The crowd, if it rules, is the most absolute and the 
most basely flattered of all sovereigns. Louis XIV was still moderated by 
the respect of a tradition. Nothing contains the crowned Caliban. This 
means I am not a democrat.’130 In 1949, Fabre-Luce insisted that ‘liberty 
remains historically associated with property, with the predominance 
of the bourgeoisie, much more strongly than with the establishment of 
universal suffrage or collectivisation. By their own movement, the masses 
run towards the tyrant.’131
The essential characteristics of Jouvenel’s brand of neoliberalism can 
be summarised as freedom of the enlightened individual, an emphasis on 
the natural leadership of a small aristocratic elite, a fundamental distrust 
of democracy and mass society, a strongly hierarchical view of society and 
pessimism about the future of Western civilisation. While the ideological 
differences between fascism and liberalism seem almost irreconcilable 
when understood in their absolute sense, the gap narrows considerably 
128 Ptak, ‘Neoliberalism in Germany’, 104.
129 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘A Disquisition on Democracy’ (undated), article draft included in 
folder ‘Articles 1949-1952’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (13).
130 [‘Je ne suis donc pas démocrate’]. Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 195.
131 Fabre-Luce, Le Siècle Prend Figure, 15, 16.
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if one takes a look at Jouvenel’s specif ic ideas during the early post-war 
years.132 The temporal overlap of his activities in the intellectual milieu 
of the French extreme right and his neoliberal activities can also serve as 
an illustration of a larger trend. By the end of the Second World War, like 
former collaborators and Pétainists, French neoliberals belonged to those 
excluded (albeit not ostracised) from a governmental leadership set on an 
agenda of planning and nationalisations.133 During this period, Jouvenel 
was not the only French neoliberal who published in the Écrits de Paris, 
which also featured contributions from Rougier, Jacques Chastenet and 
Claude-Joseph Gignoux. A joint Cold-War agenda of anti-communism and 
often also European federalism were other elements that made extensive 
connections possible between extreme-rightists and neoliberals such as 
Röpke and Raymond Aron, who contributed several articles to La Fédéra-
tion. The CNIP opened itself both to extreme-rightists like Isorni and to 
right-wing neoliberals such as Rueff. Strikingly, the early 1950s marked 
the return of former Pétainists and collaborators to political positions, 
the resurgence of a self-conf ident extreme-right press and the renewed 
influence of neoliberalism on French politics. Both prime ministers Faure 
and Pinay took inspiration and advice from neoliberal advisors.134
132 Failing to see this factual proximity, Serge Audier bluntly states that Jouvenel’s ideas as 
expressed in Du Pouvoir have nothing to do with his fascist past. See Audier, Néo-Libéralisme(s), 
274.
133 Nord, France’s New Deal, 145.
134 Denord, ‘French Neoliberalism and its Divisions’, 52, 53.

 Conclusion
From the Sohlberg to Mont Pèlerin
To a large extent, this has been an exercise in political swear words. Fas-
cism is today almost universally seen as one, even by most political parties 
historically inspired by the phenomenon or belonging to the same tradition.1 
With the exception of a few generally marginal extremist groups and 
equally marginal intellectuals, nobody calls him/herself a fascist.2 More or 
less the same is true for neoliberalism. Although considered a less absolute 
evil than fascism, little positive meaning is intended when the spectre 
of neoliberalism is conjured up in a present-day political context. This is 
partially the result of how the neoliberal milieu itself developed during the 
second half of the twentieth century. While the term was used as a positive 
epithet by neoliberals during the two decades following its invention in 1938, 
this began to change during the late 1950s alongside the rising dominance 
inside the Mont Pèlerin Society of a Chicago-School radical anti-statism 
that looked remarkably like classical liberalism. During the same period, 
the MPS lost the support of its founding members Raymond Aron, Polanyi 
and Jouvenel, who grew bored with its laissez-faire dogmatism and highly 
technical discussions and therefore stopped attending its meetings. In 1960, 
in a letter to Milton Friedman, Jouvenel admitted feeling ‘out of harmony 
with the Society’, which he saw turning ever more strongly to ‘a Manicheism 
according to which the State can do no good and private enterprise can do 
no wrong’.3
With neoliberalism falling into disuse as a self-descriptive tool of 
analysis, it was abandoned into the hands of its opponents, who have 
vocally denounced its influence, especially since the onset of neoliberal 
policy during and after the Reagan-Thatcher era. This development has 
led to the confusing situation that ‘neoliberalism’, a concept originally 
launched to develop a new liberalism acknowledging the importance of 
the state, is today often seen to stand for the most radically anti-statist 
1 For an early analysis of fascism as a near-universal swear word, see George Orwell, ‘As I 
please: 17’ [1944], in Fascism, vol. 1, eds. Griff in & Feldman, 51.
2 For a rare example of a self-proclaimed ‘fascist intellectual’ engaged in a discussion with 
historians of fascism (the twentieth-century historian’s version of a paleontologist interviewing 
a T-Rex), see the discussions with and about the Russian ‘Eurasian’ right-extremist Alexander 
Dugin in Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik 3 (2004).
3 Cited in Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 150, 175.
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free-market fundamentalism.4 Though much less universally despised 
than fascism and neoliberalism, Europeanism (and especially its evil twin 
brother ‘Europhilia’) is also rapidly becoming a swear word in present-day 
politics. While it is still in use as a positive or neutral term, politicians have 
become increasingly reluctant to revindicate it, fearing the backlash of an 
electorate that has in many countries turned against the current state of 
European integration. From a present-day perspective, the principle use of 
the three main concepts treated in this study is the negative description of 
an other. This brings us close to a Sartrian paraphrase: the fascist/neoliberal/
Europeanist, c’est les autres.
This has not been my approach. Rather than preliminarily according a 
present-day meaning to the concepts or engaging in the conflicts of def ini-
tion and categorisation that have already exerted too large an influence on 
the historiography of fascism in France, I have analysed what meaning the 
concepts of fascism, Europe and (neo-)liberalism had for the intellectuals 
themselves during the period with which I am concerned. My main argu-
ment has been that Europeanist and internationalist ideas and context 
are key to understanding the development of Bertrand de Jouvenel and 
Alfred Fabre-Luce’s political thought between 1930 and the early 1950s. The 
commitment of these two intellectuals to a future united Europe, with a 
reconciled France and Germany at its core, originated in the 1920s. This was 
not only the driving force behind their ‘fascist drift’ during the f irst half of 
the 1930s, it also strongly influenced their attitude during the occupation 
and permitted them to forge new contacts once the war was over. By the 
mid-1950s, both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were able to look back on the f irst 
half of their political and intellectual life and draw positive conclusions. 
After the horrors of the Second World War, the violent death of several 
of their closest friends (Drieu, Luchaire) by execution or suicide, and the 
near-complete collapse of the fascist ideology with which they had long 
identif ied, they witnessed the onset of a ‘European revolution’, which they 
identif ied as the fulf ilment of their decades-old ambitions.
During the 1930s, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s internationalism evolved 
from a Briandist collective security model with ambitions for a larger 
United States of Europe into an alliance of authoritarian imperial states 
that would jointly and rationally exploit the wealth of their colonies and 
weaker neighbours. Their revulsion against war and the influence of their 
German contacts steered them towards an intransigent pacif ism of the 
4 Philip Mirowski, ‘Postface: Def ining Neoliberalism’, in The Road from Mont Pèlerin, eds. 
Mirowski & Plehwe, 427, 440.
CONCLUsION 261
right, willing to subject all other interests to Franco-German rapproche-
ment. During the same period, their economic ideas shifted from a belief 
in a liberal economy with limited state guidance to a fascist-corporatist 
model. Growing frustration with the lack of reforms, chronic governmental 
instability and the slow procedures of parliament, together with the shock 
of the Great Depression, ended up shattering Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s 
confidence in parliamentarianism and capitalism. Hostile towards the left 
and associating all socialist reform projects with ‘totalitarian’ Soviet com-
munism, they came to see dictatorship, corporatism and rapprochement 
with Hitler’s Germany as the only solution for France.
Fabre-Luce’s fascist ideal type was a revolution without bloodshed, a 
fascist economy with islands of private initiative and a society of disciplined 
freedom. Jouvenel’s was the realisation of socialism without class strug-
gle, a revolution without a proletariat and with continued privileges for 
a natural elite. They sometimes presented fascism as a mere method to 
discipline democracy and immunise it against the threat of communism, 
but they generally interpreted it as a revolutionarily different system. Both 
intellectuals associated fascism with the youth, dynamism, adventure and 
‘physical virtues’ of a younger generation, with which they had identif ied 
since the late 1920s. This new fascist youth was considered different in their 
very essence from the ossified legalism and parliamentarianism of outdated 
bourgeois society. Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel attributed the foreign-policy 
successes of the fascist regimes to Hitler and Mussolini’s association with 
this new generation, while France, still under the reign of a tired and me-
diocre bourgeoisie, suffered one setback after another. From the founding 
of the PPF, Jacques Doriot reflected their hope of a strong and dynamic 
leader forging a fascist party with a more credible popular base than the 
‘reactionary’ anti-parliamentary leagues. Their activities as intellectuals 
at the party’s service permitted them to reach an unprecedented audience 
while bringing them into contact with different classes of society.
The Fall of France, the occupation and Vichy’s National Revolution 
fundamentally changed the circumstances under which the two intel-
lectuals worked but not their convictions. Both were fascinated with the 
grand opportunities offered by a Europe united by German arms, and 
they explained the German victory of 1940 as the result of larger historical, 
psychological and political developments in Western civilisation, giving 
National Socialism the credentials of a revolution equal or superior to the 
French Revolution of 1789. They linked the Nazi victory to a more general 
fascist revolution which, they hoped, would engulf all of Europe. Fabre-Luce 
fully embraced the idea of collaboration in the name of this new fascist 
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Europe, convinced that France would be able to make a worthwhile and 
even necessary contribution to the system. He criticised the narrow-minded 
nationalism of those who, out of French patriotic sentiment, refused to 
take the same direction. Jouvenel was more reluctant, sharing Fabre-Luce’s 
fascinations but unwilling to commit himself entirely to a German Europe. 
Many ambiguities remained in his behaviour, however, and he seemed to 
alternate between his connections in the Paris collaborationist world, where 
several of his closest friends held key positions, his espionage activities 
on behalf of the Vichy regime and the Resistance network with which he 
established contacts in his native Corrèze.
After mid-1943, their joint experiences with exile and persecution led to 
a partial rethinking of their earlier engagements. While both intellectuals 
rejected the post-war order as a return to the parliamentarianism they 
held responsible for France’s decadence under the Third Republic, they 
sought for a new creed that would preserve what they understood to be 
the ‘positive’ legacy of fascism, essentially consisting of unity, authority, 
an austere working spirit and respect for a ‘natural’ hierarchy without the 
pitfalls of aggressive warfare. They temporarily supported the monarchist 
movement around the Comte de Paris, after which they found a political 
home in the post-war press initiatives of the French extreme right. While 
Jouvenel developed a broader network during his exile in Switzerland and 
generally tried to avoid political provocation, Fabre-Luce chose the opposite 
strategy, openly defending the heritage of Pétain and Vichy (though not of 
collaboration) and attacking the post-war authorities. This brought him 
lasting notoriety and an almost unmatched prominence among French 
extreme-rightists, who considered him their prime spokesperson. Jouvenel 
and Fabre-Luce were hostile to parliamentarianism and to the personality 
cult of Gaullism, while at the same time fearing the permanent risk of 
a communist take-over from within or without. As an alternative, they 
supported an authoritarian kind of Europeanism based on Franco-German 
cooperation, with joint exploitation of France’s North African colonial 
empire. At the same time, Fabre-Luce was also in touch with the extremist 
hard core of post-war Eurofascism.
During the same early post-war years, Jouvenel gained international 
prominence as a neoliberal intellectual and founding member of the Mont 
Pèlerin Society, partly due to the success of his magnum opus Du Pouvoir. 
Advocating a pessimistic, Spenglerian, elitist variant of liberalism that was 
far removed from democratic parliamentarianism, he established strong 
links with Hayek, Friedman, Röpke and American Cold War conservatives. 
His correspondence with Röpke reveals how both neoliberal intellectuals 
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saw their activities as an ‘open conspiracy’ aimed at devising a system of rule 
by a tiny enlightened liberal elite over the essentially irrational masses who, 
manipulable and ever tending towards totalitarianism, could not be trusted 
politically. For Röpke, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce, the concept of totalitarian-
ism not only served to associate Soviet communism with Nazism as two 
equally dangerous enemies of the free world but also to associate Nazism 
with democracy, stressing the plebiscitary tendencies of Hitler’s system of 
rule and the frightening efficacy of mass propaganda. They stated that any 
democracy, unless restrained by a strong aristocracy and a tradition of natural 
law, permanently carried the risk of totalitarianism within itself, since a 
single party could at any time hijack the system and destroy it from within.
This analysis raises several big questions. Without pretending to be able 
to answer them systematically, I am nonetheless convinced they need to 
be addressed, if only to avoid misunderstanding. What is the relationship 
between fascism and Europeanism? Rather than following Milza’s disbelief 
that adherents of an ‘ultranationalist’ creed could ever be genuinely inter-
ested in internationalism and a European ideal, I am convinced that the 
relationship was more complex. On the one hand, despite the present-day 
character of the EU (and the present-day extreme right’s predominantly 
anti-European stance), Europe never was nor is an exclusively liberal-
technocratic concept unrelated to questions of identity, nationalism and 
imperialism. On the contrary: its strong connection to these concepts was 
exactly what made the ideal of a United Europe attractive to many right-
extremists, who were among the earliest supporters of post-war European 
integration. During the interwar period, Europe was an ideal projection 
screen for the ambitions of intellectuals in favour of revolutionary reforms, 
especially those unrelated to the Marxist parties and inspired by fascist 
visions of large-scale planning. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce are not the only 
cases of intellectuals who drifted to fascism because of their Europeanist 
ideas. During the war, and especially in Western Europe, Nazi propaganda 
was able to mobilise these Europeanist visions at the service of its own 
imperialism. Mark Mazower has argued that it was Hitler’s complete 
unwillingness to envision building a European empire for anybody else 
than ‘pure-blooded’ Germans that led to the failure of these propaganda 
initiatives, not a lack of receptivity among the conquered populations.5
On the other hand, the opposite was also true. Because ‘Europe’ was an 
alternative for the national framework, it was highly attractive to those who 
faced exclusion and persecution within their own countries. Considering 
5 Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 447, 559, 590.
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themselves ‘victims’ of their own country’s nationalist passions, many 
former collaborators and Pétainists expected protection from interna-
tional law and the European Court of Human Rights. Jouvenel pleaded 
for a ‘European tribunal’ as a bulwark against the totalitarian tendencies 
of post-war ‘national socialist’ representative governments. For French 
extreme-rightists, European integration also offered a ‘realistic’ alternative 
to De Gaulle’s politics of national grandeur. From a post-war geopolitical 
point of view, since France, Germany and the UK could no longer claim 
Great Power status on an equal footing with the United States and the Soviet 
Union, European integration was a necessity. In the context of the Cold War 
and decolonisation, a Western European union was the only possibility for 
these nations to keep playing the role of imperialist states with their colonial 
dependencies, fend off the military danger of communism and maintain 
Europe as a focal point for culture, science and civilisation.
The relationship between fascism and neoliberalism is an equally thorny 
issue. While I do not feel qualif ied to answer this question at a general level, 
I have stressed both the differences and the striking similarities between 
Jouvenel’s specif ic kind of neoliberalism and his earlier fascist ideas. Jou-
venel abandoned his fascist enthusiasm for the state as the possessor and 
sole ‘organising authority’ of all public and private national resources, and 
the post-war bearded neoliberal academician was obviously far removed 
from the 1934 rebellious youth calling for an anti-Marxist and anti-capitalist 
revolution, but this is not all that can be said. In his neoliberalism, Jouvenel 
retained both his admiration for the strength and courage of a ‘virile’ aris-
tocracy, deserving of its freedom and its right to rule, and his contempt for 
the stupidity of the masses and the weak and ‘decadent’ system of parlia-
mentarianism. More generally, despite differences that are both obvious 
and essential, neoliberalism and fascism do share a few characteristics: a 
Darwinist vision of society as a f ierce struggle between competing groups 
and individuals in which the best manage to prevail; a positive appreciation 
of societal inequality, considered not as an unfortunate and morally unjust 
by-product of the system but as a key requirement to its functioning; and a 
meritocratic elitism that presumes that those destined to rule deserve the 
privileges, rewards and honours associated with their position. Based on 
these characteristics, it is less surprising that two exiles – the outspoken 
anti-Nazi German economist Wilhelm Röpke and Jouvenel, a former promi-
nent member of the prime fascist party in 1930s France – discovered their 
profound agreement on so many issues.
How important were Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel for the post-war reconfigu-
ration of the French extreme right? It is clear that they were well-suited to 
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contribute to this ideological innovation, based on their pre-war status as 
Europeanist fascist intellectuals with ample international contacts and a 
background in progressive republicanism rather than the extreme right’s 
traditional hotbed of Maurrassian Catholic conservatism. It is hard to meas-
ure the exact extent of their contribution, however. Both their Europeanism 
and their ‘realism’ dated from the late 1920s, and it is true that these two 
elements came to replace the traditional Maurrassian dogmas of aggressive 
nationalism and contempt for republican legality that had exerted such 
an important influence on the French extreme right. Their replacement 
by a concern with the republican rule of law, a suspicious attitude towards 
national delusions of grandeur and a pro-European orientation could have 
been taken directly from the writings of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce. Consider-
ing especially Fabre-Luce’s prominence in extreme-rightist circles during 
these years, it seems probable that he made an important contribution to 
the ideological renewal of the French extreme right, while Jouvenel’s newly 
found identity as a more systematic and academic intellectual enabled his 
thought to play a more indirect role.
Another diff icult question is how this post-war ideological renewal re-
lates to fascism. This question is linked to the controversial topic of fascism 
outside its classical temporal boundaries of interwar and wartime Europe. 
Can political formations that drift away from what are often considered 
key elements of fascist ideology, during a period marked by a context 
fundamentally different from that of interwar Europe, still be meaning-
fully analysed in relation to it? Formulated more concretely: if the extreme 
right drops its aggressive nationalism and its opposition to the republic, 
what does it still have to do with fascism? While I consider this very much 
an open question, I have clung to the concept of fascism in my post-war 
analysis. Since I have studied the years immediately following the end of 
the Second World War, during which fascism was permanently evoked 
and interpreted by Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel, who both kept positioning 
themselves towards it and attempting to distil its ‘positive’ elements, I argue 
that fascism remains a valuable topic of analysis, regardless of the exact 
behaviour of the movements it has inspired.
* * *
As the crow flies, the Sohlberg and Mont Pèlerin are less than 300 kilometres 
apart. Both are low mountains situated in a country neighbouring France, 
in a beautiful natural environment. When the weather is clear, they offer 
breathtaking views of eastern France. With an altitude around or just below 
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1,000 metres, the two mountains are easily eclipsed by higher reliefs in their 
surroundings, which would have assured them a relatively anonymous 
existence had it not been for Otto Abetz and Friedrich Hayek. Although 
neither Jouvenel nor Fabre-Luce camped on the Sohlberg during the original 
Franco-German youth meeting in 1930, and only Jouvenel was present on 
Mont Pèlerin seventeen years later, the two mountains symbolise key ele-
ments in the two intellectuals’ political trajectory. The Sohlberg meeting 
resulted in the foundation of the Sohlberg Circle, which played a major 
role in mobilising the two intellectuals’ Europeanism to serve the cause of 
Franco-German rapprochement and later, after 1933, of the political agenda 
of the Third Reich. Presided by their close friend Abetz, the future German 
ambassador to occupied Paris, the Sohlberg Circle – later rebaptised as 
the Comité France-Allemagne – became the laboratory of intellectual 
collaboration during the occupation.
Jouvenel’s participation in the Mont Pèlerin conference laid the basis for a 
very different kind of collaboration. It meant his consecration as a neoliberal 
intellectual and his inclusion in its international circles, bringing him into 
close contact with its most prominent members and boosting his academic 
career in the English-speaking world. While the political and intellectual 
distance between the two mountains appears to be be much greater than 
the geographical distance, Mont Pèlerin and the Sohlberg were part of a 
political trajectory of two intellectuals that was as strongly marked by 
continuity as it was by ruptures.
 Bibliography
Archival Sources
Correspondance de Louise Weiss et Bertrand de Jouvenel (1934) Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France (BNF), Dpt. des Manuscrits FR Nouv. Acq. 17814.
Documentation sur Otto Abetz, Dossiers de coupures de presse, BNF, banque DOSS < FOL – 
LN1-232 (34).
Dossier d’Épuration, FABRE-LUCE Alfred, Archives Nationales de France (AN), Z/6/285 dossier 
8648.
Ernst Jünger Nachlass, Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, Hs.1994.0009, Hs.2005-0060.
Fonds Alfred Fabre-Luce, AN, 472 AP.
Fonds Bertrand de Jouvenel, BNF, NAF 28143. Don 90 39 (1-57) and Don 96 01 (1-311).
Fonds Emmanuel Berl, BNF, NAF 28216 (28).
Lèttres du ‘Groupe du 9 juillet’ à Louise Weiss (1934), BNF, Dpt. des Manuscrits, FR Nouv. Acq. 
17814.
Periodicals
L’Assaut: Hebdomadaire de Combat Politique et Littéraire (1936-1937)
Le Bulletin Fédéraliste (1948)
Le Cahier Bleu (1934)
Circulaire Intérieure de La Fédération: Centre d’Études Institutionnelles pour l’Organisation de 
la Société Française (1945-1946)
Les Écrits de Paris: Revue des Question Actuelles (1947-1954)
L’Émancipation Nationale: Hebdomadaire du Parti Populaire Français (1936-1938)
L’Europe Nouvelle (1926-1937)
Fédération: Revue de l’Ordre Vivant (1947-1949, 1952)
Gringoire (1937-1938)
Human Events: A Weekly Analysis for the American Citizen (1947-1951)
Ici France: Bulletin Intérieur du Centre d’Études et de Documentation (1946-1947)
Je Suis Partout (1936)
La Lutte des Jeunes (1934)
Notre Temps: Revue de la Nouvelle Génération Européenne (1927-1930)
Nouvelle Revue Française (1940-1943)
L’Oeuvre (1930)
Pamphlet (1933-1934)
Questions Actuelles: Bulletin Intérieur Mensuel du Centre d’Études des Questions Actuelles, 
Politiques, Économiques et Sociales (1946)
Rivarol: Hebdomadaire de l’Opposition Nationale (1951, 1954-1955)
Vogue (1930, 1935)
Vu (1932-1936)
268 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
Published Sources
Abetz, Otto, Das Offene Problem: Ein Rückblick auf Zwei Jahrzehnte Deutscher Frankreichpolitik: 
Mit einer Einführung von Ernst Achenbach (Cologne: Greven, 1951).
Aron, Raymond, L’Opium des Intellectuels (Paris: Gallimard, 1955).
—, Mémoires: 50 Ans de Réflexion Politique (Paris: Julliard, 1983).
—, Chroniques de Guerre: La France Libre 1940-1945 (Paris: Gallimard, 1990).
Andreu, Pierre, Le Rouge et le Blanc: 1928-1944 (Paris: Table Ronde, 1977).
Bloch, Marc, L’Étrange Défaite: Témoignage Écrit en 1940 (Paris: Franc Tireur, 1946).
Binding, Rudolf G. e.a., Sechs Bekenntnisse zum Neuen Deutschland: Rudolf G. Binding, E.G. Kol-
benheyer, die Kölnische Zeitung, Wilhelm von Scholtz, Otto Wirz, Robert Fabre-Luce Antworten 
Romain Rolland (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933).
Buré, Émile, ‘Prenez Garde! Prenez Garde!’, L’Ordre: Lettres, Spectacles (27 April 1945).
Casanova, Jean-Claude, ed., ‘Correspondance entre Raymond Aron et Alfred Fabre-Luce 1935-
1981’, Commentaire 127 (2009). 593-617.
Céline, Louis-Ferdinand, L’École des Cadavres (Paris: Denoël, 1938).
—, Choix de Lettres de Céline et de Quelques Correspondants: 1907-1961, eds. Henri Godard & 
Jean-Paul Louis (Paris: La Pléiade, 2009).
Chardonne, Jacques, Chronique Privée de l’An 1940 (Paris: Stock, 1940).
—, Voir la Figure (Paris: B. Grasset, 1941).
Davis, Frances, A Fearful Innocence (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1981).
Degrelle, Léon, La Campagne de Russie: 1941-1945 (Paris: La Diffusion du Livre, 1949).
Die Deutsche Wochenschau (22 June 1940), German newsreel featuring the victory parade in 
Paris, www.youtube.com (retrieved 25 April 2013).
Diquelou, Roland, ‘Drancy Deviendra-t-il Villégiature Pour la 5e Colonne?’, L’Humanité (28 Sep-
tember 1944).
Drieu la Rochelle, Pierre, L’Europe Contre les Patries (Paris: Gallimard, 1931).
—, Socialisme Fasciste (Paris: Gallimard, 1934).
—, Doriot ou la Vie d’un Ouvrier Français (Saint-Denis: Populaires Françaises, 1936).
Fabre-Luce, Alfred, La Crise des Alliances: Essai sur les Relations Franco-Brittaniques depuis la 
Signature de la Paix (Paris: B. Grasset, 1922).
—, La Victoire (Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1924).
—, Locarno Sans Rèves (Paris: B. Grasset, 1927).
—, Russie 1927 (Paris: B. Grasset, 1927).
—, Le 22 Avril: Après la Législature des Dupes (Paris, 1928).
—, Pour une Politique Sexuelle (Paris: B. Grasset, 1929).
—, À Quoi Rêve le Monde (Paris: B. Grasset, 1931).
—, Caillaux (Paris: Gallimard, 1933).
—, Révolution à Cuba (Paris: Pamphlet, 1935).
—, Histoire Sécrète de la Conciliation de Munich (Paris: B. Grasset, 1938).
—, Journal Intime (1937) (Paris: Plon, 1938).
—, Le Sécret de la République (Paris: B. Grasset, 1938).
—, ‘Veux-Tu Vivre ou Mourir?’, Les Nouvelles Littéraires (9 December 1938).
—, Journal de la France: Mars 1939-Juillet 1940 (Paris: J.E.P., 1940).
—, Un Fils du Ciel (Paris: Gallimard, 1941).
—, Französisches Tagebuch: August 1939-Juni 1940 [translation of Journal de la France I] (Ham-
burg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1942).
—, Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe (Paris: Plon, 1942).
BIBLIOGRAPHy 269
—, Journal de la France: Août 1940-Avril 1942 (Paris: J.E.P., 1942).
—, ‘Neue Einsichten in die Französische Geschichte’, Cahiers Franco-Allemands / Deutsch-
Französische Monatshefte 9 (October-December 1942), 321-325.
—, Nach dem Waffenstillstand: Französisches Tagebuch 1940-1942 [translation of Journal de la 
France II] (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1943).
—, Journal de la France: Mai 1942-Mai 1943 (Paris, 1943).
—, Journal de la France: Juin 1943-Août 1944 (Paris, 1944).
—, En Pleine Liberté (Paris: Éditions de Midi, 1945).
—, Au Nom des Silencieux (Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1945).
—, Le Mystère du Maréchal: Le Procès Pétain (Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1945).
—, Double Prison (Paris, 1946).
—, Journal de la France 1939-1944: Édition Définitive (Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1946).
—, Hors d’Atteinte (Paris, 1946).
—, La Verità dul Generale de Gaulle e Difesa del Maresciallo Pétain [translation of Au Nom des 
Silencieux] (Milan: Riunite, 1946).
—, ‘Devant le Monstre’, in Persiflages, eds. Gilbert Clay e.a. (Paris: La Couronne, 1947), 33-42.
—, Journal de l’Europe 1946-1947 (Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1947).
—, Le Projet Churchill: Les États-Unis d’Europe (Paris, 1947).
—, ‘On Ferme Poissy’, Paroles Françaises: Hebdomadaire Politique, Littéraire, Satirique (7 Febru-
ary 1947).
—, Une Tragédie Royale: L’Affaire Léopold III (Paris: Flammarion, 1948).
—, Le Siècle Prend Figure (Paris: Flammarion, 1949).
—, La Fumée d’un Cigare (Paris: Élan, 1949).
—, Journal 1951 (Paris: Amiot Dumont, 1951).
—, ‘Mittel und Wege zur Deutsch-Französischen Einigung’, Zeitschrift für Geopolitik: Monatshefte 
für Deutsches Auslandswissen 22 (1951), 43-56.
—, Mendès ou Pinay? (Paris: B. Grasset, 1953) [under the pseudonym ‘Sapiens’].
—, Histoire de la Révolution Européenne (Paris: Domat, 1954).
—, Haute Cour (Lausanne: J.F.G., 1962).
—, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I: Le Grand Jeu: 1936-1939 (Paris: Julliard, 1962).
—, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II: L’Épreuve: 1939-1946 (Paris: Julliard, 1963).
—, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté III: La Récompense: 1946-1961 (Paris: Julliard, 1964).
—, Journal de la France: 1939-1945: Édition Définitive Avec une Préface Inédite (Paris: Fayard, 1969).
—, J’ai Vécu Plusieurs Siècles (Paris: Fayard, 1974).
Faÿ, Bernard, ‘French Authors Warm Selves – by Typewriting!’, Chicago Tribune (7 December 1941).
Groupe du 9 Juillet, Plan du 9 Juillet: Réforme de la France (Paris: Gallimard, 1934).
Hayek, Friedrich A., The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944).
—, ‘The Intellectuals and Socialism’, The University of Chicago Law Review (January 1948), 
417-433.
—, ed., Capitalism and the Historians (London: Routledge, 1954).
Heining, Arnold, ‘Fabre-Luce, Alfred: Französisches Tagebuch’ (book review), Berliner Monats-
hefte (May 1942), 241.
Heller, Gerhard, Un Allemand à Paris: 1940-1944 (Paris: Seuil, 1981).
Hervé, Gustave, C’est Pétain qu’il Nous Faut! (Paris: La Victoire, 1936).
L’Homme en Question: Alfred Fabre-Luce (25 June 1978), television programme, France Régions 
3, www.ina.fr (retrieved 23 March 2013).
Jouvenel, Bertrand de, L’Économie Dirigée: Le Programme de la Nouvelle Génération (Paris: 
Valois, 1928).
270 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
—, Vers les États-Unis d’Europe (Paris: Valois, 1930).
—, De l’Unité Économique Européenne à l’Économie Dirigée Mondiale: Extrait de la Revue Notre 
Temps (Paris, 1931?).
—, ‘Communism Contrasted with Modern Capitalism’, The New York Times (17 January 1932).
—, La Crise du Capitalisme Américain (Paris: Gallimard, 1933).
—, ‘Réflexions sur les Rapports Franco-Allemands’, Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie 2 (February 1934).
—, ‘France Is Stirred by “Crosses of Fire”’, The New York Times (29 September 1935).
—, ‘“Soyons amis”: Interview avec Adolf Hitler’, Paris-Midi (29 February 1936).
—, ‘Le Parti Populaire Français’, Sciences Politiques, 4 (1937) 363-370.
—, Le Réveil de l’Europe (Paris: Gallimard, 1938).
—, ‘To the Editor of The Times’, The Times (19 October 1938).
—, ‘Das Französische Weltreich’, Cahiers Franco-Allemands / Deutsch-Französische Monatshefte 
5 (1938) 101-105.
—, ‘Le Secret de Hitler’, Revue de Paris (May 1939).
—, D’Une Guerre à l’Autre I: De Versailles à Locarno (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1940).
—, Après la Défaite (Paris: Plon, 1941).
—, Nach der Niederlage [translation of Après la Défaite] (Berlin: F.A. Herbig, 1941).
—, D’une Guerre à l’Autre II: La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale: Octobre 1925-Janvier 1932 
(Paris: Plon, 1941).
—, Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée: Le Blocus Continental (Brussels: Toison d’Or, 1942).
—, L’Or au Temps de Charles-Quint et de Philippe II (Paris: Sequana, 1943).
—, Na de Nederlaag [translation of Après la Défaite] (The Hague: Holle, 1943).
—, Du Pouvoir: Histoire Naturelle de sa Croissance (Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1945).
—, Les Français (Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1945) [repr. Paris: Julliard, 1979].
—, Raisons de Craindre, Raisons d’Espérer I: Quelle Europe? (Paris: Le Portulan, 1947).
—, Raisons de Craindre, Raisons d’Espérer II: Les Passions en Marche (Paris: Le Portulan, 1947).
—, Problèmes de l’Angleterre Socialiste ou l’Échec d’une Expérience (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1947).
—, La Dernière Année: Choses Vues de Munich à la Guerre (Brussels: La Diffusion du Livre, 1947).
—, Il Potere: Storia Naturale del Suo Sviluppo [translation of Du Pouvoir] (Milan: Rizzoli, 1947).
—, L’Amérique en Europe: Le Plan Marshall (Paris: Plon, 1948).
—, On Power: Its Nature and the History of its Growth [translation of Du Pouvoir] (New York: 
Viking Press, 1949).
—, The Ethics of Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952).
—, De la Souveraineté: À la Recherche du Bien Politique (Paris: M.T. Génin, 1955).
—, Un Voyageur dans le Siècle: 1903-1945: Avec le Concours de Jeannie Malige (Paris: R. Laffont, 1979).
— & Éric Roussel, Itinéraire 1928-1976 (Paris: Plon, 1983).
Jouvenel, Marcelle de, Au Diapason du Ciel (Paris: Colombe, 1948).
Jünger, Ernst, Strahlungen (Tübingen: Heliopolis Verlag, 1955).
Le Huron, ‘Exhibitionisme’, Franc-Tireur (18 September 1945).
Lecache, Bernard, ‘Fabre-Luce ou le Juvénal Clandestin’, Les Lettres Françaises (11 August 1945).
London, Geo [Georges Samuel], ‘Jean Luchaire le Super Traître, Führer de la Presse Française, 
est Enf in Jugé!’, Paris-Presse (22 January 1946).
Luchaire, Jean, Une Génération Réaliste (Paris: Valois, 1929).
—, Vers les États Fédérés d’Europe (Paris: Valois, 1929).
—, ‘Eine Realistische Generation’, Nord und Süd: Monatsschrift für Internationale Zusammen-
arbeit (May 1929), 429-441.
—, De l’Union Fédérale Européenne à la Reforme de l’État Français (Paris, 1930).
de Man, Henri, Au-Delà du Nationalisme (Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1946).
BIBLIOGRAPHy 271
—, Cavalier Seul: 45 Années de Socialisme Européen (Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1948).
—, Gegen den Strom: Memoiren eines Europäischen Sozialisten (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1953).
Marculesco, Michel, La Critique du Libéralisme d’Après les Auteurs Néo-Libéraux (Paris, 1943).
Martin du Gard, Maurice, Chronique de Vichy: 1940-1944 (Paris: Flammarion, 1948).
Morgenthau, Hans, ‘The Evil of Power: A Critical Study of de Jouvenel’s On Power’ (book review), 
Review of Metaphysics 3 (1949), 507-517.
du Moulin de Labarthète, Henry, Le Temps des Illusions: Souvenirs Juillet 1940-Avril 1942 (Geneva: 
Cheval Ailé, 1946).
Orwell, George, ‘As I please: 17’ [1944], in Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, vol. 1, eds. 
Roger Griff in & Matthew Feldman (London: Routledge, 2004), 49-51.
Payr, Bernhard, Phönix Oder Asche? Frankreich Geistiges Ringen nach dem Zusammenbruch 
(Dortmund: Volkschaft-Verlag, 1942).
Pétain, Philippe, Discours aux Français: 17 Juin 1940-20 Août 1944: Textes Établis, Présentés et 
Commentés par Jean-Claude Barbas (Paris: A. Michel, 1989).
Poliakov, L., ‘Intelligence Report on Two Enemies: Launching the New Fascist International’, 
Commentary (11 January 1952).
Püllmann, Alfred, ‘Frankreich als Beispiel: Möglichkeiten eines Europäischen Gesprächs’, 
Strassburger Neueste Nachrichten (12 July 1943).
Rauschning, Hermann, Die Revolution des Nihilismus: Kulisse und Wirklichkeit im Dritten Reich 
(Zürich: Europa-Verlag, 1938).
Rebatet, Lucien, Les Mémoires d’un Fasciste I: Les Décombres 1938-1940 (Paris: Pauvert, 1976).
Röpke, Wilhelm, Internationale Ordnung (Zürich: E. Rentsch, 1945).
—, Die Deutsche Frage (Zürich: E. Rentsch, 1945).
Rougier, Louis, Mission Sécrète à Londres: Les Accords Pétain-Churchill (Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1946).
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Du Contrat Social: Précédé d’un Essai sur la Politique de Rousseau par 
Bertrand de Jouvenel: Accompagné des Notes de Voltaire et d’Autres Contemporains de l’Auteur 
(Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1947).
Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Routledge, [1942] 2003).
Serrano Suñer, Ramon, Entre les Pyrénées et Gibraltar: Notes et Réflexions sur la Politique Espag-
nole Depuis 1936 (Geneva: Cheval Ailé, 1947).
Sulzbach, Walter, ‘Capitalistic Warmongers’: A Modern Superstition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1942).
Trevor-Roper, Hugh, ‘Aspects of Power’ (book review), The New York Times (15 May 1949).
‘Trop Tard!’, Les Lettres Françaises (September 1943), 6.
Literature
Ackermann, Zeno, ‘Shakespearean Negotiations in the Perpetrator Society: German Productions 
of The Merchant of Venice during the Second World War’, in Shakespeare and the Second 
World War: Memory, Culture, Identity, eds. Irena A. Makaryk & Marissa McHugh (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2012), 35-62.
Alden, Geraldine Lillian, ‘The Road to Collaboration: The Life and Times of Jean Luchaire’ (PhD 
diss., University of California, 1998).
Algazy, Joseph, La Tentation Néo-Fasciste en France de 1944 à 1965 (Paris: Fayard, 1984).
Amzalak, Nimrod, Fascists and Honourable Men: Contingency and Choice in French Politics 1918-45 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
272 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
Arendt, Hannah, ‘Approaches to the German Problem’, in idem, Essays in Understanding, ed. 
Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1994), 106-120.
Assouline, Pierre, ‘Enquête sur un Historien Condamné pour Diffamation’, L’Histoire 68 (1984), 
98-101.
—, L’Épuration des Intellectuels (Brussels: Complexe, 1985).
—, Une Éminence Grise: Jean Jardin 1904-1976 (Paris: Balland, 1986).
Audier, Serge, Néo-Libéralisme(s): Une Archéologie Intellectuelle (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2012).
Bar-On, Tamir, Where Have all the Fascists Gone? (Aldershot: Routledge, 2007).
—, ‘Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite’, Patterns of Prejudice 45 (2011), 199-223.
—, ‘The French New Right’s Quest for Alternative Modernity’, Fascism 1 (2012), 18-52.
Barnes, Ian, ‘A Fascist Trojan Horse: Maurice Bardèche, Fascism and Authoritarian Socialism’, 
Patterns of Prejudice 37 (2003), 177-194.
Baruch, Marc-Olivier, ed., Une Poignée de Misérables: L’Épuration de la Société Française Après 
la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Paris: Fayard, 2005).
Bauerkämper, Arnd, ‘Ambiguities of Transnationalism: Fascism in Europe Between Pan-
Europeanism and Ultra-Nationalism 1919-39’, Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 
London 29 (2007), 43-67.
—, ‘Transnational Fascism: Cross-Border Relations between Regimes and Movements in Europe, 
1922-1939’, East Central Europe 37 (2010), 214-246.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).
Beevor, Anthony & Artemis Cooper, Paris After the Liberation: 1944-1949 (New York: Doubleday, 
1994).
Bellanger, Claude e.a., eds., Histoire Générale de la Presse Française: Tôme IV: De 1940 à 1958 (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1975).
Berstein, Serge, ‘La France des Années Trente Allergique au Fascisme: À Propos d’un Livre de 
Zeev Sternhell’, Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’Histoire 2 (1984), 83-94.
—, ‘Pour en Finir avec un Dialogue de Sourds: À Propos du Fascisme Français’, Vingtième Siècle: 
Revue d’Histoire 95 (2007), 243-46.
Betts, Paul, ‘The New Fascination with Fascism: The Case of Nazi Modernism’, Journal of Con-
temporary History 37 (2002), 541-58.
Binion, Rudolph, Defeated Leaders: The Political Fate of Caillaux, Jouvenel and Tardieu (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1960).
Blandin, Claire, ‘Les Interventions des Intellectuels de Droite dans Le Figaro Littéraire: 
L’Invention du Contre-Engagement’, Vingtième Siècle: Revue d’Histoire 96 (2007), 179-194.
Bock, Hans-Manfred e.a., eds., Entre Locarno et Vichy. Les Relations Culturelles Franco-Allemandes 
dans les Années 1930, (Paris: CNRS, 1993).
Boucharenc, Myriam, L’Écrivain-Reporter au Coeur des Années Trente (Paris: Septentrion, 2004).
Bredin, Jean-Denis, ‘Le Droit, le Juge et l’Historien’, Le Débat 25 (1983), 93-111.
Brown, Kathryn, ‘Language, Modernity and Fascism: Heidegger’s Doubling of Myth’, in Attrac-
tions of Fascism: Social Psychology and Aesthetics of the ‘Triumph of the Right’, ed. John Milfull 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 1990).
Brunet, Jean-Paul, Jacques Doriot: Du Communisme au Fascisme (Paris: Balland, 1986).
Bruneteau, Bernard, ‘L’Europe Nouvelle de Hitler’: Une Illusion des Intellectuels de la France de 
Vichy (Paris: Rocher, 2003).
—, ‘Antiliberalismus und Totalitäre Verschwörung: Am Beispiel von Fünf Intellektuellen des 
“Parti Populaire Français” in den 1930er Jahren’, in Rechtsextreme Ideologien in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, ed. Uwe Backes (Cologne: Böhlau, 2003), 123-137.
BIBLIOGRAPHy 273
Burgin, Angus, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012).
Burrin, Philippe, ‘La France dans le Champ Magnétique des Fascismes’, Le Débat 32 (1984), 52-72.
—, La Dérive Fasciste: Doriot, Déat, Bergery (Paris: Seuil, 1986).
—, La France à l’Heure Allemande 1940-1944 (Paris: Seuil, 1995).
—, Fascisme, Nazisme, Autoritarisme (Paris: Seuil, 2000).
Casanova, Jean-Claude, ‘Hommage à Alfred Fabre-Luce. 16 Mai 1899-16 Mai 1983’, Commentaire 
23 (1983), 608-621.
Chrisafis, Angelique, ‘Le Pen on Trial for Saying Nazis not Inhumane’, The Guardian (15 December 
2007).
—, ‘France’s Front National Plunged in Family Feud over Holocaust Remarks’, The Guardian 
(8 April 2015).
Clarke, Jackie, France in the Age of Organization: Factory, Home and the Nation from the 1920s to 
Vichy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011).
Clavien, Alain, ‘Les Intellectuels Collaborateurs Exilés en Suisse’, Matériaux pour l’Histoire de 
Notre Temps 67 (2002), 84-89.
Cohen, Antonin, ‘De la Révolution Nationale à l’Europe Fédérale: Les Métamorphoses de la 
Troisième Voie aux Origines du Mouvement Fédéraliste Français: La Fédération 1943-1948’, 
Le Mouvement Social 217 (2006), 53-72.
—, De Vichy à la Communauté Européenne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2012).
Cointet, Jean-Paul, Expier Vichy: L’Épuration en France 1943-1958 (Paris: Perrin, 2008).
Compagnon, Antoine, Le Cas Bernard Faÿ: Du Collège de France à l’Indignité Nationale (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2009).
Conze, Eckart, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes and Moshe Zimmermann, eds., Das Amt und die 
Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik (Munich: 
Blessing, 2010).
Costa Pinto, António, ‘Fascist Ideology Revisited: Zeev Sternhell and his Critics’, European 
History Quarterly 16 (1986), 465-83.
Cotillon, Jérôme, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy (Paris: Armand Colin, 2003).
Dard, Olivier, Le Rendez-Vous Manqué des Relèves des Années 30 (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 2002).
— and Étienne Deschamps, eds., Les Relèves en Europe d’un Après-Guerre à l’Autre. Racines, 
Réseaux, Projets et Postérités (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005).
—, Bertrand de Jouvenel (Paris: Perrin, 2008).
Dehan, Xavier, ‘Jeune Europe, le Salon Didier et les Éditions de la Toison d’Or’, Bijdragen: Navor-
sings- en Studiecentrum voor de Geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog / Cahiers: Centre de 
Recherches et d’Études Historiques de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale 17 (1995), 203-236.
Delbecque, Éric, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel ou le Libéral Désenchanté’ (PhD diss., Institut d’Études 
Politiques de Paris, 2001).
Denord, François, Néolibéralisme Version Française: Histoire d’une Idéologie Politique (Paris: 
Demopolis, 2007).
de Dijn, Annelien, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel and the Revolt Against the State in Post-War America’, 
Ethical Perspectives 17 (2010), 371-388.
Dobry, Michel, ‘Février 1934 et la Découverte de l’Allergie de la Société Française à la “Révolution 
Fasciste”’, Revue Française de Sociologie 30 (1989), 511-33.
—, ed., Le Mythe de l’Allergie Française au Fascisme (Paris: A. Michel, 2003).
274 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
Douglas, Allen, From Fascism to Libertarian Communism: Georges Valois against the Third 
Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
Downs, Laura Lee, ‘“And so we Transform a People”: Women’s Social Action and the Reconfigura-
tion of Politics on the Right in France 1934-1947’, Past and Present 225 (2014), 2-39.
Drake, David, Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
Duranti, Marco, ‘The Holocaust, the Legacy of 1789 and the Birth of International Human Rights 
Law: Revisiting the Foundation Myth’, Journal of Genocide Research 14 (2012), 159-186.
—, ‘Conservatives and the European Convention on Human Rights’, in Norbert Frei & Anette 
Weinke, eds., Toward a New Moral Order? Menschenrechtspolitik und Völkerrecht seit 1945 
(Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013), 82-93.
—, ‘Holocaust Memory and the Silences of the Human Rights Revolution’, in Schweigen: Archäolo-
gie der Literarischen Kommunikation XI, eds. Aleida Assman & Jan Assmann (Munich: Fink, 
2013), 89-100.
—, The Conservative Human Rights Revolution: European Identity, Transnational Politics, and the 
Origins of the European Convention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
Durham, Martin & Margaret Power, eds., New Perspectives on the Transnational Right (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, ed., Politique Étrangère de la France: La Décadence 1932-1939 (Paris: 
Impr. Nationale, 1979).
‘Film Producer Refuses Duel with a Foe in Paris’, The New York Times (22 February 1935).
Fischer, Didier, Le Mythe Pétain (Paris: Flammarion, 2002).
Frölander, John, ‘Att Kunstruera en Kontinent: Om den Europeiska Sociala Rörelsen och en 
Mycket Annorlunda Europatanke’ (MA thesis, Uppsala University, 2013).
Garbe, Daniel, Alfred Fabre-Luce: Un Non-conformiste dans le Tumulte du XXe siècle (Paris: De 
Guibert, 2009).
Geiger, Wolfgang, L’Image de la France dans l’Allemagne Nazie 1933-1945 (Rennes: Presses 
Universitaires de Rennes, 1999).
Gentile, Emilio, ‘Fascism as Political Religion’, Journal of Contemporary History 25 (1990), 229-251.
Godard, Henri, Céline (Paris: Gallimard, 2011).
Goltz, Anna von der & Robert Gildea, ‘Flawed Saviours: The Myths of Hindenburg and Pétain’, 
European History Quarterly 39 (2009), 439-64.
Goodfellow, Samuel, Between the Swastika and the Cross of Lorraine: Fascisms in Interwar Alsace 
(Delkalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1999).
—, ‘Fascism as a Transnational Movement: The Case of Inter-War Alsace’, Contemporary 
European History 22 (2013), 87-106.
Gosewinkel, Dieter, ed., Anti-Liberal Europe: A Neglected Story of Europeanization (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2015).
Goyet, Bruno, Henri d’Orléans, Comte de Paris (1908-1999): Le Prince Impossible (Paris: O. Jacob, 
2001).
Gregor, A. James, Mussolini’s Intellectuals: Fascist Social and Political Thought (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005).
Griff in, Roger, ‘Fascism’s New Faces (and New Facelessness) in the “Post-Fascist” Epoch’, Erwägen, 
Wissen, Ethik 15 (2004), 287-300.
—, Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
BIBLIOGRAPHy 275
—, ‘Modernity under the New Order: The Fascist Project for Managing the Future’, in A Fascist 
Century: Essays by Roger Griffin, ed. Matthew Feldman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
—, ‘“Consensus? Quel consensus?” Perspectives pour une Meilleure Entente entre Spécialistes 
Francophones et Anglophones du Fascisme’, Vingtième Siècle: Revue d’Histoire 108 (2010), 53-69.
—, ‘Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age: From New Consensus to New Wave?’, Fascism: Journal 
of Contemporary Fascist Studies 1 (2012), 1-17.
—, ‘What Fascism Is Not and Is: Thoughts on the Re-Inflation of a Concept’, Fascism, 2 (2013), 
259-261.
Grunert, Robert, Der Europagedanke Westeuropäischer Faschistischer Bewegungen 1940-1945 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012).
—, ‘Autoritärer Staatenbund oder Nationalsozialistischer Großraum? “Europa” in der ldeenwelt 
Faschistischer Bewegungen’, Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History 
3 (2012), 442-448.
Grynberg, Anne, ‘Des Signes de Résurgence de l’Antisémitisme dans la France de l’Après-Guerre 
(1945-1953)?’, Les Cahiers de la Shoah 5 (2001), 171-223.
Hale, Dennis, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel: A Remembrance’, PS: Political Science and Politics 21 (1988), 
652-657.
Hellman, John, The Communitarian Third Way: Alexandre Marc and Ordre Nouveau 1930-2000 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002).
Hennecke, Hans Jörg, Wilhelm Röpke: Ein Leben in der Brandung (Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel, 
2005).
Herbert, Ulrich, ‘“Generation der Sachlichkeit”: Die Völkische Studentenbewegung der Frühen 
Zwanziger Jahre in Deutschland’, in Zivilisation und Barbarei: Die widersprüchliche Potentiale 
der Moderne, eds. Frank Bajohr e.a. (Hamburg: Christians, 1991), 115-144.
—, ‘Die Deutsche Militärverwaltung in Paris und die Deportation der französischen Juden’, in 
Nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik 1939-1945: Neue Forschungen und Kontroversen, 
ed. Herbert (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1998), 170-208.
Iordachi, Constantin ed., Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives (London: Routledge, 
2010).
Irvine, William, ‘Fascism in France and the Strange Case of the Croix-de-Feu’, Journal of Modern 
History 63 (1991), 271-95.
Jackson, Julian, France: The Dark Years 1940-1944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Jenkins, Brian ed., France in the Era of Fascism: Essays on the French Authoritarian Right (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2005).
—, ‘The Right Wing Leagues and Electoral Politics in Interwar France’, History Compass 5 
(2007), 1359-81.
Jennings, Eric, ‘Conservative Confluences: Reinscribing Vichy’s National Revolution in Indo-
china, 1940-1945’, French Historical Studies 27 (2004), 601-35.
Jilek, Lubor, ‘Paneurope Entre 1923 et 1940: La Réception du Projet en Europe Centrale et Oc-
cidentale’, Relations Internationales 72 (1992), 409-432.
Joly, Laurent, ‘The Genesis of Vichy’s Jewish Statute of October 1940’, Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies 27 (2013), 276-298.
Judt, Tony, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals 1944-1956 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992).
276 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
—, ‘“We Have Discovered History”: Defeat, Resistance, and the Intellectuals in France’, Journal 
of Modern History 64 (1992), S147-S172.
Julliard, Jacques, ‘Sur un Fascisme Imaginaire: À Propos d’un Livre de Zeev Sternhell’, Annales. 
Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 39 (1984), 849-61.
Jureit, Ulrike & Michael Wildt, eds., Generationen: Zur Relevanz eines Wissenschaftlichen 
Grundbegriffs (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005).
Kalman, Samuel, ‘“Le Combat Par Tous les Moyens”: Colonial Violence and the Extreme Right 
in 1930’s Oran’, French Historical Studies 34 (2011), 125-153.
Kaplan, Alice, The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution of Robert Brasillach (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2000).
Kéchichian, Albert, Les Croix-de-Feu à l’Âge des Fascismes: Travail, Famille, Patrie (Seyssel: 
Champ Vallon, 2006).
Kennedy, Sean, ‘The End of Immunity? Recent Work on the Far Right in Interwar France’, 
Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques 34 (2008), 25-45.
Kestel, Laurent, ‘L’Engagement de Bertrand de Jouvenel au PPF: Intellectuel de Parti et Entre-
preneur Politique’, French Historical Studies 30 (2007), 105-125.
—, La Conversion Politique: Doriot, le PPF et la Question du Fascisme Français (Paris: Raisons 
d’Agir, 2012).
Kupferman, Fred, Pierre Laval: 1883-1945 (Paris: Balland, 1987).
—, Au Pays des Soviets: Le Voyage Français en Union Soviétique (Paris: Gallimard, 2007).
Lambauer, Barbara, Otto Abetz et les Français: Ou l’Envers de la Collaboration (Paris: Fayard, 2001).
Lapaque, Sébastien, ‘Jouvenel: Le Libéral Mélancolique’, Le Figaro (4 April 2002).
Le Béguec, Gilles & Christine Manigand, eds., Henry, Robert et Bertrand de Jouvenel: Crise et 
Métamorphoses de l’État Démocratique 1900-1935 (Limoges: Presses Universitaires de Limoges, 
2004).
Lévy, Claude, Les Nouveaux Temps et l’Idéologie de la Collaboration (Paris: A. Colin, 1974).
Loiseaux, Gérard, La Littérature de la Défaite et de la Collaboration (Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 1984).
Lottman, Herbert R., La Rive Gauche: Du Front Populaire à la Guerre Froide (Paris: Seuil, 1984).
Loubet del Bayle, Jean-Louis, Les Non-Conformistes des Années 30: Une Tentative de Renouvelle-
ment de la Pensée Politique Française (Paris: Seuil, 1969).
Macklin, Graham, Very Deeply Dyed in Black: Sir Oswald Mosley and the Resurrection of British 
Fascism after 1945 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007).
Marrus, Michael M. & Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 1981).
Meletta, Cédric, Jean Luchaire: L’Enfant Perdu des Années Sombres (Paris: Perrin, 2013).
Meyer, Ahlrich, Täter im Verhör: Die ‘Endlösung der Judenfrage’ in Frankreich 1940-1944 (Darm-
stadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005).
Meyers, Marc, ‘Feminizing Fascist Men: Crowd Psychology, Gender, and Sexuality in French 
Antifascism, 1929-1945’, French Historical Studies 29 (2006), 109-42.
Mitchell, Allan, The Devil’s Captain: Ernst Jünger in Nazi Paris 1941-1944 (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2011).
Mahoney, Daniel J. ed., ‘A Symposium on Bertrand de Jouvenel’, The Politial Science Reviewer 
32 (2003), 36-117.
—, Bertrand de Jouvenel: The Conservative Liberal and the Illusions of Modernity (Wilmington: 
ISI Books, 2005).
BIBLIOGRAPHy 277
Maier, Charles S., Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the 
Decade after World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
Mammone, Andrea, ‘The Transnational Reaction to 1968: Neo-fascist Fronts and Political 
Cultures in France and Italy’, Contemporary European History 17 (2008), 213-236.
—, ‘The Eternal Return? Faux Populism and Contemporarization of Neo-Fascism across Britain, 
France and Italy’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17 (2009), 171-192.
—, ‘Revitalizing and De-Territorializing Fascism in the 1950s: The Extreme Right in France and 
Italy and the Pan-National (‘European’) Imaginary’, Patterns of Prejudice 45 (2011), 295-318.
—, Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Mazgaj, Paul, The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism (Greensboro: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1979).
Mazower, Mark, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London: Allen Lane, 2008).
Merlio, Gilbert, ‘The Critique of Liberal Democracy in the Works of Oswald Spengler’, in The 
Intellectual Revolt Against Liberal Democracy: 1870-1945, ed. Zeev Sternhell (Jerusalem: Israel 
Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996), 177-189.
Milfull, John ed., The Attractions of Fascism: Social Psychology and Aesthetics of the ‘Triumph of 
the Right’ (New York: Berg, 1990).
Millington, Chris, ‘February 6, 1934: The Veterans’ Riot’, French Historical Studies 33 (2010), 
545-72.
Milza, Pierre, Fascisme Français: Passé et Présent (Paris: Flammarion, 1987).
—, L’Europe en Chemise Noire: Les Extrêmes Droites Européennes de 1945 à Aujourd’hui (Paris: 
Fayard, 2002).
Mirowski, Philip & Dieter Plehwe, eds., The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal 
Thought Collective (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009).
Morlino, Bernard, Emmanuel Berl: Les Tribulations d’un Pacifiste (Paris: La Manufacture, 1990).
Moorehead, Caroline, ed., Selected Letters of Martha Gellhorn (New York: H. Holt, 2006).
Moses, A. Dirk, ‘The Holocaust and Genocide’, in The Historiography of the Holocaust, ed. Dan 
Stone (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 533-555.
Nolte, Ernst, Der Faschismus in Seiner Epoche: Die Action Française, der Italienische Faschismus, 
der Nationalsozialismus (Munich: R. Piper, 1963).
—, Le Fascisme dans son Époque: L’ « Action Française », le Fascisme Italien, le National-Socialisme 
(Paris: Julliard, 1970)
—, ‘Vergangenheit, die Nicht Vergehen Will: Eine Rede, die Geschrieben aber Nicht Gehalten 
Werden Durfte’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (6 June 1986).
Nord, Philip, France’s New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010).
Orlow, Dietrich, ‘Der Nationalsozialismus als Export- und Marketing-Artikel: Beziehungen 
Zwischen Nationalsozialisten, Französischen und Holländischen Faschisten, 1933-1939’, 
in Das Unrechtsregime. Internationale Forschung über den Nationalsozialismus, ed. Ursula 
Büttner (Hamburg: Christians, 1986), 427-468.
—, The Lure of Fascism in Western Europe: German Nazis, Dutch and French Fascists, 1933-1939 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
Osgood, Samuel, French Royalism under the Third and Fourth Republics (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1960).
278 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
Passmore, Kevin, ‘Boy Scouting for Grown-Ups? Paramilitarism in the Croix de Feu and the 
Parti Social Français’, French Historical Studies 19 (1995), 527-557.
—, From Liberalism to Fascism: The Right in a French Province, 1928-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997).
—, Fascism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
—, ‘The Gendered Genealogy of Political Religions Theory’, Gender & History 20 (2008), 644-668.
—, The Right in France from the Third Republic to Vichy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Paxton, Robert O., Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-44 (New York: Knopf, 1972).
—, French Peasant Fascism: Henri Dorgères’ Greenshirts and the Crises of French Agriculture, 
1929-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
—, ‘The Five Stages of Fascism’, Journal of Modern History 70 (1998), 1-23.
—, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Knopf, 2004).
—, Olivier Corpet and Claire Paulhan, eds., Archives de la Vie Littéraire Sous l’Occupation: À 
Travers le Désastre (New York: IMEC, 2009).
Payne, Stanley, A History of Fascism: 1914-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995).
—, ‘Fascism and Racism’ in The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought, eds. 
Terence Ball & Richard Bellamy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 123-150.
Poznanski, Renée, Les Juifs en France Pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Paris: Hachette, 1997).
Ray, Roland, Annäherung an Frankreich im Dienste Hitlers?: Otto Abetz und die Deutsche Frank-
reichpolitik 1930-1942 (Munich: Oldenburg, 2000).
Rémond, René, La Droite en France de 1815 à Nos Jours (Paris: Aubier, 1954).
—, Les Droites en France (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1982).
Richard, Lionel, Le Nazisme et la Culture (Paris: Complexe, 1988).
Rioux, Jean-Pierre, La France de la Quatrième République I: L’Ardeur et la Nécessité: 1944-1952 
(Paris: Seuil, 1980).
Rivarol website, www.rivarol.com (retrieved 20 July 2015).
Roussel, Éric, ‘Le Fascisme Français ne Passera Pas: Des Historiens Français Réfutent la Thèse de 
Zeev Sternhell sur la France comme Terre d’Élection du Fascisme’, Le Figaro (27 November 2014).
Rousso, Henri, Le Syndrome de Vichy: De 1944 à Nos Jours (Paris: Seuil, 1990).
Sapiro, Gisèle, La Responsabilité de l’Écrivain: Littérature, Droit et Morale en France: XIXe-XXIe 
Siècle (Paris: Seuil, 2011).
Schnapp, Jeffrey T., ‘Fascinating Fascism’, Journal of Contemporary History 31 (1996), 235-44.
—, ed., A Primer of Italian Fascism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).
Shapiro, James, Shakespeare and the Jews (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
Shields, J.G., The Extreme Right in France: From Pétain to Le Pen (London: Routledge, 2007).
Sick, Klaus-Peter, ‘Alfred Fabre-Luce et la Crise du Libéralisme dans l’Entre-Deux-Guerres’, 
Commentaire 47 (1989), 551-562.
—, ‘Vom Neoliberalismus zum Faschismus? Die Entwicklung der Politischen Ideen von Alfred 
Fabre-Luce und Bertrand de Jouvenel 1918-1945’, Lendemains: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende 
Frankreichforschung 17 (1992), 59-65.
—, ‘A Europe of Pluralist Internationalism: The Development of the French Theory of Inter-
dependence from Emile Durkheim to the Circle around Notre Temps 1890-1930’, Journal of 
European Integration History 8 (2002), 45-68.
Sirinelli, Jean François, Génération Intellectuelle: Khâgneux et Normaliens dans l’Entre-Deux-
Guerres (Paris: PUF, 1994).
BIBLIOGRAPHy 279
Soucy, Robert, Fascist Intellectual: Drieu la Rochelle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1979).
—, French Fascism: The First Wave, 1924-1933 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
—, French Fascism: The Second Wave, 1933-1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
—, ‘What is Meant by “Revolutionary” Fascism?’, Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik: Streitforum für 
Erwägungskultur 3 (2004), 350-353.
—, ‘La Rocque et le Fascisme Français: Réponse à Michel Winock’, Vingtième Siècle: Revue 
d’Histoire 95 (2007), 219-36.
Stedman Jones, Daniel, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman and the Birth of Neoliberal 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
Sternhell, Zeev, Maurice Barrès et le Nationalisme Français (Paris: A. Colin, 1972).
—, La Droite Révolutionnaire: Les Origines Françaises du Fascisme (Paris: Seuil, 1978).
—, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche: L’Idéologie Fasciste en France (Paris: Seuil, 1983).
—, ‘La Modernité et ses Ennemis: De la Révolte Contre les Lumières au Rejet de la Démocratie’ 
in L’Éternel Retour: Contre la Démocratie l’Idéologie de la Décadence, ed. Sternhell (Paris: 
Fondation Nationales des Sciences Politiques, 1994), 9-37.
—, ‘How to Think about Fascism and its Ideology’, Constellations: An International Journal of 
Critical and Democratic Theory 15 (2008), 280-90.
—, ‘Entre le Tragique et l’Imposture: Raymond Aron, Carl Schmitt et Alfred Fabre-Luce’, Les 
Temps Modernes 667 (2012), 80-120.
Ullmann, Marc, ‘Hommage à Jouvenel’, Commentaire 38 (1987), 366-380.
Unteutsch, Barbara, Vom Sohlbergkreis zur Gruppe Collaboration: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte 
der Deutsch-Französischen Beziehungen anhand der Cahiers Franco-Allemands / Deutsch-
Französische Monatshefte 1931-1944 (Münster: Kleinheinrich, 1990).
Vaïsse, Maurice, ‘Der Pazif ismus und die Sicherheit Frankreichs 1930-1939’, Vierteljahreshefte 
für Zeitgeschichte 33 (1985), 590-616.
Vinen, Richard, Bourgeois Politics in France: 1945-1951 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995).
Walter, Xavier, Paysan Militant: Jacques Le Roy Ladurie 1925-1940 (Paris: Guibert, 2008).
Wanrooij, Bruno, ‘The Rise and Fall of Italian Fascism as a Generational Revolt’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 22 (1987), 401-418.
Weber, Eugen, ‘Le Fièvre de la Raison: Nationalism and the French Right’, World Politics 10 
(1958), 560-578.
de Wever, Bruno, ‘Belgium’, in The Oxford Handbook of Fascism, ed. R.J.B. Bosworth (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 470-488.
Wildt, Michael, Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheits-
hauptamtes (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003).
Willsher, Kim, ‘Marine Le Pen Scores Stunning Result in French Presidential Election’, The 
Guardian (22 April 2012).
—, ‘Marine Le Pen’s Conf idence Vindicated by Front National Election Triumph’, The Guardian 
(25 May 2014).
Winock, Michel, ‘Fascisme à la Française ou Fascisme Introuvable?’, Le Débat 25 (1983), 35-44.
—, Nationalisme, Antisémitisme et Fascisme en France (Paris: Seuil, 1990).
—, Le Siècle des Intellectuels (Paris: Seuil, 1999).
280 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
—, ‘Retour sur le Fascisme Français: La Rocque et les Croix-de-Feu’, Vingtième Siècle: Revue 
d’Histoire 90 (2006), 3-27.
—, ‘En Lisant Robert Soucy: Sur La Rocque et les Croix-de-Feu’, Vingtième Siècle: Revue d’Histoire 
95 (2007), 237-42.
‘With Eye on Far Right Leadership, Marine Le Pen Stirs the Pot’, www.france24.com (retrieved 
4 November 2013).
Wohl, Robert, ‘French Fascism: Both Right and Left: Reflections on the Sternhell Controversy’, 
Journal of Modern History 63 (1991), 91-98.




Abetz, Otto 53-55, 58-59, 79, 118, 127-132, 138, 
142-143, 148-150, 152, 156-157, 161, 266






Algeria 18, 28, 30, 88, 97, 220
allies 115, 134, 154, 157, 159-160, 163, 165, 184-185, 
187-189, 191, 212, 251
Almirante, Giorgio 210
Andreu, Pierre 76n-78, 85, 87-88, 92-93, 96n, 
179, 213
anti-fascism 15, 18, 26, 50, 57, 82
anti-semitism 22, 33, 58, 63, 86, 100-104, 110-118, 
133, 143, 156, 160-162, 194, 202-203, 205-206




aristocracy 38, 109, 124, 134, 182, 226, 228, 
231-232, 234-235, 246, 255-256, 263-264
Aristotle 136
Arletty [Léonie Bathiat] 169
Aron, Raymond 20, 42, 60, 102n, 112, 135n, 
















Beauvoir, Simone de 164, 195
Beavor, Anthony 102
Belgium 32, 62-64, 73, 83, 95-96, 143, 175, 178, 191
Belin, René 175
Benda, Julien 15, 132, 193
Beneš, Edvard 45, 64-65
Benjamin, René 176
Bénoist-Méchin, Jacques 127, 142, 145, 153
Ber, Jacques 115-116n
Bergery, Gaston 32-33, 82-83, 142-143, 145, 222
Bergson, Henri 19, 112-113, 123, 153, 156, 238
Berl, Emmanuel 98-99, 112, 157, 222-223, 225, 
250-251






Blum, Léon 33, 61, 90, 98, 100, 108, 203, 205-206
Boas, Claire 45
Bobbio, Norberto 13-14
Boegner, Philippe 77, 79, 166, 225
Bonald, Louis de 237
Bonaparte, Napoleon 119-120, 122, 124, 136, 145, 






Bourgeois, André see Voisin, André
Bourgeois, Marcel 239
Bourquin, Constant 176, 235, 249, 255
Boutang, Pierre 192, 194, 202
Brantes, François de 187




Briand, Aristide 47, 49, 109, 165, 260
Brigouleix, Martial 157






Bruneteau, Bernard 31, 41, 148
Brüning, Heinrich 54
Burrin, Philippe 32, 34
Caillaux, Joseph 49-50, 103, 123
Cain, Julien 136
Calmette, Gaston 49
Camus, Albert 165, 171, 195




catholicism 63, 80-81, 97, 113-114, 171, 192-194, 
198-199, 205, 265
Céline, Louis-Ferdinand [Louis-Ferdinand 
Destouches] 16, 90, 135, 153, 160-163
Chamberlain, Houston Stewart 124
Chamberlain, Neville 65
282 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE
Chanel, Coco 175
Chardonne, Jacques 135, 150, 162, 164, 167





Churchill, Winston 101, 110-111, 212, 241, 245
Clarke, Jackie 71
Clementi, Pierre 202
Colette, Sidonie-Gabrielle 156, 165, 221-222, 225
collaboration 13, 21, 36-37, 40, 42-43, 51, 93, 
100-104, 114, 116, 124, 126-127, 129-139, 141-151, 
154-155, 160-167, 169-171, 176-177, 179-180, 182, 
201-202, 209, 211, 219, 225, 235, 253, 261-262, 
266
Comité France-Allemagne 55, 79, 127-128, 143, 
266
communism 15, 20, 34, 40, 56-57, 62, 65, 69-71, 
74, 80, 82-83, 90, 101, 132-133, 135, 159, 174, 
184, 186, 190, 200-201, 207, 216, 236, 245, 
247-248, 253-254, 261, 263-264
Comte de Paris see Orléans, Henri d’
conservatism 48, 51, 83-84, 97, 100, 130, 175, 

















Dard, Olivier 32, 40, 66, 80-81, 93n, 102n, 138, 
144-145, 201
Darlan, François 129, 142, 145, 191
Daye, Pierre 143
Déat, Marcel 20, 32-33, 38, 51, 72-73, 77, 82-84n, 
112n, 131, 136, 142-143, 145, 148, 154, 159, 239
decadence 20, 28, 32, 55, 61, 66n, 106, 108, 
132-133, 135, 144, 146, 218, 262
decolonisation 199, 205, 210, 217-218, 220, 264
Degrelle, Léon 63-64, 143, 176-177, 180
Desgranges, Jean-Marie 199-200




Didier, couple (Lucienne and Édouard) 148
Dobry, Michel 21, 27-28, 34
Domenach, Jean-Marie 144
Dorgères, Henri 23
Doriot, Jacques 20, 26-27, 32-34, 37, 62, 64-66, 
82-90, 92-93n, 108, 131, 137, 142-143, 145, 160, 
199, 261
Doumergue, Gaston 25, 75, 77, 96
Dreyfus, Alfred 200
Drieu la Rochelle, Pierre 16, 52, 54-55n, 59, 63, 
66, 77, 85, 88, 90, 93, 98, 123, 127, 132, 135-136, 
139, 152-153, 162-164, 210, 221-222
Duclos, Jacques 203
Du Pouvoir 42, 122, 149, 157, 159, 176-177, 187, 
225-237, 245-247, 249, 257n, 262
Duguit, Léon 231




economic intervention 41, 69-74, 149, 199, 233, 
238, 245, 247
Économie Dirigée, L’ see economic intervention
Écrits de Paris, Les 42, 194-196, 198, 201-202, 
205-206, 209, 213, 235, 246n, 257
Eisner, Kurt 107
Eliade, Mircea 62
elitism 13, 19, 40, 48, 109, 238, 252, 262, 264
Émancipation Nationale, L’ 66, 90, 92
Engdahl, Per 210
Epting, Karl 129-130, 151n-152, 154, 156, 161
Épuration 40, 42, 159, 163-174, 176, 178-183, 186, 






and empire 60-61, 71, 211, 216-218, 262
and fascism see Fascism and Europeanism
and federalism 60, 193, 200, 213-215, 257
identity 52, 62, 69, 98, 123-124, 133-135, 140, 
189, 210, 215, 263
metaphysical ideas 61-62, 67, 69
Paneuropean Movement 55-56, 109, 212
postwar integration of 43, 211-213, 215-216, 
218, 220, 260, 263-264
United States of 37, 47, 51-52, 71, 109, 165, 
212, 260
Europe Nouvelle, L’ 59-60, 69, 83
European Defence Community (EDC) 42, 
215-216, 218
Evola, Julius 210
Fabrègues, Jean de 80, 88, 199, 213
Fabre-Luce, Charlotte [Charlotte de 
Faucingy-Lucinge] 210
Fabre-Luce, Robert 161-162, 169, 180
Fajon, Madeleine 116
fall of France 95-98, 105-107, 152, 184, 248, 261
fascism
and culture 13-16, 18, 36
INDEx 283
and Europeanism 29, 36-38, 101-102, 159, 
211, 122-124, 132-137, 141, 146, 151, 155, 159, 
177, 182, 187, 189-190, 209-213, 260-264
and intellectuals 16, 17, 19-23, 27, 29, 31-41, 66, 
84, 85, 88, 106, 123, 127, 147, 210, 259, 265
and neoliberalism 256-257, 264-265
and republicanism 24, 26, 219-220, 265
def initions 22-23, 27-31, 39, 82-83
in France 13, 17-27, 29-30, 32-36, 82, 100, 
108, 260
left or right 19-23, 32-35, 50, 77-78, 81, 87, 
108, 120-122
neo-fascism 30-31, 36, 38, 176, 190, 193-199, 
202-211, 218-220
transnational fascism 29-31, 107, 122
Faucingy-Lucinge, Charlotte de see Fabre-
Luce, Charlotte
Faure, Edgar 206, 208, 257
Faÿ, Bernard 103, 136, 142-143, 147, 169
Fédération, La 213-215, 257




Fourth Republic 38, 159, 175, 179, 190, 193-194, 
196, 200-201, 205-208, 216, 220, 231
Franco, Francisco 61-62, 96, 122, 176, 194, 254
Frederick William I, king of Prussia 67
Freyburg, Joachim 146





Gaulle, Charles de 18, 38, 42, 95, 141, 144, 160, 
163, 165, 167, 170-171, 173-174, 179, 197, 203, 
205, 212, 216, 219-220, 240, 245, 247, 251, 264
Geiger, Wolfgang 156
Gellhorn, Martha 222-223
generational discourse 46-49, 51, 53, 57, 62, 70, 




geopolitics 126, 216, 218, 264
George V, king of the United Kingdom 45
Germain, Henri 37
Germany
culture 15, 129-130, 149-151, 188
economy 60, 119-120, 134-135, 248
history 118-121, 248, 250
ideas and intellectuals 123-126, 180, 250
Gide, André 57, 82-83n, 132
Gignoux, Claude-Joseph 257
Gillouin, René 175, 194, 208
Giono, Jean 135
Giraud, Henri 160, 191
Gobineau, Arthur de 58, 90, 92, 123-124
Goebbels, Joseph 128, 130, 146, 160, 177
Goering, Hermann 119
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 123-124, 188
Goy, Jean 55
Great Depression 21, 24, 37, 41, 51, 70, 72-74, 261
Gregor, A. James 16
Gressent, Alfred-Georges see Valois, Georges












Hayek, Friedrich 42, 236-237, 239-244, 246-247, 
250, 252-253, 255, 262, 266









Hitler, Adolf 24, 26, 31, 33, 37, 40-41, 54-63, 65, 
67, 74, 86, 96, 100-101, 107, 109, 111-112, 114, 
117-118, 120, 122-126, 130, 140, 142, 145, 151, 160, 
175, 180, 182, 187-189, 196, 200, 206, 212, 216, 
218, 227-228, 233, 248, 250-251, 254, 261, 263
Hobbes, Thomas 221, 227, 244
Holocaust 19, 112-116, 119, 156, 162, 167, 184, 
187-189, 202, 209
human rights 17, 80, 214-215, 219, 231-232, 264
Irvine, William 26-27
Isorni, Jacques 194, 198, 206, 257
Italy 13-15, 17-19, 21, 30-33, 47, 50, 57, 59, 61, 69, 
72, 74-75, 77, 86, 90, 107, 110, 122-123, 127, 157, 
164, 177, 184-185, 202-203, 209-210, 236
Jackson, Julian 101, 113n
Jannings, Emil 151





Jouhandeau, Marcel 135-136, 153, 162, 164
Journal de la France 99-104, 112-115, 131, 133, 
135-137, 139, 143, 145-148, 151-152, 154-155, 159, 
161-162, 167, 169-172, 177, 180-182
Jouvenel, Anne de 222-223
Jouvenel, Henry de 45, 174, 221-222
Jouvenel, Hugues de 223
284 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL AND ALFRED FABRE-LUCE












Kestel, Laurent 26, 34, 40, 66, 90n














Le Grix, François 192, 194
Le Pen, Jean-Marie 30, 194, 209
Le Pen, Marine 30
Le Roy Ladurie, Jacques 192






Leopold III, king of Belgium 175, 191
liberalism 13-15, 17, 20, 33, 36-42, 48, 56, 69-70, 
73, 75, 79-80, 106-107, 109, 135, 140, 168, 204, 







Loubet del Bayle, Jean-Louis 20, 31, 80
Louis XVI, king of France 226
Loustau, Robert 88
Lucchini, Pierre Dominique see Dominique, 
Pierre













Malaparte, Curzio [Kurt Erich Suckert] 14
Malliavin, René 194-195, 200, 202, 204-205, 208
Malraux, André 57, 132, 157, 226n
Mammone, Andrea 31






Marcel, Gabriel 170, 192, 246




Martin du Gard, Maurice 154, 194
Marx, Karl 20, 92
marxism 14, 22, 36, 72, 82, 86, 120-122, 179, 193, 
205, 238, 244, 263
Massis, Henri 194
Mateotti, Giacomo 14
Maulnier, Thierry 20, 80, 213
Mauriac, François 164-165, 171-172
Maurras, Charles 22, 26, 50, 101n, 106, 123, 131, 
165, 191-192, 211, 219
Maxence, Jean-Pierre 80, 147, 167
Mazower, Mark 263
Mendès-France, Pierre 47, 205-206, 218
Mercier, Ernest 239
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 195
Metternich, Klemens Wenzel von 246
Mill, John Stuart 231
Milza, Pierre 23, 28, 50, 209, 263




monarchism see Orléans, Henri d’
Mont Pèlerin Society 42, 241-243, 245-246, 259, 
262, 266
Montanelli, Indro 202
Montesquieu [Charles-Louis de Secondat] 137, 
230









Mosse, George L. 15, 20
INDEx 285
Moulin de Labarthète, Henry du 175-177
Mounier, Emmanuel 20, 80, 213
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 151
Muhammad 62
Mussolini, Benito 14, 19, 26, 50, 58-59, 61, 67, 
107, 122-124, 185-186, 261
national socialism see nazism
nationalism 17, 19, 30, 32-33, 36-37, 46, 49-50, 





and France 54-59, 117, 124, 127-131, 195, 196
heritage of 186-188, 202, 210-212
interpretations of 15, 56-58, 74, 100, 106-107, 
117-124, 188-189, 209, 228, 237, 248-251, 
261, 263
Nuremberg Rallies 55n, 59, 117-118
rise of 54, 56-57, 216
neofascism see fascism
neoliberalism 13, 40-43, 214, 225, 238-244, 248-
249, 252-253, 256-257, 259-260, 262, 264, 266
Nicholas II, tsar of Russia 226
Nietzsche, Friedrich 67, 123-124
Nizan, Paul 123
Nolte, Ernst 18-20, 30, 40, 188
Nouvelle Revue Française (NRF) 132-133, 135, 
137, 139, 143, 165
Oberg, Carl 156
On Power see Du Pouvoir
Orléans, Henri d’ [Comte de Paris] 191-193, 
213, 262
Orlow, Dietrich 29, 102
pacif ism 13, 17, 33, 49, 54, 57-60, 64-66, 79, 84, 
99, 112, 127, 136, 209, 254, 260
Pange, Jean de 103
Pareto, Vilfredo 238
Parti Populaire Français (PPF) 26-27, 34, 37, 60, 
62, 64-67, 85-90, 93, 127, 131, 142, 147, 165, 169, 
180, 199, 213, 222, 238-239, 261
Parti Radical 21, 24, 37, 45, 49, 57, 77, 83-84, 
98, 207
Parti Social Français (PSF) 24-27, 87, 213
Pascal, Blaise 124
Passmore, Kevin 26, 29
Paulhan, Jean 132, 162, 164-165, 202




Pétain, Philippe 35, 42, 95-100, 122, 129-131, 138, 
142, 145, 148, 159, 163, 166, 172-176, 179-180, 
183, 191, 194, 197-200, 202-203, 207, 209, 212, 
219, 241, 247, 262
Pétainism 30, 102, 136, 175, 184, 192-194, 197-199, 
205-207, 209, 211, 213, 257, 264
Philippe, André 51
Pichot, Henri 55
Pierre Dominique [Pierre Dominique Luc-






Polanyi, Michael 239, 242, 259
Popelin, Claude 85, 90
Popper, Karl 242
Popular Front 22-25, 27, 33-34, 37, 60, 63, 84-86, 




Poulet, Robert 90, 201, 204
Prat, Marcelle see Jouvenel, Marcelle de
Prévost, Jean 77
Priester, Karl-Heinz 210





racism 58, 61, 90-92, 110-111, 116-118, 123-126, 156, 




Rebatet, Lucien 103, 160-162, 204, 209
Regnery, Henry 245
Rémond, René 17-21, 26, 104
Renan, Ernest 124
Resistance 18, 34, 38-39, 42-43, 51, 126, 132, 
141-142, 144, 153-155, 157, 160, 164, 166-167, 
172-173, 178, 187-188, 191, 195-197, 200-201, 213, 
219, 240, 253, 262
Résistancialisme 195-196, 200, 207, 212
Reynaud, Paul 95-96, 98







Roche, Émile 47, 128, 194




Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 41, 73-74, 101, 188, 233
Röpke, Eva 250
Röpke, Wilhelm 42, 214, 236, 239-242, 244, 246, 
248-257, 262-264
Rosenberg, Alfred 123, 146




Rougemont, Denis de 20, 80, 213
Rougier, Louis 176-177, 238-242, 248, 257
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 176, 229
Rousso, Henri 18
Rueff, Jacques 239, 243, 247, 257
Rüstow, Alexander 239-240, 242, 248, 252
Saint Paul 113

















Sieburg, Friedrich 130, 148, 152-153
Siegfried, André 170-171, 242-243
Sobernheim, Rudolf 54
social Darwinism 124, 228, 247, 264
socialism 14, 20, 24, 32-33, 37, 40, 48, 51, 57, 
61, 63, 69, 72, 74, 78, 86-87, 90, 120-122, 124, 
174-175, 179, 193, 212, 237, 239, 244-248, 253, 
255, 261
Sohlberg Circle 53-55, 266
Sorel, Georges 19, 50, 121, 124
Soucy, Robert 22, 26-27, 29
Soviet Union 61, 69-70, 73, 82, 137, 141, 159, 180, 
186, 188, 199, 203, 211-212, 215, 217, 220, 245, 
254, 261, 263-264
Spaak, Paul-Henri 64
Spain 33, 61-63, 96, 111, 122-123, 176, 194, 248, 254
Spengler, Oswald 123, 234-235, 237, 252, 262
Stalin, Joseph 86-87, 200, 203, 206, 226
Stavisky, Alexandre 24, 75-76
Stefanik, Milan 45
Sternhell, Zeev 16, 19-23, 27-28, 31-32, 50, 80, 







Suckert, Kurt Erich see Malaparte, Curzio
Sukarno 217
Sulzbach, Walter 255
Switzerland 38, 42, 136, 157, 159, 162, 166-168, 
174-179, 184, 188, 192, 197-198, 212, 221-222, 
226, 236, 238, 240, 246, 248, 262
Taine, Hippolyte 67, 237
technocracy 13, 48-51, 60, 71-73, 81, 97, 212, 263
Thatcher, Margaret 259
Thérive, André 90, 176, 202
Thibon, Gustave 192
Thiers, Adolphe 57
Third Republic 32, 37, 64, 97-98, 105-106, 109, 
139, 144, 185-186, 191, 199-200, 229, 262
Thorez, Maurice 86, 197, 203, 245
Tito, Josip Broz 86, 245




United Kingdom 38, 46, 60, 64-65, 83, 95, 97, 
109-111, 121, 124, 127, 134, 141-142, 192, 198, 
209, 212, 217-218, 231, 237, 241, 243, 251, 264
United States of America 29, 37, 52, 55-56, 69-70, 
72-75, 101, 109, 111, 119, 132-133, 143, 147-149, 167, 
175, 180, 185, 191, 200, 210, 214-217, 222-223, 233, 
236-237, 240-241, 245-246, 248, 260, 262, 264
Valéry, Paul 123, 132, 165
Vallat, Xavier 194




Vibraye, Régis de 66, 136
Vichy regime 17, 19, 30-32, 37, 40n-41, 43, 
96-101, 105, 111-114, 123, 126, 128-131, 136-137, 
139, 142-143, 148, 155, 159-160, 162-163, 166, 
176, 178, 180, 190-192, 194, 196-202, 207, 219, 
241-242, 248, 261-262
Vinen, Richard 194n, 207, 219










Winock, Michel 21, 23, 28
Wohl, Robert 23, 35
youth 47-49, 51, 53-55, 63, 71-72, 77-78, 81-82, 
106-108, 116, 133, 143, 152, 165, 192-193, 225, 
228, 235, 261, 266
Zeitschel, Karl Theo 150
 NIOD Studies on War, 
Holocaust, and Genocide
Bas von Benda-Beckmann: German Historians and the Bombing of 
German Cities. The Contested Air War
2015, ISBN 9789089647818
Stefan-Ludwig Hofffmann, Sandrine Kott, Peter Romijn and Olivier 
Wieviorka (eds): Seeking Peace in the Wake of War. Europe, 1943-1947
2015, ISBN 9789089643780
Uğur Ümit Üngör (ed.): Genocide. New Perspectives on its Causes, Courses, 
and Consequences
2016, ISBN 9789089645241
Remco Ensel and Evelien Gans (eds): The Holocaust, Israel and ‘the Jew’. 
Histories of Antisemitism in Postwar Dutch Society
2017, ISBN 9789089648488 (hardback) and 9789462986084 (paperback)

